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Abstract 
 
This thesis has two main objectives: (1) to provide a critical political economy study 
of local-global interlinkages and structural problems of the current agri-food system, 
using a case study of Thailand; and (2) to explore the possibilities that the current 
agri-food system can be transformed towards more socially and ecologically 
sustainable paths. With these two objectives in mind, the thesis asks the central 
research question: "How have hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces shaped the 
agri-food system in Thailand (1990 to 2014)?" The thesis uses a combined neo-
Marxist and Gramscian theoretical framework, as well as English and Thai primary 
and secondary sources. Overall, 87 interviews from 7 provinces in the North, 
Central, South and Northeastern regions of Thailand are used in this thesis. 
 The thesis argues four main points: (1) that the mainstream agri-food system 
in Thailand has been shaped to aid capital accumulation by domestic and 
transnational hegemonic forces, and is sustained through hegemonic agri-food 
production-distribution, governance structures and ideational order; (2) that the Thai 
sustainable agriculture and land reform movements' counter-hegemonic ideas, 
production-distribution practices, and governance structures have managed to 
influence the agri-food system in Thailand and offer alternatives to certain extents; 
(3) that hegemonic forces have many measures to co-opt dissent, alternative and 
reformist forces into hegemonic structures; and (4) that counter-hegemony should be 
seen as an un-linear ongoing process over a long period of time, where 
predominantly counter-hegemonic forces may at times retain some hegemonic 
elements. The threat of co-optation suggests that counter-hegemonic forces need to 
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continually refine and develop clear ideas and practices in order to guard against co-
optation. 
 The thesis makes six main original contributions to knowledge. First, it 
brings new empirical information from the Thai case study into existing literatures 
on the corporate agri-food system and agrarian political economy. Second, the thesis 
brings new empirical information from Thailand into existing literatures on 
alternative agri-food and agrarian movements. Third, the research extends neo-
Marxist and Gramscian theoretical perspectives in the study of the agri-food system. 
Fourth, the dissertation provides new perspectives as well as recent data on Thai 
agrarian development and social movements. Fifth, the work provides new 
perspectives as well as recent data on practices and discourses of Thai localism. 
Sixth and finally, the thesis provides a new perspective on polarised politics in 
Thailand. 
 Empirical exploration of the agri-food system in Thailand supports the thesis' 
argument that transformative change in the agri-food system can appropriately be 
seen as an un-linear process over a long period of time, which challenges agri-food 
studies from the Marxist tradition which tend to focus on "crisis and change". 
Through the combined neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical approach, the thesis 
suggests the importance of counter-hegemonic struggles at ideational and material 
levels, and that social movements do not necessarily have to resemble stereotypical 
images of politicised, structured, and leftist national movements. Moreover, by 
providing new perspectives on Thai localism and polarised politics in Thailand, 
particularly how cross-class alliances can further or frustrate counter-hegemonic 
movements, this thesis points to the importance of analysing social movements in 
relation to established political authority. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
This opening chapter provides an overview of the thesis. It starts by describing the 
substantive problems in Thai and global agriculture that prompted the research. 
Subsequent sections of the chapter lay out the thesis’ central research question, 
contributions to knowledge, theory and methodology, main arguments, and chapter 
outline. In short, the introductory chapter summarises the analysis that is elaborated 
in detail in the rest of the thesis. 
Part 1: Impetus to research 
This thesis originated from the author's interests in rural poverty and income 
inequality in Thailand. Further research and analysis of structural problems of Thai 
agriculture and rural poverty have led the author to academic studies on the global 
agri-food system, which inspired the topic of this thesis. In this thesis, an "agri-food 
system" is defined as being comprised of the set of activities and relationships that 
interact to determine what and how much, by what method and for whom food is 
produced, processed, distributed and consumed. 1 The thesis uses an international 
political economy approach to understand the agri-food system in Thailand as part of 
a globalised agri-food system. Core to this system is an interplay between forces that 
try to sustain the status quo and forces that seek alternatives to the current agri-food 
system. The thesis contributes to existing literature that focuses on Thailand 
(specifically on Thai rural development, agriculture and food, politics, poverty and 
                                                          
1 Ben Fine, The Political Economy of Diet, Health and Food Policy (London: Routledge, 1998), 
quoted in Michel Pimbert et al., “Global Restructuring , Agri-Food Systems and Livelihoods”. IIED 
Gatekeeper series no. 100, 2001, 4. 
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inequality), as well as existing literature on the mainstream global agri-food system. 
The mainstream agri-food system is sometimes referred to in this thesis as the 
corporate or neo-liberal capitalist agri-food system to emphasise that, under this 
system, the main organising principle is the market2 and that it is inseparable from 
the capitalist system. The following paragraphs explain why a study of agriculture 
and food is relevant in the present-day context, and briefly suggest the importance of 
a critical international political economy approach. 
 In Thailand, it is difficult to escape news reports, discussions and first-hand 
observations of problems facing small-scale farmers, unresolved rural poverty, rural-
urban migration and, in recent years, political discourses engineered to exploit 
material and ideological differences between rural/marginalised classes of society 
and middle/higher classes in urban areas. Even though the agricultural sector 
accounted for only 11.46 percent of Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2009,3 around 44.4 percent of the total workforce was in the agricultural sector in 
2010.4 Hence, a large share of the population still depends on the agricultural sector 
(to varying extents) despite its small share in the country's GDP. The agricultural 
sector, however, is plagued with problems. Chapter 3 discusses problems of the agri-
food system in Thailand in detail, but to cite a brief example here, statistics show 
                                                          
2 Philip McMichael, “A Food Regime Analysis of the ‘World Food Crisis’,” Agriculture and Human 
Values 26, no. 4 (July 31, 2009), 285. 
3 Office of Agricultural Economics (Thailand), Basic information on the agricultural sector 2010 
(Bangkok: Office of Agricultural Economics, 2010), 1-2. Industry and service accounted for around 
45 percent of GDP each. 
4 Office of Agricultural Economics (Thailand), Agricultural Economics Indicators 2010 (Bangkok: 
Office of Agricultural Economics, 2010), 4. 
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that in 2009 around 6 million farmers were in debt to a total extent of 1 billion baht, 
and 30 percent of these loans were non-performing.5  
 Globally, also, agriculture and food remain important to marginalised people. 
Around 2.6 billion out of 7 billion people on Earth, or around 37 percent, rely on 
agriculture for their livelihood,6 while 842 million people were unable to meet their 
dietary energy requirements between 2011 and 2013.7 Of these 842 million, 827 
million lived in developing regions.8 Moreover, at least 70 percent of the world's 1.4 
billion poor people reside in rural areas.9 These statistics suggest the marginalised 
world population's dependency on agriculture and rural economies, as well as their 
vulnerabilities to food insecurity. Addressing problems of the global agri-food 
system is likely to have significant positive impact on their lives. Therefore, this 
thesis' contributions to the study of the dynamics and structural problems of the agri-
food system, through a case study of Thailand, are very much relevant in the present-
day context. 
 In recent years, there have been renewed interests in agricultural investments, 
as well as growing concerns over food security, following the hikes in world food 
prices of 2007 and 2008. Both in Thailand and globally, mainstream discourses often 
use concerns over food security to call for increased investments in the agricultural 
sector to improve economic efficiency and productivity, such as to reduce labour in 
                                                          
5 Interview with Dr. Sansit Piriyarangsan, at the time head of the Farmers’ Reconstruction and 
Development Fund, in “The Economics Team’s Editorial,” Thairath Newspaper, June 15, 2009. (in 
Thai) 
6 H.R. Herren et al., UNEP Green Economy Report: Agriculture (Geneva: UNEP, 2001), 36. Statistics 
on world population are based on UN estimate in October 2011. 
7 FAO, IFAD, and WFP, The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2013. The Multiple Dimensions of 
Food Security (Rome, 2013), 8. 
8 Ibid, 8. 
9 Poor people are classified as those who live on less than US$1.25 a day. IFAD, Rural Poverty 
Report 2011. New Realities, New Challenges: New Opportunities for Tomorrow’s Generation (Rome, 
2011), 16. 
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the agricultural sector through large-scale mechanised farming and with the help of 
biotechnology.10 Global population growth and rising income levels in developing 
countries are also often cited in mainstream sources as main causes for global food 
security concerns. 11  Portraying food security as mainly a supply-demand issue, 
however, is only part of the story as statistics have shown that over the last two 
decades, food supplies have grown faster than the population in developing 
countries, resulting in rising food availability per person.12 Food supply availability, 
however, does not necessarily translate into better food access and 
utilisation. 13 Mainstream focuses on high technologies of large corporations as 
solutions to global food security can also hide structural social, political, economic 
and ecological problems associated with the current agri-food system, which will be 
made salient through this thesis' critical international political economy approach.  
 In Thailand and in many other countries around the world, there are concerns 
over ecological unsustainability, social injustice and political-economic inequality 
associated with the current mainstream corporate agri-food system. For example, 
there are concerns over climate change and its effects on food security, negative 
environmental and health consequences of industrial agricultural production and 
trade, as well as monopoly control over agricultural inputs and trade channels. Many 
are also wary of financial speculations on agri-food commodities by non-commodity 
traders, the growth of agro-fuels production and its negative impact on food security, 
                                                          
10 For example, see Global Harvest Initiative, Accelerating Productivity Growth: The 21st Century 
Global Agriculture Challenge. A White Paper on Agricultural Policy, 2009, iii and Calestous Juma, 
“Feeding Africa: Why Biotechnology Sceptics Are Wrong to Dismiss GM,” The Guardian, May 27, 
2014.. 
11 For example: FAO, How to Feed the World in 2050 (Rome, 2009), 1; Global Harvest Initiative 
(2009), i-ii; Monsanto, “Why Does Agriculture Need to Be Improved? Growing Populations, 
Growing Challenges,” <http://www.monsanto.com/improvingagriculture/pages/growing-populations-
growing-challenges.aspx>, retrieved 30 June 2015. 
12  FAO, IFAD and WFP (2013), 18. 
13  Ibid, 28. 
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as well as the influence of large transnational agri-businesses and global governance 
bodies on agri-food policies of countries around the world. Mainstream analytical 
frameworks, often based on neo-classical economics, usually do not take into 
account these concerns and lack adequate conceptual tools to discuss and analyse 
structural problems of the agri-food system. This is why the thesis adopts a critical 
international political economy theoretical approach, which allows discussions on 
important issues such as power relations and structural inequalities in the agri-food 
system, that are necessary to help analyse social, political-economic, and ecological 
ills of the current agri-food system. 
Part 2: Central research question  
This thesis has two main objectives: 1) to provide a critical political-economic study 
of the local-global interlinkages and structural problems of the current agri-food 
system, using a case study of Thailand; and 2) to explore the possibilities that the 
current agri-food system can be transformed towards more socially and ecologically 
sustainable paths. 
 With these two objectives in mind, the thesis asks the central research 
question: "How have hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces shaped the agri-
food system in Thailand (1990 to 2014)?" The Gramscian terms "hegemonic" and 
"counter-hegemonic" are explained later in this chapter’s summary of the theoretical 
framework. 
 To answer the central research question, the thesis asks the following sub-
questions: 
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- What are the problems of the current corporate agri-food system? (to be discussed 
in chapters 2 and 3) 
- What hegemonic forces operate in the agri-food system in Thailand? (to be 
discussed in chapter 3) 
- What counter-hegemonic forces try to resist and offer alternatives to the current 
agri-food system? (to be discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6) 
- How do counter-hegemonic forces analyse problems of the agri-food system; and 
how do their analyses shape their strategies and activities? (to be discussed in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6) 
- What and how have factors specific to the Thai context shaped the mainstream 
agri-food system and alternative agri-food movements? (to be discussed in chapters 
3, 4, 5 and 6) 
- How do hegemonic forces respond to critiques of the current agri-food system?  
(to be discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6) 
 One could argue that interconnections between production and consumption 
in the agri-food system make them inseparable. However, the thesis' starting point 
and focus are on the production rather than consumption side of the agri-food 
system. This is due to the limited length of the thesis and because problems 
associated with industrial agricultural production methods, as well as unequal 
distribution of land, are main issues which give rise to the sustainable agriculture and 
land reform movements in Thailand, which will be discussed as counter-hegemonic 
forces in chapters 4 to 6. 
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Part 3: Original contributions to knowledge 
The thesis makes six main empirical and conceptual original contributions to 
knowledge. First, it brings new empirical information from the Thai case study into 
existing literature on the corporate agri-food system and agrarian political economy. 
Second, the thesis brings new empirical information from Thailand into existing 
literature on alternative agri-food and agrarian movements. Third, the thesis extends 
neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical perspectives in the study of the agri-food 
system. Fourth, the thesis provides new perspectives as well as recent data on Thai 
agrarian development and social movements. Fifth, the thesis provides new 
perspectives as well as recent data on practices and discourses of Thai localism. 
Sixth, the thesis provides new perspectives on polarised politics in Thailand. These 
original contributions to knowledge are elaborated in the following paragraphs. 
3.1) Brings new empirical information on the mainstream agri-food system  
A survey of literature on the agri-food system and agrarian political economy finds 
no study which gives a recent and comprehensive political-economic analysis of the 
agri-food system in Thailand. Academic literature surveyed, such as from the 
Journal of Agrarian Change and Journal of Peasant Studies, touch on topics such as 
land grabs, problems of industrial agriculture, agro-fuels, power of transnational 
agri-businesses, financialisation and speculations in the agri-food system. They often 
discuss examples of developing countries using case studies from Africa and Latin 
America, or with specific focuses on Asian countries other than Thailand.14 Chapter 
                                                          
14 Although not an exhaustive list, some of the studies surveyed include: Miguel Altieri and Victor 
Manuel Toledo, “The Agroecological Revolution in Latin America: Rescuing Nature, Ensuring Food 
Sovereignty and Empowering Peasants,” Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 3 (July 2011): 587–612; 
Miguel Teubal, “Peasant Struggles for Land and Agrarian Reform in Latin America,” in Peasants and 
Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question, ed. A. Haroon 
8 
 
2 will use some of these studies to elaborate on problems of the current agri-food 
system. In some studies, examples from Thailand are briefly discussed, while in 
some other studies the focus might be on Thailand, but then only some aspects of the 
agri-food system are discussed, such as boom crops and contract farming.15  
 A comprehensive international political economy study of the agri-food 
system in Thailand, as presented in this thesis, can contribute more extensively to 
existing literature. Thailand is an interesting case study for many reasons, in addition 
to the suggestion that middle-income countries have emerged in recent years as new 
players which influence agri-food governance. 16  Not only is Thailand a major 
exporter of agri-food products, with controversial government policies such as the 
paddy pledging scheme (to be discussed in chapter 4). The country is also 
headquarters of Charoen Pokphand (CP), a large and politically influential Asian 
transnational agri-business. Empirical discussions of land grabs in Thailand in this 
thesis also adds to emerging studies on land grabs in Southeast Asia,17 and can also 
be used to challenge stereotypical images of land grabs as large-scale acquisitions of 
land by foreign capital, such as by suggesting how foreign land grabs can occur 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Akram-Lodhi and Cristobal Kay (New York: Routledge, 2009); Jens Lerche, Alpa Shah, and Barbara 
Harriss-White, “Introduction: Agrarian Questions and Left Politics in India,” Journal of Agrarian 
Change 13, no. 3 (July 16, 2013): 337–350; Bridget O’Laughlin et al., “Introduction: Agrarian 
Change, Rural Poverty and Land Reform in South Africa since 1994,” Journal of Agrarian Change 
13, no. 1 (January 12, 2013): 1–15. 
15 For example: Jasper Goss, David Burch, and Roy E. Rickson, “Agri-Food Restructuring and Third 
World Transnationals: Thailand, the CP Group and the Global Shrimp Industry,” World Development 
28, no. 3 (2000): 513–530; Isabelle Delforge, Contract Farming in Thailand: A View from the Farm. 
A Report for Focus on the Global South (Bangkok: Focus on the Global South, 2007); Ben Belton and 
David Little, “The Development of Aquaculture in Central Thailand: Domestic Demand versus 
Export-Led Production,” Journal of Agrarian Change 8, no. 1 (December 12, 2007): 123–143; 
Jefferson Fox and Jean-Christophe Castella, “Expansion of Rubber (Hevea Brasiliensis) in Mainland 
Southeast Asia: What Are the Prospects for Smallholders?,” Journal of Peasant Studies 40, no. 1 
(January 2013): 155–170. 
16 Saturnino M. Borras, Jennifer C. Franco, and Chunyu Wang, “The Challenge of Global Governance 
of Land Grabbing : Changing International Agricultural Context and Competing Political Views and 
Strategies,” Globalizations 10, no. 1 (2013), 163. 
17 At the time of thesis submission, the author came across many conference papers on land grabs in 
Southeast Asia, which are presented at the "Land Grabbing: Perspectives from East and Southeast 
Asia" conference in Chiang Mai, Thailand, June 2015. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to engage in comparative studies or to suggest a regional perspective on land grabs in Southeast Asia. 
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through nominees. Moreover, there are historical, social, cultural and political-
economic conditions in Thailand which give rise to a unique form of the hegemonic 
mainstream agri-food system. These issues will be explored in greater detail in 
chapter 3. 
3.2) Brings new empirical information on alternative agri-food movements  
Empirical discussions of alternative agri-food and agrarian movements from 
Thailand contribute to existing literature, as a lot of such studies are based on 
movements in Latin America,18 while only a few studies are based on movements in 
Southeast Asia. 19  The thesis' focus on unique historical, social and political-
economic conditions which shape agri-food and agrarian movements in Thailand 
also enriches existing literature. Studies on food sovereignty movements, for 
example, have been criticised for focusing too much on the homogeneity of 
movements in different countries, without paying much attention to differences 
within and between countries.20 There are studies which discuss how transnational 
agrarian social movements generally agree on certain types of common political 
strategies and forms of action. 21 However, it is also important academically and 
politically to understand that there are potential and actual differences within and 
between social movements. When some transnational agrarian social movements 
look to build alliances in other countries, and see no rural associations that are 
                                                          
18 For example: James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, Social Movements in Latin America: 
Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Abdurazack Karriem, 
“The Rise and Transformation of the Brazilian Landless Movement into a Counter-Hegemonic 
Political Actor: A Gramscian Analysis,” Geoforum 40, no. 3 (May 2009): 316–325.  
19 Examples: Kevin Malseed, “Where There Is No Movement: Local Resistance and the Potential for 
Solidarity,” Journal of Agrarian Change 8, no. 2–3 (2008): 489–514; Nancy Lee Peluso, Suraya 
Afiff, and Noer Fauzi Rachman, “Claiming the Grounds for Reform: Agrarian and Environmental 
Movements in Indonesia,” Journal of Agrarian Change 8, no. 2–3 (2008): 377–407. 
20 Saturnino M. Borras and Marc Edelman, “Transnational Agrarian Movements Confronting 
Globalization,” Journal of Agrarian Change (2008), 169-204. 
21 Such studies include, for example, Annette Desmarais, La Vía Campesina: Globalization and the 
Power of Peasants. (London: Pluto, 2007), quoted in Borras and Edelman (2008), 187. 
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similar to them ideologically and politically, they tend to conclude that there are no 
social movements in these societies. For example, Central Asia, the Middle East, 
North Africa, China and Southeast Asia are often characterised as having no clear 
political strategies or having an absence of movements. 22  Such assumptions are 
problematic, as in many countries peasants do engage in "everyday forms of 
resistance" that maybe unorganised, unstructured or covert to defend or advance 
their interests.23  
 As chapter 5 will discuss in greater detail, members of the sustainable 
agriculture movement (SAM) in Thailand are generally inspired by transnational 
ideas and practice such as food sovereignty, organic and community support 
agriculture. However, some of SAM members' ideas and discourses, such as their 
appeals to traditional wisdom and local sufficiency, might cause them to be 
perceived as conservative forces. Chapter 5 will also discuss some critiques of Thai 
localism and argue that, while Thai localism might not be unproblematic, it should 
nevertheless be considered as having counter-hegemonic potential. Such an 
argument resonates with some studies on social movements in other Asian countries, 
which seek to enrich existing literature's perception of what constitutes counter-
hegemonic agri-food movements. For example, Le Mons Walker (2008) argues that 
one should not assume that local struggles by peasants and the rural dispossessed in 
China in the last 20 years will not assume a broader social or political form, and that 
the peasants have actually forged collective identities that can provide a basis for 
                                                          
22 Borras and Edelman (2008), 187; Saturnino M. Borras, Marc Edelman, and Cristóbal Kay, 
“Transnational Agrarian Movements: Origins and Politics, Campaigns and Impact,” in Transnational 
Agrarian Movements Confronting Globalization, ed. Saturnino M. Borras, Marc Edelman, and 
Cristóbal Kay (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 18-19. 
23 For example: James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990); Benedict Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics: How 
Vietnamese Peasants Transformed National Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); 
Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), quoted in Borras and Edelman (2008), 187. 
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conceptualising alternatives to neo-liberal capitalism.24 Another example is Malseed 
(2008) which argues that it is more useful to think of social movements as having a 
multitude of possible structural expressions, ranging from well-organised network 
structures to leaderless and nebulous movements such as Karen-style village 
resistance in Burma. 25  Some scholars have also raised questions regarding 
representation and accountability of transnational social movements, suggesting that 
there is little analysis on the linkages between the local, national and international 
levels of contemporary agrarian movements.26 As a contribution to this discussion, 
chapter 5 will discuss the SAM's transnational collaborations, while chapter 6 will 
discuss the land reform movement (LRM) and its connection with La Vía Campesina 
- the largest transnational peasants movement. 
3.3) Extends neo-Marxist and Gramscian theories on the agri-food system 
Key scholars in the study of the global corporate agri-food system, such as Philip 
McMichael, Farshad Araghi, and Jason W. Moore, have used neo-Marxist 
perspectives and concepts, such as David Harvey's concept of accumulation by 
dispossession, to explain dynamics of the current agri-food system.27 Chapter 2 part 
3 utilises their work to construct a framework to explain problems of the current 
corporate agri-food system. An additional contribution of this thesis is to combine 
and to elaborate more extensively on how Gramscian theoretical perspectives can 
add to existing neo-Marxist understandings of the corporate agri-food system, as 
                                                          
24 Kathy Le Mons Walker, “From Covert to Overt: Everyday Peasant Politics in China and the 
Implications for Transnational Agrarian Movements,” in Transnational Agrarian Movements 
Confronting Globalization (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 310 and 315. 
25 Malseed (2008), 338. 
26 Borras, Edelman and Kay (2008), 11. 
27 For example: McMichael, "A Food Regime Analysis," (2009); Farshad Araghi, “Food Regimes and 
the Production of Value: Some Methodological Issues,” Journal of Peasant Studies 30, no. 2 (2003): 
41–70; Jason W. Moore, “Transcending the Metabolic Rift: A Theory of Crises in the Capitalist 
World- Ecology,” Journal of Peasant Studies 28, no. 1 (2011): 1–46. 
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well as possibilities of change. Neo-Marxist theoretical perspectives help the thesis 
to explain structural forces that sustain the corporate agri-food system, but they do 
not allow much room to discuss the creation of ideas, values and discourses that help 
to sustain the status quo, or to aid alternative agri-food movements. It is true that 
certain authors have discussed hegemonic ideas and co-optations in the corporate 
agri-food system. For instance, McMichael suggests that in the current corporate 
agri-food system, there are hegemonic principles and assumptions which appear as 
implicit natural rules, such as beliefs in efficiency over ecology.28 There are also 
quite a few studies of value creation in alternative food networks.29 However, these 
studies do not discuss interlinkages of ideas, production-distribution practices, and 
governance structures in the agri-food system to the same extent as this thesis. 
 With combined neo-Marxist and Gramscian perspectives, the thesis is better 
able to articulate the symbiosis of ideas and practices in the agri-food system, using 
concepts such as commodification, accumulation by dispossession, appropriation of 
surplus, hegemony, counter-hegemony and co-optation of oppositions. In other 
words, these Gramscian concepts help the thesis to explain how ideas continuously 
shape practices and material structures in the agri-food system in Thailand, and vice 
versa. In addition, a combined neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical framework 
can be used to describe how different forces shape the agri-food system in Thailand 
over time, in contrast to neo-Marxist frameworks, which often focus on crisis and 
change. A summary of the theoretical framework is provided in part 4 of this 
chapter. 
                                                          
28 McMichael, "A Food Regime Analysis," (2009), 292. 
29 For example: David Goodman and E. Melanie DuPuis, “Knowing Food and Growing Food: 
Beyond the Production-Consumption Debate in the Sociology of Agriculture,” Sociologia Ruralis 42, 
no. 1 (January 2002): 5–22; Julie Guthman, “Raising Organic: An Agro-Ecological Assessment of 
Grower Practices in California” (2000): 257–266; Laura T. Raynolds, “Consumer/Producer Links in 
Fair Trade Coffee Networks,” Sociologia Ruralis 42, no. 4 (October 2002). 
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3.4) New perspectives and data on Thai agrarian development and movements 
There are some books on Thailand published in the 1990s which address the 
agricultural/rural sector as part of Thailand's historical economic and political 
development as a whole, and take into account some new forms of social movements 
which were concerned with agriculture and natural resources. 30  There are also 
studies in the 1970s and 1980s which have used political economy frameworks to 
understand problems in the agri-food system, agrarian development and social 
movements of those periods.31 However, these studies are now quite old, and there is 
a need for more up-to-date study that takes into account recent developments in the 
agri-food sector. 
 Aside from bringing in more up-to-date information, this thesis also provides 
a new way of looking at problems and contradictions in the agri-food system in 
Thailand. It further sheds new light on alternative agri-food movements in Thailand. 
A review of literature in recent years suggests that studies on the Thai agricultural 
sector often adopt business and economic approaches. Moreover, a lot of the studies 
are quite Thai-centric in the sense that they do not study the problems of the Thai 
agri-food system as part of a wider global agri-food system or global capitalist 
system. When they do, their analyses are based on mainstream economic 
frameworks which are mostly concerned with price mechanisms, export potentials, 
                                                          
30 For example: Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995);Walden Bello, Shea Cunningham, and Li Kheng Pho,  A Siamese 
Tragedy: Development and Disintegration in Modern Thailand (New York: Zed Books, 1998). 
31 For example: Krirkkiat Phipatseritham, The Social, Economic and Political Change and the 
Concentration of Economic Power by Private Enterprise. (Bangkok: Economics Department, 
Thammasart University, 1979); Witayakorn Chiengkul, The Effects of Capitalist Penetration on the 
Transformation of the Agrarian Structure in the Central Region of Thailand (1960-1980) (Bangkok: 
Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute, 1983); Andrew Turton, Production, Power and 
Participation in Rural Thailand: Experiences of Poor Farmers’ Groups (Geneva, 1987); Kevin 
Hewison, Power and Politics in Thailand: Essays in Political Economy (Manila: Journal of 
Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1989). 
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or are intent on offering specific policy evaluations, such as studies by the Thailand 
Development Research Institute (TDRI). 32  Other studies include, for example, 
Phetprasert (2006), which attempts to evaluate the Thai government's rice storage 
loans, with a brief mention of how the international rice market influences domestic 
prices of rice, and Thaotawil (2003), which evaluates government policies on 
farmers' debt moratorium.33 
 Most studies surveyed in this research tend to focus on documenting very 
specialised problems in the agri-food system, but do not analyse root political-
economic causes of the problems, nor talk about recent attempts at transforming the 
agri-food system towards a more sustainable system. There are some good empirical 
studies, such as Pintoptang et al. (2003), which documents case studies of poverty 
problems facing small-scale farmers. 34  However, these studies do not provide 
comprehensive theoretical explanation of root political-economic causes of rural 
poverty; nor do they address social movements which try to reform the agri-food 
system. There are also a few studies on contract farming in Thailand.35 Publications 
by NGOs are often quite critical of the mainstream agri-food system, and tend to 
provide up-to-date information of recent problems of the agri-food system in 
                                                          
32 Nipon Poapongsakorn, Study of the Supply Chain Management and Logistics of Agricultural 
Products (Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute, 2009). 
33 Narong Phetprasert, “Rice Politics Under State-Capital Monopoly,” in Journal of Political 
Economy (for the Community) (Bangkok: Edison Press, 2006) (in Thai); Pruek Thaotawil, 
“Government Policies and Farmers’ Debts: The Failure of Small-Scale Farmers’ Debt Moratorium,” 
in A Study of the Possibility of Developing a Welfare System for the Poor and Disadvantaged in 
Thailand. (Bangkok: Thailand Research Foundation, 2003). (in Thai) 
34 Prapart Pintoptang, Supha Yaimuang, and Banchorn Kaewsong, The Possibility of Developing the 
Welfare System for the Poor and the Disadvantaged: The Case of Farmers (Bangkok: Political 
Economy Study Center, Economics Faculty, Chulalongkorn University, 2003). (in Thai) 
35 For example: Delforge, "Contract farming in Thailand," (2007); D. Glover and L.T. Ghee, Contract 
Farming in Southeast Asia: Three Country Studies., ed. D. Glover and L.T. Ghee (Kuala Lumpur: 
Institute Pengajian Tinggi/Institute for Advanced Studies, 2008); Pruek Limnirandkul, Bootsara, 
Yipmantasiri, Cho-paka Muangsuk, and Pratanthip Kramol, “Contract Farming and the Opportunity 
of Development of Small Scale Farmers” (Chiang Mai, 2006). 
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Thailand. 36  However, despite their merits, these studies do not provide a 
comprehensive political economy theoretical framework to understand the problems 
of the agri-food system. 
 Adopting a neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical framework to study the 
agri-food system in Thailand does not only provide a new way of understanding the 
topic, but it also has progressive political implications. Instead of identifying 
problems as isolated issues, a neo-Marxist and Gramscian approach enables us to see 
problems of the agri-food system as having roots in interrelated ideational and 
material structures, and that extensive changes are needed across local, national, 
regional and global scales. In addition, by regarding the agri-food system in Thailand 
as part of the global agri-food system, it should become more salient that there are 
factors specific to Thailand as well as factors resulting from a globally interlinked 
agri-food system, that have shaped the current agri-food system in Thailand. This 
supplements some Thai-centric literature which tends to focus on domestic factors. 
3.5) Provides new perspectives and empirical data on Thai localism  
An activist who has written extensively on problems of the agri-food system in 
Thailand summarises quite well that there are two main views in existing studies 
regarding rural development in Thailand. The first group of people, usually 
identified as Thai localists, see community culture and rural sufficiency as desirable 
models to be implemented, while the other group views rural communities and 
small-scale farmers as something to be overcome, or as transitional situations toward 
modernisation, industrialisation and urbanisation. Both views may have limitations. 
                                                          
36 For example, see publications by Biothai Foundation (http://www.biothai.net/) and Green Net 
Cooperative (http://www.greennet.or.th/). 
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On the one hand, localists may underestimate the extent that the modern economy 
has transformed the rural sector. On the other hand, people who hold modernisation 
views may not give enough importance to the agricultural sector and its potential, 
and usually neglect to analyse the power of capital in the current agri-food system.37 
 Another contribution that this thesis makes is to provide new perspectives on 
the seemingly polarised debate between the "localist" camp and the "modernist" 
camp. Thai localism will be discussed in more detail in chapters 4 and 5. Briefly, a 
review of literature suggests that there are scholars who are very critical of Thai 
localist ideas and practices, seeing them as conservative forces.38 Others, however, 
see Thai localism more positively,39 and as an alternative development path to that of 
Western modernisation. 40  This thesis suggests that Thai localism can involve 
counter-hegemonic attempts to create alternative development ideas and practices, 
although some variants of Thai localism might be problematic. Moreover, Thai 
localist ideas are still being improved, and they should not be ruled out as 
fundamentally elitist and conservative ideologies. As chapters 5 and 6 will discuss, 
both the sustainable agriculture and land reform movements' counter-hegemonic 
ideas and practices are partially inspired by localist ideas. 
3.6) Provides new perspectives on polarised politics in Thailand 
Discussions on polarised political conflicts in Thailand, whether in Thailand (in 
newspapers, public forums, etc.) or in academic literature, usually focus on a few 
                                                          
37 Witoon Lienchamroon, “The Role of Agri-Businesses and the Changes in Rural Thailand and Thai 
Society,” updated 25 November 2011, <http://www.biothai.net/node/10889>, 3. (in Thai) 
38 For example: Kevin Hewison, “Localism in Thailand: A Study of Globalisation and Its 
Discontents,” CSGR Working Paper No. 39/99, (September 1999), 22; Duncan McCargo, “Populism 
and Reformism in Contemporary Thailand,” South East Asia Research 9, no. 1 (2001): 89–107. 
39 For example: Phongpaichit (2005), 138; Chatthip Nartsupha, Modernisation and the “Community” 
School of Thought (Bangkok: Sangsan Publishing, 2010). 
40 Chatthip Nartsupha, Modernisation and the “Community” School of Thought (Bangkok: Sangsan 
Publishing, 2010), 166-167 and 174, 177. (in Thai) 
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issues, such as the legitimacy of "street protests" politics versus "electoral and 
parliamentary" politics, the extent of  power of different groups of political elites in 
Thailand (particularly the military and the monarchy), corruption, nationalism, etc.41 
Although polarised politics is not the focus of this thesis, effects of polarised politics 
in Thailand on the agri-food system and social movements will be discussed in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6. Such issues have been neglected in the study of political 
conflicts in Thailand in recent years.  
 This thesis contributes to understandings of polarised politics in Thailand in 
recent years, by pointing out damaging and dividing effects that the polarised 
political situation and discourses have on civil society and alternative agri-food 
movements in Thailand. For example, existing political polarisation reduces 
discussions of agrarian development to having only "two opposing sides" and 
distracts people from social and ecological destruction threats posed by the capitalist 
system and political-economic elites (on both sides of the conflicts), which arguably 
has negative effects on the people's movements and the well-being of the population. 
The thesis also suggests that class-based analysis of polarised politics in Thailand is 
problematic. Chapters 4 to 6 discuss these issues in greater detail. 
Part 4: Theory and methodology 
This thesis adopts a critical international political economy (IPE) approach with a 
combined neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical framework. It also uses a critical 
inductive approach, where starting points of theoretical generalisations are based on 
                                                          
41 This is not an exhaustive list, but see, for example: Kevin Hewison, “A Book, the King and the 
2006 Coup,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (2008); Kasian Tejapira, “Toppling Thaksin,” 
New Left Review 39 (2006); Pasuk Phongpaichit, “Thai Politics beyond the 2006 Coup” no. July 
(2007): 1–4; Alex M. Mutebi, “Explaining the Failure of Thailand’s Anti-Corruption Regime,” 
Development and Change 39, no. 1 (January 2008): 147–171. 
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empirical observations, rather than treating theories and assumptions as facts or 
unambiguous "truth". 42 The decision to adopt a critical global/IPE approach was 
based on preliminary empirical observations that led the author to seek out the most 
convincing explanatory theoretical framework. Prior to the start of the PhD research 
project, the author had observed that mainstream neo-classical economic analyses 
might be inadequate in addressing structural problems of the agri-food system, which 
have political implications. Such observations have led the author to agree with 
foundational principles of critical IPE in the Coxian tradition, particularly the 
rejection of the belief that there is a value-free theory.43 The term "critical" in IPE in 
this context refers to a kind of analysis that sees existing social orders and their 
structural inequalities as products of history, and that the role of critical analysis is 
both to interpret and to help change existing social orders. In other words, to be 
critical means to have "progressive commitment towards emancipation and the belief 
that the present social system can be transformed in order to address its injustices."44 
Preliminary empirical observations of local, national and global linkages in the agri-
food system in Thailand also suggest the appropriateness of the critical IPE 
analytical framework. 
 The combined neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical framework enables the 
thesis to analyse structural problems of the agri-food system in Thailand in ways that 
reflect the complexity of contemporary situations, taking into account the 
interconnections of ideational and material structures. Moreover, the framework 
                                                          
42 Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan, “Empiricism and Objectivity: Reflexive Theory Construct in a 
Complex World,” in Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy: International Political 
Economy as a Global Conversation, ed. Mark Blyth (London: Routledge, 2007), 123–125. 
43 Jason P. Abbott and Owen Worth, “Introduction: The ‘Many Worlds’ of Critical International 
Political Economy,” in Critical Perspectives on International Political Economy, ed. Jason P. Abbott 
and Owen Worth (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2. 
44 Owen Worth, “Reclaiming Critical IPE from the ‘British’ School,” in Critical International 
Political Economy Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, ed. Stuart Shields, Ian Bruff, and Huw 
Macartney (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 118. 
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helps the thesis to explore how the agri-food system might be directed in more 
socially equitable and ecologically sustainable directions through ideational and 
practical initiatives, as well as cross-class alliances, which should constantly try to 
improve and reinvent themselves to guard against co-optation. 
The theoretical framework of this thesis was first drafted after significant 
literature reviews and was subjected to many further revisions during the course of 
the research, based on reflections and engagement with additional empirical data. 
The most significant revision of the theoretical framework occurred in respect of 
counter-hegemonic prospects. Initially, inspired by the 2007/2008 food crisis 
narratives, the prospects of structural counter-hegemonic changes were portrayed in 
the theoretical framework as arising from "crisis" (or crises) brought about by 
structural contradictions of the agri-food system. The revised theoretical framework 
now conceptualises change or transformation in the agri-food system as an un-linear 
continuous process over a long period of time, shaped by hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic forces in the agri-food system. The following section briefly summarises 
the neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical framework adopted in this thesis. 
4.1) Summary of the neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical framework 
As chapter 2 will elaborate, the mainstream neo-classical/neo-liberal economics 
approach is problematic because, with its unsustainable reductionist theoretical 
assumptions and models, it inadequately explains problems of the agri-food system. 
It neglects to discuss structural social-ecological problems and power relations 
within the agri-food and economic system, which in effect conceals structural 
inequalities, ecological unsustainability, and tensions within the current agri-food 
system. Chapter 2 will also discuss how poststructuralist and feminist/gendered 
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perspectives also contributed some insights to the theoretical framework of the 
thesis. Specifically, poststructuralist studies point to the importance of ideas, values, 
knowledge and the power of consumers in the creation of alternative agri-food 
systems. The feminist/gendered perspectives enrich the neo-Marxist framework by 
pointing out the importance of non-commodified work, and that both capitalism and 
patriarchy can be seen as sources of structural oppression. 
 There are two main parts to the neo-Marxist and Gramcian theoretical 
framework of the thesis. In the neo-Marxist part, the thesis draws on the work of 
scholars such as Philip McMichael, Farshad Araghi, David Harvey, and Jason W. 
Moore to conceptualise agriculture and food as integral parts of global capital 
accumulation, where structural problems of the current agri-food system are 
inseparable from the capitalist system. Chapter 2 will discuss in greater detail the 
processes in which capitalism's exploitation of both labour and nature, as well as 
surplus appropriation through market exchanges, are linked to contemporary agri-
food issues such as commodification of natural resources, negative environmental 
effects of industrial agriculture, land grabs, speculations, and monopoly power in the 
agri-food system. In other words, the neo-Marxist part of the theoretical framework 
provides the basis for this thesis' conceptualisation of the mainstream "hegemonic" 
agri-food system. As chapters 4 to 6 will discuss, environmental and social problems 
of the hegemonic capitalist agri-food system spark "counter-hegemonic" ideas and 
practical alternatives that try to challenge, reform and/or transform the mainstream 
agri-food system towards more socio-ecological sustainable paths. 
 The second part of the theoretical framework uses Gramscian concepts of 
"hegemony" and "counter-hegemony" to classify main types of forces which shape 
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the agri-food system. Practices and ideas that sustain the mainstream capitalist agri-
food system are seen as part of hegemony, whereas forces which try to change and 
transform such hegemonic ideas and practices are portrayed as counter-hegemonic 
forces. The thesis also uses a Gramscian concept of "co-optation of oppositions" to 
understand hegemonic forces' attempts to integrate or subsume dissent so that it does 
not become a major threat to the status quo. As the following chapters will discuss, 
in reality distinctions between hegemony, counter-hegemony, and co-optation of 
oppositions are not always clear-cut. Moreover, although the global dimension is an 
important focus, this thesis does not neglect the importance of nation-specific 
counter-hegemonic strategies to influence the agri-food system. 
 Overall, the neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical framework of the thesis 
explains the dynamics of the agri-food system in Thailand, as something which is 
continually being shaped and re-shaped by hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
forces. The Gramscian concept of counter-hegemony is particularly useful in helping 
the thesis to address both ideational and material dimensions of counter-hegemony, 
and to emphasise that struggles to change the status quo are likely to be an un-linear 
process over a long period of time. 
 4.2) Methodology and data collection 
This thesis uses different types of primary and secondary sources in Thai and 
English languages. The following paragraphs discuss different types of secondary 
sources that are used in the thesis, methods of obtaining them, as well as primary 
sources that are used. Special attention is given to explanations of why and how 
semi-structured interviews were used, how case studies and interviewees were 
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chosen, important interview questions, how interviews were conducted and 
processed, as well as ethical considerations during the field research. 
 The thesis draws on a wide range of secondary sources in English and in 
Thai, which are related to the study of the agri-food system and alternative agri-food 
movements: for example, studies on agro-fuels and the food-energy nexus, land 
grabs, the Green Revolution and genetically modified seeds, agri-businesses, agro-
ecology, food sovereignty, food security, fair trade, organic products, local green 
markets, and so on. Literature on Thailand includes, for example, works on agrarian 
development, Thai localism, Thai civil society, rural poverty and inequality, 
agriculture and food chains, contract farming, and polarised politics in Thailand. 
Literature surveyed for the thesis comes from various disciplines across the social 
sciences, including those which adopt politics, sociology and business approaches, as 
well as some scientific studies, such as studies on negative effects of agricultural 
pesticides. 
 Secondary sources were obtained through different channels. Academic 
books, journal articles, dissertations, reports based on academic conferences, as well 
as publications by NGO researchers were obtained from universities in the UK and 
in Thailand, in hard copies and as online downloads. In addition, through attending 
academic conferences in the UK, other parts of Europe, Canada, Japan, and 
Thailand, the author was exposed to varieties of research materials and key scholars. 
In Thailand, the author obtained secondary sources from libraries at Thammasat 
University and at Kasetsart University. Some dissertations and studies were 
downloaded online from the Chiang Mai University library website, as well as from 
Thammasat and Kasetsart University libraries. Publications by academics and NGOs 
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were obtained at book fairs and during visits to their offices, such as at the BioThai 
Foundation in Nonthaburi province. In addition, numerous research reports funded 
by the Thailand Research Fund (TRF) and publications by the Thailand 
Development Research Institute (TDRI) were obtained online. 
 Primary documents used in the research include government publications and 
statistics made available online, such as by the Thai National Statistical Office and 
the Office of Agricultural Economics. Interviews and statements made public by 
people and organisations relevant to the study of the agri-food system in Thailand 
were also often obtained online through Thai newspapers' websites and their 
organisational websites. 
Substantial primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews,45 
as well as materials from conferences and public forums, obtained in Thailand from 
October 2012 to February 2013. During the field research, 97 people from 7 
provinces (in the North, Central, South and Northeastern regions of Thailand) were 
interviewed. However, the final draft of the thesis uses 87 of the interviews. Semi-
structured interviews were mainly used to gather information on the sustainable 
agriculture movement (SAM) and the land reform movement (LRM), which are the 
two case studies of counter-hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand to be 
discussed in chapters 4 to 6, because up-to-date information from secondary sources 
was scarce. Interviewees associated with the movements were farmers, NGO 
activists, academics, civil servants and local leaders. Among 87 interviews, 12 
involved government officials and 5 involved academics (officials were in senior 
positions or from local administrative offices). In addition to the interviewees, 10 
                                                          
45 See the list of interviewees after the bibliography. 
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organic businesses and agri-businesses owners were interviewed through email 
exchanges. In the final draft, the thesis uses 7 of these email exchanges. The author 
tried to interview a larger number of government officials and representatives from 
agri-businesses, such as from Monsanto (Thailand), but it was not always possible to 
get interviews. To supplement the interviews, the thesis uses secondary sources to 
explore the state and the private sector's perspectives. 
 Semi-structured interviews as a method was preferred over quantitative 
surveys and structured interviews, because they allowed for collections of more 
open-minded, comprehensive, and multi-dimensional information, 46  which was 
necessary to understand the SAM and the LRM. On the one hand, qualitative semi-
structured interviews allowed room for the author to understand the interviewees on 
their own terms and to adapt questions (or how each question was worded) 
accordingly, based on new information revealed during interviews. On the other 
hand, some prepared main questions and topics enabled the author to stay focused 
during the interviews. Predetermined structured questions and quantitative surveys 
might uncritically "frame" answers of interviewees according to particular 
theoretical framework and existing literature. A good example was how the author, 
under the influence of past neo-classical economics training, initially tended to focus 
on asking about economic returns and productivity of organic farming compared to 
mainstream industrial farming. Through qualitative interviews, the author came to 
understand the world-views of members of the SAM, who have other ways of 
understanding and explaining advantages of sustainable farming, as well as how 
                                                          
46 Many books discuss the benefits of qualitative methods and semi-structured interviews, such as 
Bruce L. Berg and Howard Lune, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (New Jersey: 
Pearson, 2012). 
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sustainable farming might help to transform the corporate agri-food system and Thai 
society. 
 The SAM and the LRM were selected as case studies of counter-hegemonic 
movements in the agri-food system in Thailand, because they can be seen as the 
most prominent movements/networks which have challenged and influenced some 
important ideas and practices of the current corporate agri-food system for decades. 
Interviews of members of the SAM and the LRM have provided information on their 
critiques of the hegemonic agri-food system, as well as their counter-hegemonic 
ideas, practices and limitations. Having two case studies provided more 
comprehensive insights of counter-hegemony in the agri-food system; while farmers 
in the SAM tend to have their own land or relatively easier access to land, members 
of the LRM tend to be landless or land-scarce farmers and marginalised population, 
so their priorities, goals and strategies are different. 
 The SAM and the LRM have members and supporters in many regions 
throughout Thailand, as well as internationally. In chapters 4 to 6, both secondary 
sources and primary sources will be used in cross-reference analyses of different 
groups in the SAM and the LRM, to give comprehensive overviews of the 
movements. The thesis could not cover major sites in every region due to financial 
and time constraints. However, interviews and site visits were carried out in 
important geographical locations and groups, as the following paragraphs elaborate. 
  For the study of the SAM, interviews and site visits were focused in four 
provinces in three regions of Thailand: Bangkok (the capital city) and metropolitan 
area (Central), Chiang Mai (North), as well as Surin and Yasothorn (Northeast). 
Such an arrangement allowed for key figures and members to be interviewed. Hard-
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to-find documents were also collected during site visits. Chapter 5 will elaborate in 
greater detail varieties of counter-hegemonic ideas and practices of SAM groups. 
The main focus of the interviews and site visits was in Surin and Yasothon provinces 
in the Northeast, where there are many organic rice farming groups and producer rice 
mills which process and sell their own products, both domestically and abroad. 
Around 35 people from these provinces were interviewed, and overall chapter 5 will 
utilise interviews of 55 people. 
 For the study of the LRM, interviews and site visits were focused on 
community land title deed (CLTD) groups in Chiang Mai and Lamphun provinces in 
the North, which is where CLTD ideas originated. Chapter 6 will provide more detail 
of these communities. Another site visit was at Klongyong co-operative in 
Nakhonpratom province, which had been given a formal land deed in the form of a 
CLTD. The thesis also discusses CLTD projects in other regions of the country, as 
well as other attempts to challenge hegemonic governance of land, in order to give a 
comprehensive overview of the LRM. In addition, some interviews of LRM 
members from other regions in Thailand were conducted in Bangkok, when the 
LRM staged a protest at Government House in October 2012. Overall, interviews of 
around 30 to 35 people will be used in chapter 6. 
 The thesis relies on interviews of key figures of the SAM and the LRM, as 
well as heads and/or representatives of private and public organisations, such as the 
BioThai Foundation and the Land Reform Office, because they are persons who 
usually have extensive experiences and are in the positions to influence their 
networks. Based on literature reviews and interviews, subjected to constant additions 
and revisions throughout the field research, the thesis identified various key 
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academics, civil servants, NGOs, farmers’ leaders, and corporate managers in the 
agri-food system in Thailand. Site visits were often facilitated through contacts with 
local NGOs. Access to sites and interviewees were sufficient for the purpose of this 
thesis, but occasionally some interviews had to be conducted by telephone or email 
exchanges. A few people also refused to give interviews. Aside from people at 
leadership levels, members of SAM and LRM groups were also interviewed. 
However, due to the lack of time to familiarise oneself with the locations and to 
establish trust, it was not possible to interview people in visited sites according to, 
for example, differences in gender, age, social and economic classes. In some 
groups, those who were willing to give interviews were often male, and were able to 
communicate well in Central Thai dialect. Interviewing a few people concurrently 
also occurred during site visits, to save interviewees' time and to encourage them to 
participate more in the discussions. 
 The main questions asked during interviews differed from person to person in 
terms of focus and wordings, but essentially interviewees were asked to identify, 
explain and/or give examples of various characteristics of the current mainstream 
agri-food system in Thailand, based on their direct experiences and/or their study of 
the agri-food system. They were also asked to explain their (or their organisation’s) 
responses to perceived problems of the mainstream agri-food system, and obstacles 
that they face. Open-ended and specific essential questions were asked, as well as 
probing questions to encourage interviewees to explain some answers in greater 
detail. 
 The author tried to be sensitive by asking interview questions using words 
that interviewees were accustomed to, and sometimes started interviews by using 
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simple "ice-breaker" questions, or varied the settings of the interviews to be less 
formal, to establish rapport with the interviewees. It took accumulated interview 
experience, time and a lot of on-the-spot observations to be sensitive towards 
different types of interviewees, and to formulate questions using appropriate words. 
For example, when a farmer in the LRM was asked to describe other problems 
facing small-scale farmers in his community aside from access to land, he said that 
there were none. However, follow-up questions revealed that there were prevalent 
cases of chronic agricultural debts in his community. The initial question did not 
help to get satisfactory information, because the farmers did not see debts as a 
"problem", as most farmers he knew had debts.47 Such instances reminded the author 
to ask clearer and more specific questions. Another example is how some farmers 
opened up more when they were interviewed together in groups, or while walking on 
their farms, compared to when they were interviewed alone in more formal settings. 
 During the interviews, the author took voice-recordings and also took notes 
of important points discussed. To process these data into a useful format, the author 
did not use any software and manually arranged important points from each 
interview and important quotations under broad categories, such as that of 
hegemony, counter-hegemony, co-optation, and other factual information. 
Subsequent readings of the notes allowed the author to reflect more carefully about 
how to use these interview information because some issues do not always fall neatly 
into such categories. During the writing stage of the research, the author re-arranged 
important points from the interviews into sub-categories to correspond with sub-
                                                          
47 Mr. Wichai (undisclosed surname), a farmer from Tambol Aynalai, Ampur Wiengsa, Naan 
province, interviewed 1 October 2012 during the LRM's protest in Bangkok. 
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sections in each chapter, such as land issues, monopoly power, and counter-
hegemonic visions. 
 As for ethical considerations, the University of Warwick suggests that PhD 
researchers should obtain signed consent forms from interviewees before interviews 
commence. However, to be sensitive towards Thai social contexts and to 
interviewees from various backgrounds who might be skeptical of signing 
documents, the author did not ask for signed consent forms from interviewees. Still, 
interviews proceeded only after interviewees gave verbal indications that they were 
willing to participate and to be voice-recorded. Moreover, prior to the interviews, the 
author explained the nature of the project, how the data was going to be used, and 
discussed the level of confidentiality that the interviewees were comfortable with. 
Interviewees were encouraged to ask questions about the project, and copies of 
general information about the PhD project were given to some interviewees who 
needed more information. Resources to conduct the field research came from the 
Thai Office of the Higher Education Commission as part of the author's PhD 
scholarship, but the funder in no way interfered with the research design or the 
content of this thesis. 
Part 5: Summary of the main arguments 
In sum, this thesis argues that the agri-food system in Thailand has been shaped by 
domestic and transnational hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces to varying 
extents, and is continually evolving. Counter-hegemonic forces currently have rather 
limited power to influence and direct the agri-food system in Thailand towards more 
socially and ecologically sustainable paths, partly due to hegemonic power's co-
optation of oppositions and other structural limitations. To overcome existing 
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problems and limitations, counter-hegemonic movements in the agri-food system in 
Thailand must continue to refine and develop their counter-hegemonic ideas and 
practices, step-up on national political struggles, broaden their alliances, as well as 
further explore or deepen transnational collaborations. Within this overall line of 
argument there are four main points. 
 First, the thesis argues that the mainstream agri-food system in Thailand has 
been shaped to aid capital accumulation by domestic and transnational hegemonic 
forces, and is sustained through the maintenance of hegemonic agri-food production-
distribution, governance structures and ideational order. Important participants in the 
maintenance of the status quo often include transnational capital and global 
governance bodies, large domestic capital, and the Thai state. Hegemonic neo-liberal 
ideas and practices in the agri-food system in Thailand have also been strengthened 
by some cultural-political ideologies and practices specific to Thai historical-social 
context, namely the "Sakdina" (feudal/hierarchical) mentality and patron-client 
relations. 
 Second, the thesis argues that the SAM's and the LRM's counter-hegemonic 
ideas, production-distribution practices, and governance structures have managed to 
influence the agri-food system in Thailand and offer alternatives to certain extents. 
Both the SAM and the LRM are influenced by local, national, as well as global 
factors. Hence, despite how they mostly operate within local and national 
boundaries, the SAM and the LRM should be seen as part of global counter-
hegemonic forces in the agri-food system. Despite some progress, there are still 
structural problems and limitations which prevent transformational changes of the 
mainstream agri-food system in Thailand. 
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 Third, the thesis argues that hegemonic forces have many measures to co-opt 
dissent, alternative and reformist forces into hegemonic structures. To an extent, 
such measures have weakened alternative movements. The line between counter-
hegemony and co-optation of oppositions is often unclear. Nevertheless, some 
examples of co-optation include attempts by large agri-businesses to green-wash 
themselves by using similar terms as those in the SAM, as well as some conservative 
forms of Thai localism and rural populist policies implemented by the Thai state. 
 Fourth, the thesis argues that counter-hegemony should be seen as an un-
linear ongoing process over a long period of time, where forces that are 
predominantly counter-hegemonic may at times retain some hegemonic elements. 
The threat of co-optation suggests that counter-hegemonic forces should continually 
refine and develop clear ideas and practices to guard against co-optation. In addition, 
to implement structural reforms on wider scales and to bring about significant 
transformations of the mainstream agri-food system, it is unavoidable to organise 
politically to challenge local, national, and global hegemonic governance structures. 
This suggests that counter-hegemonic forces should continue to broaden their 
domestic and transnational alliances, as well as refine their ideological goals and 
analytical framework. 
Part 6: Chapter outline 
This opening chapter has established the contemporary relevance of the thesis 
research topic, as well as the objectives, central research question and sub-questions 
of the thesis. It has also discussed six main original contributions to knowledge of 
the thesis with reference to existing literature; reviewed the theoretical framework, 
methodology and data collection; and summarised the main arguments of the thesis.  
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 Chapter 2 will discuss problems of the current global corporate agri-food 
system and provide a critique of mainstream neo-classical economics theoretical 
framework. It will also outline the alternative neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical 
framework adopted in this thesis, with additional insights from poststructuralist and 
feminist perspectives. Through the neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical 
framework, the current corporate agri-food system is understood as an integral part 
of capitalist accumulation. However, the agri-food system is being shaped and 
reshaped by hegemonic as well as counter-hegemonic forces. Material and ideational 
structures that sustain the corporate agri-food system can be seen as part of the 
hegemonic forces, whereas forces which try to change and transform such 
mainstream ideas and practices are classified as counter-hegemonic forces. 
 Chapter 3 will advance the first main argument of this thesis, which is that 
the mainstream agri-food system in Thailand has been shaped to aid capital 
accumulation processes by domestic and transnational hegemonic forces, and is 
sustained through the maintenance of hegemonic agri-food production-distribution, 
governance structures and ideational order. The first part of the chapter will discuss 
hegemonic agri-food production-distribution in Thailand, which involves issues such 
as unsustainable industrialised production methods, land grabs, financial 
speculations of agri-food commodities, and monopoly power in the agri-food sector. 
The second part of the chapter will discuss hegemonic governance structures which 
facilitate the mainstream agri-food system in Thailand, with emphasis on the roles of 
domestic forces, such as the Thai state, and transnational forces such as global 
governance bodies. The last part of the chapter will discuss hegemonic ideational 
order, which is a combination of transnational hegemonic ideas and domestic 
historical-cultural mentality in Thailand, such as that of patron-client relations, 
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which aid capital accumulation through the mainstream agri-food system in 
Thailand. 
 Chapter 4 will provide a comprehensive overview of counter-hegemony and 
co-optation of oppositions in the agri-food system in Thailand, which serve as a 
foundation for the study of the SAM and the LRM in chapters 5 and 6. In addition to 
providing an overview of the SAM's and the LRM's counter-hegemonic ideas, 
production-distribution practices and governance structures, this chapter will suggest 
that the movements can be understood partly as a lineage of past agrarian 
movements in Thailand, and as part of Thai civil society's search for alternative 
developmental paths. Moreover, this chapter will suggest that polarised political 
conditions and rural populist policies in Thailand hinder counter-hegemonic efforts 
of the SAM and the LRM, as well as opening room for co-optation of oppositions. 
The chapter will also explore the paddy pledging scheme as a case study of co-
optative rural populist policy. 
 Chapter 5 will focus on the SAM in Thailand. It will elaborate on the SAM's 
counter-hegemonic ideas and discourses, production-distribution practices, and 
governance structures. The reason that counter-hegemonic ideas and discourses are 
discussed first (unlike in chapter 3 where hegemonic production-distribution 
practices are discussed first) is because the SAM (and also the LRM) based its 
counter-hegemonic ideas and practices on critiques of the current system. Topics to 
be discussed in chapter 5 include, for example, a summary of the SAM's counter-
hegemonic ideas and discourses, organic agriculture, green market channels, as well 
as sustainable farmer groups and producer rice mills in Surin and Yasothon 
provinces. Counter-hegemonic obstacles, grey areas, and possibilities of co-optation 
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of oppositions will also be explored. This will include discussions of the critiques of 
Thai localism and sustainable agriculture, as well as the roles of the private sector 
and the Thai state in sustainable agriculture. Overall, chapter 5 will help to advance 
the second and third main arguments of the thesis: namely, that although the 
mainstream agri-food system is dominated by hegemonic capitalist interests, 
domestic and transnational counter-hegemonic forces can influence some changes in 
the system, even though they are faced with limitations and co-optation of 
oppositions. This chapter will also support the fourth main argument of the thesis, 
which is that counter-hegemony should be seen as an un-linear process over a long 
period of time. 
 Chapter 6 will examine counter-hegemony and co-optation of oppositions in 
the case of the LRM. Similar to the preceding chapter on the SAM, chapter 6 will 
support the second, third and fourth main arguments of the thesis. It will argue that 
the LRM tries to develop complementary counter-hegemonic ideas, governance 
structures, as well as production-distribution practices, to challenge the primacy of 
private individual rights and to promote de-commodification of land, as well as 
equitable distribution and sustainable usage of land. The concept of the complexity 
of rights, community land title deed (CLTD), and a national campaign to challenge 
existing legal and policy governance of land will be discussed. In addition, this 
chapter will explore obstacles facing the LRM and possibilities of co-optation given 
the global context and contemporary Thai politics. The discussions will cover, for 
example, violence and legal persecutions facing the LRM, how political polarisation 
may weaken the LRM, and obstacles facing the LRM in its engagement with 
counter-hegemonic struggles at the global level. 
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 Chapter 7 will restate the central research question and reflect on the main 
arguments advanced in previous chapters. It will also provide a summary of 
contributions to knowledge, assess the implications of the research finding for 
knowledge and practice, reflect on the research experience, and outline areas for 
future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Dynamics of the Global Capitalist Agri-Food System 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 has discussed that there is a need to address problems of the current agri-
food system, and that this thesis attempts to contribute by asking the central research 
question "how have hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces shaped the agri-food 
system in Thailand (1990 to 2014)?" As a first step in elaborating an answer to this 
central research question, this chapter evaluates different theoretical approaches to 
construct what it deems to be the most convincing and appropriate analytical 
framework in respect of the agri-food system in Thailand. The chapter does so by 
first discussing the inadequacy of mainstream neo-classical economics approach. It 
then provides alternative conceptual framework, based mainly on neo-Marxist and 
Gramscian perspectives, to help analyse the agri-food system in Thailand. 
 To understand the forces that shape the agri-food system, as well as 
possibilities of changes in favour of ecological and social sustainability, this chapter 
discusses how the thesis can draw on neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical 
perspectives, with supplementary insights from feminist and poststructuralist 
perspectives. In this chapter and throughout the thesis, the current mainstream agri-
food system is understood as an integral part of capitalist accumulation, supported by 
mainstream neo-classical economics and neo-liberal ideology. In answering the 
central research question, concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony are used to 
classify the main forces which shape the agri-food system. Production-distribution 
practices, governance structures and ideas that sustain the mainstream agri-food 
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system can be seen as part of hegemonic forces, whereas counter-hegemonic forces 
are those which try to change, reform and transform the hegemonic agri-food system 
toward more social and ecological sustainable paths. Overall, the theoretical 
framework of the thesis tries to explain the dynamics of the agri-food system as 
something which is continually being shaped and re-shaped by hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic forces. The chapter also uses a Gramscian concept of co-optation 
of oppositions to explore hegemonic forces' attempts to integrate or subsume dissent 
so that it does not become a major threat to the status quo. 
 The first part of this chapter briefly discusses problems of the capitalist agri-
food system, with some references to circumstances in Thailand. Part 2 then shows 
how the problems are intertwined with neo-classical economics and neo-liberal 
ideologies, which makes neo-classical theoretical framework unsuitable for this 
thesis. An alternative neo-Marxist framework, discusses in part 3, enables one to 
understand the agri-food system as part of capital accumulation, riddled with 
structural political-economic and ecological problems. Part 4 then discusses 
Gramscian concepts of hegemony, counter-hegemony, and co-optation of 
oppositions in the agri-food system, while part 5 discusses supplementary insights 
from poststructuralist and feminist perspectives. 
Part 1: Problems of the mainstream capitalist agri-food system 
A wide range of studies suggest that the current mainstream capitalist agri-food 
system has some serious structural ecological and political-economic problems. This 
part of the chapter briefly discusses how the industrial agricultural production 
methods are ecologically unsustainable and work against small-scale farmers. So-
called "free trade" rules benefit countries unequally, while mono-cropping and cash-
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cropping for export create dependency and increase food insecurity in some 
countries. In addition, the supposed "free market" conceals the power of monopolies 
in agri-food chains. Growing interests in agro-fuels, large-scale acquisitions of land 
in developing countries or "land grabs", and financial speculations in agricultural 
commodity markets in recent years, are also important problems of the mainstream 
agri-food system. 
1.1) Production 
The Green Revolution, promoted around the world by institutions such as 
Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, the US and other Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) governments since the Second World War, 
helped transfer techniques such as plant breeding and the dissemination of High 
Yielding Variety seeds (HYVs) throughout the world.1 The yield of HYVs depends 
on complementary capital-intensive soil management practices (fertilisers, agri-
chemicals, irrigation), which often do not benefit small-scale farmers in marginal 
resource-scarce land.2 The associated biological simplification and standardisation of 
mono-cropping and intellectual property seeds are connected to the loss of 
indigenous species and biodiversity that increase genetic vulnerability, local 
biological knowledge in farming, and vulnerability to the spread of pests, weeds, 
fungi and disease.3 As resistance to agri-chemicals/pesticides develops, it is likely to 
                                                          
1 David Goodman and Michael Redclift, “Internationalization and the Third World Food Crisis,” in 
Refashioning Nature: Food, Ecology and Culture (London: Routledge, 1991), 151-152. 
2 For example: Vandana Shiva, The Violence of the Green Revolution. Third World Agriculture, 
Ecology and Politics (London: Zed Books, 1991), 45; Clara Ines Nicholls and Miguel A. Altieri, 
“Conventional Agricultural Development Models and the Persistence of the Pesticide Treadmill in 
Laitn America,” International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 4, no. 2 (1997), 
94. 
3 Tony Weis, “The Accelerating Biophysical Contradictions of Industrial Capitalist Agriculture,” 
Journal of Agrarian Change 10, no. 3 (2010), 320; Shiva (1991), 89 and 93-95. 
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lead to increased economic costs in farming.4 Chapter 3 will discuss in greater detail 
the Green Revolution experience in Thailand. There is evidence, for example, of 
environmental degradations, as well as linkages between industrial agri-food 
production and rising debts of farmers.5 
 Repeating the experience of the Green Revolution and HYVs is the attempt 
to promote genetically modified (GM) seeds improvement technology as "magic 
bullets" to drive change and innovation in agriculture by the corporate sector and the 
World Bank,6 even though it is scientifically unproven that GM seeds are higher-
yielding, better adapted to climate change, and are thus the answer to world hunger. 7 
The technology and associated intellectual property rights system can help to 
increase monopoly power of large transnational agri-businesses, 8  in addition to 
possible increased in ecological, social and economic costs. Many scientists have 
given a variety of reasons to suggest that large-scale uses of transgenic crops pose a 
series of environmental risks that threaten the sustainability of agriculture.9 Adding 
with the fact that farmers may have to pay inflated-price for these patent seeds, and 
accompanying pesticide packages, as well as bear the consequences of GM 
contamination and loss of export markets, GM seeds arguably have high economic 
                                                          
4 See Nicholls and Altieri (1997), 97-99, for a case study in Latin America. 
5 A comprehensive study of such problems include Pattama Sittichai and et al., A Complete Report on 
the Project to Compile and Analyse the Problems of Farmers and Sustainable Development 
(Bangkok: National Economics and Social Development Board (NESDB), 2002). (in Thai) 
6 Shelly Feldman and Stephen Biggs, “The Politics of International Assessments: The IAASTD 
Process, Reception and Significance,” Journal of Agrarian Change 12, no. 1 (2012), 146. 
7 For example: D. Gurian-Sherman, Failure to Yield: Evaluating the Performance of Genetically 
Engineered Crops. (Cambridge: Unions of Concerned Scientists, 2009), quoted in Giménez and 
Shattuck (2011), 119; United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Genetically Engineered 
Crops for Pest Management (Washington DC: USDA Economic Research Service, 1999); Dominic 
Glover, “Is Bt Cotton a Pro-Poor Technology? A Review and Critique of the Empirical Record,” 
Journal of Agrarian Change 10, no. 4 (2010), 500-503. 
8 M. Blakeney, “Recent Developments in Intellectual Property and Power in the Private Sector 
Related to Food and Agriculture,” Food Policy 36 (2011): 109–113, quoted in Sage (2013), 72. 
9 Miguel A. Altieri and Peter Rosset, “Ten Reasons Why Biotechnology Will Not Ensure Food 
Security, Protect the Environment and Reduce Poverty in the Developing World,” AgBioForum 2, no. 
3&4 (1999): 155–162. Other studies include, for example, Goldberg (1992),  Paoletti and Pimentel 
(1996), Snow and Moran (1997), and Lutman (1999). 
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and social costs as well. In addition, it has been argued that the present GM seeds 
and chemical intensive technological trajectories may lock out agro-ecological 
innovations. 10  In Thailand, even though the Thai state has not approved of 
commercial-scale plantation of GM crops, news and evidence of GM papaya 
contaminations have already complicated Thai papaya exports to the European 
Union (EU), 11  not to mention that there is continuing lobbying attempts by 
transnational agri-businesses, such as Monsanto, for Thailand to promote GM 
seeds.12 
1.2) International trade  
The neo-liberal agri-food production and trade under the World Trade Organisation's 
(WTO) governance, specifically the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) implemented 
in 1995, established a set of binding obligations on members. These obligations 
include limitation and reduction of tariffs and quotas, domestic subsidies to farmers 
beyond market prices, and export subsidies which allow surplus production to be 
sold on world markets at prices below the costs of production, often referred to as 
"dumping".13 The rules, however, have not been applied to all countries to the same 
extent. The EU and the US continued to give farm subsidies, and many developing 
countries were unable to protect their farm sectors from such food imports that had 
artificially been cheapened via subsidies, while at the same time faced restricted 
                                                          
10 Gaetan Vanloqueren and Philippe V. Baret, “How Agricultural Research Systems Shape a 
Technological Regime That Develops Genetic Engineering but Locks Out Agroecological 
Innovations,” Research Policy 38 (2010): 971–83, quoted in David Wield, Joanna Chataway, and 
Maurice Bolo, “Issues in the Political Economy of Agricultural Biotechnology” 10, no. 3 (2010), 356. 
11 Bangkok Business Newspaper, “EU Warns against GM Papaya,” July 03, 2012. (in Thai) 
12 Bangkok Post (online), “Fresh Struggle Kicks off to Halt GM Crops,” October 24, 2014. 
13 Bill Pritchard, “Trading into Hunger? Trading Out of Hunger? International Food Trade and the 
Debate on Food Security,” in Food Systems Failure: The Global Food Crisis and the Future of 
Agriculture, ed. Christopher Rosin, Paul Stock, and Hugh Campbell (London: Earthscan, 2012), 48-
49. 
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access to foreign markets.14 Neo-liberal structural adjustment policies, imposed by 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), also 
intensified the reduction in farmer support mechanisms.15 
 Based on the belief in comparative advantage and free trade, developing 
countries have been encouraged to specialise and grow high-value cash-crops for 
export. This reduces their domestic food security and, at the same time, increases 
their dependence on imports of artificially cheap subsidised staple food grains such 
as wheat, rice, and maize from advanced capitalist countries. In many developing 
countries, farmland that used to grow food for domestic consumption now grows 
luxuries for higher-income consumers and overseas market.16 This problem of food 
dependence and insecurity is exacerbated in recent years with the growing 
production of agro-fuels and financial speculations, which are discussed in later 
sections. Even though Thailand is food sufficient at the national level, mono-
cropping for export and some free trade agreements have caused a lot of economic 
risks and problems for small-scale farmers, as chapter 3 will discuss. 
1.3) Agri-businesses and monopoly power 
There are studies which suggest that large transnational firms have monopoly power 
to influence agri-food chains in various ways at the expense of smaller-scale 
producers and consumers, through monopoly controls over inputs (such as seeds),17 
                                                          
14 For example, see Geoffrey Lawrence and Philip McMichael, “The Question of Food Security,” 
International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 19, no. 2 (2012), 135. 
15 Raj Patel, Stuffed and Starved. Power and the Hidden Battle for the World Food System (London: 
Portobello Books, 2007), quoted in Lawrence and McMichael (2012), 135. 
16 For example, see: John Madeley, Hungry for Trade. How the Poor Pay for Free Trade. (London: 
Zed Books, 2000), 54-56. 
17 For example: Wield, Chataway, and Bolo (2010), 347; ETC group, “Global Seed Industry 
Concentration,” Communiqué 90 (2005); ETC group, “Concentration in Corporate Power,” 
Communiqué 91 (2005). 
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trade, processing and distribution channels. At the global level, agri-food trade, 
processing and retail are subjected to business concentration and monopoly power.18 
Aside from using their market power, large agri-businesses can also influence the 
agri-food system through lobbying for certain government policies and regulations. 
Neo-liberal policies (such as liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation) have 
enabled large agri-industrial transnational corporations to increase their political and 
market power in many countries, and to promote certain agricultural production 
technologies.19 Neo-liberal policies have also helped to increase monopoly power in 
agri-food processing and trade industries in many countries, which drive up prices at 
consumers' expenses. In Mexico, after the signing of North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), prices of US corn imports fell by 50 percent, but tortilla prices 
in Mexico tripled during the 1990s.20 With two food processors which control over 
97 percent of the industrial corn flour market, as well as reduction of state food 
subsidies and wages, tortilla riots became common. 21 As chapter 3 will discuss, 
transnational Thai and non-Thai agri-businesses play an important role in shaping 
the agri-food system in Thailand. 
1.4) The food-energy complex and agro-fuels 
The ecological unsustainability of the current corporate agri-food system is very 
clear when one look at its dependence on finite fossil fuels, principally oil and 
                                                          
18 See: Lawrence Busch and Carmen Bain, “New! Improved? The Transformation of the Global 
Agrifood System,” Rural Sociology 69, no. 3 (2004): 321–346; ETC group, “Concentration in 
Corporate Power,” (2005). 
19 For example: Miguel Teubal, “Peasant Struggles for Land and Agrarian Reform in Latin America,” 
in Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question, 
ed. A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi and Cristobal Kay (New York: Routledge, 2009),155-157; Zulkuf 
Aydin, “Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture,” Journal of Agrarian Change 10, no. 2 
(2010), 161 and 182-183. 
20 Peter Rosset,  Food Is Different. Why We Must Get the WTO Out of Agriculture (London: Zed 
Books, 2006), 57, quoted in Philip McMichael,“A Food Regime Analysis of the ‘World Food 
Crisis,’” Agriculture and Human Values 26, no. 4 (July 31, 2009), 289. 
21 Patel (2007), 53, quoted in McMichael, "A Food Regime Analysis," (2009), 289. 
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natural gas, which is needed in mechanised production methods, agricultural inputs 
(fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides, which may be derived from petrochemicals), 
and transport of agri-food products. 22  One estimate suggests that industrial 
agriculture requires an average 10 calories of fossil fuels to produce a single calorie 
of food. 23 Because of the food-fuel connection, rising energy costs are likely to 
translate to rising costs of production and food prices, which become burdens to both 
farmers and consumers.  
 Due to the growing fear of "peak oil" or the scarcity of fossil fuel energy in 
recent years, there is increasing diversion of agri-food production resources and agri-
food products from food consumption uses to the production of agro-fuels, which 
might raise food prices and food insecurity. For most forms of first generation agro-
fuels (that are available in the short and medium run), the aggregate fossil energy 
used in the production of agro-fuels is higher than the energy contained in agro-fuel 
outputs, not to mention that agro-fuels output per land area is also low.24 This shows 
that agro-fuels might exacerbate both the energy problems and the ecological-social 
unsustainability of the current agri-food system. The agri-food system in Thailand is 
also reliant on fossil fuels and, as chapter 3 will discuss, it is likely that agri-food 
resources will be increasingly diverted to agro-fuels production. 
 
 
                                                          
22 For example: Philip McMichael, “Banking on Agriculture: A Review of the World Development 
Report 2008,” Africa 9, no. 2 (2009), 242; Sage, “The Interconnected Challenges for Food Security 
from a Food Regimes Perspective: Energy, Climate and Malconsumption,”(2013), 75. 
23 McCluney, “Renewable Energy Limits,” (2005) and Manning, “The Oil We Eat: Following The 
Food Chain Back to Iraq,” (2004) and Pollan, “Farmer in Chief,” (2008), quoted in Weis (2010), 321. 
24 Pimentel and Patzek, “Ethanol Production Using Corn, Switchgrass, and Wood; Biodiesel 
Production Using Soybean and Sunflower,” (2005) , Patzek and Pimentel, “Thermodynamics of 
Energy Production from Biomass,” (2006), quoted in Weis (2010), 325. 
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1.5) Land grabs 
Liberalisation policies have enabled captures of resources by international investors 
in developing countries. In recent years, many have noted unprecedented 
phenomenon of "land grabs", which usually refers to large-scale land acquisitions in 
land-abundant countries, especially following the 2007/2008 hikes in world food 
prices. Both private and public entities participate in land grabs, often with goals of 
securing food and energy for their own purposes, or for distribution in their 
countries.25 Beliefs in the benefits of large-scale farms and comparative advantages 
are often used to justify large-scale corporate land grabs. 26  However, there are 
concerns over negative environmental effects and over how small-scale farmers and 
rural population might be forced off of their land, which will intensify existing 
ecological and social problems of the current agri-food system. The United Nations 
(UN) Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Oliver De Schutter, points out that 
there are opportunity costs involved in large-scale land purchases by investors, as the 
land could have been used in alternative ways for more pro-poor effects and to 
benefit local farming households.27 Land issues in the Thai context will be discussed 
in greater detail in chapters 3 and 6. 
1.6) Financialisation and the agri-food system 
It has been suggested that the conjunction of food, energy and financial problems, 
have prompted international capital markets to engage in speculative ventures in 
                                                          
25 United Nations, Foreign Land Purchases for Agriculture: What Impact on Sustainable 
Development?, 2010; GRAIN, Seized! The 2008 Land Grab for Food and Financial Security 
(Barcelona: GRAIN, 2008); Julia Behrman, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Agnes Quisumbing, “The 
Gender Implications of Large-Scale Land Deals,” Journal of Peasant Studies 39, no. 1 (2012), 51.  
26 P. Collier, “Politics of Hunger: How Illusion and Greed Fan the Food Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, 
(2008), quoted in Ben White et al., “The New Enclosures: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Land 
Deals,” Journal of Peasant Studies 39, no. 3–4 (July 2012), 625. 
27 Olivier De Schutter, “How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-Scale 
Investments in Farmland,” Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 2 (March 2011), 256. 
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land, food and agro-fuels.28 In the past few years, financial institutions have become 
increasingly involved at all points of the agri-food system, investing in farmland, 
input supplies, storage and logistics, inspection and certification, food production 
and processing, commodity trading, retailing and food services.29 This potentially 
allows them to have the capacity to alter the conditions or to re-organise various 
stages of agri-food supply chains. In recent years, non-commercial speculators, such 
as hedge funds, have also entered futures market in large numbers to bet on rising 
prices of food commodities.30 Agricultural commodity speculations partially helped 
to inflate a price bubble that has pushed the costs of basic foodstuffs beyond the 
reach of the poor in many countries between 2007 and 2008. 31  The Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) noted that, by June 2008, a significant portion of the 
price volatility in international food markets was beyond what could be explained by 
the underlying supply and demand. Futures prices for wheat, for example, were 60 
percent beyond what the market fundamentals would dictate in March 2008.32 While 
these financial actors may benefit from the boom, rapidly falling prices after the 
bubble bursts can harshly affect millions of food producers throughout the world.33 
To a certain extent, Thailand is affected by fluctuating international prices of 
agricultural commodities prompted by speculations, as will be discussed in chapter 
3. Moreover, chapter 4 will discuss how the "speculation fever" had also inspired the 
Thai government's paddy pledging scheme, which exacerbates problems of the 
                                                          
28 For example, see Philip McMichael, “The Land Grab and Corporate Food Regime Restructuring,” 
Journal of Peasant Studies 39, no. 3–4 (July 2012), 690. 
29 David Burch and Geoffrey Lawrence, “Towards a Third Food Regime: Behind the 
Transformation,” Agriculture and Human Values 26, no. 4 (July 31, 2009), 271. 
30 For example, see: Jennifer Clapp, “Food Price Volatility and Vulnerability in the Global South: 
Considering the Global Economic Context,” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 6 (September 2009), 
1187. 
31 Peter M. Rosset, “Food Sovereignty and the Contemporary Food Crisis,” Development 51, no. 4 
(2008), 461. 
32 FAO, Food Outlook, (Rome: FAO, June 2008), 55-57, quoted in Clapp (2009), 1186. 
33 Rosset (2008), 461. 
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mainstream agri-food system, as well as hinder sustainable agriculture development 
in Thailand. 
Part 2: A critique of neo-classical economics and neo-liberal ideologies 
The diversity of the problems discussed in part 1, such as land grabs and monopoly 
power in agri-food chains, may give the impressions that these are issues to be 
addressed separately. However, underlying threads linking these problems include 
neo-classical economic policy prescriptions and theoretical perspectives. It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to make original contributions to knowledge by providing a 
comprehensive critique of neo-classical economics, and the thesis recognises that 
other scholars in the fields of Political Economy and Economics have provided much 
more comprehensive and extensive critiques elsewhere.34 This part of the chapter, 
based on some of such critiques and the author's study of neo-classical economics, 
briefly discusses how the social, political-economic and ecological problems of the 
(global and Thai) agri-food system are intertwined with neo-classical economics and 
neo-liberal ideologies. It starts with a discussion on how attempts to address social 
and ecological ills of the current agri-food system, which do not depart from neo-
classical perspectives, are likely to be counter-productive because neo-classical 
perspectives are part of the illness to begin with. This part of the chapter then 
summarises the flaws and inadequacy of some of the main tenets of neo-classical 
                                                          
34 For some examples, see: Frank Stilwell, “The Ideology of the Market: Neoclassical Economics,” in 
Political Economy: The Contest of Economic Ideas, 3rd ed. (Victoria: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
149–210; Dimitris Milonakis, “Neoclassical Economics,” in The Elgar Companion to Marxist 
Economics, ed. Ben Fine, Alfredo Saad-Filho, and Marco Boffo (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), 
246–251; Herman E. Daly and Joshua Farley, Ecological Economics: Principles and Applications 
(Washington DC: Island Press, 2004). For example, from an Economics disciplinary perspective, 
Weeks (2012) provides a critique of neo-classical economics as being taught in universities, rejects 
the automatically adjusting market neoclassical belief, and supports basic reforms to regulate markets 
in the public interests. (John Weeks, The Irreconcilable Inconsistencies of Neoclassical 
Macroeconomics (New York: Routledge, 2012), 207 and 236 
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ideologies as a theoretical approach, to understand how the agri-food system could 
be transformed towards more socially and ecologically sustainable paths. 
 After the 2007/2008 hikes in prices of agri-food products, there has been a 
renewed interest in issues of agriculture and food. Mainstream discourses  on food 
security tend to focus mainly on analysing factors which affect market demand and 
supply, and often support market-based solutions and technological fixes to increase 
productivity. 35  Based on ideologies of economic liberalism and free-market 
fundamentalism, some international finance and development institutions (such as 
the IMF, WTO, World Bank), major transnational agri-food monopolies (such as 
Cargill, Monsanto, Carrefour, Tesco, Wal-Mart), agricultural policies of the G-8 (US 
Farm Bill, EU’s Common Agricultural Policy), and big philanthropy capital (the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation), continue to call for the intensification of neo-liberal 
policies, such as further deregulations of land and labour markets for large-scale 
investments in agro-fuels production and industrial farming. 36  The Gates 
Foundation, for example, advocates increasing agricultural output through corporate-
led technological innovation and the expansion of global markets. 37  Calls for 
investments in agriculture are also often accompanied by arguments in favor of 
genetically modified (GM) crops.38 Such discourses and policy prescriptions over-
                                                          
35 For example, see executive summaries in FAO, How to Feed the World in 2050 (Rome, 2009), 1-3 
and Global Harvest Initiative, Accelerating Productivity Growth: The 21st Century Global 
Agriculture Challenge. A White Paper on Agricultural Policy, 2009, i-iii. Other studies make similar 
arguments include Philip McMichael, “Peasants Make Their Own History, But Not Just as They 
Please...,” Journal of Agrarian Change 8, no. July (2008), 224 and James Kirwan and Damian Maye, 
“Food Security Framings Within the UK and the Integration of Local Food Systems,” Journal of 
Rural Studies 29 (March 2012): 91–100. 
36 For further discussions on this topic, see Eric Holt Giménez and Annie Shattuck, “Food Crises, 
Food Regimes and Food Movements: Rumblings of Reform or Tides of Transformation?,” The 
Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 1 (January 2011), 119. 
37 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, “Agricultural Development Strategy, 2008–2011,” 11 July 
2008, quoted in Holt Gimenez and Shattuck (2011), 116. 
38 For example, see: Mark Lynas, “Mark Lynas Plenary Speech for International Rice Congress 2014, 
Bangkok, Thailand,” October 31, 2014, <http://www.marklynas.org/2014/10/mark-lynas-plenary-
speech-for-international-rice-congress-2014-bangkok-thailand/>, retrieved 30 June 2015; Cargill, 
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simplify the causes of food price spikes and food insecurity, while at the same time 
neglect to address structural social-ecological problems and contradictions discussed 
in part 1. As the following paragraphs elaborate, there are flaws in the neo-classical 
economics framework which, when translate to policy prescriptions, have been 
major causes of the problems of the current agri-food system to begin with. 
Therefore, the views that intensifying  the implementations of such policies will be 
beneficial, and that neo-classical economics is an appropriate framework to analyse 
and solve problems in the agri-food system, are highly problematic. 
 Neo-classical economics and neo-liberal views are embedded in the dominant 
discourses, policies and practices that have shaped the agri-food system in many 
countries throughout the world. There are variations across countries, but main 
characteristics include: commodification, specialisation and industrial methods in the 
production, distribution and consumption of agri-food products; support for large-
scale enterprises and high technologies; trade and investment liberalisation of agri-
food products and natural resources; as well as strict enforcement of private and 
intellectual property rights. Underlying such views and policy prescriptions are neo-
classical economics and neo-liberalism ideologies38F39 with general core beliefs in 
economic efficiency, comparative advantage, free market and free trade (with 
government interventions to aid the market economy), and private property rights, as 
the following paragraphs elaborate. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
“Food Security: The Challenge,” 2014, <http://www.cargill.com>, retrieved 30 June 2015;R. 
Paarlberg, Starved for Science: How Biotechnology Is Being Kept Out of Africa (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), quoted in Holt Gimenez and Shattuck (2011), 114.  
39 Neo-liberalism and neo-classical economics have similar beliefs with regards to the freedom of 
choice, ideal properties of markets, and minimal role of the state. (see further discussion in Stilwell 
(2012), 151 and 207-208) 
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 There are many flaws to such a neo-classical theoretical approach. One 
important flaw is how the emphasis on economic efficiency - a structural imperative 
imposed on firms by competitive environments where firms must combine factors of 
production efficiently so that consumers obtain the product at the lowest possible 
cost40 - is seen as most desirable, even if efficiency does not always translate to 
social and ecological well-being.41 As part 1 briefly suggests, industrial agriculture 
does not take into account environmental and social externalities such as soil erosion 
and salinisation, the loss of biodiversity, and the costs to human physical and mental 
health.42  
 The belief in the benefits of free trade and markets in bringing competition 
and higher welfare, is often used as an argument in favour of liberalisation and 
deregulations. However, such belief conceals empirical reality where there is rarely 
"perfect competition" nor "free" trade as described in neo-classical economic 
textbooks, not to mention that market failures such as negative environmental 
externalities warrant some state interventions in the market. In effect, such rhetoric 
helps maintain existing unequal market and social relations. As part 1 has suggested, 
large transnational agri-businesses can be quite influential in the agri-food systems 
of many countries, and international trade regulations do not enforce free trade 
measures to all countries to equal extents. Moreover, it is doubtful that the promised 
benefits of specialisation in production based on comparative advantage43 can be 
realised in the real world where countries compete to export agricultural 
                                                          
40 Stilwell (2012), 178. 
41 Ecological economic perspectives also criticise the neo-classical view that utility and welfare 
depend solely on people's preferences that are revealed through market transactions, while assuming 
that non-market goods contribute little to welfare (Daly and  Farley (2004), 3-4). 
42 Weis (2010), 316-317. 
43 For an introductory discussion of these concepts, see Economics textbooks such as N. Gregory 
Mankiw, Principles of Macroeconomics, 5th ed. (Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning, 
2009), 54-56. 
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commodities and also, at the same time, face unequal access to other countries' 
markets. As discussed in part 1, developing countries are often advised to grow cash-
crops for exports based on their comparative advantages, while advanced capitalist 
countries subsidise their domestic food grains production and protect their markets. 
Relying on few export crops and imports of other agri-food products to meet 
domestic food demands may be contradictory to the socially desirable goal of food 
security. Given recent developments such as land grabs, agro-fuels production, 
speculations, and the variability of climate due to global warming, there are 
increasing risks of production shortages and food price spikes. Chapter 3 will discuss 
these issues in greater detail using the case study of Thailand. Chapters 4 and 5 will 
then discuss different forms of alternative market governance structures, such as 
Community Support Agriculture and organic labels, which seek to embed market 
exchanges in social and ecological sustainable values in ways that distinguish these 
alternative markets from neo-classical economics' conception of free competitive 
markets which focuses on price competition. 
 Neo-classical economics' assumption that people are rational economic actors 
which act according to self-interests to maximise their utility,44 as well as liberal 
values such as individualism and freedom, are sometimes used to justify certain 
consequences of neo-liberal market economy. They are also used to portray existing 
patterns of production, distribution, and consumption as inevitably the best outcome 
possible. A good example representing such views is the World Bank's development 
report (2008) which hides the consequences of dispossession and impoverishment 
through neo-liberal policies through the use of terms such as "choices" and "free 
                                                          
44 For an introduction to some of these basic concepts, see Mankiw (2009), 3-15 and other Economics 
textbooks. 
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will", as well as through the assertion that rural people rationally adapt their 
livelihood options and strategies to their resource endowments and constraints to 
achieve efficiency. For example, circumstances resulting in landlessness and the 
movement to wage labour, is interpreted as efficient adaptations (or even poverty-
alleviating).45 Such analyses neglect to take into account the importance of historical 
and socio-cultural contexts that shape unequal political-economic power and 
governance structures, which conditioned choices for individuals and different 
groups in society. Taking into account these factors, it is unjustifiable to believe that 
the mainstream market-led agri-food system is inevitable or the most desirable. 
Overall, such analytical frameworks which focus on individuals as the main unit of 
analysis, without considering structural dimensions, should be critically challenged. 
 Similarly, technological advances under the supposedly free market system 
are often seen uncritically as being political-economically neutral and desirable. 
However, commercial technologies are usually funded and promoted because they 
allow opportunities to maximise profits and/or rent from intellectual property rights, 
not because they are the best types of technologies from social and ecological 
perspectives. In the context of the agri-food system, GM seeds improvement 
technology is generally accepted in mainstream discourses, and is being identified 
with the notion of universal progress for humanity,46 even though there is cause to 
believe that it might be a socially and ecologically unsustainable technology, as 
discussed in part 1. From neo-liberal perspectives, private intellectual property rights 
are important as incentives to innovate. However, it can be argued that private 
                                                          
45 Kojo Sebastian Amanor, “Global Food Chains, African Smallholders and World Bank 
Governance,” Journal of Agrarian Change 9, no. 2 (April 2009), 256. 
46 G. Bridge, P. McManus, and T. Marsden, “The Next New Thing? Biotechnology and Its 
Discontents,” Geoforum 34 (2003), 165, quoted in Jacqui Dibden, David Gibbs, and Chris Cocklin, 
“Framing GM Crops as a Food Security Solution,” Journal of Rural Studies 29 (November 2011), 60. 
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intellectual property rights encourage self-interested individualism, as well as 
empower monopolies in the market. In mainstream perspectives, a lot of emphasis is 
put on the benefits of well-defined private property rights and intellectual property 
rights, with no room to analyse other types of rights, such as common or community 
rights, or other alternatives and beliefs, such as in public funding of research and the 
benefits of common knowledge. This narrow-mindedness could be a cost to society. 
One could question, for example, why GM seeds' profitability should be protected 
through intellectual properties rights that yield monopoly rents and fenced off as 
private, while in fact seeds have been developed by farmers for many generations 
without being patented, and can also alternatively be seen as part of the global 
commons. As chapters 4 to 6 will discuss, many people in the sustainable agriculture 
and land reform movements in Thailand criticise such way of thinking, and are also 
inspired by community right ideas and practices. 
 In summary, neo-classical economics theoretical framework offer rather 
narrow, reductionistic and unrealistic accounts of the current agri-food system. Its 
core beliefs, when translated into policy prescriptions, rhetoric and practices, provide 
ideological legitimation and support of the corporate control over the agri-food 
system. Such beliefs sustain problematic agri-food production-consumption practices 
while masking structural political-economic problems of the agri-food system. This 
is why the thesis cannot use neo-classical economics to construct its theoretical 
framework. 
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Part 3: Neo-Marxist critique of the capitalist agri-food system 
As Robert Cox suggests, "theory is always for someone and for some purpose".47 
Parts 1 and 2 have clearly suggested that neo-liberalism is a problematic theoretical 
framework which conceals political-economic and ecological problems of the agri-
food system, and is incompatible with the emancipatory objective of this thesis, 
which is to understand the possibilities of transforming the agri-food system towards 
more ecologically and socially sustainable paths. Every theoretical approach could 
be subjected to critiques and shortcomings, but through a reading of different 
perspectives and evaluation of empirical evidence, the thesis has found neo-Marxist 
and Gramscian perspectives to be most convincing as a framework to understand the 
current agri-food system. While the neo-Marxist part of the theoretical framework 
helps the thesis to explore the dynamics of the capitalist agri-food system by 
bringing to light how capital accumulation tendency underlies seemingly 
unconnected social and ecological problems of the mainstream agri-food system, the 
Gramscian part of the theoretical framework helps the thesis to analyse material as 
well as ideational structures of the agri-food system. Together, the combined neo-
Marxist and Gramscian theoretical approach sheds important light concerning 
alternative agri-food movements: neo-Marxist analysis of the hegemonic structures 
can be used to reflect on the transformative potential of alternative agri-food 
movements, while Gramscian concepts such as national-popular strategies and 
organic intellectuals can be used to explore agri-food movements in different social 
contexts. The Gramscian concept of co-optation of oppositions also enriches the neo-
                                                          
47 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” 
Millennium - Journal of International Studies 10 (1981), 128. 
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Marxist analysis of the capitalist agri-food system by suggesting how hegemonic 
forces have many measures to subsume dissent to maintain the status quo. 
 From neo-Marxist and Gramscian perspectives, the neo-liberal framework 
can be seen as part of the hegemonic ideology that sustains the current corporate 
agri-food system. This thesis views the global agricultural and food system as an 
integral part of the global capitalist economy, and that problems of the current agri-
food system have their foundations in the capitalist system. Section 3.1 constructs a 
framework to explain how the general tendency of capital accumulation, and neo-
liberal forces, shape the corporate agri-food system and its social-ecological 
problems, which have been discussed in part 1. Section 3.2 then discusses 
possibilities to resolve structural problems of the corporate agri-food system in ways 
that do not necessary benefit capital accumulation. 
3.1) The corporate agri-food system and capital accumulation 
Marxist analysis points to the tendency that capital are constantly seeking new ways 
to increase the rate of surplus value.48 Two main channels of surplus appropriation 
are often discussed, usually with the focus on the exploitation of labour in the realm 
of production. First, capital can increase absolute surplus value by making workers 
work longer hours and/or make them work harder and faster per day, keeping wages 
at the same level. Second, they can increase relative surplus value by reducing wage 
costs, or by cutting down on their subsistence needs. Cutting wages may contribute 
to accumulation problems stemming from over-production/under-consumption. 
There are, however, many ways to alleviate accumulation problems, such as through 
                                                          
48 Surplus values are understood as differences between the values of commodities produced and the 
values of labour power/wages. 
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the exploitation of nature alongside the exploitation of labour, as the following 
paragraphs elaborate. 
 The exploitation of both humans and the ecological system can be observed 
through the study of linkages between agriculture, food and capital accumulation. 
Agriculture and food are linked to the accumulation process as determining factors 
of the value of labour power (wages) and the costs of raw materials.49 On the one 
hand, lowering values of commodities consumed by workers, such as food, can 
reduce the value of labour and has equivalent effects to reducing wage costs.50 It has 
been argued that during the 1980s and the 1990s, the global corporate food regime 
was generally characterised by low prices of traded agricultural commodities, at the 
expense of small-scale farmers, to provide cheap food for wage earners in the North 
whose wages were declining.51 On the other hand, cheaper raw materials and energy 
(circulating capital) has equivalent effects to that of raising labour productivity 
without having to increase fixed capital.52 To keep the prices of circulating capital or 
raw materials down, there is a tendency for capital to continually seek new ways to 
appropriate "uncapitalised nature", such as by geographically expanding the frontiers 
of appropriation, where nature refers to both humans and extra-human nature such as 
food, energy and non-energy inputs, such as metals, wood, and fibers.53 Land grabs 
in developing countries, following the 2007/2008 hikes in food prices and growing 
energy scarcity concerns, can be seen as manifestations of such tendency under the 
capitalist system. Expansions of mono-crops of key agricultural commodities can 
                                                          
49 Farshad Araghi, “Food Regimes and the Production of Value: Some Methodological Issues,” 
Journal of Peasant Studies 30, no. 2 (2003), 45 and Jason W. Moore, “Transcending the Metabolic 
Rift: a Theory of Crises in the Capitalist World- Ecology,” Journal of Peasant Studies 28, no. 1 
(2011), 23. 
50 Araghi (2003), 44-45 and Moore (2011), 23. 
51 McMichael, “A Food Regime Analysis," (2009), 285.  
52 Moore (2011), 21-25. 
53 Ibid, 21-23. 
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also aid capital accumulation, as increased supply drives down prices. Chapter 3 will 
discuss problems of mono-crops for export in Thailand in greater detail. 
  The appropriation of extra-human nature, such as farmlands and other 
agricultural resources, helps to reduce the costs of raw materials, and also leads to 
the dispossessions of small-scale farmers or "depeasantisation", which serve to 
widen the pool of "reserve army of labour". The reserve army of labour, understood 
as the bulk of unemployed workers whose existence serves to discipline the 
employed labour force, can be one main channel to appropriate human nature (or 
surplus labour). If there is a large number of unemployed workers across the globe, 
the labour supply can be treated as almost unlimited, and there can be "super-
exploitation" where capital purchases labour power below the cost of reproduction. 
This is because capital no longer has to be concerned about deteriorating health of 
workers, and can also exploit weaker organised resistance in certain countries. 
Longer working hours, more intensive work per day, and wage cuts can also be 
imposed.54 With contract farming and increased popularity of hiring farm managers 
to manage large farm estates, such as in Thailand, situations of small-scale 
farmers/labourers and industrial workers become more similar. 
 This general mechanism which cheapens agri-food production inputs and 
materials to aid capital accumulation, can be described as "accumulation by 
dispossession" or the release of a set of assets at very low (and in some instances 
zero) costs for capital's benefits.55 It is the continuation and proliferation of some 
processes of what Marx's called "primitive accumulation" practices.56 Those that are 
related to agriculture and food include, for example, commodification and 
                                                          
54 Araghi (2003), 46 and 60. 
55 David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 149. 
56 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 159. 
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privatisation of land, forceful expulsions of peasant populations, conversions of 
various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusive 
private property rights, and suppressions of alternative (indigenous) forms of 
production and consumption. Moreover, new mechanisms of accumulation by 
dispossession have been created, which include rules on intellectual property (e.g. 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights or TRIPS 
agreement) that allow for the patenting and licensing of natural resources such as 
seeds, which have been developed by local populations over generations. 57 
Commodification of nature escalates the depletion of the global environmental 
commons (land, air, water), and has resulted in all kinds of environmental 
degradations.58 Free trade and open capital markets can also aid accumulation by 
dispossessions, as well as give advantages to monopoly powers in advanced 
capitalist countries that dominate trade, production, services and finance. 59  The 
credit system and finance capital have also become a major method of accumulation 
by dispossession, most importantly through "speculative raiding" of hedge funds and 
other major institutions of finance capital, which David Harvey has described as "the 
cutting edge of accumulation by dispossession in recent times".60 Previous parts of 
this chapter have already discussed these issues in the context of the capitalist agri-
food system. 
Capital can also appropriate surplus through their power in market relations, 
not just in the realm of production. It has been noted by many neo-Marxists that the 
concentration and centralisation of capital, or the rise of monopoly capital, is a 
natural tendency of capitalist development. For example, in a study of agriculture in 
                                                          
57 Harvey (2003), 145-148. 
58 Harvey (2005), 160. 
59 Harvey (2003), 181. 
60 Ibid, 147. 
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Latin America in the 1970s, Andre Gunder Frank observed how “monopoly in the 
modern sense refers to concentration in a universally interrelated whole”, which 
includes the monopolisation of land, other forms of capital, labour, commerce, 
finance, industry and technology.61 Some empirical evidence on monopoly power in 
the agri-food system, previously discussed in part 1, suggest how large corporations 
can influence agri-food chains. In many countries including Thailand, there are 
small-scale farmers and/or semi-dispossessed peasantries (those who might 
potentially be part of the reserve labour) who still have ownership (or some access) 
to some of their means of production. Corporate capital and their chains of sub-
contractors can appropriate their surplus via provisions of credit, seeds and other 
inputs, as well as market access, while labour process and partial ownership of 
means of production are left in the hands of direct producers. 62 In other words, 
monopoly power of large agri-businesses allow them to appropriate surplus from 
small-scale farmers through monopoly concentration of ownership and control over 
major productive resources such as land and seeds, monopoly control over the means 
of storage, transportation and distribution of agricultural products, as well as 
monopoly control over potentially productive investment funds. Chapter 3 will 
discuss how some contract farming arrangements in Thailand aid surplus 
appropriation in this manner. 
 The process of accumulation by dispossession in the agri-food system in 
Thailand will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3. Important issues include: 
unequal distribution of land and conflicts over land use; attempts to introduce GM 
                                                          
61 André Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of 
Chile and Brasil. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), 243. 
62 Farshad Araghi, “The Invisible Hand and the Visible Foot: Peasants, Dispossession and 
Globalization,” in Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the 
Agrarian Question, ed. A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi and C. Kay (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 134. 
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seeds and to patent indigenous seeds; evidence of monopoly control over productive 
resources, trade, distribution channels and credits; state policies which encourage 
large agri-businesses' monopoly control over agri-food chains; industrial agri-food 
production technology package; and contract farming which represents the 
amalgamation of surplus appropriation from small-scale semi-dispossessed farmers. 
Due to many sources of accumulation by dispossessions, small-scale farmers in 
Thailand often rely on both farming (for subsistence and income) and on selling their 
labour power. Moreover, they often have to engage in intensive industrial farming 
production methods to free up their time so that they can also sell their labour power, 
even if it means increasing negative environmental externalities.63 In other words, 
labour becomes complicit in the exploitation of nature for survival in the short run, 
even though they may be made worse off in the longer run (for example, with soil 
degradation and damage to health). This thesis also questions the modernisation 
view that there is (or ought to be) an on-going non-reversible transitional period 
where labourers move from the agricultural to industrial sectors in Thailand. As 
chapters 3 and 5 will discuss, rural-urban or agricultural-industrial and service sector 
dynamics in Thailand are much more complicated than that. For example, small-
scale farming households and family farms in rural areas can be seen as social 
"safety nets" in case of unemployment or forced under-consumption. 
 At a global level, the process of capital accumulation is filtered through 
competitive market relations among very unequal states and global governance 
structures, such as the rules of the WTO that promote the mobility of capital and 
intellectual property rights.64 States, including the Thai state, often internalise neo-
                                                          
63 There are interviews, academic studies and income statistics of rural households from the Office of 
Agricultural Economics in Thailand to support these points, as will be discussed in chapters 3 to 6. 
64 Philip McMichael, “Peasant Prospects in the Neoliberal Age,” Development 11, no. 3 (2006), 409. 
   
60 
 
liberal capitalist ideologies and have a very crucial role in supporting capital 
accumulation. In many countries, the state shoulders the problem of rising food 
prices through various food stabilisation measures, such as food subsidies, price 
controls and export restrictions, because rising food prices threaten the reproduction 
of labour.65 With its monopoly of violence and definitions of legality, the state plays 
a crucial role in enabling accumulation by dispossession.66 For example, the state 
can promote liberalisation through free trade agreements, privatise public assets, 
withdraw farm and rural subsidies, or allow land and agriculture to be accumulated 
in corporate hands. 67 Chapter 3 will discuss mainstream agri-food governance in 
Thailand, while chapter 6 will discuss suppressions of the land reform movements in 
Thailand in greater detail. 
3.2) Crisis and change ? 
Evidence of many social and ecological problems of the current capitalist agri-food 
system, such as those previously discussed in part 1, provide grounds for some 
people to discuss structural contradictions which will lead to crisis and change. The 
food-energy connection is a good example of contradictions within the system. 
Cheap fuel is important for capital accumulation, but so is cheap food, because it is 
essential in keeping wages down and to ensure social stability. Industrial agro-fuels 
and value-added agriculture may solve profitability and energy scarcity problems in 
the short-run, for political-economic elites and consumers with relatively high 
purchasing power, but it has been suggested that unless the need for low-carbon bio-
diverse agriculture is addressed, energy, climate change and food security problems 
                                                          
65 McMichael, "A Food Regime Analysis," (2009), 286. 
66 Harvey (2003), 145 and 148. 
67 Philip McMichael, “Food Sovereignty, Social Reproduction and the Agrarian Question,” in 
Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question., 
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cannot be solved.68 In addition, the acceleration of the incorporation of nature into 
the production process (capitalisation of nature), which intensifies the drive towards 
further geographical expansion, cannot go on forever as global space is "asymptotic 
and finite".69 
 Despite all these fundamental problems and contradictions, it can also be 
argued that there are still natural resources in many areas of the world which can be 
exploited in the foreseeable future. Examples include a previously closed society 
such as Burma. There are also many makeshift short and medium-run solutions to 
ensure the continuity of capital accumulation. This includes financial speculations on 
agri-food commodities, as well as many institutions and regulatory mechanisms 
upheld by states and international institutions, that continue to aid capital 
accumulations in different ways. As chapters 3 and 4 will discuss, the Thai state 
implements many rural populist policies which enable small-scale farmers to 
accumulate debts without addressing production problems, and also exacerbate 
structural socio-ecological problems of the agri-food system. Governments also 
sometimes use food security concerns to subsidise agri-businesses. Food price hikes 
of 2007/2008 exhibited problems and contradictions of the agri-food system, and yet 
monopoly agri-businesses managed to be profitable. Profits of the top three grain 
traders (Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge) rose 103 percent, while profits 
those of the top three global seeds and pesticides companies (Monsanto, Syngenta 
and Dupont) rose 91 percent.70 
 One can argue that the general public, seeing such ecological and social 
problems embedded in the current agri-food system, is likely to pressure their 
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governments and other institutions to make some reforms or to implement drastic 
changes. The problems are that there are many obstacles which prevent this from 
happening, not to mention that people may not notice structural problems of the 
current agri-food system. Utilising the insights and the concept of hegemony from 
Gramscian perspectives, the following part discusses how hegemonic governance 
structures, as well as discourses and ideas, can be used to maintain the status quo. 
Part 4 also uses the concepts of counter-hegemony and war of position to discuss 
how social and political forces may influence the capitalist agri-food system. 
Moreover, this part suggests that positive radical fundamental changes or 
transformations should be understood more as continual struggles over long periods, 
rather than as sudden transformations of the system brought about by "crises". 
Part 4: Hegemony and counter-hegemony in the agri-food system 
The previous part has discussed how agriculture and food fit into capital 
accumulation dynamics. However, to understand capitalist organisation of 
agriculture, it is insufficient to look solely through the lens of capital accumulation, 
as one should also look at "political spaces that constitute its oppositions" which, for 
example, determines the existence and size of the reserve army of labour. 71  In 
addition, even though the thesis understands the corporate agri-food system as a 
global system with interlinkages that account for certain similar tendencies across 
countries, it tries to guard against overgeneralisations across different regions, 
countries and local contexts. In other words, the thesis adopts a historical view which 
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calls for the conceptualisation of social phenomena as local-global processes within 
a specified historical context.72  
 This part of the chapter tries to address these issues through Gramscian 
theoretical perspectives. The thesis utilises Gramscian concepts of hegemony, 
counter-hegemony and co-optation of oppositions, in combination with the neo-
Marxist critique of the current agri-food system, as an overarching framework to 
understand forces that shape the agri-food system. Section 4.1 frames ideas, 
production-distribution practices, and governance structures of the capitalist agri-
food system as part of the hegemonic structures. It starts with a discussion of the 
concept of hegemony, its inter-scalar articulation, and hegemony in the context of 
the agri-food system that is used in this thesis. Section 4.2 then discusses counter-
hegemony in the agri-food system. It also provides a brief overview of counter-
hegemonic social movements in the agri-food system in Thailand, which will be 
discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Section 4.3 discusses the concept of co-optation of 
oppositions and examples of neo-liberal co-optation attempts in the agri-food system 
in recent years. Section 4.4 then discusses grey areas between counter-hegemony and 
co-optation of oppositions. 
4.1) Hegemony in the agri-food system 
From a Gramscian perspective, there is no simple dichotomy divide between the 
"economic structure" and the "ideological superstructure". While the economic 
structure may set certain limits, so-called "superstructural" factors have a degree of 
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autonomy. 73 Aside from government apparatus and direct coercion, civil society 
consisting of private organisations such as schools, churches, clubs and the media, is 
another channel which can be used by the ruling class to establish “hegemony,”74 
which can be defined as:75 
 “an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which 
one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and 
private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, 
religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their 
intellectual and moral connotations". 
 Hegemony occurs when a leading class transcends its particular economic 
interests and is capable of binding and cohering diverse aspirations and general 
interests of various social forces.76 It can be seen as an important tool which the 
ruling class uses to establish “political leadership based on the consent of the 
led...secured by the diffusion and popularisation of the world view of the ruling 
class".77 It is a method of control which helps to maintain the status quo and current 
social relations of production.  
 Hegemony could manifest itself as an international phenomenon through the 
outward expansion on a world scale of a particular mode of production,78 such as the 
neo-liberal capitalist order promoted by political-economic elites in the US and other 
                                                          
73 Adam David Morton, Unravelling Gramsci (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 96. 
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advance capitalist countries. Since the 1970s, there has been an increasing 
internationalisation of production and finance driven by a “transnational managerial 
class”. 79 Aside from transnational companies, other elements of productive capital, 
including small and medium-sized businesses as well as elements of financial capital 
involved in banking and insurance, have been supportive of the internationalisation 
of production.80 Global governance bodies or the “axis of influence” consisting of 
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the G-7, have also ensured the 
ideological osmosis and dissemination of neo-liberal policies to state agencies.81 The 
role of the state is still significant despite the rising structural power of transnational 
capital which supported common perspectives or an "emulative uniformity", between 
business, state officials and representatives of international organisations, favouring 
the logic of capitalist market relations.82 Neo-liberal capitalist hegemony has been 
articulated in different ways in speciﬁc national and regional contexts, through a 
variety of political, social and cultural agents.83 In other words, neo-liberal interests 
of transnational social forces of capital can be internalised into different national 
forms of state.84  
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 In the context of the capitalist agri-food system in this thesis, hegemony 
refers to mainstream capitalist agri-food production-distribution practices, 
corresponding ideas and discourses, as well as social superstructures or governance 
structures which support the continuation of the status quo. Hegemonic ideas in the 
corporate agri-food system include neo-classical and neo-liberal ideas and 
assumptions regarding agriculture and food previously discussed in part 2, which 
justify the current corporate agri-food system and support its continuation. For 
example, the belief that free market, trade and investment, as well as corporate 
domination over agri-food systems, yield the most efficient and best outcomes for 
producers and consumers. 
 Similar to many countries around the world, Thailand's agri-food system has 
been shaped by such neo-liberal visions, but the Thai agri-food system also has its 
own local characteristics. For example, chapter 3 will discuss how neo-classical 
economic and neo-liberal ideologies, modernisation development world views, 
hierarchical patron-client mentality and other ideas, combined to help maintain the 
hegemonic status quo in the agri-food system in Thailand. The state, agri-businesses, 
universities and other political-economic elite groups in Thai society, play important 
roles in promoting and sustaining the hegemonic corporate agri-food system. 
Ideational and practical hegemony in the agri-food system, however, is not 
unproblematically imposed in a top-down manner on Thai society. As chapters 4 to 6 
will discuss, there are many contestations that also helped to shape the agri-food 
system in Thailand. 
 The concept of hegemony in this thesis suggests that to transform the 
hegemonic agri-food system towards more ecologically and socially sustainable 
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paths, one should comprehensively challenge and develop alternatives to hegemonic 
ideas, production-distribution practices, as well as governance structures. 
Governance structures in this thesis refers to both formal (such as the law) and 
informal (such as social relations) governance structures. The Gramscian concept of 
counter-hegemony is elaborated in the next section. 
4.2) Counter-hegemony 
From a Gramscian perspective, progressive social change will not happen 
automatically after a certain stage of economic development, but can only be 
produced by historically situated social agents, whose actions are both enabled and 
constrained by their social self-understandings. 85  Hegemony is constantly being 
constructed and contested, and is never a static reflection of an alliance of social 
class forces.86 To build up "counter-hegemony", it is insufficient to try to implement 
progressive social changes by taking over state power (war of maneuver), as one 
must also engage in what Gramsci called the “war of position”, which refers to the 
diffusion and mass acceptance of radical ideas about humans and society,87 or the 
building up of alternative ideas and values. In other words, there is room to contest 
hegemony, as existing hegemonic structures are unstable product of a continuous 
process of a war of position. 88  The level of difficulty of a war of position is 
determined by historical development of dominant thoughts within each nation, or 
the “ideological terrain” which ideological struggles are likely to move. This 
historical form of popular thinking forms people’s “commonsense” which constitutes 
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the realm of practical thinking for the masses of the people.89 It is an amalgam of 
historically effective ideologies, scientific doctrines, and social mythologies, which 
can be fragmentary and contradictory, open to multiple interpretations, and hence 
potentially supportive of very different kinds of social visions and political 
projects.90  
 In the context of the agri-food system in this thesis, counter-hegemony 
consists of ideas, production-distribution practices, and governance structures which 
challenge and provide socio-ecologically sustainable alternatives to the hegemonic 
agri-food system. In Thailand, it seems like "commonsense" to believe in the 
superiority of large-scale high-technologies promoted by transnational agri-
businesses, or to see increased large-scale corporate control over the agri-food 
system as "modern" and hence desirable. As the following chapter will discuss in 
greater detail, there are traditional cultural norms such as the "Sakdina" or patron-
client attitudes that might obstruct the building up of counter-hegemony. On the 
other hand, as chapters 4 to 6 will discuss, there are also other cultural and religious 
beliefs which aid the construction of counter-hegemonic ideas and practices. For 
example, Buddhist values such as moderation and self-reliance, as well as appeals to 
traditional wisdom and idealised versions of rural Thai community filled with 
generosity, are used by some people to construct counter-hegemonic ideas and 
practices. However, such construction is not without its problems and contradictions, 
as chapters 4 to 6 will discuss. 
 Through a reading of Gramscian perspectives combined with field research, 
this thesis recognises the need for counter-hegemonic movements to balance 
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between transnational and domestic dimensions, and to understand the plurality and 
heterogeneity of contemporary social movements. On the one hand, with the 
transnationalisation of production and finance as well as of neo-liberalism, class 
struggle is now taking place not only between capital and labour at the national level, 
but also potentially at an international level.91 On the other hand, hegemony at the 
local and national levels should also be addressed. To influence state policies and 
other national governance structures, counter-hegemonic movements ought to 
understand historical, socio-economic and cultural specificities at the local and 
national levels. Gramsci mentions a role for "organic intellectuals" who can help 
form hegemonic or counter-hegemonic projects. By propagating certain ideas, 
intellectuals can perform a valuable supporting role in counter-hegemonic 
movements. 92  Nevertheless, inclinations toward elitist cosmopolitanism among 
intellectuals should be curbed, and counter-hegemonic projects should consider 
"national-popular" strategies which have relevance to the socio-economic needs and 
cultural demands of the common people.93 Social movements should also be careful 
not to employ highly globalised and abstract ideological discourse that lack cultural 
specificity, or ignore possible benefits of mobilising popular forces at a national 
level, using unique and particular socio-economic and cultural demands. Failure to 
do so could increase gaps between intellectual elites in the movements who are 
likely to be more global in their outlook, and the masses who might be embedded in 
national-popular ideological contexts.94  
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 Chapters 4 to 6 will discuss the role of Thai organic intellectuals that help to 
shape counter-hegemonic movements' ideas, strategies and actions, as well as how 
both sustainable agriculture and land reform movements are influenced by a 
combination of local, national, regional and international forces. For example, the 
sustainable agriculture movement is influenced by organic and fair trade movements, 
principles of natural farming from Japan, as well as Thai localism, while the land 
reform movement is influenced by landless movements in Latin America, food 
sovereignty, as well as the "complexity of rights" concept of Anan Ganjanapan from 
Chiang Mai University, Thailand. Despite having similar ideas, goals and practices, 
the fact that different groups of people in the movements use different terms and 
discourses (transnational and local terms) can sometimes be problematic. On the one 
hand, the movements are able to draw attention and support from different groups of 
people, but on the other hand, some modern-minded people are alienated from the 
uses of what they see as "traditional" and "conservative" terms. Chapters 5 and 6 will 
discuss this issue in greater detail. 
 When speaking of social movements which try to reform the agri-food 
system, one may tend to focus only on rural agrarian social movements which have 
farmers as the majority of members. Alternatively, Marxist perspectives often 
discuss potentials for social changes arising from conflicts between labour and 
capital, assuming that small-scale farmers will eventually become part of proletarian 
labour. Such views may perhaps be counter-productive, given complex urban-rural 
linkages and potentials of small-scale agro-ecological farms. In addition, problems in 
the agri-food system do not only concern farmers but everyone in the society; as 
consumers and as bearers of negative socio-ecological consequences. Field research 
in Thailand also suggests that there are benefits to building alliances across political-
   
71 
 
economic and social groups/classes. Hence, a better approach to understand 
contemporary counter-hegemonic movements in the agri-food system is through the 
concept of the "postmodern Prince" coined by Stephen Gill. It refers to a set of 
(postmodern) conditions, particularly political, material, and ecological, that are 
giving rise to new forms of political agency with the quest to ensure human and 
intergenerational security on and for the planet, as well as democratic human 
development and human rights.95 The postmodern Prince as a political agency is 
plural and differentiated, without institutionalised and centralised structure of 
representation. While many movements may appear local in nature, there is broad 
recognition that local problems also require global solutions.96 Within a country such 
as Thailand, different agencies which may not be formally organised but are united 
by common goals, can be seen as part of a social movement in the postmodern 
Prince sense. 
 In sum, this thesis aims to explore the complex local, national and global 
linkages of the agri-food system, as well as accept the plurality and heterogeneity 
within social movements in Thailand, instead of looking only at the conflicts 
between labour and capital or peasant and capital. The following chapters will, 
nevertheless, discuss possible limitations of such plural and differentiated 
movements. For example, chapter 5 will discuss different approaches on organic, fair 
trade, local and green markets in Thailand that may lead to "co-optation of 
oppositions". Overall, chapters 4 to 6 suggest that counter-hegemonic movements in 
the agri-food system in Thailand have influenced the agri-food system to certain 
extents, but they are still far from bringing about structural transformations. 
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4.3) Co-optation of oppositions and short-term fixes 
One problem in the building up of counter-hegemony is that of "co-optation of 
oppositions" or "trasformismo". The term refers to a deliberate strategy to prevent 
popular participation and systemic change within the policies and procedures of 
political institutions through ideational distortion. This can be done through the 
incorporation of rhetorics of radical changes and counter-hegemony into part of the 
hegemonic project, without changing the hegemonic substance. Another method of 
co-optation is to include counter-hegemonic leaders and organisations in the decision 
making process, or integrate them into hegemonic institutions but without allowing 
them to affect the status quo. Such co-optation methods give impressions that 
hegemonic institutions have now taken into account concerns of counter-hegemonic 
groups, and that mobilisation is no longer necessary. Hence, it can decapitate popular 
protests for a very long time because it is difficult to mobilise the public again 
around the same issues. 97 
 Re-assertions and intensifications of mainstream capitalist ways of managing 
the agri-food system, as well as implementations of various "reform" measures that 
are compatible with neo-liberal ideology, can be seen as possible co-optation of 
oppositions. The World Bank's development report (2008) is a good example, as it 
tries to portray that the agenda is to help small-scale farmers, even though in essence 
the report prescribes policies which advance neo-liberal and corporate agenda. 98 
Transnational agri-business giants, such as Monsanto, have constructed the image of 
"pro-poor" GM seeds to justify their investments in biotechnology, as well as to 
                                                          
97 Bill Paterson, “Trasformismo at the World Trade Organization,” in Gramsci and Global Politics. 
Hegemony and Resistance, ed. Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 47. 
98 Amanor (2009), 247 and 257-258.  
   
73 
 
attract financial and political support.99 Another example is the Gates foundation, 
which has influenced world views and working agendas of many humanitarian 
international NGOs, research institutions, and the media through providing them 
with funding.100 
 There are some who support corporate-led measures to address problems of 
the current agri-food system, as well as other short-term fixes that may provide 
short-term reliefs but not structural reforms. Such measures can often be seen as co-
optation of oppositions. Examples include: voluntary corporate responsibility 
mechanisms;101 industry-dominated certifications for sustainable soy, palm oil and 
agro-fuels; 102  the corporate mainstreaming faction of fair trade and of organic 
products;103 as well as the World Bank, FAO, United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD)'s principles for responsible land investment.104 It is doubtful 
that corporations would take the principles for responsible land investment into 
account alongside owners and shareholders' interests.105 In addition, investors and 
governments in host countries have incentives to shield the deals from outside 
scrutiny, and voluntary guidelines may come to serve as checklists to legitimise land 
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grabs.106 The next section also discusses how boundaries between counter-hegemony 
and co-optation of oppositions are not always clear. 
4.4) Counter-hegemony or co-optation of oppositions?  
Harriet Friedmann uses the term "corporate-environmental food regime" or "green 
capitalism" to refer to the corporatisation of fair trade and organic niche markets, 
which can be seen as responses to pressures by social movements to address socio-
ecological problems of the mainstream agri-food system. It has been noted that 
concerns over food quality and safety, as well as environmental effects of industrial 
farming, have inspired rapid growth of organic and fair trade food. On the one hand, 
such "green capitalism" can be seen as co-optation of oppositions; green capitalism 
might benefit certain privileged consumers, but it might also hinder emerging 
alternative agri-food systems. 107  On the other hand, depending on contexts, one 
might be able to look at market-led initiatives such as fair trade and organic markets 
as having counter-hegemonic potentials, or as stepping stones to transform the 
mainstream agri-food system in the long run. The following paragraphs provide a 
brief overview of the debate regarding the potential transformative power of green 
niche markets, such organic and fair trade markets. This discussion is related to 
section 5.1 in the following part of the chapter, which discusses poststructuralist 
interest in counter-hegemonic potentials of value-creation and the consumption side 
of agri-food chains.  
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 Some people welcome increased involvements of large agri-businesses in the 
organic market, because they think it will allow organic products to reach a greater 
number of consumers. However, some people consider it as a hijacking of organic 
agriculture.108 Another perspective suggests that corporate organic can co-exist with 
smaller-scale producers.109 Co-existence may be possible in the short to medium run, 
but under the current market system, large-scale producers who can capture higher 
benefits of economies of scales tend to triumph over smaller-scale producers. The 
way highly capitalised agri-businesses/farms could out-compete existing organic 
producers by adopting industrial methods that play upon scale economies, is referred 
to as "conventionalisation" in organic markets.110 A good example to demonstrate 
this problem is in California, USA. A study in 2001 suggests that 52 percent of sales 
in the California organic sector was accrued to 1.8 percent of growers, which 
indicates a polarised industry structure where a handful of large firms capture most 
of the revenue, while a large number of smaller-scale firms capture relatively 
little.111 Aside from direct economic competitions, there are also threats of lower 
organic standards to accommodate profit-centered agri-businesses. 112  If organic 
regulations focus only on having "organic inputs" or allowing "cookie-cutter" 
organic practices, instead of looking at social and ecological dimensions of the 
production process as a whole, they are likely to encourage more entrants by agri-
                                                          
108 For example: Daniel Buck, Christina Getz, and Julie Guthman, “From Farm to Table: The Organic 
Vegetable Commodity Chain of Northern California,” Sociologia Ruralis 37, no. I (1997): 3–20. 
109 For example: Brad Coombes and Hugh Campbell, “Dependent Reproduction of Alternative Modes 
of Agriculture: Organic Farming in New Zealand,” Sociologia Ruralis 38, no. 2 (1998): 127–145, 
quoted in Lyons et al. (2004),116-118. 
110 Kristen Lyons et al., “Contrasting Paths of Corporate Greening in Antipodean Agriculture: 
Organics and Green Production,” in Agribusiness and Society. Corporate Responses to 
Environmentalism, Market Opportunities and Public Regulation, ed. Kees Jansen and Sietze Vellema 
(London: Zed Books, 2004), 120. 
111 K. Klonsky et al., Statistical Review of California’s Organic Agriculture 1995-1998 (Davis: 
University of California, Agricultural Issues Center, 2001), quoted in Lyons et al. (2004), 124-125. 
112 T. Clunies-Ross, “Organic Food: Swimming Against the Tide?,” in Political, Social and Economic 
Perspectives on the International Food System, ed. T. Marsden and J. Little (Aldershot: Avebury, 
1990), 200–214, quoted in Lyons et al. (2004), 118.  
   
76 
 
businesses.113 For example, studies suggest that agri-businesses in California tend to 
practice a shallower form of agro-ecology based on input substitutions, industrial-
scale plantings of single crops, and contract farming. 114 This issue is also being 
discussed in Thailand, as chapter 5 will discuss in greater detail. 
 Similarly, literature on fair trade and local markets suggest that there are 
some benefits to such initiatives, but they are not without their problems. On the one 
hand, there are many studies which support local and fair trade markets as means to 
redistribute income to marginalised individuals.115 For example, it is argued that fair 
trade shortens social distance between consumers and producers, creating networks 
based on trusts and fairness on a world-scale.116 On the other hand, there are some 
studies which suggest that niche markets based on certified agricultural products 
might price out a majority of consumers and producers,117 thereby exacerbate socio-
economic inequalities at the point of production and undermine existing social 
norms.118 Another critique is that fair trade is not that different from conventional 
businesses which use advertisements to add values to their products. For example, 
despite having an ethical image, a case study of fair trade shea butter produced by 
women in Burkina Faso suggests that female shea butter producers purchase shea 
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Ruralis 42, no. 4 (October 2002), 419-420. 
117 For example: Stewart Lockie, “The Invisible Mouth: Mobilizing ‘the Consumer’ in Food 
Production-Consumption Networks,” Sociologia Ruralis 42, no. 4 (2002): 278–294; Robin Jane Roff, 
“Shopping for Change? Neoliberalizing Activism and the Limits to Eating Non-GMO,” Agriculture 
and Human Values 24, no. 4 (August 08, 2007): 511–522. 
118 For example: S. Freidberg, The Contradictions of Clean: Supermarket Ethical Trade and African 
Horticulture (London, 2003) and Christina Getz and A. Shreck, “What Organic and Fair Trade Labels 
Do Not Tell Us: Towards a Place-Based Understanding of Certification,” Journal of Consumer 
Studies 30, no. 5 (2006): 490–501, quoted in Niles and Roff (2008), 6. 
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nuts from female nut collectors at cut-throat prices to turn a slight profit on their own 
butter production enterprise.119 As for local markets, such as farmers market and 
community supported agriculture (CSA), power and privilege sometimes rest more 
with educated, middle class consumers than with farmers and less-advantaged 
consumers. For example, if share prices of CSA are considered too high, current 
members may not return the following seasons, while new members are difficult to 
recruit.120 
 Chapter 5 will discuss how such alternative green market channels are still 
developing in Thailand, and that despite benefits to producers and consumers, there 
is room for improvement. The thesis will also argue that even though market-led 
initiatives may appear to provide only short to medium term fixes, they could bear 
seeds of counter-hegemonic transformations. Farmers market, CSA, organic and fair 
trade market channels can be used to bridge gaps between producers and consumers, 
and raise awareness about structural ecological, social and political-economic 
problems of the agri-food system, which may then transform into counter-hegemonic 
ideological and practical forces. Poststructuralist perspectives, to be discussed in the 
next part of the chapter, also suggest that such producer-consumer movements have 
political-economic power to influence and reform the mainstream corporate agri-
food system.  
 
                                                          
119 Marlène Elias and Magalie Saussey, “‘The Gift That Keeps on Giving’: Unveiling the Paradoxes 
of Fair Trade Shea Butter,” Sociologia Ruralis 53, no. 2 (April 01, 2013), 159 and 173. 
120 For example, see: Clare Hinrichs, “Embeddedness and Local Food Systems: Notes on Two Types 
of Direct Agricultural Market,” Journal of Rural Studies 16 (2000); 295-303; C.A. Cone and A. 
Kakaliouras, “Community Supported Agriculture: Building Moral Community or an Alternative 
Consumer Choice,” Culture and Agriculture 51/52 (1995): 28–31. 
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Part 5: Insights from other theoretical perspectives 
In the construction of an alternative theoretical approach to that of the neo-classical 
economics approach, this chapter relies mainly on neo-Marxist and Gramscian 
perspectives. However, it has kept in mind possible critiques of such theoretical 
perspectives, as well as other insights from poststructuralist and feminist 
perspectives. Section 5.1 discusses poststructuralist critiques of Marxism's 
structuralist and production-centric tendencies, as well as some main concerns 
regarding the importance of values and the sphere of consumption. It also argues that 
the Gramscian approach addresses these concerns. Section 5.2 then discusses other 
concerns raised by feminist/gender perspectives, particularly regarding structural 
oppression based on gender and the role of non-commodified work in the agri-food 
system. 
5.1) Poststructuralism 
Influenced by poststructuralism, the field of sociological agri-food studies made 
what is often called "a consumption turn".121 By the late 1990s, there are many 
studies which try to pay more attention to a wider range of actors in the agri-food 
system. For example, many studies explore the power and influence of retailers and 
consumers in agri-food chains, and creations of alternative values and knowledge in 
fair trade and organic agri-food network.122 The thesis uses some of these studies to 
                                                          
121 For example: David Goodman and E. Melanie DuPuis, “Knowing Food and Growing Food: 
Beyond the Production-Consumption Debate in the Sociology of Agriculture,” Sociologia Ruralis 42, 
no. 1 (January 2002): 5–22; T. K. Marsden and A. Arce, “Constructing Quality: Emerging Food 
Networks in the Rural Transition,” Environment and Planning 27, no. 8 (1995): 1261–1279. 
122 For example: Raynolds (2002); Stewart Lockie et al., “Eating ‘Green’: Motivations Behind 
Organic Food Consumption in Australia,” Sociologia Ruralis 42, no. 1 (2010): 23–40; A. Arce and T. 
K. Marsden, “The Social Construction of International Food: A New Research Agenda,” Economic 
Geography 69, no. 3 (1993): 293–311. 
   
79 
 
explore hegemony and counter-hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
 From a poststructuralist view point, Marxist perspectives tend to see 
production and labour as the privileged loci of politics and social change, while 
consumption is seen as private, atomic and passive.123 A Marxist analysis would 
suggest that what seems "political" in the realm of consumption is just bourgeois 
ideology. For example, when upper income consumers buy products from niche 
markets, the act of buying gives an appearance of emancipation even though it is still 
implicated with capitalism. 124 Such view can be criticised using poststructuralist 
studies which suggest that knowledge and discourse can be linked to the political and 
material world. For example, struggles over definitions and certifications of organic 
food have political-economic consequences on organic production-consumption 
networks. 125  In sum, constructions of values and knowledge in alternative 
production-consumption networks, which contest normally accepted productionist 
values in mainstream agri-food networks, may bear "the seeds of a political struggle" 
that could lead to broader producer-consumer and/or political alliances.126 
 The critique of Marxism's production-centered approach is useful as a 
reminder not to be too narrow-minded and "privilege the agency and power of either 
producers or consumers”.127 This thesis values the viewpoint that struggles in the 
realm of ideas, values and knowledge, can have political implications. However, it 
                                                          
123 Arjun Appadurai, The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 31, quoted in Goodman and Dupuis (2002), 9. 
124 Goodman and DuPuis (2002), 6-9. 
125 See Guthman, “Raising Organic,” (2000). 
126 Goodman and DuPuis (2002), 17. 
127 S. Lockie and L. Collie., “‘Feed the Man Meat’: Gendered Food and Theories of Consumption,” in 
Restructuring Global and Regional Agricultures: Transformations in Australasian Agri-Food 
Economies and Spaces, ed. D. Burch, J. Cross, and G. Lawrence (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 
1999), 270, quoted in Goodman and DuPuis (2002), 15. 
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frames the issues differently, using Gramscian concepts such as counter-hegemonic 
ideas and war of position, in combination with a neo-Marxist analysis of the 
hegemonic corporate agri-food system. This is to guard against a generalisation that 
all kinds of supposedly "alternative" values and knowledge in "alternative" agri-food 
networks hold seeds of structural emancipatory transformations. In other words, 
structural analysis serves as a benchmark to evaluate these alternative ideas and 
practices; to see if they may be able to influence and transform the hegemonic 
system towards more socially and ecologically sustainable directions. As discussed 
in section 4.4, one has to look carefully at both ideas and practices in these 
alternative agri-food networks to guard against co-optation of oppositions. Some 
participants may utilise rhetorics of "alternative" ideas and values, while in reality, 
their actions may not deviate from the mainstream. Chapter 5 will discuss in greater 
detail how producer-consumer networks are important to counter-hegemonic projects 
of the sustainable agriculture movement in Thailand. 
5.2) Feminist/gender perspectives 
There are some feminist/gender studies which indicate that women are often in 
disadvantaged positions in the agri-food system compare to men.128 For example, 
women labour in agricultural production is often central and yet invisible (not 
acknowledged),129 not to mention that women have unequal access to land compare 
to men in many places of the world.130 Women also have constrained access to non-
                                                          
128 Patricia Allen and Carolyn Sachs, “Women and Food Chains: The Gendered Politics of Food,” 
International Journal of Sociology of Food and Agriculture 15, no. 1 (2007), 4; Deborah Barndt, 
Women Working the NAFTA Food Chain: Women, Food and Globalization (Toronto, ON: Sumach 
Press, 1999); Catherine Dolan, “On Farm and Packhouse: Employment at the Bottom of a Global 
Value Chain,” Rural Sociology 69, no. 1 (2004): 99–126. 
129 Allen and Sachs (2007), 5. 
130 Bina Agarwal, A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994); S. Lastarria-Cornhiel, “Impact of Privatization on Gender and 
Property Rights in Africa,” World Development 25, no. 8 (1997): 1317–1333; Shahra Razavi, 
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land resources such as agricultural production inputs, credit and extension 
services, 131  while the effects of many neo-liberal and agricultural modernisation 
policies have harsher consequences for women in the agri-food sector.132 There are 
also empirical studies which suggest that women use their access to agricultural 
resources to improve household agricultural productivity and food security, as well 
as children's health and nutrition.133 In addition, women might be motivated to social 
and political action differently than men regarding environmental problems and 
crises.134 
 These gendered differences in knowledge of the environment, access, and 
activism, should be seen as "products of socially and culturally created structural 
positions", rather than something which is inherently biological. 135  This thesis 
recognises that more gendered research on the agri-food system is needed, and 
although it focuses its study at the macro level using a neo-Marxist and Gramscian 
approach, there is room to integrate gendered perspectives into its framework 
through the use of feminist socialists' critique of both capitalism and patriarchy as 
the two sources of structural oppression, 136  as well as perspectives on non-
commodified work. Studies have noted how rural women often face "double 
                                                                                                                                                                    
“Liberalisation and the Debates on Women’s Access to Land,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 8 
(December 2007): 1479–1500. 
131 A. Peterman, J. Behrman, and A. R. Quisumbing, A Review of Empirical Evidence on Gender 
Differences in Non-Land Agricultural Inputs, Technology and Services in Developing Countries. 
International Food Policy Research Institute Discussion Paper 001003 (Washington DC, 2010). 
132 For example: Deborah Barndt, Tangled Routes: Women, Work, and Globalization on the Tomato 
Trail (UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008); Candice Shaw, “Global Agro Food 
Systems: Gendered and Ethnic Inequalities in Mexico’s Agricultural Industry,” McGill Sociological 
Review 2, April (2011), 92-93 and 103-104. 
133 L. C. Smith et al., The Importance of Women’s Status for Child Nutrition in Developing Countries. 
Research Report 131 (Washington DC, 2002); K. Saito, H. Mekonnen, and D. Spurling, Raising the 
Productivity of Women Farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Discussion Paper 230 (Washington DC, 
1994). 
134 Paul Robbins, Political Ecology: a Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (Chicester: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012), 64; Allen and Sachs (2012), 12-13. 
135 Robbins (2012), 64. 
136 George Ritzer, Sociological Theory, 5th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), quoted in Shaw 
(2011), 100. 
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burden", which refers to when women are responsible for domestic tasks as well as 
being increasingly responsible for supplying a wage to their families. Sometimes 
women face "triple burden" when they also have to work on family farmland for 
partial subsistence. 137  Feminist political economy also draws attention to the 
importance of non-commodified work, and the fluidity of the boundary between 
commodified and non-commodified spheres within capitalist economies. It also 
raises questions on how the reserve army of labour sustains itself. In Southern 
Africa, it has been argued that having a plot of land can be considered a form of 
social security against the vagaries of wage employment.138 This is an important and 
useful perspective when discussing the continuing rural-urban linkages and semi-
proletarian farmers in Thailand. As chapter 5 will discuss in greater detail, the 
agricultural sector/rural areas in Thailand often provide social safety nets for low and 
semi-skilled workers who migrated to urban area to work, as well as subsidise their 
costs of living e.g. through food provision and as places to raise children. 
 There is not much gendered studies on the agri-food system in Thailand to 
build on, but the thesis tries to take notice of gender differences and socially 
differentiated groups during field research. While not denying that there are probably 
some serious forms of gender inequality in Thai society and in the agri-food sector, 
field research in Thailand reveals that many women in the agri-food sector and 
counter-hegemonic movements are not barred from leadership positions, whether in 
the civil service, NGOs, local politics, or business enterprises. Relative to some other 
countries, it is not clear that women in the agri-food system in Thailand are at 
                                                          
137 Barndt (2008), quoted in Shaw (2011), 100. 
138 Bridget O’Laughlin, “Gender Justice, Land and the Agrarian Question in Southern Africa,” in 
Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question, 
ed. A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi and Cristobal Kay (New York: Routledge, 2009), 204-205. 
   
83 
 
strikingly disadvantaged positions, or that they have different ways of using 
agricultural resources compare to men. Chapters 5 and 6 will provide more detail. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed how mainstream neo-liberal ideology and neo-classical 
economic perspectives have influenced the development of the current mainstream 
agri-food system. It has outlined an alternative theoretical framework based on neo-
Marxists and Gramscian perspectives, to explain how the current system is linked to 
capital accumulation and to expose structural social, political-economic and 
ecological problems. With a clear framework to explain structural problems of the 
current global agri-food system, one can better identify alternative values, 
knowledge, production-distribution practices and governance structures, that address 
emancipatory social and ecological concerns. Part 4 of this chapter has discussed 
how a reading of Gramsci and Stephen Gill's "postmodern Prince" suggests that 
counter-hegemonic movements are likely to benefit from balancing local, national 
and global goals in their strategies, and in having diverse and non-centralised 
agencies in their movements that share common goals. It has also discussed co-
optation of opposition attempts by neo-liberal forces. Even though the theoretical 
framework relies mostly on neo-Marxist and Gramscian perspectives, part 5 has tried 
to explain how the thesis takes into account some insights from poststructuralist and 
feminist/gender theoretical perspectives. For example, the thesis accepts the 
possibility that alternative value creations in organic and fair trade niche markets 
could have political-economic consequences, and also tries to be gender sensitive, 
even though it cannot do a full-scale gendered analysis of the Thai agri-food system. 
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 Overall, this chapter has helped to advance the third main contribution of this 
thesis, which is to extend neo-Marxist and Gramscian theories on the agri-food 
system. The following chapter will build on this chapter in its exploration of 
hegemonic ideas and discourses, production-distribution practices and governance 
structures in the agri-food system in Thailand. It will also address local, national and 
global linkages in the Thai agri-food system. Empirical exploration in the next 
chapter will also support the assertion that the neo-Marxist and Gramscian 
theoretical framework outlined in this chapter is relevant and appropriate to the study 
of the agri-food system in Thailand. 
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Chapter 3 
Hegemony in the Agri-Food System in Thailand 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has discussed the neo-Marxist and Gramcian theoretical 
framework used in this thesis to explore how the general tendency of capital 
accumulation has shaped the globalised mainstream hegemonic agri-food system. In 
addition, this theoretical framework suggests that the hegemonic agri-food system 
should be understood as being supported by economic structures as well as 
governance and ideological structures. The present chapter discusses the hegemonic 
agri-food system as it unfolded in Thailand between 1990 and 2014, and suggests 
that the neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical framework is appropriate as an 
analytical tool in this context. The discussion of hegemonic agri-food system in 
Thailand in this chapter provides a foundation to understand counter-hegemonic 
movements in the agri-food system in Thailand and co-optation of oppositions, 
which are discussed in the following chapters. 
 Through an in-depth engagement with empirical evidence from Thailand, this 
chapter advances the first main argument of this thesis, which is that the mainstream 
agri-food system in Thailand has been shaped by transnational and domestic forces 
to aid capital accumulation, and is sustained through the maintenance of hegemonic 
agri-food production-distribution, governance structures and ideational order. As the 
following parts of the chapter elaborate, hegemonic agri-food production-distribution 
in Thailand benefit large corporations and capital accumulation at the expense of 
nature, producers, and the general population. This chapter also suggests that the 
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continuing existence of such hegemonic agri-food production-distribution practices 
in Thailand is supported by many forms of governance structures and hegemonic 
ideas. 
 This chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part starts the 
discussion of the hegemonic agri-food system in Thailand by exploring hegemonic 
production-distribution practices, which is the most observable component of the 
agri-food system compare to hegemonic governance and ideas. Issues to be 
discussed include: unsustainable industrialised production methods; land grabs; the 
food-fuel nexus; financial speculations of agri-food commodities; and monopoly 
power in the agri-food sector. The second part of the chapter discusses hegemonic 
governance structures which facilitate the mainstream agri-food system in Thailand, 
with emphasis on the roles of domestic forces such as the Thai state and 
transnational forces such as global governance bodies. The last part of the chapter 
discusses the hegemonic ideational order, which is a combination of transnational 
neo-liberal/capitalist ideas as well as domestic historical-cultural mentality in 
Thailand, such as that of patron-client, which aid capital accumulation through the 
mainstream agri-food system in Thailand. 
Part 1: Hegemonic agri-food production-distribution in Thailand 
This part of the chapter explains how the neo-Marxist theoretical framework, 
discussed in section 3.1 of the previous chapter, can appropriately be used to make 
sense of mainstream agri-food production-distribution in Thailand. Reflections on 
empirical evidence, in combination with the theoretical framework, suggest that the 
hegemonic capitalist agri-food production-distribution in Thailand seems to benefit 
large corporations and capital accumulation at the expense of nature, small and 
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medium farmers, as well as consumers. The following sections 1.1 to 1.4 discuss 
major defining components of the contemporary capitalist agri-food production-
distribution practices in Thailand, which are important to capital accumulation. 
These interconnected components include: commodification and capitalist agri-food 
production; land grabs and the food-fuel nexus; cash crops and financial 
speculations; and agribusinesses and monopoly power. As part of the global system, 
hegemonic agri-food production-distribution practices in Thailand reflect many 
characteristics of the globalised corporate agri-food production-distribution practices 
that were discussed in the previous chapter. 
1.1) Commodification and capitalist agricultural production 
This section first discusses historical roles of transnational hegemonic forces in 
laying the foundations of contemporary mainstream agri-food production-
distribution in Thailand, such as by encouraging exports of agri-food products to 
meet world market demands. The latter part of this section further discusses how the 
Green Revolution production paradigm in Thailand, adopted from advanced 
capitalist countries, is a manifestation of the hegemonic neo-classical economic 
world views previously discussed in part 2 of chapter 2, which disregard ecological-
social externalities in the name of economic efficiency. From a neo-Marxist 
perspective, increased commercialisation and commodification of agri-food 
resources, as well as under-valuations of the production costs of agri-food products, 
help to establish conditions for cheap food and raw materials which aid global 
capital accumulation. Using empirical evidence from Thailand, this section 
illustrates how industrial agricultural production methods, genetically modified seeds 
and associated private property rights, have been instrumental in the 
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commodification of natural resources and agri-food products. They can also be seen 
as methods of accumulation by dispossessions that enable exploitations of both 
humans and nature in service of capital accumulation. Parts 2 and 3 of this chapter 
continue the discussion on hegemonic transnational forces, with focuses on 
hegemonic governance and ideas of the agri-food system in Thailand in more recent 
periods. 
 The historical role of hegemonic transnational forces 
Since the very beginning, transnational forces have encouraged the integration of 
Thailand into the global agri-food system and economy, as well as encouraged 
exports of Thai agricultural commodities to meet world market demands. 
Commercialisation of agricultural production accelerated following the Bowring 
Treaty of 1855 between Thailand and Britain. Britain, which was at that time in 
search for cheap rice for its colonies and raw materials, encouraged Thailand to 
supply rice to the international market.1 After the Second World War, grains were 
much needed in Europe, and Thailand expanded plantations of certain commodities 
to meet these demands. Through the advice of the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) in 1947 and loans from the World Bank 
in 1952, the Thai government started to invest in infrastructures, such as large-scale 
irrigation projects, to help transform the agricultural sector and encourage exports of 
agri-food products such as rice.2 Around 1957 and 1958, the World Bank published 
a report on a public development program for Thailand, which became an important 
                                                          
1 Walden Bello, Shea Cunningham, and Li Kheng Pho, A Siamese Tragedy. Development and 
Disintegration in Modern Thailand (New York: Zed Books, 1998), 168. 
2 Witoon Lienchamroon and Suriyon Thankitchanukit, From the Green Revolution to Bio-
Engineering. Lessons for the Future of Thai Agriculture. (Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2008), 61(in Thai) 
and Sayamon Kraiyoorawong et al., Traditional Wisdom: Community and Nature’s Ways (Bangkok: 
Duan-tula Printing, 2008), 101. (in Thai) 
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influence for the first Thai National Economic and Social Development (NESD) plan 
in 1961. The plan outlined a nationwide transformation of agricultural production in 
different regions. For example, rice production was to be expanded in the Chaopraya 
River Delta in the Central Plain, while the production of sugar cane and other cash-
crops was encouraged in the Northeast.3 In the South, the spread of mono-cropping 
of rubber plantations was an initiative of the Thai government, but it was also 
encouraged by international factors such as the Korean War, which increased 
demands for rubber. Thailand also received international loans from the World Bank 
and the UK Department for International Development (formerly known as the 
Overseas Development Administration) to implement expansions of rubber 
plantations between 1978 and 1982.4 
 As chapter 2 section 1.1 discussed, the Green Revolution was promoted 
around the world after the Second World War by private institutions such as 
Rockefeller and Ford foundations, as well as by the US and other OECD 
governments. At the start of the adoption of Green Revolution technology in 
Thailand in 1950, the US sent two agricultural science academics to train officials 
and students, and to collect different rice genetic materials to be developed so that 
they are responsive to chemical fertilisers, with aims to meet domestic demand and 
international trade.5 The development of hybrid maize seeds, for example, was 
supported by the Rockefeller Foundation.6 The next sub-section discusses how the 
Green Revolution production paradigm aids capital accumulation at the expense of 
nature and small-scale farmers in Thailand. 
                                                          
3 Sukran Rojanapraiwong et al., Local Genes and Sustainable Agriculture: A Document for the Third 
Alternative Agriculture Assembly 18-21 November 2004, Kasetsart University (Nonthaburi: Pim-dee 
Printing, 2004), 46-48. (in Thai) 
4 Lienchamroon and Thankitchanukit (2008), 80 and 88-89. 
5 Ibid, 49-51. 
6 Rojanapraiwong et al. (2004), 50-59. 
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 The Green Revolution and capital accumulation 
Part 1 of chapter 2 discussed the Green Revolution production paradigm and its 
many ecological-social problems, such as the current agri-food production methods' 
unsustainable reliant on fossil fuels. This sub-section provides a brief exploration of 
empirical evidence in Thailand which lend support to such views. It also suggests 
that hegemonic economically "efficient" agricultural production methods, such as 
industrial-scale mono-cropping with extensive use of chemical fertilisers and 
pesticides, help to commodify nature. In addition, Green Revolution production 
paradigm disregards negative social-ecological costs, which enables exploitation of 
both nature and humans to ensure "cheap" raw materials and food for capital 
accumulation's sake. 
 In Thailand, the Green Revolution causes soil degradation and the reduction 
of biodiversity (such as loss of traditional rice, fish and plant genes), toxin in soil, 
water and food, as well as many new plant diseases, which have negative impact on 
local food security.7 However, these costs are not reflected in the costs of production 
of agri-food products, as the following paragraphs elaborate. In addition, under the 
current hegemonic production, yields of mono-crops are used as measures of 
productivity, while side effects and co-products are neglected and not seen as 
important even if they affect local food security, local ecologies, and potential 
income sources. This reflects a form of commodification of nature where agri-food 
products are seen in isolation as objects to be sold in markets to gain value, without 
considerations of how these products relate to their natural and social contexts. 
Intensive mono-cropping of rice and extensive use of chemicals, for example, can 
                                                          
7 Lienchamroon and Thankitchanukit (2008), 156. 
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destroy local varieties of vegetables and fish in paddy fields, which negatively affect 
local food security. As suggests by a field research from Lumbua, Suphanburi 
province, before the Green Revolution a household could catch 200 to 300 kilograms 
(kg.) of fish per year from their paddy fields. In early 2000s, the catch would be 
worth 10,000 to 15,000 baht per year. However, farmers from Lumbua reported a 
reduction in fish species and that they could rarely catch fish from their paddy fields 
due to chemical pesticides.8  
 High Yielding Varieties (HYV) and genetically modified (GM) seeds, which 
are major technological components of the Green Revolution production paradigm, 
can be seen as a form of commodification that gives capital more power over 
agriculture. These seeds may increase yields, but their prices can also be quite high 
under corporate monopoly control. A fieldwork study in 2008 in Kampangpech and 
Utaraditr provinces, for example, found that hybrid rice seeds sold by Charoen 
Pokphand (CP) increased productivity by only 15 percent, while the costs were 
around 500 percent higher than local seeds. Hence, it was not economically sensible 
for farmers to use CP hybrid rice seeds. In addition, farmers cannot save CP hybrid 
rice seeds for the next round of plantation, unlike traditional open pollinated seeds, 
so they would have to buy rice seeds every year from the company.9 
 Between 1998 and 2003, the average yield of rice in Thailand was 420 kg. 
per rai (rai is a unit which is equal to 1,600 square metres), which was around 37.77 
percent higher than before the introduction of new HYV seeds.10 However, as 
discussed previously, there were many other costs to consider. For example, new 
                                                          
8 Ibid, 148-149. The field study was conducted in the early 2000s. 
9 BioThai, “Report on the Problems of Hybrid Rice Seeds: Case Study of Hybrid Rice Owned by the 
Charoen Pokphand Group,” 2009, 18-20. (in Thai) 
10 Calculation based on FAO STAT (2004) in Lienchamroon and Thankitchanukit (2008), 114-117. 
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semi-dwarf rice seeds do not suit ecological realities in many areas, and they also 
require complementary large-scale irrigation systems.11 Intensive mono-production 
of rice which does not allow paddy fields to rest tends to lead to environmental 
problems such as land degradation, which attributes to the spread of pests and the 
need to use increased levels of chemicals.12 This tends to lead to vicious cycles, as 
uses of chemicals and antibiotics increase diseases and pests.13 Between 1994 and 
2004, annual imports of agricultural chemicals in Thailand increased fourfold, and 
chemicals usage increased by 13.2 percent per year per rai. However, yield per rai 
increased on average only 2.5 percent per year.14 It has also been suggested that 
prices of chemical fertilisers tend to increase because they are derived from finite 
fossil fuels.15 Average percentage increases of the prices of imported inputs per year 
between 2007 and 2011 were 10.36 percent for chemical fertilisers, 6.00 percent for 
pesticides and herbicides, and 386.42 percent for walk-behind tractors.16 
 Higher costs of production relative to revenues are often suggested as 
contributing factors that lead to debts and dispossessions of small-scale farmers in 
Thailand.17 A study suggests that in 2009, 6 million farmers were in debt to a total 
                                                          
11 Ibid, 124. 
12 Assoc. Prof. Juthatip Patrawart, Director of an academic study of co-operatives, Kasetsart 
University, quoted in Yupin Hongthong, “The State Pushes to Solve Farmer Crisis: Open Smart 
Farmers School in 6 provinces” Bangkok Business News, August 11, 2013 (in Thai); Kookiet 
Sroythong, “Pesticides Usage and the Spread of Brown Planthoppers among Rice Crops in the Central 
and Lower North Regions,” in An Academic Conference to Monitor Agricultural Chemicals 1, 16-17 
June 2011, ed. National Committee to pPan for Food Security, 2011. (in Thai) 
13 Lienchamroon and Thankitchanukit (2008), 185-187. 
14 National Health Committee, Report of the Meeting 1/2008 on the Topic of Policies and Strategies 
to Reduce Negative Health Effects from Chemical Pesticides on 14 January 2008 (Bangkok, 2008), 
quoted in Sajin Prachason, “A Draft Document for the Meeting ‘Agriculture and Food in Time of 
Crisis’, 22 July 2008,” in Progress Report to the National Health Commission on Developments of 
Proposals from the National Health Assembly 2008, 40. (in Thai) 
15 Lienchamroon and Thankitchanukit (2008), 118-120.  
16 Office of Agricultural Economics (Thailand), Agricultural Economics Indicators 2011, 44. 
17 This issue is discussed by many scholars and studies, such as Assoc. Prof. Juthatip Patrawart, 
Kasetsart University, quoted in Hongthong, “The State Pushes to Solve Farmer Crisis,” (2013) and 
Pattama Sittichai and et al., A Complete Report on the Project to Compile and Analyse the Problems 
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extent of 1 billion baht and 30 per cent of these loans were non-performing loans.18 
Another study in 2011, based on random surveys of 1,182 samples of farmers in 
Thailand, found that 87.6 percent of them had debts over 100,000 baht each, while 
their income was significantly lower than their ability to pay back debts.19 Major 
shares of the loans, from both formal and informal sources, were used for 
consumption and agricultural investments. Even though 82.2 percent of the farmers 
suggested they could repay formal debts, 52.8 percent could not repay their informal 
loans.20 
 There are also problems of incorrect usage of chemicals and negative 
consequences on health and the environment.21 Between 2001 and 2010, there were 
over 1,000 cases of sickness from agricultural pesticides per year. Land in many 
areas of the country was also found to be contaminated.22 A study suggests that 72 
percent of farming communities experienced soil problems such as soil erosion and 
lack of organic compounds in 2006.23 A survey in 2007 from the Ministry of Health 
also suggests that 38.52 percent of farmers had dangerously high level of agricultural 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of Farmers and Sustainable Development (Bangkok: National Economics and Social Development 
Board (NESDB), 2002). (in Thai) 
18 From Dr. Sansit Piriyarangsan's interview, at the time was the head of the Farmers’ Reconstruction 
and Development Fund, in The Economics team's editorial, Thairath Newspaper, 15th June 2009. (in 
Thai) 
19 Mr. Thanawat Pholwichai, Director of the Center of Economics and Business Forecasting, 
University of Chamber of Commerce, quoted in Thairath (online), 26 May 2011. (in Thai) 
20 Ibid. 
21 Over-usage of agricultural chemicals are often attributed to incorrect usage of chemicals by farmers 
(this view is shared by agri-business representatives interviewed by emails, such as Songpun 
Kuldilokrat, Managing Director at Arysta LifeScience Co., Ltd, email correspondent date 21 January 
2013 and Dr. Kriengsak Suwantharadol, Syngenta (Thailand), email correspondent date 14 March 
2013), uncontrolled imports of dangerous types of chemicals and of advertising (Phuttina 
Nontaworakarn, “Summary of the Current Status of the Revised Dangerous Chemical Acts 2008,” in 
An Academic Conference to Monitor Agricultural Chemicals 1, 16-17 June 2011, ed. National 
Committee to Plan for Food Security (Bangkok, 2011), 100-101. (in Thai)) 
22 National Committee to Develop Strategic Plan to Manage Chemicals, National Strategic Plan to 
Manage Chemicals 4 (2012-2021), (Nonthaburi: Integrated Programme for Chemical safety, Food 
and Drugs Administration, Ministry of Public Health, 2011), 8. (in Thai) 
23 Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning, “Situation on State of 
Environment,” 2006, quoted in Sajin Prachason, Food Security in Thai Society: A Report Submitted to 
UNDP Thailand, January 2009 (Bangkok, 2009), 37. (in Thai) 
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chemicals in their bodies.24 Aside from dangerous toxins in agri-food products, the 
general population can also be negatively affected by the current production methods 
through other channels, such as through haze from land clearing.25 
 It can be seen that the current hegemonic production paradigm has many 
negative environmental and health consequences, and yet Thailand is still committed 
to it. By externalising socio-ecological costs, the hegemonic Green Revolution 
production paradigm helps capital accumulation by systematically under-valuing the 
costs of agri-food products. Moreover, dependency on finite fossil-fuels suggests 
that the current mainstream agri-food system is not sustainable in the long run. 
 Commodification of seeds also helps capital to extract surplus or rents. 
Similar to the case of HYV seeds, genetically modified (GM) seeds are being 
portrayed in recent years as a cutting-edge technological advancement which would 
help solve global food security. However, as chapter 2 section 1.1 discussed, GM 
seeds are scientifically unproven to be higher-yielding. In addition, many studies that 
they have negative ecological, social and economic costs, and their use is usually 
coupled with strict property rights agreements which reinforce monopoly power of 
biotechnology agri-businesses. For example, during bilateral free trade agreement 
negotiations, the US usually tries to convince other states to use the same trade 
                                                          
24 Dr. Pibul Issarapan, Vice Deputy Director Bureau of Occupational and Environmental Diseases, 
Ministry of Health, “Farmers’ Risks from Using Agricultural Chemicals and Sudden Illness,” in An 
Academic Conference to Monitor Agricultural Chemicals 1, 16-17 June 2011, ed. National 
Committee to Plan for Food Security (Bangkok, 2011). 60. (in Thai) 
25 For example, it has been suggested that agricultural land clearing through burning, for the purpose 
of contract farming of maize in the Northern part of Thailand, is an important factor contributing to 
dangerous (above standard level) of haze during the first few months of each year, which causes 
various health problems for people in the Northern provinces and increases risks of lung cancer in the 
longer run. (Assoc. Prof. Dr. Phongthep Wiwattanadech, the Department of Community Medicine, 
Faulty of Medicine, Chiang Mai University, interviewed in Thai Publica (online), “‘Phongthep 
Wiwattanadech’, Medical Doctor at Chiang Mai University Suggests ‘Contract Farming’ to Be the 
Cause of Haze Pollution in Northern Thailand. Revealed Statistics Suggesting Peaked Dangerous 
Chemicals - Lung Cancer,” Thai Publica (online), September 01, 2012. (in Thai) 
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standards as the US regarding genetically modified organisms and intellectual 
property rights.26 From a neo-Marxist perspective, such commodification and strict 
intellectual property rights of seeds can be seen as a form of accumulation by 
dispossession. 
 In Thailand, the leakage of Monsanto's genetically modified BT cottons 
outside experimental fields, discovered in 1999, led to widespread opposition from 
civil society against open-field experiments of GM seeds. In 2001, the Thai state 
agreed to halt GM's cultivation for commercial purposes, except under laboratory 
and greenhouse conditions.27 Nevertheless, since then there have been 
contaminations of certain commodities such as papaya, maize, soya, cotton and 
chilli.28 There have also been constant pressures, such as from some researchers and 
the private sector, for the Thai state to support GM research and field tests.29 In 
addition to pushing for a bilateral Thai-US FTA in 2004 (which was never realised 
due to protests from civil society), US officials also tried to lobby and establish good 
relations with the government, civil servants, academics and newspapers in Thailand, 
to push for public acceptance and commercial plantations of GM seeds.30 In 2007, 
the Thai state finally allowed open-field experiments of GM seeds under certain 
conditions, such as under the state's controlled land and with the state's permission. 
In February 2013, Monsanto started working with Naraesuan University to test GM 
                                                          
26 Sittiphol Wiboonthanakul, GMOs in the International Economic Governance (Bangkok: WTO 
Watch project, Economic Department, Thammasart University, 2004), 59 and 79. (in Thai) 
27 Prachason (2009), 44 ; Natwipa Iewskul, “18 Years Track Records of GMOs: Threats to Thailand’s 
Food Sovereignty,” Greenpeace Southeast Asia Website, April 02, 2013. (in Thai) 
28 BioThai found these contaminations, quoted in Iewskul (2013) and also from tests at transgenic 
technology center, Science Faculty, Chulalongkorn University, quoted in Plan for Resource Base 
2007-2010 and Plan to Support Food Security 2010-2013, From Resource Base to Food Security: 
Restoration of Natural Resource Base and Biodiversity for Food Security in Community and Thai 
Society (Co-operation between BioThai, SATHAI, Esan Man Yuen Center at Ubolratchathani 
province, and others), 19. (in Thai) 
29 Iewskul (2013). 
30 Interviews of relevant people in Lienchamroon and Thankitchanukit (2008), 266-269. 
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maize (NK603) in an open field environment, raising concerns over contaminations 
and other ecological effects.31 Some people are also concerned that this initiative 
will pave way for the introduction of other GM crops such as GM rice and chili.32 In 
addition, under strict property rights agreements that Thailand might be pressured to 
sign in the near future as of 2014 (free trade agreements are discussed in part 2 of 
this chapter), farmers are likely to have to pay royalty fees if their crops are 
contaminated by GM plant genes. It is also likely that farmers will not be allowed to 
save seeds and must instead purchase new seeds from companies every year, which 
undermines their power vis-à-vis transnational agri-businesses. A recent attempt to 
introduce open-field testing of GM crops in 2014, as well as counter-movements 
from civil society groups, will be discussed in chapter 5. 
1.2) Land grabs and the food-fuel nexus 
Section 1.4 in chapter 2 discussed the contradictory food-fuel connections where 
diversions of resources to agro-fuels production threaten food security without 
solving finite energy problems. Even though the international prices of rice, an 
important food grain in Thailand, adjusted downwards in the latter half of 2008 after 
dramatic spikes in 2007/2008, it has been noted that agro-fuels policies and changes 
in prices of production inputs contributed to a new higher price level in Thailand 
compare to before 2007.33 Sections 1.5 and 1.6 in chapter 2 also discussed how 
global interests in food and agro-fuels production following the 2007/2008 spikes in 
global agri-food commodity prices have prompted transnational capital to engage in 
resource grabs and in speculations of agricultural commodity prices. Resource grabs 
                                                          
31 Isra News, “Judiciary Declared the State Was Not Guilty for GM Papaya Contamination, 
Greenpeace Feared Monsanto Monopoly,” April 2, 2013. (in Thai) 
32 Ibid. 
33 Somporn Isawilanont and Sanit Kao-ian, Dynamics of Thailand’s Rice Production Economy and 
The Future Outlook (Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2009), 33. (in Thai) 
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issue extends beyond land grabs for agricultural purposes. However, due to limited 
space, this section focuses only on recent waves of agricultural land grabs in 
Thailand. Unequal land distribution and the contemporary land reform movement in 
Thailand will be discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
 A neo-Marxist perspective, discussed in chapter 2, can be used to explain 
increased global interests in land grabs and agro-fuel investments as the capitalist 
system's tendency to appropriate nature to ensure continuities of capital 
accumulation through "cheap" food and energy. Land grabs in developing or land-
abundant countries can be seen as a form of accumulation by dispossession, which 
does not only help to secure relatively cheap production inputs, but also causes 
dispossession effects on small-scale farmers and marginalised rural populations, 
turning them into a reserve army of low-skilled and semi-skilled labours. Empirical 
evidence of land grabs and increased investments in agro-fuels in Thailand, 
discussed below, can be understood in this light. This section explores how both 
Thai and non-Thai capital, as well as other agents, actively engage in land grabs and 
agro-fuels production. Moreover, this section suggests that even though current land 
grabs for agro-fuels may be able to stimulate capital accumulation in the short and 
medium term, they are unlikely to solve the finite energy problem in the long run. 
 Since the 1980s, there have been growing conflicts in Thailand between the 
state’s control over forest areas and local usage of land, and the mass purchases of 
land all over the country by capitalists, who often leave the land unutilised.34 A study 
in 1999 suggests that, after the Asian economic crisis of 1997, over 70 percent of 
                                                          
34 Sittichai et al. (2002), 69-71. 
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land in the country is under-utilised.35 In the early 2010s, there are many reports by 
farmers, real estate businesses, government officials and others, which suggest that 
both Thai and non-Thai capital have been investing in land and at various points 
along vertical agri-food chains to gain integrated systemic control.36 Continual 
increases of fossil fuel prices have also led the Thai government to support 
production of agro-fuels, which drives up prices of sugar cane, cassava and palm 
oil.37 The following paragraphs elaborate on these issues. 
Non-Thai transnational capital is prohibited by the Foreign Business Act of 
1999 to purchase land for agricultural purposes. In practice, however, there are many 
loopholes that have allowed non-Thais to control land for agricultural purposes, such 
as through Thai nominees. It is often difficult to gather information from farmers as 
they fear backlash,38 but from what is available, it seems that land grabs in many 
provinces all over the country can be of various scales, such as from ten rai to over a 
thousand rai.39 Contrary to the typical image of land grabs where land grabs are 
pictured as large-scale plantations, in the case of Thailand, land grabs can also occur 
                                                          
35 See abstract of Warin Wongharnchao, Land Institute Foundation et al., A Study of Ownership and 
Usage of Land, as Well as Economic and Legal Measures to Maximise Land Usage (Bangkok: 
Thailand Research Fund, 2001). (in Thai) 
36 For example, Dr. Weerachai Nakwibulwong, Secretary General of ALRO, interviewed 14 February 
2013, Bangkok. For interviews of state officials from DSI and Ministry of Commerce, as well as vice 
mayor of Pichit province, see: Post Today Newspaper’s editors, “Foreign and Thai Capital’ Purchases 
of Foundations of Agriculture,” Post Today, February 20, 2010, reprinted in 
<http://http://www.tja.or.th/>. For other reports, such as from the president of Thai farmers' 
association, see: Dailynews, “Foreign Force Swallows Million Rai of Paddy Field. President of Thai 
Farmers’ Association Exposed Dangerous Sign; Foreign Force's Land Grab Goals in Central and 
Northeastern Regions,” Dailynews (online), August 04, 2009; Manager Newspaper (weekly), 
“Foreign Force’s Land Grabs in 25 provinces. Land Sold in Massive Volume by Farmers and 
Brokers,” September 17, 2009; Matichon Newspaper, “Village Leader Tells of Capitalist Land 
Grabbing of Rice Fields,” April 04, 2012. (in Thai) 
37 Isawilanont and Kao-ian (2009), 33 and 35. 
38 Mr. Prasit Boonchuey, President of Thai Rice Farmers' Association, quoted in Dailynews, "Foreign 
Force," (2009). 
39 DSI and Ministry of Commerce's preliminary investigation of foreign land grabs, quoted in Post 
Today Newspaper’s editors, "Foreign and Thai Capital," (2010); Prasit Boonchuey quoted in 
Dailynews, "Foreign Force," (2009); BioThai and local informants quoted in Manager Manager 
Newspaper (weekly), “Foreign Force’s Land Grabs in 25 Provinces," (2009). 
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through networks of several small firms which were established to purchase land in 
different areas.40  
There are also other arrangements similar to contract farming which allow 
non-Thais to control what is being produced, how it is produced and processed (for 
example, which company's hybrid seeds to use), and where products are 
distributed.41 Non-Thai capital can hire Thai nominees or brokers to purchase and 
manage large plantations for them, and they can offer to rent land at much higher 
prices than prices paid by Thai farmers to ensure their access to large plots of land. 
Thai farmers are usually hired as labour in these land plots for the production of 
agricultural commodities (e.g. rice) by capital from various places such as Lebanon, 
Taiwan and Saudi Arabia. The products are then exported to countries of origin of 
these capital groups.42 There are also reports of a growing number of Thai firms that 
provide "all-in-one" large-scale agricultural plantations to service non-Thai capital.43 
In the North, Northeast, Central, and South regions of the country, non-Thai capital 
are not only interested in land grabs for food productions, but also cash crops and 
energy crops.44 Suratthani province in the South, for example, is known for having a 
lot of large-scale palm oil plantations owned by medium and large Thai and non-
Thai (dominated by Malaysian and Singaporean capital) palm oil refinery 
                                                          
40 Local Act Organisation's (an NGO) study based on the database of the Department of Land, quoted 
in “Famous Business Families Stocking up Land All over Thailand, Jareon Rich with 6.3 Hundred 
Thousand Rai, Land Tax in Consideration,” Prachachat Turakiij (online), June 18, 2014. (in Thai) 
41 See: Dailynews, "Foreign Force," (2009) and Bangkok Business Newspaper, “President of Thai 
Farmers’ Association Reports to DSI about Foreign Land Grabs of Rice Fields,” August 06, 2009. (in 
Thai) 
42 Summary from interviews of Prasit Boonchuey in Dailynews, "Foreign Force," (2009) and 
Bangkok Business Newspaper, "President of Thai Farmers' Association," (2009). (in Thai). 
43 For example, see: Manager Newspaper (weekly), "Foreign Force's Land Grabs," (2009). 
44 For example, in the South there are reports of land grabs by Thai and Malaysian capital for palm oil 
plantations. (Prachachart Thurakit Newspaper, “Wave of Land Grabs for Speculations and Agro-Fuels 
Inputs due to Low Interest Rates and Rising Agricultural Commodity Prices,” May 14, 2008.) 
According to the BioThai Foundation's investigation with help from farmer networks in over 19 
provinces, the top six provinces for foreign land grabs are in the Central plain, including Ayuthya 
where there are Middle East capital investing in rice production. (Witoon Lienchamroon from 
BioThai, quoted in Manager Newspaper (weekly), "Foreign Force's Land Grabs," (2009).) 
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companies.45 There are also other forms of agricultural investment by foreign 
capital. For example, some Japanese capital have reportedly purchased 49 percent 
shares (as limited by the Thai law) in rice mills and engaged in Japanese rice 
contract farming, while some Taiwanese capital have purchased shares in sugar 
factories in addition to their investments in sugar cane, palm oil and eucalyptus 
plantations.46 
Interestingly, many large land holders in Thailand have interests in the 
energy sector, which further suggests the interconnections of the agri-food and 
energy sectors. Two of the biggest Thai transnational capital groups - the Charoen 
Pokphand  (CP) group and Thai Beverage plc. (often referred to in Thailand as 
"Chang Beer" business Group) - have also joined the quest to secure agri-food 
production resources. They invest not only just in Thailand, but also abroad, as 
future profitability rises due to concerns around food security and energy scarcity. In 
2008, the Thai Beverage group had over 100,000 rai of land in over 56 provinces.47 
In 2014, it is suggested that it has the control of over 630,000 rai of land through 
individual, family and company land ownerships.48 They have also hired a former 
Director General of the Department of Agriculture, Anan Dalodom, to plan what can 
be grown in each area, with an emphasis on key commodities such as rice, rubber, 
sugar cane, cassava and palm oil. For example, rice is grown on over 10,000 rai of 
their land in Ayuthya.49 It is estimated that Thai Beverage has become the biggest 
                                                          
45 Land Reform Network and Local Act, A Report on the Study “Land Management and Social 
Justice: A Case Study of the Land Reform Network”, Part of the Project to Encourage Social Justice, 
Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Social 
Research Institute, 2010), 106-108. (in Thai) 
46 Manager Newspaper (weekly), "Foreign Force's Land Grabs," (2009). 
47 According to a manager at TCC Agro which is part of the Thai Beverage group, quoted in Business 
Thai, “Thanin-Jaroen: 2 Rich Men Are Revolutionising Thai Agriculture!,” May 08, 2008. (in Thai) 
48 Local Act Organisation's (an NGO) study based on the database of the Department of Land, quoted 
in Prachachat Turakiij (online), “Famous Business Families Stocking up Land,” June 18, 2014. 
49 Manager Newspaper (weekly), "Foreign Force's Land Grabs," (2009). 
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owner of rubber and sugar cane plantations in Thailand.50 The second largest land 
holder in Thailand is the CP group (over 200,000 rai),51 which also utilises contract 
farming as a way to secure inputs for its biodiesel production plants. By 2017, CP 
plans to have over 500,000 rai of contract farms of palm oil in Thailand, Laos, 
Vietnam and Myanmar.52 CP and contract farming in Thailand are discussed in 
greater detail in section 1.4. Other large landholders in Thailand include: United 
Palm Oil Industry Plc. (44,400 rai); the Crown Property Bureau (around 30,000 rai); 
IRPC Plc. (petro-chemical manufacturer which owns 17,000 rai); the Maleenont 
family (telecommunication business group which owns more than 10,000 rai); and 
Dr. Boon Wanasin, Executive Managing Director of Thonburi hospital group 
(around 10,000 rai).53 
The Thai state and the private sector often suggest that Thai farmers will 
benefit when agricultural commodities fetch higher prices, due to food security 
concerns and the food-fuel connections (such discourses are discussed in part 3 of 
this chapter). However, the influx of resource grabs in recent years contributes to 
higher purchase prices of land and rental prices of agricultural land in many areas, 
which makes it increasingly difficult for small and medium size farmers to continue 
renting land. Problems of drastic increases of land and rental prices have been 
reported by many people such as the BioThai Foundation,54 Dr. Permsak 
                                                          
50 Business Thai, "Thanin-Jaroen," (2008). 
51 Local Act Organisation's study based on the database of the Department of Land, quoted in 
Prachachat Turakiij (online), “Famous Business Families Stocking up Land,” June 18, 2014. 
52 Manager Newspaper (weekly), “CP Advances on Biodiesel Business, Contract Farming of Palm Oil 
in Indochina,” March 21, 2008. (in Thai) 
53 Local Act Organisation's study based on the database of the Department of Land, quoted in 
Prachachat Turakiij (online), “Famous Business Families Stocking up Land,” June 18, 2014. (in 
Thai) 
54 Quoted in Manager Newspaper (online), “Food Crisis Increases Pressure on Landless Farmers. 
Watch out for CP’s Monopoly Control over 100,000 Million Baht Rice Seeds Market,” May 01, 2008. 
(in Thai) 
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Mokarapirom (an academic and member of the National Reform Committee),55 
journalists' local sources,56 and civil servants.57 For example, Mr. Phraiwal Choomai 
from the Agricultural Office in Patlung province suggests that recent waves of land 
grabs have pushed the price of rubber plantations from 120,000 to 200,000 baht per 
rai.58 Some locals reported that in Suphanburi province, land plots which used to 
cost around tens of thousands of baht (before 2007) now cost around 120,000 baht or 
more,59 while in Chainat the rental price more than tripled from 500 baht per rai per 
year (before 2007) to 1,500 baht per rai per round of production (as reported in 
2009).60 At the national level, between 2008 to 2011 and 2012 to 2015, the average 
price of land increased 5 percent (8 percent in the South).61 In areas with good access 
to public utilities, prices could double. Such increases in the prices of land also 
further stimulate large-scale purchases for speculation purposes.62 In another new 
practice, rent is now charged not per year but per round of production, as landlords 
see that agri-food products can fetch higher prices.63 Landlords also sometimes 
decide to stop renting and engage in agricultural production themselves.64 Chapter 4 
will also discuss how the paddy pledging scheme also contributed to the increased in 
prices of farmland. 
                                                          
55 Quoted in Matichon Newspaper, “National Reform Committee Suggests Land Reform to Take 
Advantage of Food Crisis,” March 16, 2011. (in Thai) 
56 Manager Newspaper (weekly), "Foreign Force's Land Grabs," (2009). 
57 For example, complaints received from farmers were reported by Minister of Agriculture and Co-
operatives (MOAC) in MOAC, “Ministry of Agriculture and Co-Operatives Tries to Stop Capitalists 
from Increasing Rent and Exploiting Farmers, Using Legal Means according to the Agricultural Land 
Rent Act,” April 21, 2008. (in Thai) 
58 Reported in Prachachart Thurakit Newspaper, “Wave of Land Grabs", (2008). 
59 Manager Newspaper (weekly), "Foreign Force's Land Grabs," (2009). 
60 Ibid. 
61 Assistant Professor Dr. Duangmanee Laowakul, Faculty of Economics, Thammasart University, 
research presentation at the Food Security Assembly 2014 in Thailand, quoted in “Macro View of 
Land in Thailand Reveals Inequality and Highly Concentrated Land: Wealth in Poor People’s Tears,” 
Isra News, July 14, 2014. (in Thai) 
62 Ibid. 
63 MOAC (2008). 
64 Witoon Lienchamroon quoted in Manager Newspaper (online), “Food Crisis Increases Pressure on 
Landless Farmers," (2008). (in Thai) 
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The recent spurs of land grabs in Thailand are likely to increase the scale of 
dispossession of small and medium scale farmers, or transform them into semi-
farmers/semi-workers through contract farming arrangements. Some farmers have 
become farm managers to manage large-scale plantations to meet non-Thai capital's 
export orders.65 As chapter 2 suggested, their situations are close to that of workers 
in the industrial sector. Farmers who still have their own land might also be 
increasingly tempted by short-term monetary gains and sell their land, even though 
future prospects as low or semi-skilled workers, or as part of the "reserve army of 
labour", can be rather bleak. In addition, even though Thailand is still a net exporter 
of food, recent waves of land and other forms of resource grabs have raised concerns 
over food security, environmental degradation, and reduction of biodiversity. After 
2002, domestic prices of food and energy crops increased substantially, and many 
farmlands switched their production from food crops to energy crops. In total, energy 
crop plantation area increased from 18.6 million rai in 2002 to 22.3 million rai in 
2007.66 A regression study also suggests that fossil fuel prices positively correlate 
with prices of energy crops in Thailand, and to a lesser extent with prices of food 
crops. This suggests a future trend where more resources are likely to be devoted to 
energy crop production, resulting in rising costs of agri-food production and 
potential domestic food security problems.67 
As discussed in chapter 2, given current technology, aggregate fossil energy 
used in the production of agro-fuels is higher than the energy contained in agro-fuel 
                                                          
65 During the author's field research in Thailand (October 2012-February 2013), a few farmers in the 
Central and Northeastern regions discussed having been offered positions as farm managers of certain 
agri-food commodities, or that they know of other farmers who took such jobs. An example include 
Ms. Nanta Haitook, President of Baan Tanon organic group, interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin. 
66 Isawilanont and Kao-ian (2009), 35. 
67 Ibid, 33 and 36. 
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outputs.68 Hence, the growth of large-scale production of agro-fuels is unlikely to 
solve the finite energy problem. Many agricultural inputs such as fertilisers and 
chemicals are also derived from fossil fuels and it can be seen that, for example, 
fertiliser costs increased dramatically in 2008 as a result of higher fossil fuel prices.69 
In addition, there are also opportunity costs to consider with regard to agro-fuels 
production, as land could perhaps be used in other ecologically sustainable ways to 
benefit the majority of the population.70  
Concerns over food and energy scarcities, which increase expected 
profitability of agriculture, have prompted not only the recent waves of land and 
other resource grabs, but also financial speculations on agricultural commodities 
which exaggerate prices beyond supply fundamentals. Although this section focuses 
on the food-energy nexus and land grabs, the thesis recognises intimate linkages 
between land grabs, finance capital, and speculations, as chapter 2 has discussed.71 
The next section discusses in greater detail some of these linkages, particularly how 
financial speculations contribute to volatile prices of some key commercial crops in 
Thailand. 
1.3) Commercial crops, volatile prices and speculations 
This section explores how financial speculations on agri-food products can 
contribute to increasingly volatile prices, which have dispossession effects on small 
                                                          
68 Pimentel and Patzek, “Ethanol Production Using Corn, Switchgrass, and Wood: Biodiesel 
Production Using Soybean and Sunflower,” (2005), Patzek and Pimentel, “Thermodynamics of 
Energy Production from Biomass,” (2006), quoted in Weis (2010), 324-327. 
69 Isawilanont and Kao-ian (2009), 47. 
70 An analysis of land grabs using the concept of opportunity costs has been used by Olivier De 
Schutter, “How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-Scale Investments in 
Farmland,” Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 2 (March 2011): 249–279. 
71 For example, see Jennifer Clapp, “Food Price Volatility and Vulnerability in the Global South: 
Considering the Global Economic Context,” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 6 (September 2009): 
1183–1196. 
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and medium scale producers by making their revenues uncertain. Moreover, as will 
be discussed below using empirical evidence from Thailand, speculations can 
sometimes increase prices of food within a short period of time, which has similar 
effects to reductions in real wages of average consumers, which can lead to forced 
under-consumption. However, price increases do not necessarily proportionately 
benefit producers. 
 Important commercial agricultural products in Thailand include rice, rubber, 
cassava, maize, palm oil, and top major export products in terms of value include 
rubber, rice, shrimps, fish and their products, as well as sugar and cassava.72 As 
discussed in chapter 2, in the past few years, non-commercial speculators have 
entered futures markets in large numbers, betting on rising prices.73 For example, 
hedge funds saw sugar as “the new crude oil”.74 These artificially high prices send 
problematic market signals to producers. When prices are high, producers are often 
encouraged to expand production, which then leads to higher supply and lower 
prices. Increased financial speculations amplifies these problems. In Thailand, sugar 
cane prices reached the highest level in 28 years in 2009, and the price level was 
estimated by Thai sugar mill associations to remain high for many years due to 
world demand (such as from India and China) and due to speculations by hedge 
funds. Thai sugar cane producers then increased production to respond to the higher 
prices.75 However, producers in other countries also increased their production. In 
early 2014, prices of sugar cane dropped to near or below break-even prices for 
producers in Thailand, mainly because of increased world supply of sugar cane and 
                                                          
72 Office of Agricultural Economics (Thailand), Agricultural Statistics of Thailand 2010, 168. 
73 Clapp (2009), 1187. 
74 Paul Tharp, “Hedge Funds Find New Sweet Spot in Sugar,” New York Post, 30 September 2009. 
75 Matichon Newspaper, “3 Sugar Plants Associations Believe in the Long Bright Future of Sugar 
Cane and Sugar Industries, Pushing the State to Support Ethanol,” September 25, 2009. (in Thai) 
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sugar from India, China and Brazil.76 Maize producers in Thailand have faced 
similar problems. For example, there was an expansion of maize production in Naan 
province after the high prices in 2007 and 2008.77 However, the costs of production 
(seed, fertilizer and herbicide prices) doubled during the same period, while there 
was no significant increase in yield. Later on, prices received by producers dropped 
significantly (almost by half) due to increased supply and also due to imports of 
maize from neighbouring countries.78 
 Such cycles of "low supply-high price" and "high supply-low price" are 
common for agricultural commodities under current market arrangements, but 
speculations further complicate the situations. Some commercial plants such as palm 
oil, rubber, and other garden plants, require some fixed investments over a period of 
time before produce can be harvested, which means that producers could harshly be 
affected economically by fluctuating prices. Similar to the case of sugar, rubber in 
Thailand is grown mostly for export, and prices depend on various factors such as 
world supply and demand (particularly demand from large industrialised economies 
such as China, Japan, the US and the EU), as well as on speculations in Japanese and 
Singapore markets.79 In early March 2011, prices of rubber in Thailand dropped 
drastically in the same direction as in futures markets of Tokyo and Singapore, as a 
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response to concerns in the Middle East and other factors. This caused further 
speculations and downward spiral in prices. Drastic drops in prices (22 US 
dollars/ton in one week) caused small and medium rubber co-operatives and other 
players in Thailand to lose over 10,000 million baht.80 Aside from such economic 
losses, intensive production of cash crops and energy crops also intensifies 
environmental problems.81 
 By relying on one or few of these commodities, small-scale or semi-
dispossessed farmers face increased economic risks, as volatile prices make their 
revenues uncertain. They also face increased food insecurity due to reductions of 
biodiversity and food crops in their land.82 Global financial speculations on basic 
food grains such as rice, can also affect the agri-food system and well-being of the 
majority of people in Thailand. The price spikes of 2007/2008 drove up domestic 
prices of rice, which negatively affected (especially low-income) consumers, while 
small and medium scale producers were not the main beneficiaries of the higher 
prices, as explained below. 
  Thailand produces around 20 million tons of rice per year. Roughly half of it 
is used for domestic consumption and the other half is exported.83 Due to linkages 
with the global market, domestic price movements in Thailand closely follow world 
market prices. Between 1985 and 2011, the movements of domestic paddy and rice 
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prices were in the same directions as export market prices.84 A study from FAO also 
suggests that, although Thailand has some government interventions in terms of 
procurement and storage, domestic prices nevertheless follow world prices very 
closely (except in the 1960s and 1970s) such as between 2003 and 2007.85 After 
2008, prices of rice in important export markets became increasingly volatile,86 and 
in recent years the paddy pledging scheme makes the situation more complicated (to 
be discussed in chapter 4). When international prices of rice surged from an average 
of $378 per ton in December 2007 to more than $700 per ton by the end of March 
2008, domestic rice prices in Bangkok increased 17 percent between January and 
February 2008.87 Between April and May 2008, a few food commodity prices in 
Bangkok became significantly higher, particularly Jasmine rice (103 percent), 
followed by brown sugar and meat.88 This negatively affected not only low income 
and poor people in the city, but also the general population, as a field research in 
2010 suggests that spending on food accounted for 30 to 50 percent of total 
household income across the country.89 Interestingly, a study in 2003 suggests that, 
despite proximity to agricultural production resources, around 17.8 percent of 
households in rural areas spends more than 80 percent of their income on food.90 
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 Rice producers in Thailand have occasionally benefited from increased 
prices, but not as much as intermediaries and large-scale corporations operating 
along the rice export supply chain. It has been noted that the increased in prices 
received by farmers tends to be proportionately less than the increased in wholesale 
and export prices.91 A study based on interviews of rice mill operators and rice 
exporters, as well as figures from the Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE), 
suggests that during the global food price spikes of 2007/2008 (between 2007 and 
2008), farmers' average costs of paddy production increased around 60 percent; 
variable costs (labour, seeds and other inputs) increased around 44 percent while 
other fixed costs, such as rent, increased over 108 percent.92 Profits accrued to 
farmers, however, increased 52 percent between 2007 and 2008, which accounted to 
around 18.5 percent of total profits in rice export supply chains – a reduction from 21 
percent in 2007.93 Profits accruing to middlemen, on the other hand, increased 440 
percent, which amounted to 8.5 percent of total profits in 2008, which was a massive 
increase compared to their share of 2.8 percent in 2007.94 Profits accruing to rice 
mills increased 16 percent between 2007 and 2008 (profits of rice mills were already 
substantially increasing by 128 percent between 2005 to 2008) and, most 
importantly, exporters' profits increased 134 percent, which amounted to 42.7 
percent of total profits in rice export supply chains in 2008.95 
 Rice mills and exporters had lion's shares of total profits in the late 2000s. 
Between 2005 and 2008, rice mills and exporters' profits amounted to around 73 to 
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77 percent of total profits of rice exports.96 Such distribution of profits is likely to be, 
at least partially, the result of monopolistic/monopsonistic structures of the paddy 
and rice markets, as well as the result of the paddy pledging scheme (to be discussed 
in chapter 4). In 2009, there were various news reports that rice mills often hoard 
rice to bargain for higher prices from exporters when international market prices 
were expected to be higher. Such actions help to push up prices of rice in Thai 
domestic markets without yielding higher economic benefits to small-scale 
farmers.97 
As the next section elaborates, farmers whose revenues are already uncertain 
due to volatile prices of agri-food commodities can also be subjected to monopoly 
power in the markets, which dictate prices and pass on the burden of depressed 
prices to smaller players. The next section also discusses contract farming 
arrangements in Thailand which, in theory, seem to provide some certainty and less 
risks for producers, with fixed guaranteed channels to sell products and pre-agreed 
upon prices. However, in reality, there are some inequitable contract farming 
arrangements in Thailand which enable surplus appropriations from producers to 
agri-businesses through market exchanges of agri-food inputs and outputs. 
1.4) Monopoly power, large agri-businesses and surplus appropriation 
As chapter 2 discussed, the neo-Marxist critique of the corporate agri-food system 
suggests the tendency for monopoly capital to emerge in the capitalist system, and 
that monopoly capital can use their power to appropriate surplus through their 
monopoly controls, such as over production inputs, trade channels, and credits. The 
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previous sections have briefly suggested that there are certain degrees of monopoly 
control over production inputs such as seeds and land in Thailand. As for agricultural 
chemicals, a study suggests that the ten biggest importers of agricultural chemicals 
(out of around 200 companies) controlled 52.64 percent of market shares in Thailand 
in 2007.98 This section discusses monopoly power and appropriations of surplus in 
the agri-food system in Thailand in greater detail. It argues that many large agri-
businesses have managed to control production inputs, credits, methods, as well as 
processing and trade channels of many agricultural products. The following 
subsections discuss examples of such large agri-businesses and contract farming 
arrangements in Thailand which facilitate systematic monopoly control over agri-
food chains. 
 Agri-businesses and contract farming: integrated monopoly control  
One of the largest and most influential agri-businesses in Thailand is the Charoen 
Pokphand (CP) group, which started out as a seed company and then grew into a 
modern large-scale chicken raising business. At present, it has become a leading 
transnational company based in Thailand with over a hundred companies around the 
world, including in Asia, Europe, North America and the Middle East, with 
businesses in many sectors aside from agro-industry, such as petrochemical, 
communications, real estate, etc.99 CP has considerable power in some agri-food 
commodity chains in Thailand. It holds a large amount of land and also engages in 
contract farming of many products such as poultry, pork, and fish. In Thailand, CP 
controlled over 20 percent of the market in chicken production, 20 percent in the 
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pork retail sector, 40 percent in animal feed, and 20 percent of the total export 
markets in the broiler sector in 2001.100 The next sub-section focuses on CP's 
monopoly power in the modern retail business in Thailand, while part 2 of the 
chapter discusses CP's linkages with the Thai state in greater detail. 
 According to the FAO Integrated Pest Management regional programme, 
contract farming is becoming the most dominant export production system in 
Thailand.101 Even though it does not apply to all cases and all agri-food 
commodities, some contract farming arrangements in Thailand can be seen as the 
amalgamation of monopoly control over productive resources, processing, trade 
channels, and credit. Many studies suggest that a lot of contract farming 
arrangements yield lower benefits to small-scale farmers compare to contracting 
companies, such as the 2003 report by the Thai Senate Committee on Agriculture 
and Co-operatives.102 Through contract farming, agri-businesses can gain complete 
control over production inputs, methods, and distribution. They also encourage 
commodification and capitalist agriculture, discussed in section 1.1, and farmers are 
often converted into mere "workers in a vast agro-industrial assembly line" who 
perform specialised production skills.103  
 Contract farmers tend to have low bargaining power and usually have to 
carry production risks, such as those associated with the weather and climate change. 
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The returns that they receive can sometimes be lower than the income received by 
non-agricultural sector labourers.104 A study conducted between 2010 and 2012 of 
contract farming of five commodities (pork, chicken, fish, sugar cane and maize) in 
four provinces of Thailand also suggests that small-scale farmers tend to have lower 
bargaining power compare to agri-businesses. From standard surveys of 41 farmers: 
90.2 percent of the farmers suggested that they had to carry most of the production 
risks and investment costs; 87.8 percent felt powerless to bargain to determine prices 
and agreed that companies can set all the terms regarding product standards and 
harvest time; and 73.2 percent were affected by price fluctuations because companies 
pass on lower prices to them.105 Aside from having to carry disproportionate parts of 
production risks, small-scale farmers usually have to purchase their inputs only from 
the agri-businesses they are selling their products to.106 A study in 2011 found that, 
with contract farming, over 70 percent of small-scale farmers' costs of production 
were in different forms of payment to agri-businesses. In the case of fish and chicken 
contract farming, payment for production inputs can be as high as 85 to 90 percent of 
total costs.107  
There are many reasons why Thai farmers sign up for contract farming 
arrangements, but one cannot simply argue that they have complete freedom of 
choice under a competitive market economy, as monopoly power exerts influence 
over production inputs, trade channels, and access to credits in the agri-food system, 
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which limits options and choices of small-scale producers. As suggested by a field 
research of pig and chicken farmers in three provinces of the Central and North-
eastern regions in 2004, in addition to higher expected income, farmers signed the 
contracts because they had no capital to set up independently, as it was difficult for 
them to receive loans from other sources. If they signed contracts with the company, 
the company would provide inputs and access to bank loans. In addition, there was 
no market for independent farmers who want to raise chicken broilers, as contracting 
companies controlled the majority of trade channels.108  
Contract farming arrangements of some commodities require large sums of 
fixed capital investments, often financed through bank loans, which discourage 
farmers from breaking off their contracts when they find the contracts to be 
inequitable. For example, egg contract farmers at Ampur Banpong community, 
Chiang Mai province, had to invest a lot in production equipments and often used 
their land as collateral. However, the contracting companies seem to have higher 
power as they can stop purchasing from them at any time. In addition, there were a 
lot of negative externality problems in terms of pollution and unhygienic conditions, 
which cause grave conflicts in the community.109 The author's interviews of a few 
egg contract farmers at Romphothong village, Chiang Mai province in 2012 also 
support these points.110 
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Agri-businesses and monopoly control over agri-food processing and trade  
This subsection uses examples of rice, fruits and vegetables to demonstrate how 
participants in some agri-food chains in Thailand tend to have unequal market 
power. In the case of rice, a study found that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, some 
farmers had to sell their paddy to rice mills even though they knew the rice mills 
were cheating on them, or that they were paid less than what they should had 
received. This was because they lacked other channels to sell their paddy, and it 
would cost just the same to transport the paddy to other mills.111 This study also 
found that gross revenues and net profits of Jasmine rice traders were quite high, as 
compare to that of farmers.112 Rice trade in Thailand, before the implementation of 
the paddy pledging scheme in recent years, was dominated by few big firms. In 
2007, the ten biggest companies exported 70 percent of total Thai rice export. The 
biggest company was Nakhon Luang or Capital Rice, which exported 17.6 percent of 
total rice export.113 In 2010, five companies exported 50 percent of total export.114 
Monopolistic power also helps to explain why, as discussed in the previous section, 
when prices of rice was high during the global food price crisis of 2007 and 2008, 
farmers did not benefit as much as rice mills and exporters. Chapter 4 will also 
discuss how the paddy pledging scheme has helped to increase the power of large 
rice mills and traders. 
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 Another good example of monopoly power in the agri-food export business is 
in the case of longans - a type of fruit which can be exported in fresh or dried forms. 
Mr. Pitak Saengsin, Vice President of the Chiang Mai branch of the Bank of 
Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operative (BAAC), suggests that the monopoly 
power of around 4 to 5 traders makes it possible for them to depress prices received 
by smaller-scale traders and farmers. China is the main export market of Thai 
longans, but Chinese importers prefer to deal with large-scale longan middlemen in 
Thailand, which help to increase their power. Without connections, it is very difficult 
to compete in the business. For example, delays at Chinese customs may spoil the 
products, and hence can be used to eliminate competition or to force 
collaborations.115  
 At first glance, domestic fruits and vegetable central/wholesale markets in 
Thailand might appear to be competitive with many players.116 Further study, 
however, suggests that there are some well-established "networks" backed by large 
capital or influential individuals who wield considerable power along some 
commodity chains. The BAAC in Chiang Mai had tried to directly collect products 
from farmers and find channels to sell them to reduce the power of middlemen. 
However, even when they sold the products at lower prices at a central market, 
virtually nobody bought the products. This is because traders only buy from their 
usual networks. If they buy products from someone else, such as from the BAAC, 
they might face retributions. In other words, some agri-food products, such as 
onions, which are sold at central and wholesale markets such as Talad-Thai, See-
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mum-muang, and Ratchaburi wholesale markets, are likely to be controlled by 
certain individuals and their networks. Smaller-scale traders are, overall, more 
concerned about maintaining good long-term relationships with these monopoly 
networks and influential individuals who have extensive controls over many agri-
food product supply chains, rather than with short-term price competitiveness.117 
Such mafia-like informal rules of the market are compatible with the widespread 
acceptance of patron-client relationships in Thai society, which are discussed in the 
next part of the chapter as part of the hegemonic governance structures. Monopolies 
and patron-client relationships can obstruct new players to enter the market and to 
compete. Smaller players are allowed to enter some small retail markets, such as on 
the streets or markets in front of hospitals, but not the central wholesale markets 
which determine nationwide retail prices.118 
  In sum, there is evidence to suggest that, in many cases, intermediaries in 
agri-food supply chains wield considerable market power, which allows them to 
appropriate surplus from small-scale farmers. Similarly, there are also monopolies in 
the modern retail trade sector where agri-food products are important components. 
Studies suggest that, with increased vertical concentrations along agri-food chains in 
both developed and developing countries, supermarkets now play a huge role in 
product development, branding, supplier selection and distribution. They can use 
their market power to exercise control along the chains. For example, they can 
specify how products should be grown, harvested, transported, processed and 
stored.119 In Thailand, a few companies which developed through alliances of Thai 
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and non-Thai capital, have been able to control major market shares in the national 
modern retail sector. Supermarkets in Thailand have approximately 40 to 50 percent 
share of the national fruit and vegetable market,120 and many agri-food products are 
now being sold through modern trade channels of varying scales, ranging from large 
hypermarkets to village-level convenience stores.  
 Following two major business takeovers in the early 2010s, the two biggest 
Thai capital groups in the modern retail sector are the CP group and the Central 
group.121 CP's annexation of Siam Makro (the biggest wholesale and retail company 
in Thailand) in 2013 further reaffirms the status of the CP group as the biggest 
monopoly transnational agri-business and agri-food retail giant operating in 
Thailand. In addition to having partial ownership and management interests in 
Tesco-Lotus, the biggest hypermarket-supermarket company in Thailand largely 
owned by Tesco (British supermarket giant), CP also owns 7-11 and CP Fresh Mart 
convenient stores in Thailand, which have numerous branches throughout the 
country. This means that CP has some control and influence over three out of the 
four biggest retail companies operating in Thailand (7-11, Tesco-Lotus, Makro, Big 
C). It has been estimated that the combined turnover of 7-11 and Makro in 2013 was 
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around 300,000 million baht, or 49 percent of total market share, while Tesco-Lotus 
had around 25 percent.122  
 In essence, Thai capital in the modern retail business, similar to Thai capital 
which engages in land grabs, do not seem to behave significantly differently from 
non-Thai capital groups, which are generally stimulated by capital accumulation. 
The growth and development of modern trade in Thailand have largely been a result 
of the adoption of advanced capitalist countries' transnational retail companies' 
business models and management techniques, implemented through co-operations 
and joint investments with transnational companies based in Thailand. The CP 
group, for example, learned and imported management techniques from transnational 
businesses in advanced capitalist countries.123 It has also been noted that before 
1997, the Central group did not play a major role in the management of Big C and 
Carrefour even though they were major share holders.124 After the Asian economic 
crisis of 1997, CP and Central groups sold most shares of their hypermarkets (Lotus, 
Big C and Carrefour) to non-Thai transnational companies.125 Joint co-operations 
seem to be mutually beneficial to both non-Thai and Thai transnational companies. 
For example, CP tried to learn from Tesco as it expanded its operations in countries 
such as China and also used connections with Tesco to export its poultry products to 
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the UK,126 while Tesco benefited from CP's cultural and political linkages in 
Thailand and China.127 
 It is possible for the two dominant business groups and their associated allies 
in the retail sector to use their market power to manipulate the agri-food system in 
Thailand, such as to impose inequitable trade deals with small and medium size 
suppliers who have less bargaining power in the market. Large suppliers, on the 
other hand, may be able to sign exclusive supply and territory deals to further limit 
or eliminate competitions in the market. In 2002, there were reports by suppliers of 
various products to the Ministry of Commerce which claim that suppliers were 
charged unfair fees by retail giants who used these fees to cover their losses from 
predatory pricing.128 Often, agricultural products such as rice were sold at low prices 
to promote sales of other products, which depressed rice prices.129 Another study in 
2002 by the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) suggests that small 
suppliers had to pay around 7 to 10 percent of their sales revenue as fees to 
hypermarkets.130 In addition, there were various reports from small and medium 
retail businesses in many provinces that they were being squeezed out of the 
market.131 
 The monopolistic market power of large hypermarkets can further support the 
dominance of large agri-businesses and large-scale middlemen in agri-food supply 
chains, which further reduces the power and choices of both consumers and 
                                                          
126 Than Settakij News, 27-30 August 2000, quoted in Karnchuchat (2006), 239 and Arunee Pholnoi, 
Retail and Wholesale Trade’s Strategies (Bangkok: Pansan, 2003), 137. (in Thai) 
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128 Pholnoi (2003), 71, 76 , 78, 81-82. 
129 The Parliament’s Committee of Commerce, Report on the Study of Problems and Effects of 
Modern Trade (Bangkok, 2003), 9. (in Thai) 
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131 The Parliament’s Committee of Commerce (2003), 7. 
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producers. The CP group, for example, uses their retail outlets as market channels for 
their agri-food products, such as poultry and frozen food.132 In addition, as a few 
studies suggest, hypermarket giants prefer to deal with large-scale suppliers who can 
meet their standards.133 Smaller-scale producers and suppliers may not be able to 
gain significant profits after having to pay fees charged by large retailers. Naso 
producer rice mill (to be discussed in chapter 5) in Yasothon province, for example, 
had tried to supply rice to many hypermarket companies, only to discover that huge 
fees imposed by the companies did not make the sales worthwhile.134 At the same 
time, it is increasingly difficult for smaller-scale producers and suppliers to sell their 
products through alternative channels, especially if they need to sell perishable agri-
food products in large volumes, given that retail giants take up large percentages of 
total modern retail market shares and have the tendency to crowd out smaller retail 
businesses. The next part also discusses CP's ties to the Thai state. 
Part 2: Governance structures of the hegemonic agri-food system in Thailand 
The previous part of the chapter has discussed how the mainstream agri-food 
production-distribution practices in Thailand aid capital accumulation. Production-
distribution practices, however, are only parts of the hegemonic agri-food system in 
Thailand. From a Gramscian theoretical perspective discussed in chapter 2, 
hegemony encompasses more than just the economic structure, but also governance 
and ideological structures. This part of the chapter discusses the hegemonic 
                                                          
132 Pawida Pananont and Weerayuth Karnchuchat, “Thai Capital Expands Abroad,” in The Struggles 
of Thai Capital 1: Adaptation and Dynamics, ed. Pasuk Phongpaichit (Bangkok: Matichon, 2006), 
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governance structures of the agri-food system in Thailand, while part 3 discusses the 
hegemonic ideological order that helps to sustain the hegemonic agri-food system. 
This thesis understands agri-food governance to include public, private, formal and 
informal frameworks – or rules and norms –  that affect the agri-food system in 
Thailand. Even though this chapter concentrates on hegemonic aspects of agri-food 
governance, it should be noted that there can also be counter-hegemonic governance 
structures, which will be discussed in the following chapters. While this chapter 
discusses the central role of the Thai state in the maintenance of hegemonic 
governance structures that support the hegemonic agri-food system, chapters 4 to 6 
will discuss how some smaller parts of the Thai state support counter-hegemonic 
projects which challenge the mainstream agri-food system. This serves to highlight 
one of the central arguments of this thesis regarding how the lines between 
hegemony and counter-hegemony can be quite blurred, and that the Thai state should 
not be seen as a monolithic entity. 
 Chapter 2 has discussed important problems of the global mainstream agri-
food system, which partially arise from existing neo-liberal agri-food production and 
trade governance, as well as the lack of effective global governance structures to 
regulate transnational capital from, for example, land grabs and excessive 
speculations on agri-food commodity prices. Governance structures, such as those 
relating to private intellectual property rights and trade liberalisation, as well as 
regulations (or the lack of them) on market monopolies and contract farming, can be 
used as methods of accumulation by dispossession. The following section 2.1 
explores the role of domestic forces in shaping hegemonic agri-food governance 
structures in Thailand, with a particular focus on the Thai state's policies and 
national laws, which tend to be of similar characters to that of neo-liberal/neo-
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classical economics-embedded policies criticised in chapter 2. Section 2.1 also 
discusses political-cultural-historical informal norms in Thailand, particularly those 
of patron-client relations, which help to explain the crony nature of the Thai state 
that aids capital accumulation in many ways. Section 2.2 then focuses on the role of 
transnational forces in shaping hegemonic agri-food governance in Thailand, such as 
through conditions of loans, trade agreements and private agri-food commodity 
standards. This section also elaborates on how hegemonic transnational influence is 
mediated through various domestic forces in Thailand. 
2.1) Hegemonic domestic forces' influence on the governance structures 
This section focuses on the role of the Thai state in establishing and sustaining 
governance structures which support the hegemonic capitalist agri-food system. It 
also discusses the privileged position of the Crown Property Bureau which is a large 
holder of land. In addition, this section discusses how patron-client relations can be 
seen as important informal norms underlying the crony and pro-capital accumulation 
nature of the Thai state, which help to sustain the hegemonic agri-food system. 
 Policies to aid capital accumulation through the agri-food sector 
The Thai state has consistently promoted capital accumulation through the agri-food 
sector, and also favoured large agri-businesses at the expense of small-scale farmers 
and consumers. For example, when the Green Revolution production paradigm was 
first introduced, the Thai state encouraged Thai farmers to stop using traditional 
seeds and to purchase new seed varieties or high-yield variety (HYV) seeds from the 
state and corporations.135 Markets for maize seeds, for example, are now dominated 
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by a few agri-businesses.136 The Thai state has also favoured the industrial sector at 
the expense of the agricultural sector. For example, the Thai state depressed prices of 
some agricultural commodities to keep industrial workers' wages low in the past,137  
such as through rice premium or ad valorem tax on rice exports.138 It has been 
suggested that the Thai state's policy to use agriculture to subsidise industry was not 
a transitory policy like in some other countries. Instead, it is a permanent policy, as 
substantial parts of government revenues do not go back to improve agriculture.139 
 Since the early 1960s, agri-businesses could secure packages of tax breaks, 
duty privileges and other promotional measures,140 and agricultural export promotion 
policies were clearly adopted since the 1970s.141 In the 5th National Economic and 
Social Development (NESD) plan (1982-1986), agri-businesses were given high 
priority.142 It has been suggested that the domination of agri-businesses in Thailand, 
starting in the 1970s and 1980s, can partially be seen as a "symbolic political 
victory" of the elites, following violent repressions of agrarian movements in the 
1970s which weakened the rural population politically (to be discussed in chapter 4). 
Farmers were also weakened economically due to the decline of primary commodity 
prices in the 1980s.143 
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 Vertical integrations of farming, processing and high value-added exports 
were encouraged by the state, such as through the Office of Agricultural Economics 
(OAE) and the Department of Agricultural Extensions (DAE).144 There were also 
cases in which state officials, such as from the Agricultural Land Reform Office 
(ALRO), used their positions to encourage farmers to grow crops for companies in 
exchange for financial arrangements.145 On the other hand, as discussed in the 
previous part, little has been done to ensure fair and equitable contracts between 
agri-businesses and farmers. The Thai state also supports contract farming in 
neighbouring countries such as Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia through the 
Aeyawadee-Chaopraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation (ACMECS) agreement. 
Transnational Thai agri-business investors also receive tax exemptions when they 
import raw agricultural commodities into Thailand from these countries.146 This 
suggests that the Thai state also aids accumulation by Thai capital in surrounding 
regions of Thailand. As discussed briefly in the previous section, these imports from 
lower-cost countries can help to depress domestic prices and hurt Thai producers 
economically. 
 Despite concerns over the recent global rush for food-energy land grabs, by 
2014 there is still no clear Thai state policy to safeguard agricultural land for food 
production. Although a law to protect agricultural land in Thailand has been drafted, 
it has not been passed. The Thai state, however, started to promote agro-fuels since 
early 2000s. It also supports conversions of agricultural land for the production of 
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ethanol and bio-diesel inputs such as sugar cane, cassava and palm oil. Ethanol 
production has been promoted through many measures, such as machinery and 
corporate tax exemptions from the Board of Investment (BOI). Exports of ethanol to 
countries such as Japan, China, and the US are also encouraged by the Thai Ministry 
of Commerce.147 Land surrounding ethanol production plants have been purchased 
by private entities, and local farmers were also encouraged by the state and private 
sector to grow energy crops.148 The next subsection discusses linkages between the 
Thai state and large agri-businesses, which partly help to explain why the Thai state 
provides agri-food governance structures which are favourable to capital 
accumulation. 
 Crony capitalism: the Thai state and politically connected agri-businesses 
It has been suggested that policies which subordinate agriculture to industrial needs 
also selectively benefited Thai urban-industrial interests that had ties to the 
bureaucracy.149 This is a reflection of the crony capitalist nature of the Thai state. 
Through both direct and indirect participations in politics, some large businesses 
manage to influence policies and state apparatus for their interests. It has been 
suggested that large agri-businesses in Thailand have built connections with political 
parties, educational institutions, the bureaucracy, and other prominent institutions in 
Thailand through financial support and by giving other aids. These businesses, in 
turn, benefit from state concessions and public research.150 In addition, it has been 
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noted that some land grabs by Thai and non-Thai capital receive assistance from 
local politicians who use their canvassers to help purchase land.151 
 It is common practice for businesses in Thailand to give a lot of financial 
contributions to help political parties and individual politicians (from all parties) 
with their election campaigns (and vote buying), so that they can call in favours at 
later dates.152 Struggles of (debt-ridden) Thai conglomerates after the 1997 Asian 
economic crisis, combined with the 1997 Constitution which gave much power to 
the executive branch, provided conditions for strong alliances of politicians and large 
business conglomerates which come to assume leading roles in Thai politics.153 
Thaksin Shinawatra, whose business was in the area of telecommunications, was 
well aware of the benefits of state concessions, and headed the newly established 
Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party in 1998 which came to power in 2001. Funds to create 
TRT came from pooled resources of various large capital groups.154 The party 
clearly represented the interests of the new urban-based capitalist group, despite 
having some rural populist policies (discussed below and in following chapters). 
Bangkok-based business-politicians emerged as the most powerful group of state 
managers, although provincial business politicians were still able to exert some 
influence.155 In 2001, the proportion of members of parliament with business 
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backgrounds was 30 percent.156 Thaksin had also appointed businessmen to the 
boards of government agencies and state enterprises.157 Not surprisingly, many 
studies suggest that capital groups associated with politics benefit economically from 
their direct linkages with the Thai government.158 
As discussed in the previous part, the CP group is possibly the most 
influential transnational agri-business based in Thailand. CP has been noted to have 
strong political linkages with the Thai state since the late 1970s when, for example, 
CP helped establish relations between Thai and Chinese government leaders, which 
allowed CP to gain the trust of both the Chinese and Thai governments.159 CP 
currently has strong ties with various institutions in Thailand, such as in the 
bureaucracy and educational institutions. Many key people in these institutions were 
drawn to work for CP. They also have connections with political parties such as 
Democrat and Thai Rak Thai. CP's high-ranking managers and some members of 
their families had been state managers, which might had enabled them to push for 
favourable policies for CP and agri-businesses.160 For example, the early Thaksin 
Cabinet included big business representatives such as Mr. Pitak Intarawitayanunt and 
Mr. Wattana Muangsuk from the CP group.161 Other notable CP figures include Dr. 
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Aarch Taolanont and Dr. Suthat Sriwattanapong.162 During the first Thaksin 
administration (2001 to 2005), CP received several tax exemptions from the BOI.163 
Although some studies suggest that CP hybrid rice seeds cannot compete with 
traditional rice strains, some state offices such as local branches of the Bank of 
Agriculture and Co-operatives, often encourage farmers to join projects to grow CP 
hybrid rice seeds.164 Following the coup d'état in 2014, it seems that CP is still able 
to maintain good relations with elites on both sides of the political polarisation 
conflict.165 Nevertheless, it is too soon to jump to any definite conclusion at the time 
of writing. 
Patron-client relationships 
Patron-client relationships - a historical-cultural legacy of the Sakdina absolute 
monarchical Thai state - help sustain the crony nature of the Thai state, and help the 
Thai state to support hegemonic agri-food governance without much resistance from 
the general population. In a patron-client hierarchy, those higher up in the hierarchy 
maintain power through the support of those below them. Those lower down in the 
hierarchy in turn expect tangible benefits from their patrons.166 Patron-client as a 
hegemonic mentality in Thai society is discussed in part 3 of this chapter, while this 
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section focuses on patron-client relations in Thai politics which help to explain the 
nature of the Thai state and hegemonic agri-food governance structures upheld by 
the Thai state. It should be noted, however, that patron-client relations are not limited 
to politics, and can be embedded in other forms of social relations such as in the 
trading of agri-food production inputs and commodities. As discussed in part 1, there 
are powerful networks controlling markets of certain fruits and vegetables. Land 
grabs can also be facilitated through the help of canvassers and their patron-client 
networks. Moreover, although this sub-section focuses on patron-client relations 
during electoral democracy periods in Thailand, the thesis recognises that such 
hierarchical social relations and mentality also play important roles in legitimising 
and encouraging tolerance of coup d'états (such as in 2006 and 2014), as well as 
brief periods of military-established governments. However, it is beyond the scope 
of the thesis to discuss these issues in detail. 
 Many scholars have discussed the central role of patron-client relationships in 
Thai politics.167 Patron-client relationships infer that members are unequal, and 
hence undermine a democratic principle of equality in Thailand.168 Many studies 
have linked patron-client relations with vote buying,169 where vote buying goes 
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beyond monetary exchanges170 and can be defined to include many measures that 
help to sustain patron-client networks. For example, local canvassers may try to 
provide special development budgets for certain communities or to promise other 
benefits.171 Many scholars suggest that, owing to patron-client relations, elections 
are often seen by Thais as means to support their patrons or leaders to gain national 
political power. The leaders are then expected to share the spoils of political victory 
within their patron-client networks, rather than to prioritise national policies that 
would benefit the whole country.172 Patronage roles in pre-1990s Thailand were 
typically filled by state officials, politicians and middlemen.173 Political parties also 
reinforce patron-client relationships by selecting candidates based on the criterion 
that they have large patron-client networks.174 In recent times, the Thai state under 
the TRT and Phua Thai administrations provide good examples of the most 
successful political patron-client networks. TRT and Phua Thai managed to win 
elections and used state power to benefit their crony capital, while many of their 
agri-food policies reinforced hierarchical patron-client relations and exacerbated 
structural problems in the agri-food system, as will be discussed in detail in chapter 
4.175 
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 The Crown Property Bureau and the lèse majesté law 
Another notable capital group relevant to the discussion of the agri-food system is 
the Privy Purse Bureau, which was established in 1890 under the absolute monarchy 
regime and was later renamed the Crown Property Bureau (CPB).176 It has been 
estimated that, in the early 1970s, the CPB's landholdings included almost one-third 
of pre-war Bangkok, as well as estates in 22 provinces.177 The CPB has been given 
some special privileges by the state. For example, the 1948 Crown Property Act 
absolved the CPB from tax on its income and established the CPB as an absolutely 
unique entity – as an undefined unit of the Thai state.178 As of around 2008, the CPB 
was worth around US$41 billion.179 However, the extent of influence and privilege 
of the CPB beyond this point, as well as its exact relationships with the Thai 
monarchy, have not been clearly documented. This is perhaps related to the lèse 
majesté law in Thailand that tends to prevent research and public discussions on the 
CPB, which is problematic to the study of the agri-food system in Thailand because 
the CPB owns vast amounts of land and many other businesses.180 As part 3 
discusses, Sakdina or patron-client mentality and royal nationalist sentiments in 
Thailand also help to limit discussions on the CPB. In effect, such sentiments 
support the continuing existence of the lèse majesté law and the privileged position 
of the CPB. 
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2.2) Hegemonic transnational forces' influence on the governance structures 
As discussed in part 1, transnational forces have been instrumental in the shaping of 
physical infrastructures and hegemonic agri-food production-distribution in 
Thailand. This section continues to discuss how they have also influenced the 
hegemonic corporate-led nature of the governance of the agri-food system in 
Thailand, particularly the governance of trade and intellectual property rights of agri-
food products. The thesis recognises that domestic actors do not only support 
transnational hegemonic forces just because their interests are aligned, but also 
because they have internalised globalised hegemonic ideologies, such as those based 
on beliefs in neo-classical/neo-liberal economic principles. However, this issue is 
discussed in greater detail in part 3 of the chapter. 
 After the Asian economic crisis of 1997, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) imposed many austerity measures on Thailand as part of the conditions for its 
loan, resulting in cutbacks of public investments in the agricultural sector, which 
further reinforced the status of agri-businesses as the "nexus point" between world 
market and farms.181 In 1999, the Asian Development Bank (ADB)'s $300 million 
loan for agricultural sector restructuring in Thailand, which accounted for 10 percent 
of the Agriculture Ministry's budget, also included measures explicitly designed to 
introduce market relations into previously state-subsidised activities, particularly the 
provision of water resources, which helped to increase the power of agri-businesses 
in the agri-food system.182 
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 Hegemonic domestic and transnational forces often help each other to 
influence the governance structures of the agri-food system in Thailand, such as by 
lobbying the Thai state to sign free trade agreements (FTAs) and accept strict 
property rights regime that, as discussed in part 1, can enhance monopoly controls 
over seeds. The Thailand Board of Investment (BOI), for example, has been 
promoting foreign investments in agro-fuels production and other agro-processing 
industries, especially since 2008. In 2010, as part of the ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement (ACIA) negotiation, BOI suggested that Thailand should 
remove some fishery, forestry, and plant genetic improvement activities from the 
sensitive list, allowing foreign investors to invest freely in these areas.183 This could 
accelerate the process of accumulation by dispossession such as land grabs and 
monopoly control over genetic resources.  
 Representative groups of the Thai population are usually not involved in free 
trade agreement (FTA) negotiations. The Thai state tends to involve representatives 
from industries and agri-businesses in FTA negotiations but not farmers.184 Pressures 
to sign FTAs with China and the US in the early 2000s, for example, have been 
argued to come from from Thaksin Shinnawatra, the CP group, and other 
transnational companies.185 The Thailand-EU FTA negotiations in the early 2010s, 
which have been criticised for their lack of transparency,186 put pressures on 
                                                          
183 BioThai, Thai life Foundation (RRAFA), and SATHAI, Public Policies’ Implications on Food 
Security, ASEAN free trade arrangements, and Fffects on Farmers, Natural Resources, and the 
Agricultural Sector (Bangkok: BioThai, 2009), 9-14. (in Thai) 
184 Prachason (2008) and Thammawit Terd-udomsap, The Political Economy of Thai FTAs, Research 
Document 8 (Bangkok, 2008), 140. 
185 Witoon Lienchamroon and Supha Yaimuang, “Alternative Agriculture: From Individual Farmers 
to Social Movements,” in Reform the Agricultural Sector for Food Security: Analysis and Practical 
Policies, ed. Witoon Lienchamroon (Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2011), 307-309. (in Thai) 
186 For example, criticisms were made by Assoc. Prof. Dr Jirapon Limpananont, member of the 
National Economics and Social Development Board (NESDB), quoted in Prachathai news, “NESDB 
Warns the Government the Unconstitutional Risk of Not Listening to Public Opinions Regarding 
Thai-EU FTA,” January 16, 2013. (in Thai) 
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Thailand to modify domestic laws to enforce a stricter property rights regime on 
plant genetic materials, in accordance with the International Convention for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) of 1991. This means, for example, 
eliminating a clause on sharing benefits of genetic materials, making it easier for 
seed and biotechnology companies to patent genetic materials in Thailand. In 
addition, patent protection might be extended from 12 years to 20 years.187 A study 
by FTA Watch (Thailand) suggests that the signing of the Thai-EU FTA, which will 
force Thailand to accept strict intellectual property regime, is likely to lead to 
monopoly control of seeds which results in 6 times higher prices, which will cost 
Thailand 1.4 trillion baht per year (in addition to another 1.2 trillion baht/year cost of 
medicine). The costs arguably outweigh the benefits of 30 to 40 thousand million 
baht gained from exporting agri-food products through the EU's generalised system 
of preferences (GSP),188 which would be accrued to a few transnational Thai agri-
businesses such as CP.189 
 Another good example to demonstrate how the combined power of 
hegemonic domestic and transnational forces can shape agri-food governance 
structures to aid capital accumulation, is in the case of the modern retail industry in 
Thailand. As discussed briefly in the previous section, giant supermarkets in 
Thailand have adopted commodity standards, management and distribution practices 
from their transnational non-Thai partners, which affect agri-food chains in Thailand. 
In addition to that, public governance structures have been lenient to large retail 
                                                          
187 BioThai, “Effects of Thai-EU FTA on Plant Genes, Biodiversity, and Food Security,” February 26, 
2013. (in Thai) 
188 Kannikar Kitwetchakul, FTA Watch (Thailand), quoted in Isra News, “Against Section 190 
Modification. NGOs against an Increase in the Power of the Executive - Elites, and a Reduction of 
Civil Society’s Spaces,” November 18, 2013. (in Thai) 
189 Post Today Newspaper, “Draft of Thai-EU FTA: Thai Loses More than Gain,” December 10, 
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transnational capital. As one of the conditions to receive financial aid from the IMF 
after the Asian economic crisis of 1997, Thailand had to pass the Foreign National 
Business Act of 1999 which made foreign investments easier in many areas.190 
Transnational companies such as Tesco (UK) and Carrefour (France), with their 
politically influential Thai capital alliances, became powerful lobbying forces. With 
help from the Central group, BOI was successfully lobbied to provide investment 
supports to Carrefour in 1998 despite objections from the Ministry of Commerce.191 
In 2002, an attempt to pass a law to control monopoly power and unfair trade 
practices was halted after Nevin Chidchop was replaced as Deputy Minister of 
Commerce by Mr. Wattana Muangsuk, who was married into the Jiarawanont family 
which owns the CP group.192 In general, it seems that the Thai state supports vertical 
integrations along agri-food supply and retail chains. The Thai state does not directly 
challenge large monopoly transnational capital, but it initiates some secondary 
policies and supports retail giants' training programmes to help small and medium 
size Thai retailers to increase their competitiveness.193 
 Overall, this part of the chapter has focused on some important hegemonic 
agri-food governance structures in Thailand. Additionally, chapter 6 will also discuss 
hegemonic land governance in Thailand. Underlying these governance structures and 
hegemonic production-distribution practices are hegemonic ideas, such as beliefs of 
certain neo-classical economic principles, the inevitability and desirability of 
Western-style modernisation, as well as patron-client mentality. The following part 
of the chapter explores such hegemonic ideological order which supports the 
mainstream agri-food system in Thailand.  
                                                          
190 Karnchuchat (2006), 234. 
191 Karnchuchat (2006), 237-238 and Pholnoi (2003), 117.  
192 Pholnoi (2003), 84 and 184. 
193 Karnchuchat (2006), 236 and Pholnoi (2003), 181. 
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Part 3: Hegemonic ideational order of the agri-food system in Thailand 
This part of the chapter discusses the hegemonic ideational order that helps to 
establish consent and acceptance of the status quo in the agri-food system in 
Thailand, including even by those who are disadvantaged by established policies. 
There are many forms of hegemonic ideas in Thai society, but this thesis focuses on 
important hegemonic ideas relating to the agri-food system that aid capital 
accumulation, namely those relating to hegemonic transnational neo-liberal and neo-
classical economic ideas, as well as more locally specific hegemonic ideas of patron-
client and nationalist sentiments. 
 The hegemonic ideological order of the agri-food system in Thailand is 
propagated and reproduced by transnational and domestic hegemonic forces through 
different channels, such as educational institutions and the media. Internalised by the 
majority of the Thai population, the hegemonic ideational framework creates 
acceptance which enables the continual existence of the hegemonic agri-food system 
in Thailand. As pointed out in the Gramscian theoretical perspective in chapter 2, 
neo-liberal capitalist ideologies can be seen as global hegemonic ideas, often being 
promoted by political-economic elites in advance capitalist countries as well as other 
transnational forces, and are mediated through various agencies and channels within 
specific national-local contexts. Section 3.1 discusses beliefs of certain neo-
classical/neo-liberal economic principles in Thailand and of the modernisation 
development paradigm. Section 3.2 then discusses informal political norms of 
"Sakdina" or patron-client mentality and some forms of nationalist sentiments in 
Thailand. Overall, this part of the chapter suggests that the hegemonic ideational 
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order consists of interactions of such neo-classical/neo-liberal economic ideas and 
the hegemonic historical-cultural ideas specific to the context of Thailand. 
3.1) Neo-classical economics and modernisation 
Part 2 of this chapter has discussed how hegemonic transnational forces have 
influenced the governance structures of the agri-food system in Thailand. 
Transnational hegemonic influence, however, also include dissipation and 
propagation of neo-classical economics and modernisation development ideas in 
Thai society, which help to establish the population's acceptance of the hegemonic 
agri-food system. Chapter 2 already discussed, for example, beliefs in the desirability 
of economic efficiency, specialisation and trade according comparative advantage, 
and private intellectual property rights. The following paragraphs give some 
examples of mainstream economics' hegemonic discourses that have been 
propagated by the mainstream in Thai society, such as by state officials, businesses 
and academics, which have been internalised by the general population. These 
discourses establish consent while hiding structural problems in the hegemonic agri-
food system in Thailand. This section then discusses hegemonic beliefs in the 
modernisation development theory and specialised academic disciplines in the Thai 
context. There might also be some other transnational hegemonic ideas which have 
been internalised by the general public in Thailand. As chapter 5 will discuss, some 
people in the sustainable agriculture movement suggest that consumerism and 
individualism can be seen as part of the hegemonic ideational order. However, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss them in detail. 
139 
 
 Similar to the World Bank's World Development Report of 2008 discussed in 
chapter 2,194 in Thailand, food-energy scarcity concerns, market mechanisms, and 
capital's domination over the globalised agri-food system, are often portrayed as 
win-win opportunities for everyone, even though that is not the case as discussed in 
previous parts of the chapter. When the production of energy and economic crops are 
encouraged by the Thai state and agri-businesses to meet industrial and export 
demands, it is often accompanied by the explanation that these crops fetch higher 
prices and hence will help to improve economic situations of Thai farmers. For 
example, high sugar cane and sugar prices in world market in 2009 were presented 
as a golden opportunity for growers in Thailand.195 The state's support of the 
production of ethanol, which is made from cassava and sugar cane, is argued by 
some state officials and the private sector to be opportunities to improve income 
levels and economic stability of farmers.196 
 The win-win scenario under the mainstream capitalist agri-food system is 
doubtful. As part 1 has discussed, higher prices tend to lead to higher supply and 
future reductions in prices, which might be good from capital accumulation's 
perspective, but it can be economically destructive to small-scale producers. 
Moreover, as section 1.4 and part 2 of this chapter have already discussed, there is 
evidence of monopoly power in the agri-food sector and that some large agri-
businesses are aided by the crony capitalist Thai state. The existence of unequal 
market power relations suggests that competitive efficient markets are mere 
mythologies of neo-classical economics, and that in reality, win-win situations under 
                                                          
194 The World Bank, World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (Washington 
DC: The World Bank, 2007). 
195 Matichon Newspaper, “3 Sugar Plants Associations,” (2009). 
196 Department of Industrial Promotion (2009), 15 and Sitiwuth Siempakdee, Vice President of Thai 
Sugar Miller company, quoted in Matichon Newspaper, “3 Sugar Plants Associations,” (2009). 
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the current mainstream agri-food system are doubtful. Owing to unequal power 
relations in the agri-food system, large players tend to benefit more from higher 
prices compare to smaller-scale players, as with the case of rice exports between 
2007 and 2008 previously discussed in part 1. There is also a possibility that large 
agri-businesses can use concerns for global food-fuel "crisis" to gain support for 
their products. For example, Mr. Thanin Jiarawanont, President of the CP group, has 
proposed that under the global context of food-energy crisis, Thailand should reduce 
land for rice production from 62 million rai to 25 million rai, and increase 
productivity using CP rice seeds to free up land for rubber and palm oil 
plantations.197 
 As discussed previously, volatile prices in recent years make it difficult for 
producers to plan their productions and also encouraged financial speculations. 
Hegemonic neo-classical economic views, however, tend to simply suggest that 
volatile prices are inevitable outcomes of supply-demand or accept speculations as 
given. Aside from some short-term government interventions to help stabilise or 
support prices, hegemonic perspectives suggest that there is unlikely to be 
alternatives because market mechanisms provide the best and most efficient 
outcomes. Such discourses also tend not to mention problems of unequal power-
relations in the markets and speculations by finance capital, nor mention market 
governance options. In effect, such discourses, which are often propagated by state 
officials, private sectors, and academics, help to establish the acceptance of the 
hegemonic agri-food system.198 
                                                          
197 BioThai, “Report on the Problems of Hybrid Rice Seeds,” (2009). 
198 For example, Dr. Ammar Siamwalla, honourary academic at TDRI, suggested that Thailand's agri-
food products are inevitably dependent to global markets and that government interventions, such as 
those which aim to maintain prices, can only be temporary measures. Such view is not uncommon 
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 The Thai state and the private sector have also used rhetorics of competitive 
and efficient free markets that benefit everyone to rally the public's acceptance of 
foreign direct investments in the retail sector, as well as few regulations of large 
monopoly corporations. Hegemonic arguments in support of retail giants usually 
refer to their purportedly higher standards which force Thai suppliers to improve, 
benefits that consumers receive from lower prices, and that there can be "win-win" 
situations where small and medium size retailers can buy their products from retail 
giants.199 A few studies have suggested that such "win-win" situations are 
doubtful.200 In addition, these arguments do not address the issues raised in section 
1.4 regarding how increased concentration and centralisation of control over retail 
channels and agri-food supply chains reduce choices and power of  both consumers 
and producers in the longer-run.  
Beliefs in market mechanisms and efficiency are also related to the 
modernisation development worldview, which tends to see development as having 
linear stages where industrial and service sectors' economic activities are seen as 
having higher values or as the "next steps" of development compared to agricultural 
economic activities. Such a view, which is generally internalised by the general 
population, tends to see it as a desirable progress when more labourers move from 
the agricultural sector to the industrial sector, even through dispossessions by market 
                                                                                                                                                                    
among economists. Nevertheless, Ammar tried to provide a more balance view by suggesting that if 
Thailand refuses the global markets, there must be clear alternatives which take into account 
competitiveness as well as global warming. (Siamwalla's speech at "The future of Thai agriculture in 
the global context", 29-30 August, Mahidol University, Nakhon pratom, Thailand, quoted in 
Prachathai News, “Ammar’s Speech ‘The Future of Thai Agriculture Under Changing 
Circumstances,’” August 29, 2013. (in Thai)) 
199 Pholnoi (2003), 96, 133-134 and Manager Newspaper (online), “CP Took over Makro," 2013. 
200 For example, see: Puapongsakorn et al. (2002); The Parliament’s Committee of Commerce (2003); 
and interview with Dusit Nonthanakorn, Vice President of Thai Chamber of Commerce, in Thailand 
industry news, “The Private Sector Pushes for the Birth of Retail Business Act, Concerns over 
Foreign Monopoly and Destruction of Traditional Thai Shops,” Thailand Industry News (online), 
June 16, 2008. (in Thai) 
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forces. In Thailand, it has been suggested that some Thai bureaucrats believe most of 
the agricultural workforce would eventually be absorbed into the industrial sector if 
left to market forces, so perhaps they do not feel much need to intervene and to solve 
problems facing small-scale farmers.201 The private sector and some academics also 
help to promote the acceptance of such views; that it is unquestionably normal and 
desirable for labourers to be moved to the industrial and service sectors. For 
example, in 2008, Mr. Thanin Jiarawanont of the CP group proposed in a television 
show that Thailand should reduce farmers to only 1 to 2 percent (author: probably 
referring to percentage of the labour force or population), while the rest should work 
in the service sector or in other countries as nurses, cooks and (Thai massage) 
masseurs.202 Dr. Viroj Naranong, an economist from Thailand Development 
Research Institute (TDRI), also suggests in a public conference in 2013 that Thailand 
ought to reduce labourers in the agricultural sector, as well as embrace larger-scale 
plantations and mechanisations to increase productivity to levels similar to 
developed countries such as the US.203  
As discussed in previous parts of the chapter, such views promote 
problematic agri-food production methods. Similar to the position adopted by the 
World Bank's development report (2008) previously discussed, such views reduce 
humans to labour commodities that, "rationally" speaking, should be able to move 
around freely across economic sectors to gain highest returns. However, in reality, 
farmers often have to move to other economic sectors not by choice, but because 
they are forced to or are "dispossessed" by hegemonic forces in the agri-food system. 
                                                          
201 Interview with an Agriculture and Cooperatives Ministry official, anonymity requested, September 
1993, in Bello, Cunningham, and Li (2005), 167. 
202 BioThai, People’s Handbook about Food (in)security and Thailand's Solutions (Nonthaburi: 
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In addition, there are other factors that neo-classical/neo-liberal economic views do 
not take into account, such as the importance of access to agricultural resources to 
marginalised people in terms of maintenance of family ties, local and national food 
security, and other components of quality of life.204 From a neo-Marxist theoretical 
perspective, dispossessed farmers can be seen as part of the reserve army of labour 
which benefits capital accumulation. Overall, it seems that neo-classical/neo-liberal 
economic views help to legitimise the current hegemonic agri-food system that 
serves capital accumulation at the expense of nature and labour. To prevent 
misunderstanding, the thesis would like to emphasise that it does not suggest keeping 
every farmer and labourer in the agricultural sector, but it tries to expose the 
inadequacy of hegemonic ideologies, and to find alternatives which increase 
bargaining power and choices of agricultural producers and rural labourers. 
Aside from the widespread acceptance of neo-classical principles in the 
mainstream economic discipline, the specialisation and compartmentalisation of 
agricultural production knowledge, which reflects the commodification of nature and 
natural resources, also underlies industrial/Green Revolution agricultural production 
methods discussed in section 1.1 of this chapter.205 It has been suggested that the 
compartmentalisation of knowledge of agricultural science in Thailand is responsible 
for the specialised departmental organisational structure of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Co-operatives, and that it is a result of Western/transnational-style 
educational system that trains people to become specialists in certain agricultural 
                                                          
204 Such views are also advanced by farmers and agri-food activists such as Kriskorn Silarak and Ubol 
Yoowah, quoted during discussions at a public conference: "Rice, Fish, Food: Menu of Inequalities 
Facing Thai farmers," 14 January 2013, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. Chapter 5 will 
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205 Transfers of specialised/departmentalised Green Revolution production knowledge from Western 
academics and international organisations are discussed in, for example, Lienchamroon and 
Thankitchanukit (2008), 38-49. 
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components or products. The problem is that these specialists tend not to be able to 
analyse the agri-food production system as part of the socio-ecological system.206 
Such compartmentalised hegemonic knowledge paradigm also plays a part in 
preventing alternative production methods such as agro-ecology from emerging. In 
chapter 5, sustainable agricultural production knowledge will be discussed as part of 
counter-hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand. 
3.2) Sakdina patron-client mentality and nationalist sentiments 
This section discusses the deeply rooted Sakdina or patron-client mentality in Thai 
society, which underlies informal norms of patron-client relations discussed in part 
2. It also discusses some forms of nationalist sentiments which have been used to aid 
capital accumulation through the current agri-food system, particularly royal 
nationalism and crony capitalist nationalism, which give support to the special status 
of the Crown Property Bureau and some large Thai agri-businesses. Patron-client 
mentality and nationalist sentiments are also related to the current polarised political 
conflict in Thailand, which weakens the strength of counter-hegemonic movements. 
However, this issue will be discussed in greater detail in following chapters. 
 Thailand used to be under the rule of the absolute monarchy in which the 
"Sakdina" system had regulated the social order since the late 15th Century. 
Essentially, the basic hierarchical cleavage in the Sakdina society was between the 
royalty and aristocracy on the one hand, and the peasantry or "Phrai" on the other.207 
Under this system, there are different hierarchical levels of masters-followers who 
                                                          
206 Mr. Chanuan Rattanawaraha, former Deputy Director General of the Department of Agriculture 
who held a position at the Office of Department of Agriculture (DOA) Technical Advisor at the time 
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were bounded to each other through informal norms and ethical rules, and were 
expected to fulfill certain obligations according to their social hierarchies. People's 
mentality and political consciousness were narrowly based on loyalty to groups and 
individual leaders.208 Even when the Sakdina and corvee system were abolished, 
traditional personal linkages between people of different classes persisted as patron-
client relationships, as discussed in part 2. The “Sakdina attitude” or patron-client 
mentality - the consciousness of hierarchical social structures - affect all kinds of 
social relations in Thai society,209 and can hinder the development of a more 
equitable agri-food system in many ways. Notably, the Sakdina attitude has become 
infused in the working culture of the Thai bureaucracy, as can be seen from top-
down nature of rural development and agrarian promotion policies discussed in part 
2 of the chapter. 
 Sakdina influence in Thai society is also reflected in the prominent status of 
the royal family in contemporary Thailand, as well as the lèse majesté law and the 
special position of the Crown Property Bureau which were discussed in part 2. The 
majority of the population's loyalty to the King of Thailand are based on various 
reasons, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to give a complete analysis of the 
roots of such sentiments. However, there are two notable reasons that are related to 
the agri-food system in Thailand, which suggest rather contradictory pictures of the 
Thai monarchy. On the one hand, the importance and popularity of the monarchy in 
Thailand can be explained as a political construct which started in the 1940s, when 
the military built up the role of the monarch as the symbolic head of the nation 
                                                          
208 Prasertkul (2005), 11-13. 
209 Duncan McCargo, Politics and the Press in Thailand: Media Machinations (London: Routledge, 
2000), 136, quoted in McCargo and Pathmanand (2005), 173. 
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through various means.210 The promotion of royalism in Thailand is arguably not a 
continuous and consistent process. However, most recently, the coup d'état in 2014 
opened up a new opportunity for the military junta to promote royalism agenda in 
Thailand. On the other hand, as an individual, His Majesty Bhumiphol Adulyadej is 
widely admired for his various talents (such as in music and engineering) and 
because he is accepted to have dedicated himself to many development projects to 
help marginalised people in Thailand.211 These two reasons (at least partially) help to 
explain the popularity of the Thai monarchy.  
 King Bhumiphol has also been instrumental in the promotion of sufficient 
philosophy and economic ideas that aim to help counter-balance negative effects of 
the globalised capitalist economy. As the following chapters will discuss, such ideas 
and philosophy often provide positive inspirations to some people in counter-
hegemonic movements in the agri-food system in Thailand, although arguably, such 
ideas are not without problems. It has also been suggested that King Bhumipol 
donated 44,000 rai of his own land to small-scale farmers and encouraged the 
development of rural groups and co-operatives in Thailand.212 However, the CPB, 
with its holding of around 30,000 rai of land, is still considered one of the largest 
landholders in the country.213 Regardless of the role of King Bhumiphol in rural 
development, royal nationalism reinforces Sakdina mentality and aids the 
maintenance of some aspects of hegemonic agri-food governance; in addition to the 
                                                          
210 For example, various ceremonies have been used to raise the monarchy's profile. Controls over 
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Economy,” in 37 Years of the Agricultural Land Reform Office (Bangkok: ALRO, 2012). (in Thai) 
213 Prachachat Turakiij, “Famous Business Families Stocking up Land,” 2014. 
147 
 
lèse majesté law, loyalty to the King tends to restrain Thais from discussing the 
power and influence of the CPB. 
Nationalist sentiments can also be used to rally public support for Thai 
capital. For example, the CP group, with the help of the Director-General of the 
Department of Internal Trade, had used nationalistic sentiments - the fact that CP is a 
Thai capital group - to gather public tolerance and support for CP's expansion and 
monopoly power in the retail market.214 Nevertheless, as previous parts have 
discussed, Thai transnational capital do not behave that much differently from non-
Thai capital with regards to their roles in the agri-food system. It should be noted, 
however, that aside from such crony capitalist nationalism, there can be other forms 
of nationalism such as the more radical populist nationalism of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and people’s organisations in Thailand.215 
3.3) The hegemonic ideational order, the Thai state, and consent 
Generally, the Thai state subscribes to the usual modernisation policy prescriptions 
and neo-classical economic beliefs. Nevertheless, the Thai state hardly promotes 
textbook-style free competition. Some agri-food policies, for example, have been 
used to provide special treatments to large capital groups connected to the ruling 
parties. The cronyist nature of the Thai state can be seen as part of the tendency for 
capital to try to become larger and more powerful to survive, but in addition to that, 
patron-client mentality lends a helping hand to support and justify practices of crony 
capitalism, as well as state policies that benefit large monopoly capital. 
                                                          
214 See the interviews in Manager Newspaper (online), “CP Took over Makro," (2013). 
215 Crony capitalist nationalism and a different variant of radical populist nationalism are discussed in 
Kasian Tejapira, “Post-Crisis Economic Impasse and Political Recovery in Thailand: The Resurgence 
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Thai Rak Thai (TRT) and Phua Thai governments, which have been in power 
most of the time between 2001 and 2014, provide good examples to illustrate how 
the hegemonic ideational order influences national agri-food and rural development 
policies. Political-economic elite groups associate with TRT and Phua Thai are very 
influential in the agri-food system in Thailand, as discussed in various places of this 
chapter. Their agri-food policies and capitalist cronyism reflect both hegemonic 
capitalist/neo-liberal mentality as well as patron-client mentality. On the one hand, 
TRT under the command of Thaksin Shinnawatra adopted many pro-capital and 
many seemingly neo-liberal friendly policies such as privatisation and free trade 
agreements. Thaksin is also known to be a fan of neo-liberal economists such as 
Hernando de Soto and Michael Porter.216 On the other hand, TRT and Phua Thai 
used the power of the Thai state to aid their crony capital groups. Thaksin used his 
political power to build massive-scale patron-client networks around himself and his 
allies, which consist of several large business conglomerates, political parties, the 
National Assembly, the military and the police.217 Chapter 4 will discuss the TRT's 
networks and rural policies in greater detail. 
This part of the chapter has discussed how the hegemonic ideological order 
influences national agri-food and rural development policies. Nevertheless, it is 
important to emphasise that the hegemonic ideological order's most important 
function is to help establish consent or acceptance among the Thai population of the 
hegemonic governance structures and production-distribution practices of the current 
capitalist agri-food system. As the following chapters will discuss, counter-
hegemonic movements in the agri-food system in Thailand have tried to tackle the 
                                                          
216 Jim Glassman, “Economic Nationalism in a Post-Nationalist Era: The Political Economy of 
Economic Policy in Post-Crisis Thailand,” Critical Asian Studies 36, no. 1 (2004), 59-60, quoted in 
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hegemonic ideational order, but it is not an easy task. Moreover, there are many 
forms of co-optation of oppositions that have weakened counter-hegemonic 
movements. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has advanced the first main argument of the thesis; that the mainstream 
agri-food system in Thailand has been shaped by transnational and domestic forces 
to aid capital accumulation, and that the system is sustained through a combination 
of hegemonic agri-food production-distribution, governance structures and ideational 
order. The chapter has also helped the thesis to make the first, third and fourth 
original contributions to knowledge that were outlined in chapter 1, as the following 
paragraphs elaborate. 
 First, this chapter has helped the thesis to advance the first original 
contribution to knowledge by bringing new empirical information from Thailand to 
existing literature on the corporate agri-food system and agrarian political economy. 
Through an exploration of the hegemonic agri-food system in Thailand which is 
operating within the global agri-food system, this chapter has brought interesting 
insights which are locally distinctive and are globally relevant. For example, the 
chapter has explored the many ways in which domestic and transnational forces can 
collaborate to facilitate land grabs in Thailand, such as through the use of nominees. 
The chapter has also discussed how monopoly power in the agri-food system in 
Thailand can come in many forms, ranging from formal contract farming to informal 
monopoly networks. Hegemonic agri-food governance structures and ideational 
order which are locally specific to Thailand have also been discussed in relation to 
and as part of the hegemonic global agri-food system. In addition, this chapter's 
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analysis of the hegemonic agri-food system in Thailand has yielded support to some 
main arguments in existing agri-food literature, such as regarding negative 
consequences of excessive financial speculations on agri-food commodities, and 
negative consequences of the Green Revolution production paradigm. 
 Second, this chapter has helped the thesis to make the third original 
contribution to knowledge by extending neo-Marxist and Gramscian theories on the 
agri-food system. The chapter has used a combined neo-Marxist and Gramscian 
theory to analyse the hegemonic agri-food system in Thailand as consisting not only 
of hegemonic production-distribution practices, but also hegemonic governance 
structures and ideological order. This approach has advantages over purely neo-
Marxist perspectives which tend to neglect the roles of ideas and discourses in the 
hegemonic agri-food system. This chapter has particularly discussed neo-liberal/neo-
classical ideologies and the belief in modernisation, which can be seen as 
transnational hegemonic ideologies, as well as historical-cultural specific hegemonic 
ideas of patron-client, which help to legitimise and support the hegemonic agri-food 
system in Thailand. 
 Third, this chapter has helped the thesis to advance the fourth original 
contribution to knowledge, which is to provide new perspectives and data on Thai 
agrarian development. As chapter 1 discussed, there is a need for a more up-to-date 
study of recent development in the Thai agri-food sector. This chapter has discussed 
some important contemporary issues in the Thai agri-food system, such as the food-
fuel nexus and land grabs. Moreover, this chapter has provided new perspectives on 
Thai agrarian development, which add to existing literature that tend to focus on 
domestic factors or adopt mainstream economic theoretical approach. Through the 
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combined neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical approach, structural problems in 
the mainstream Thai agri-food system has been analysed in this chapter as having 
roots in interconnected ideational and material structures at local, national, and 
global scales. 
 In this chapter, the roles of many institutions such as the Thai state and 
transnational companies have been discussed. However, it should be noted that even 
though this chapter has discussed some of their actions and discourses as being part 
of the hegemonic forces, there can be discrepancies and heterogeneities within these 
institutions which allow room for counter-hegemony or co-optation of oppositions. 
The next chapter will give an overview of counter-hegemony and co-optation of 
oppositions in the agri-food system in Thailand. It will also provide a foundation for 
the discussions of sustainable agriculture and land reform movements in chapters 5 
and 6. 
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Chapter 4 
Counter-Hegemony and Co-Optation of Oppositions  
in the Agri-Food System in Thailand 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has advanced the first main argument of this thesis, which is 
that the mainstream agri-food system in Thailand has been shaped to aid capital 
accumulation by domestic and transnational hegemonic forces. It has pointed out 
many structural causes which explain the general tendency for small-scale farmers to 
receive low and uncertain income, and discussed how the hegemonic agri-food 
production methods have led to many negative ecological and health consequences. 
This chapter continues the analysis of the agri-food system in Thailand by providing 
a foundation to discuss the sustainable agriculture movement (SAM) and the land 
reform movement (LRM) in the following chapters. 
 This chapter, as well as the following chapters 5 and 6, advance the second 
and third main arguments of the thesis; that although the mainstream agri-food 
system is dominated by hegemonic capitalist interests, domestic and transnational 
counter-hegemonic forces can, to certain extents, influence some changes in the 
system. As the previous chapter has discussed, the hegemonic structures of the 
current agri-food system consists not only of production-distribution practices, but of 
hegemonic ideas and governance structures. The discussion of counter-hegemony, 
then, should take into account these three dimensions, which is consistent with the 
Gramscian approach adopted by this thesis where counter-hegemony is 
conceptualised as practical and ideological challenges to the hegemonic status quo. 
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In addition to providing an overview of the SAM's and the LRM's counter-
hegemonic ideas, production-distribution practices and governance structures, this 
chapter suggests that they can be understood partly as a lineage of past agrarian 
movements in Thailand, and as part of the Thai civil society's search for alternative 
development paths. This helps to advance the fourth main argument of the thesis, 
which is that counter-hegemony should be seen as an un-linear ongoing process over 
a long period of time, where predominantly counter-hegemonic forces may at times 
retain some hegemonic elements. This chapter also suggests that polarised political 
conditions and rural populist policies in Thailand hinder counter-hegemonic efforts 
of the SAM and the LRM, as well as open room for co-optation of oppositions. 
 The first part of this chapter briefly discusses the historical development of 
Thai agrarian movements and the search for alternative development paths. It then 
provides a comprehensive discussion of counter-hegemonic ideas, production-
distribution practices, and governance structures of the SAM and the LRM. The 
discussion also fleshes out how chapters 4, 5 and 6 help the thesis to advance six 
original contributions to knowledge as outlined in chapter 1. As a foundation for 
detail explorations of co-optation in chapters 5 and 6, part 2 of this chapter discusses 
polarised political situations and rural populist policies in Thailand. Part 2 also 
discusses the paddy pledging scheme as a case study of a policy that strengthens the 
hegemonic agri-food system, but is being portrayed as counter-hegemonic. 
Part 1: Counter-hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand 
This part of the chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the SAM and the 
LRM, which are discussed in detail in chapters 5 and 6. First, section 1.1 briefly 
situates the SAM and the LRM within the historical development of agrarian 
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movements in Thailand. In addition, it discusses the influence of popular alternative 
development ideas, such as that of Thai localism, on both the SAM and the LRM. 
Other international/transnational sources of inspirations, such as the food sovereignty 
discourse and practice which influence both the SAM and the LRM, will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapters 5 and 6. Section 1.2 then discusses main 
features of the SAM's and the LRM's counter-hegemonic projects, to make salient 
the interconnections of counter-hegemonic ideas, production-distribution practices, 
and governance structures promoted by the movements. 
1.1) Agrarian movements and the search for alternative development paths 
To a certain extent, the SAM and the LRM build themselves on past agrarian 
movements and alternative development ideas which have achieved some levels of 
influence in Thai society. The first organised agrarian movement in Thailand was the 
Peasants’ Federation of Thailand (PFT) which was established in November 1974 to 
protect the interests of farmers.1 Even though the PFT was violently suppressed in 
the late 1970s, some of the PFT's ideas and sympathisers survived. Many activists, 
local leaders, farmers, academics and civil servants who help to advance the SAM's 
and the LRM's counter-hegemonic projects, were partly involved or were inspired by 
the PFT and the spirit of activism of that era. Examples include Mr. Rangsan 
Sansongkwae, who is a farmer leader of Raidong community land title deed project 
in Lamphun province, and Mr. Boonsong Martkhao from Kammad Organic 
Agriculture group in Yasothon province.2 Despite violent repressions, the Thai state 
                                                          
1 Kanoksak Kaewthep, “The Struggle of Thai Farmers 1989-1999,” in The Path of Thai Farmers 
(Bangkok, 1999), 41-42. (in Thai) 
2 Interviewed 30 October 2012 and 25 December 2012 respectively. 
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made some attempts to appease the rural population in the 1970s.3 As chapter 6 will 
discuss in greater detail, the Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO) was 
established in 1975 as a response to demands for land reform. Although ALRO has 
generally been perceived as ineffective in distributing land to small-scale farmers, 
chapter 6 will suggest that its counter-hegemonic potential should not completely be 
ruled out. Moreover, community land title deed (CLTD) ideas and practice proposed 
by the LRM can also be seen as reactions to the limitations of ALRO. 
In the 1980s, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and their rural 
development projects were starting to be seen in a better light by the state, and NGOs 
also started to develop linkages with other sectors such as the media and the middle 
class.4 Alternative development ideas were also being developed by activists and 
public intellectuals such as Niphot Thianwihan, Apichart Thongyu and Bamrung 
Panya, who were inspired by the importance of community, local wisdom and self-
reliance. These trends of thought became known as the "community culture school of 
thought", and was popularised by a progressive neo-Marxist academic, Chatthip 
Nartsupha, as well as other Thai academics such as Dr. Prawase Wasi5 who can be 
seen as organic intellectuals in a Gramscian sense. Localist ideas are closely 
associated with concepts of sufficiency, self-reliance, as well as community rights, 
and have a lot of influence on many Thai NGOs and academics. The concept of 
"grassroots democracy" which is widely promoted by Thai NGOs, for example, has 
great resonance with localist ideas. It infers wide-ranging reforms of the bureaucracy 
                                                          
3 Pitch Pongsawat, “The Relationship Between the Economic and Political Changes and Farmers 
Movement in the Present Thai Society: A Critical Observation,” Fah-Diewkan, Year 1 volume 1, 
(Jan-April 2005), 67. (in Thai). 
4 Naruemon Thabchumpon, “NGOs and Grassroots Participation in the Political Reform Process,” in 
Reforming Thai Politics, ed. Duncan McCargo (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2002), 189. 
5 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 386-388. 
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and decentralisation of power to allow local communities and people's organisations 
to take part in the decision-making process, and to restore their rights to manage 
local natural resources.6 Chapter 5 will discuss in greater detail Thai localist ideas 
and their critiques. 
Owing to pressures from NGOs and public intellectuals in the community 
school of thought, the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions recognise the importance of 
community rights in the sustainable management of natural resources.7 However, 
practical implementation of community rights is very limited.8 As chapter 6 will 
discuss in greater detail, the LRM makes use of the Constitution's recognition of 
community rights to legitimise their counter-hegemonic projects, but the lack of 
supporting subsidiary laws which support community rights is problematic for the 
LRM.9 Chapters 5 and 6 will also discuss in greater detail the influence of Thai 
localism on the SAM's and LRM's counter-hegemonic ideas and practice. In doing 
so, they help to advance the fifth contribution to knowledge of this thesis, which is to 
provide new perspectives on Thai localism; that Thai localism can be seen as a 
counter-hegemonic national-popular strategy in a Gramscian sense, rather than a 
conservative appeal to the past as some academic literature suggest. Other sources of 
counter-hegemonic ideas will also be discussed. 
From the late 1980s onwards, conflicts between the locals, the state and 
capital over use rights of land and other natural resources have intensified.10 As 
                                                          
6 Thapjumphol (2002), 196-197. 
7 Wich Jeerapat, “Reflection on Thai Community Right Ideas,” Julniti Journal (in Thai) 3, no. 38 
(2010), 40. (in Thai) 
8 Chatthip Nartsupha, Modernisation and the “Community” School of Thought (Bangkok: Sangsan 
Publishing, 2010), 160. (in Thai) 
9 For example, see: Ittipol Srisaowalak et al., A Study Project on the Law to Manage Local Areas 
(Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2001), Abstract page II and III. (in Thai) 
10 Kaewthep (1999), 71-72. 
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reactions to the problems facing small-scale farmers in the agricultural sector, many 
grass-root rural organisations emerged in the early 1990s, such as the Small-scale 
Farmers of the Northeast (So Ko Yo Oo) and the Northern Farmers Network. 
Through the mid-1990s, rural organisations used protests to attract attention and 
negotiations to gain concessions from the state. On the International Human Rights 
day, 10 December 1995, a new umbrella organisation called the Assembly of the 
Poor was formed in Thailand. It encompassed agricultural groups such as the 
Alternative Agriculture Network (AAN), which is the core group of the SAM, as 
well as other marginalised people's groups and their urban middle class allies.11 
Chapter 5 will discuss in greater detail how the Assembly of the Poor's protest 
allowed the AAN to receive the budget for its pilot programme to promote 
sustainable agriculture in Thailand. In addition, as chapter 6 will discuss, the 
Assembly of the Poor and the Northern Peasants Federation are Thai members of La 
Vía Campesina, and they help to spread transnational counter-hegemonic ideas 
within their networks. 
1.2) Counter-hegemonic ideas, production-distribution, and governance structures 
This section gives an overview of counter-hegemonic ideas, production-distribution 
practices, and governance structures advocate by the SAM and the LRM, while 
detail can be found in chapters 5 and 6. The rationale for selecting the SAM and the 
LRM as examples of counter-hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand was 
already discussed in chapter 1. 
 
                                                          
11 Chris Baker, “Pluto-Populism: Thaksin and Popular Politics,” in Thailand Beyond the Crisis, ed. 
Peter Warr (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 119. 
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 An overview of the sustainable agriculture movement (SAM) in Thailand 
As will be discussed in greater depth in chapter 5, SAM groups try to provide 
alternatives to the mainstream agri-food system and prioritise health, social ties, self-
reliance, and ecological sustainability over profit maximisation.12 SAM's ideas and 
discourses are also used to build new and more dignified cultural identities for 
farmers.13 Some promoters of sustainable agriculture use religion and traditional 
cultural beliefs to inspire counter-hegemonic ideas and to promote sustainable 
agriculture, while others prefer transnational ideas and terms such as those from the 
food security and food sovereignty discourses. Despite strong emphasis on 
community empowerment and traditional knowledge, SAM members interviewed 
for this thesis also learn from international experiences such as that of organic 
farming in Europe, and have also formed transnational trade linkages and other 
forms of co-operation.14 
 Many forms of sustainable agricultural production methods and alternative 
market arrangements in Thailand have been developed to reflect such counter-
hegemonic ideas. SAM groups promote various forms of sustainable agriculture such 
as organic agriculture and integrated farming. They aim to preserve bio-diversity and 
encourages different varieties of agri-food crops to be grown in a farm, partly to 
                                                          
12 For example: Mr. Pat Apaimool, a sustainable farmer at Tambol Mae-ta, Chiang Mai, interviewed 1 
November 2012; Mr. Pakphum Inpan, a farmer from Natural Farmer group, Tambol Tamor, Surin, 
interviewed 20 December 2012; Mr. Decha Siripat, founder of Khao Kwan Foundation and the AAN, 
interviewed 14 October 2012 in Nonthaburi. 
13 Sajin Prachason et al., Market Options of Farmers: Structural Effects on Unfairness and Benefit 
Distribution (Bangkok: BioThai and the Social Research Foundation, Chulalongkorn University, 
2012), 232-233; Chalita Bantuwong, “Local Sage: Creation of Identity through Sustainable 
Agriculture,” in Sustainable Agriculture: Cultural Identity, Agricultural Problems and the Identity of 
Thai Farmers, ed. Anusorn Unno (Nonthaburi: Sustainable Agriculture Assembly Committee and 
Heinrich Bӧll Foundation, 2004), 238–239. (in Thai) 
14 Mr. Witoon Lienchamroon, BioThai, interviewed 5 April 2012, Nonthaburi; Mr. Ubol Yoowah, 
NGO activist, interviewed 22 December 2012, Yasothon; Dr. Chomchuan Boonrahong, lecturer at 
Maejo University, interviewed 3 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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reduce economic and food insecurity risks of small-scale farmers; so that they can 
rely on sales (and personal consumption) of a few crops instead of just one or two 
crops. Instead of being fixated on only small-scale farms, there are also practical 
examples of many different sizes of agricultural farms and arrangements, such as 
organic contract farming, which are accepted as long as they embodied counter-
hegemonic principles.15 In addition, although the capitalist market-led nature of the 
current agri-food system is criticised, the SAM does not reject the market. Instead, 
members try to develop market governance mechanisms which are embedded with 
counter-hegemonic values, such as that of environmental sustainability.  
 There are many types of distributional channels of sustainable agri-food 
products in Thailand, ranging from local green markets to large-scale exports of 
organic and fair trade products. Producers have opportunities to receive higher 
income and higher bargaining power in these markets. Most groups interviewed try 
to expand their activities so that members can benefit from value-added 
opportunities along agri-food chains, as well as from job creations that come with 
processing and marketing agri-food products.16 Higher income and job opportunities 
arising from sustainable agriculture reportedly help to strengthen social ties in some 
communities.17 Chapter 5 will draw on experiences of many SAM groups, 
particularly producer rice mills in Yasothon and Surin provinces. It will also discuss 
in greater detail current and potential limitations of these alternative production-
distribution practices. 
                                                          
15 For example, there is an organic contract farming arrangement in Suphanburi, which is a result of 
collaborations between Khao Kwan Foundation, local rice mills, and local farmers. 
16 Mrs. Supha Yaimuang, president of Sustainable Agriculture Thailand (SATHAI), interviewed 3 
October 2012, SATHAI, Nonthaburi. 
17 A few farmers suggest this point, such as Mrs. Kanya Onsri, leader of the organic agriculture group 
at Tap-tai community, interviewed 22 December 2012, Surin and Mr. Arpaporn Krueng-ngern, a 
young organic farmer in Mae-ta community, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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 Aside from formal alternative market governance such as organic labels, 
some SAM members also recognise the importance of fostering counter-hegemonic 
individual behaviours and informal social relations to support their sustainable 
agricultural production and distribution practices.18 Moreover, as chapter 5 will 
discuss in greater detail, the Alternative Agriculture Network (AAN) also tries to 
shape the policy and legal structures governing the agri-food system in Thailand at 
the local, national and (to a limited extent) global levels, such as those relating to the 
governance of seeds, intellectual property rights and free trade agreements. Some 
counter-hegemonic gains were made, but since attempts to challenge policy and legal 
hegemonic governance structures at the national level often result in limited success, 
some people in the SAM prefer to concentrate on developing alternative production-
distribution practices without much engagement with the Thai state.19 
 An overview of the land reform movement (LRM) in Thailand 
The LRM criticises the primacy of private individual rights and are inspired by 
community rights ideas, particularly the concept of "the complexity of rights" put 
forward by Anan Ganjanapan from Chiang Mai University. Complexity of rights 
suggests that different forms of rights can overlap within a geographical unit.20 For 
example, one may have an ownership right over a piece of land, but others may 
benefit from by-products of the land.21 As chapter 6 will discuss in detail, land 
                                                          
18 For example, see: Mr. Arpakorn Krueng-ngern, Mae-ta organic farmer, interviewed 1 November 
2012, Chiang Mai; Prachason et al. (2012), 285. 
19 Such as Mr. Kankamkla Pilanoi, main co-ordinator at the Thamma-ruamjai moral rice network, 
interviewed 23 December 2012, Yasothon. 
20 Anan Ganjanapan, “Community Rights in Development,” in The Community Dimension: Local 
Way of Thinking Regarding Rights, Power and Natural Resource Management (Bangkok: Thailand 
Research Fund, 2001), 241 and 243. (in Thai) 
21 For example, see Prayong Doklamyai, “From Discourse to Practical Innovation: Land Reform by 
Communities. Transcript of the Presentation at a Conference on Anan Ganjanapan’s Complexity of 
Rights, 8 March 2008,” in “I Don’t Have the Answer”: 60 Years Professor Dr. Anan Ganjanapan 
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occupations in the 1990s and early 2000s led to the call for land reform and re-
distribution of land to marginalised people in the form of community land title deed 
(CLTD). CLTD is a form of local governance of land based on democratically 
formed rules. Generally, members can use individual plots of land for agricultural 
and housing purposes, but land exchanges are controlled so that, for example, land 
cannot be sold to people outside of the community for speculation purposes.22 This 
general principle is established to prevent land grabs by capital groups and to 
encourage small-scale farmers' access to land. By encouraging democratic 
participations, CLTD projects try to encourage the spirit of solidarity and provide 
counter-hegemonic challenges to hierarchical social structures and mentality in 
Thailand.  
 CLTD reflects the complexity of rights concept as land is owned collectively, 
such as by a co-operative, while individual members receive usage rights over 
individual plots of land.23 However, CLTD does not imply giving exclusive rights to 
local groups. Other parties, such as the state and civil society, can be involved in the 
governance of local natural resources in a form of checks and balances.24 Aside from 
promoting decentralisation of power, social justice, and community rights in the 
management of natural resources, at the leadership level, the goals of the LRM also 
include safeguarding agricultural land for domestic food security and the promotion 
of sustainable agriculture.25 As chapter 6 will elaborate, counter-hegemonic ideas of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and 20 Years of Social Movement on Community Rights and Natural Resources Management (Chiang 
Mai: Sustainable Development Foundation, 2008), 251. (in Thai) 
22 Pongthip Samranjit, “A Summary of Research on Ground-up Land Reforms by Communitites,” 
July 22, 2011, <http://www.landreformthai.net>. (in Thai) 
23 Anan Ganjanapan, lecturer of Sociology and Anthropology, Chiang Mai university, interviewed 29 
October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Prayong Doklamyai, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai; The Land Reform Network, 
CLTDs - We Can: a Handbook (Bangkok: Land Reform Network, 2012), 14 (in Thai); Samranjit 
(2011). 
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the LRM also resonate with some academic literature and global counter-hegemonic 
initiatives.26 Participations in international conferences organised by La Vía 
Campesina, as well as exchanges with other civil society groups in Thailand and 
abroad, also help to promote LRM members' interests in food security and food 
sovereignty.27 Nevertheless, as chapter 6 will discuss, there are still many obstacles 
in the promotion of sustainable agricultural practices in CLTD projects.28 
 The LRM also recognises that it is important to address macro-level legal and 
policy governance structures to challenge and transform the hegemonic status quo. In 
2014, the LRM started pushing for "four laws for the poor",29 which include laws 
regarding land taxation, land bank and community rights in the management of land 
and natural resource (CLTD law), as well as a law to support the establishment of a 
Justice Fund for marginalised citizens who need help with their legal fees.30 As 
chapter 6 will discuss, limited success by the LRM to challenge the hegemonic legal 
structure and national policies serve as obstacles which further constrain the 
potential of existing CLTD projects,31 and there are also some other potential 
obstacles. Nevertheless, the chapter will suggest that the counter-hegemonic struggle 
is still ongoing, and that the LRM should be credited for stimulating debates on 
equitable distribution and just governance of resources in Thai society. 
                                                          
26 For example, see: Olivier De Schutter, “How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three Critiques of 
Large-Scale Investments in Farmland,” Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 2 (March 2011), 268-269; 
Matias E. Margulis, Nora McKeon, and Saturnino M. Borras, “Land Grabbing and Global 
Governance: Critical Perspectives,” Globalizations 10, no. 1 (2013), 12. 
27 Mr. Direk Kong-ngern, interviewed 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
28 Prayong Doklamyai, quoted in Achara Rakyutitham, “Anan’s Dynamic: From Culture, Na-Moo to 
Complexity,” in “I Don’t Have the Answer”: 60 Years Professor Dr. Anan Ganjanapan and 20 Years 
of Social Movement on Community Rights and Natural Resources Management (Chiang Mai: 
Sustainable Development Foundation, 2008), 250-251 and also see chapter 6. 
29 Drafts of the proposed laws can be found at <http://www.landwatchthai.com/index.php/th/4>. 
30 Acharawadee Buaklee, “The North Pushes for 4 Land Laws,” ThaiPBS, April 04, 2014,  
<http://www.citizenthaipbs.net/node/4015>. 
31 Interviews from community leaders such as Direk Kong-ngern, Montri Bualoi (from Baan Pong, 
interview date 31 October 2012), Rangsan Sansonkwae and Sangwal Kantham (30 October 2012, 
Raidong/Mae-aow villages, Lamphun), as well as Mr. Sarawut Wongnikorn, Northern Peasants 
Federation, interviewed 30 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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Part 2: Co-optation of oppositions in the agri-food system in Thailand 
There are many forms of opposition and intimidation which discourage counter-
hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand. For example, some LRM land 
occupiers and critics of retail giants have faced legal suits,32 while the Thai state 
often tries to discredit and suppress rural social movements.33 These measures are 
rather obvious compare to "co-optation of oppositions" - a Gramscian concept which 
refers to strategies of ideational and practical distortion to subsume and hinder 
counter-hegemony in the agri-food system. Existing academic literature have 
suggested many methods of co-optation of oppositions, such as the incorporation of 
rhetoric of radical change without changing hegemonic principles or substance, as 
well as the incorporation of leaders and organisations in the decision making process 
without allowing them to influence the status quo.34  
 This part of the chapter provides an overview of the contemporary political 
situation in Thailand and possibilities of co-optation of oppositions relating to the 
SAM and the LRM. Section 2.1 discusses co-optation of agrarian movements 
through patron-client relations, as well rural populist policies and polarised political 
discourses, which serve as distortions of counter-hegemony. Section 2.2 then 
discusses Phua Thai government's paddy pledging scheme as a case study of a rural 
populist policy. Although it is being presented as a solution, the scheme intensifies 
and exacerbates structural problems of the agri-food system, and hence can more 
                                                          
32 By 2008, Tesco-Lotus had sued four people such as a journalist and an academic for libel (Network 
of People’s Media of the North, “An Open Letter to Thai People Regarding Tesco-Lotus’ 
Encroachment on Free Speech Right,” April 20, 2008, <http://www.tja.or.th>). 
33 For example, between 1998 and 1999, the second Chuan Leekpai government (Democrat party) had  
tried to portray rural protesters as development obstructers. Politicians sometimes set up their own 
people’s groups to clash with farmer demonstrators, used the law to arrest the leaders, or paid them 
off with money. (Kaewthep (1999), 81.) 
34 Bill Paterson, “Trasformismo at the World Trade Organization,” in Gramsci and Global Politics. 
Hegemony and Resistance, ed. Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 47. 
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appropriately be considered a form of co-optation of oppositions. Chapter 5 will 
further the discussion by suggesting that the polarised political conflict and 
accompanying discourses add fuel to the interpretation of Thai localism and 
sustainable agriculture as being conservative. Moreover, chapter 5 will argue that the 
paddy pledging scheme hinders the operation of producer rice mills and organic rice 
production. Chapter 6 will then elaborate, from the perspective of the LRM, how 
political polarisation in Thailand weakens social movements.35 Chapters 5 and 6 will 
also discuss obstacles and potential for co-optation specifically relating to the SAM 
and the LRM, such as the possibilities of co-optation of sustainable agriculture by 
the Thai state and businesses, as well as the possibilities of co-optation of CLTD 
projects through the state's co-operative law. 
2.1) Co-optation, rural populist policies and polarised political discourses 
Patron-client relations, discussed as part of the hegemonic agri-food governance 
structures in the previous chapter, have been used as a tool to co-opt agrarian 
movements. By providing political patronage and some concessions to selected 
marginalised population and farmer groups, political economic elites can exert 
influence over them and control their agenda. It has been noted that in most 
provinces where there were viable profit-making state promoted co-operatives, local 
and national politicians were usually behind them as advisers.36 In addition, many 
rural leaders and AAN activists point to the prevalence of patron-client relations and 
co-optation of rural groups by politicians and local notables, such as through offers 
                                                          
35 For example: Anan Ganjanapan, interviewed 29 October 2012, Chiang Mai; Prapart Pintoptang, an 
academic at the Department of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, interviewed 16 October 
2012, Nonthaburi. 
36 Nipon Puapongsakorn and Ammar Siamwalla, “Rural Villagers’ Economic Group: Success and 
Survival, 51,” in A Report for the Annual Seminar 1995 of Thailand Development Research Institute 
(TDRI), 9-10 December (Cholburi, Thailand, 1995), 51. (in Thai) 
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and promises of short-term gains.37 If agricultural co-operatives and farmers’ groups 
have to rely on patron-client relationships, they may only be able to develop as cases 
of “special concessions” from the state, and might not seek to expand on their own 
initiatives or to challenge the hegemonic status quo. 
 Aside from political patronage, rural populist policies and polarised political 
discourses are also important forms of co-optation of oppositions that establish Thai 
Rak Thai and Phua Thai parties, which were in power most of time between 2001 
and 2014, as powerful patrons at the national level.38 Before he came to power, Thai 
Rak Thai leader Thaksin Shinnawatra had enlisted many activists, academics and 
local leaders as advisors. However, during the first Thaksin administration, social 
movements rarely mobilised or were quickly dispersed, while some NGO and 
academic activists were portrayed as middlemen who exploited poverty.39 Some 
activists had also used their grassroots networks to help Thaksin's political party.40 
Many scholars have noted how rural populist policies of the first Thaksin 
administration (2001 to 2004) reinforced hierarchical patron-client attitude in Thai 
society.41 By creating feelings of personal gratitude, rural populist policies manage 
to bound a lot of Thais to Thaksin Shinnawatra, his family and his political party, as 
well as encourage them to overlook policies which support and intensify exploitative 
                                                          
37 Mr. Praderm Damrong-jaroen, former Farmer Network Party, phone interview on 17 October 2012; 
Mr. Decha Siripat, founder of Khao Kwan Foundation, 14 October 2012; Mr. Samrueng Roopsuay 
and Mr. Arunsak Ocharos, veterans in rural social movements from Sri-saket, Northeast of Thailand, 
interviewed 6 April 2012, Bangkok. 
38 In this thesis, "populist policies" refer to policies which might be popular with the people and may 
solve short-term problems, but do not solve structural problems. 
39 Witoon Lienchamroon and Supha Yaimuang, “Alternative Agriculture: From Individual Farmers to 
Social Movements,” in Reform the Agricultural Sector for Food Security: Analysis and Practical 
Policies, ed. Witoon Lienchamroon (Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2011), 309-311. 
40 Decha Siripat of Khao Kwan Foundation discussed how an activist he used to work with helped 
Thaksin by using NGOs' long-term connections with rural groups to bring them under Thai Rak 
Thai's patron-client relation (interviewed 14 October 2012). 
41 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker suggest that the TRT populist rural policies are attempts to 
replace old local patron-client relationships and transfer the rural people’s loyalty directly to the TRT 
party (Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin: the Business of Politics in Thailand (Chiang 
Mai: Silkworms Books, 2004), 188-189.). 
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political-economic structures in the agri-food system. It has been suggested that 
many farmers and marginalised people feel very defensive of rural populist policies 
because, for many decades, they have been neglected and weakened by the state. 
When they gained something from rural populist policies (even short term monetary 
gains) they felt like they could die for those who came up with such policies, as they 
never had any political party to depend on before.42 Nevertheless, reliance on 
populist policies can prevent the population from trying to change the system.43 
Grassroots support also allows Thaksin and his allies to expand their political 
influence and economic control over the Thai economy.44 Moreover, Thaksin, his 
family and close associates have been accused of many corruption charges and of 
using political positions to increase the family fortune.45  
 Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai party encouraged the rural population’s 
dependency on their policies, and tried to establish Thaksin and the party as the 
biggest patrons of the rural poor. From a quick glance, policies such as the debt 
moratorium for small-scale farmers and the scheme to provide a one million baht 
fund for each village, or to give money to rural villages in general, would benefit the 
rural population such as small-scale farmers. The fine prints, however, often suggest 
that these policies reinforce hegemonic capitalist agriculture.46 Phua Thai party, 
which can be seen as a political successor to the Thai Rak Thai party after it was 
abolished under court's order, has not departed from such rural/agricultural populist 
                                                          
42 Mr. Prapat Panyachatrak, interviewed 29 January 2013, National Farmer Council, Bangkok. 
43 Mr. Witoon Lienchamroon, BioThai Foundation, interviewed 5 April 2012, BioThai headquarter, 
Nonthaburi. 
44 Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, “The Thaksinization of Thailand” (Copenhagen: Nordic 
Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) Press, 2005), 217. 
45 For a discussion of how Thaksin used his political power to benefit his family's business empire, 
see chapter 7 "Power and Profit" in Phongpaichit and Baker (2004). 
46 There are quite a few studies of the Thai Rak Thai rural development policies such as Ammar 
Siamwalla and Somchai Jitsuchon, Tackling Poverty: Liberalism, Populism or Welfare State. A Paper 
Presented at the Annual Thailand Development Research Institute Academic Seminar, 10-11th 
November 2007 (Cholburi, Thailand, 2007). (in Thai) 
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policies. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Phua Thai's rural populist 
policies in detail, but one good example of such policies is the heavily criticised 
paddy pledging scheme of the Yingluck Shinnawatra's administration (2011 to 
2014), which is discussed in the next section. 
 After the 2006 coup d'etat in Thailand which ousted the second Thaksin 
administration from power, polarised political conflicts and accompanying 
discourses in Thailand have escalated and hindered counter-hegemony in the agri-
food system in Thailand. Contemporary political polarisation in Thailand is often 
simplified as having two sides; the yellow shirts or the People's Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD) and more recently (2013 to 2014) the People's Democratic 
Reform Committee (PDRC), versus the red shirts or the United Front for Democracy 
Against Dictatorship (UDD). PDRC and PAD supporters are often perceived as 
those who oppose Thaksin Shinnawatra, his family and political party, and are also 
seen by the red shirts as being pro-monarchy and elitist. UDD supporters, on the 
other hand, present themselves as those who oppose the military and feudal elites, 
but they are perceived by others as being pro-Thaksin and pro-Phua Thai. Despite 
stereotypes, it is not necessary the case that all of those who protest against Phua 
Thai government are conservative royalists. Many see themselves as activists and 
reformers, or as socially conscious citizens. Likewise, some people become red shirts 
not because they support Thaksin but because of other reasons, such as to express 
their disagreements with coup d'états. 
 The popularity and legitimacy of Phua Thai's rural populist policies are being 
supported by discourses which present Phua Thai and red shirt leaders as being on 
the side of "peasants" or "phrai" who are fighting for marginalised people's causes. 
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They also claim to be on a mission to defend democracy by eliminating elitist 
Sakdina or the "ammart" influence in Thai society. Such discourses are propagated 
by many people such as red shirt leaders, intellectuals, politicians and an 
international lawyer/lobbyist.47 The red shirts' claim to represent the peasants, 
however, is questioned by many Thais as well as some academic literature, which 
suggest that Thaksin and his associates help to orchestrate and benefit from the red 
shirts' political mobilisation.48 The definition of the "ammart" is also problematically 
vague, and has come to include not only the groups of people directly associated 
with the monarchy and the 2006 coup d'état, such as the privy council, but also 
whatever institutions and people (often portrayed as the middle/upper class) that 
criticise Phua Thai government, including some senators, academics, and the 
Supreme Court.49 Even some civil society networks which have built themselves up 
over the past two to three decades are often dubbed by red shirt intellectuals as being 
part of the "ammart's network."50 
 Such polarised "phrai" versus "ammart" discourses can be seen as a form of 
co-optation of oppositions, engineered by political-economic elites to solicit support 
from the people by directing their attention (and attributing some grievances arising 
from the hegemonic agri-food system) to the vaguely defined "ammart" class. This 
helps to mask structural problems of the hegemonic agri-food system, and to distract 
the public's attention away from the social and ecological threats posed by the 
                                                          
47 For example, see Robert Amsterdam, "White Paper: Thailand – The Plot Against Democracy," 18 
March 2014 <http://robertamsterdam.com/thailand/category/red-shirts/>. 
48 For example, see: Tim Forsyth, “Thailand’s Red Shirt Protests: Popular Movement or Dangerous 
Street Theatre?,” Social Movement Studies 9, no. 4 (November 2010): 461–467; Yoshinori Nishizaki, 
“Peasants and the Redshirt Movement in Thailand: Some Dissenting Voices,” Journal of Peasant 
Studies 41, no. 1 (January 30, 2014): 1–28; S. Crispin, “Thailand’s Classless Conflict,” in Bangkok 
May 2010: Perspectives on a Divided Thailand, ed. Michael Montesano (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012), 
109, quoted in Nishizaki (2014), 18. 
49 Also see the discussion in Nishizaki (2014), 2. 
50 Prapart Pintoptang, interviewed 16 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
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hegemonic agri-food system. Such discourses also undermine counter-hegemonic 
ideas in the agri-food system and hinder rational debates in Thai society. This is 
because polarised political discourses often lead to the narrow framing of rural 
development issues, where rural development is portrayed as having only two 
opposing paths. Rural populist policies of Thai Rak Thai and Phua Thai parties are 
generally portrayed by the red shirts as modern globalised choices compare to the 
backward path of development offered by those who utilise terms associated with 
Thai localism and the King's sufficiency economy concept, such as community 
rights and self-reliance. Environmental concerns from increased usage of pesticides 
to produce rice and other attempts to promote sustainable agriculture are also 
sometimes ridiculed as middle/upper class elitist concerns.51 Those who criticise the 
paddy pledging scheme have been portrayed as being unsympathetic to farmers, 
while protests and oppositions to Phua Thai government are often portrayed as being 
motivated by disingenuous political gains. For example, in early 2014, Mrs. Thida 
Thawornset, president of the UDD, made a statement suggesting that there were 
some people who pretended to be farmers to encourage other farmers to protests 
against the Phua Thai government regarding the paddy pledging scheme.52 
 Some people have suggested that electoral results which allowed Thai Rak 
Thai and Phua Thai parties to come into power serve to legitimise the modern 
capitalist developmental path and other major policies that these parties pursue. 
Some have also suggested that this somehow de-legitimises Thai localist 
alternatives, which are seen as the opposite (anti) development path. An example is 
                                                          
51 For example: Nithi Iewsriwong, “Changing Thailand with the Rice Mortgage Scheme,” Mathichon 
Newspaper, November 5, 2012; Nithi Iewsriwong, “Changing Thailand with the Rice Mortgage 
Scheme (One More Time),” Mathichon Newspaper, December 3, 2012; Kam Pakha, “Morality Leads 
Thailand Towards Destruction,” Mathichon (weekly), 14-20 January 2011. (in Thai) 
52 Bangkok Business Newspaper, “Thida Condemns Doctors for Joining PDRC,” January 21, 2014. 
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Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011) which portrays the Assembly of the Poor as an advocate 
of community-based resource management and pitches it against Thaksin and his 
party's modern capitalist development approach.53 Since the Shinnawatra's political 
party received a lot of electoral support from the North and Northeast despite failing 
to follow through the Assembly of the Poor's demands, the book suggests that this 
represents a "betrayal" of the Assembly and that the rural population had no 
objection to capitalism or modernity, nor quarrel with the idea of development.54 
 There are many problems with such an assessment. Some members of the 
Assembly of the Poor support Thaksin and the red shirts while others do not,55 not to 
mention that the Assembly of the Poor does not claim to represent every single 
individual in rural Thailand. Moreover, aside from issues such as patron-clients and 
vote buying that distort the principles of electoral democracy, people's decisions to 
vote for Thai Rak Thai and/or Phua Thai can be based on many reasons e.g. as a 
second worse choice, because they approve of a few policies, or because of their 
appreciations of local candidates. In other words, voting for Thai Rak Thai and/or 
Phua Thai does not necessarily imply complete endorsement of all dimensions and 
consequences of capitalism and modernity, nor does it imply that voters have 
critically evaluated the structural problems of capitalism and are ideologically 
consistent. As chapter 6 will discuss, some members of the LRM sympathise with 
the red shirts even though they promote community rights to manage local natural 
                                                          
53 Derek Hall, Philip Hirsch, and Tania Murray Li, Powers of Exclusion: Land Dilemmas in Southeast 
Asia (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011), 187-188. 
54 Andrew Walker, "Beyond the Rural Betrayal: Lessons from the Thaksin Era for the Mekong 
Region." Paper presented at the International Conference on Critical Transitions in the Mekong 
Region. Chiang Mai, Thailand, 29-31 January 2007, quoted in Hall, Hirsch, and Li (2011), 188. 
55 Prapart Pintoptang, interviewed 16 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
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resources.56 In addition, both the Democrat (supposedly an elitist "ammart" party) 
and Phua Thai parties advocated CLTD projects in their 2011 election campaigns.57 
Although Phua Thai party won the election in 2011, the percentage of votes in the 
2011 election in the North and Northeast (Phua Thai's stronghold) actually indicates 
the rural population to be rather politically fragmented. For example, Phua Thai 
received only 54.9 percent of party-list votes in the North.58 Overall, it seems that 
using electoral results to legitimise the modern capitalist development approach is 
problematic and could consequently serve to benefit elites as well as maintain the 
capitalist status quo. Chapter 5 will also discuss how the assumption that capitalism 
and modernity represent "development" is problematic, and can be considered part of 
the hegemonic ideological order. 
 Some NGO activists suggest that agrarian social movements have been 
weakened due to political polarisation, and the lack of unity partly makes large-scale 
mobilisation difficult.59 After the coup d'état in 2006, many NGO activists were 
uncertain about their political beliefs and future strategies, so their counter-
hegemonic projects suffered as a consequence.60 The situation has improved at the 
time of writing in 2013 and early 2014, but it is still difficult for agrarian social 
movements to try to expand their networks and alliances without being labelled as 
either red or yellow. Red shirt intellectuals and supporters sometimes perceive 
demands by other social movements as "minor", and that Phua Thai party's policies 
                                                          
56 For example, as suggested by Baan Pong community leaders, Mr. Direk Kong-ngern and Mr. 
Montri Bualoi, interviewed 31 October 2012, Baan Pong, Chiang Mai. 
57 Prayong Doklamyai, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai and P-move declaration 18, 26 
April 2013. 
58 For further discussion, see Nishazaki (2014), 5. 
59 Witoon Lienchamroon, interviewed 5 April 2012, Nonthaburi. 
60 Ms. Switta Teerowattanakul, Northern Peasants Federation, interviewed 29 October 2012, Chiang 
Mai. 
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alone should be rather sufficient.61 Mr. Piroj Polpechr, Secretary of NGO 
Coordinating Committee on Development (North), sums up the problem quite well 
when he suggests that NGOs have the tendency to criticise large capital and the 
capitalist system because they work with local people who are adversely affected by 
pro-capitalist government policies. Seeing the problems as stemming from the state 
and capitalism, they cannot put the blame on the "ammart". Nevertheless, because 
they tend to criticise businessmen, large capital and politicians rather than "ammart", 
some people think these NGOs have chosen a side in the political conflict62 and 
ignore their causes. To make matters worse, hard-core red shirt groups sometimes 
mobilise to stop other social movement's demonstrations to "defend" Phua Thai 
government. For example, the Rak Chiang Mai 51 group - a branch of the red shirts - 
tried to obstruct demonstrations to oppose the 3,500 million baht water management 
plan at the 2nd Asia-Pacific water summit in Chiang Mai province between 14 and 
20 May 2013.63 In early 2014, some farmers who had not received payment from the 
paddy pledging scheme for over half a year reported that they were threatened by 
local red-shirts and community leaders to stop their protests against the 
government.64 
 The critique of the red shirts movement in this thesis does not intend to 
suggest that red shirts are fully co-opted or that they completely lack counter-
hegemonic potential, because many red shirts might be genuinely interested in 
bringing about a more egalitarian social order. The thesis also certainly does not 
                                                          
61 Prapart Pintoptang, interviewed 16 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
62 Prachatham news, “Piroj Polpechr Investigates the Accusations of ‘Kathin’, Egoistic Strategy of 
Thai NGOs and Lack of Unity,” February 20, 2013. (in Thai) 
63 Manager Newspaper (online), “Rak Chiang Mai 51 Shows Support to ‘Plod’ - Threathens NGOs 
Causing Chaos at the Water Summit - Prepares to Mobilise Thousands to Resist,” May 16, 2013. (in 
Thai) 
64 Bangkok Post (online), “Farmers End Protest in Phitsanulok,” January 28, 2014. 
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suggest that all anti-red shirt groups should be considered as part of counter-
hegemony in the agri-food system, because they encompass a variety of groups with 
different agenda, which are not directly related to agriculture and food. The intention 
of the critique is mainly to point out that the red shirts movement and its "phrai-
ammart" political discourse currently have problematic implications toward counter-
hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand. Some anti-red shirt groups can also 
be as problematic, especially if they refuse to acknowledge inequality in Thai society 
and blindly accept the domination of other elite groups, as long as they are not from 
the Shinnawatra family. At the time of writing, the Thai military recently staged the 
12th successful coup d'état in Thailand on 22 May 2014 and suspended the 2007 
Constitution, so it is unclear how the new development in Thai politics will affect 
civil society and counter-hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand. Chapter 6 
will also discuss some recent developments, as well as how the LRM's campaign is 
often obstructed by the military after the coup d'état in 2014. 
2.2) A case study of the paddy pledging scheme 
This section discusses the paddy pledging scheme as a co-optive populist policy, and 
focuses on its implementation under Phua Thai government between 2011 and 2014. 
This scheme is fiercely debated in Thailand due to its massive costs to the 
government budget, its substantial effects on Thai agri-food chains and rural 
economy, as well as its political nature. Hence, a discussion of the agri-food system 
in Thailand would be incomplete without a discussion of the paddy pledging scheme. 
 While claiming to help farmers, the scheme encourages hegemonic agri-food 
production and enables large capital to benefit from the government's monopoly 
control over rice commodity chains. Phua Thai government often argues that it plans 
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to sell the government stockpiles of rice when international prices are high, 
suggesting that the government seems to have adopted a speculative mentality 
similar to finance capital. As this section discusses, the government's plan to 
speculate with international prices of rice and to benefit from its monopoly control 
over Thailand's rice supply is problematic. In addition to the fact that it is a 
massively wasteful drain on the budget, the scheme intensifies problematic industrial 
production methods, increases power of monopolies and large capital in rice 
commodity chains, encourages crony and patron-client relationships, and also help to 
increase the scale of dispossessions of small-scale farmers. Moreover, at the time of 
writing in early 2014, the Thai National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) is 
investigating corruption practices in the scheme.65 
 The first paddy pledging programme was introduced in Thailand in the 
1981/1982 cropping season to provide soft loans for farmers who wanted to delay 
sales of their crops. However, since around 2001, the scheme has been used to 
support price and to increase farmers' income.66 A study of the paddy pledging 
programme in year 2005/06 suggests that most of the benefits (55 percent) did not go 
to farmers, and that the scheme tends to benefit well-to-do farmers in irrigated areas 
                                                          
65 For example, see Bangkok Post (online), “NAAC Decides to Impeach Yingluck,” May 08, 2014. 
Some experts on Thai rice production and trade suspect that the government had illegally sold some 
rice to private bodies at very low prices through politically well-connected agents (Puapongsakorn 
(2013), 7-15 to 7-21 and doctor Warong Dejkijwikrom from the Democrat party's information, quoted 
in Thai Publica (online), “Problems from the Collapse of Paddy Pledging Scheme,” June 28, 2013). 
For other reports of alleged corruption: Bangkok Business Newspaper, “Yingluck Government Lied 
about G-to-G Rice Deal - Damages to the Budget and Rice Stock,” January 17, 2014; David Eimer, 
“Burmese Smugglers Get Rich on Yingluck Shinawatra’s £13 Billion Thai Rice Subsidies,” The 
Telegraph, February 04, 2014;Thai Post Newspaper, “Hand over to DSI to Deal with Corruption in 
Rice Mortgage Scheme. Threaten to Blacklist- Boonsong Organised the Team,” February 24, 2012; 
Patsara Jikkham, “Rice Stockpile to Be Audited,” Bangkok Post (online), June 13, 2014. 
66 Nipon Puapongsakorn, “The Political Economy of Thai Rice Price and Export Policies in 2007–
2008,” in The Rice Crisis Markets, Policies and Food Security, ed. David Dawe (London-Washington 
DC: FAO and Earthscan, 2010), 192. 
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and large-scale exporters.67 During the global agri-food commodity price spikes of 
2007/2008, the Thai government did not sell any portion of its 2.1 million tons of 
rice stock, but increased the guaranteed price for its paddy pledging programme to a 
high record of 14,000 baht per ton for the 2008 dry-season crop.68 This could be 
because the government wanted to please politically influential farmers and rice 
millers, or simply because of shortsightedness. The share of pledged paddy in total 
production then increased dramatically to 44.8 percent for the 2007/2008 dry season 
paddy, making the government the country's largest trader of rice.69 
 Phua Thai government under the leadership of Prime Minister Yingluck 
Shinnawatra came into power in August 2011, and continued to support the paddy 
pledging scheme which offered to buy rice at significantly higher prices than the 
market. Phua Thai government officials had often explained that they intended to 
speculate and sell rice in the international market at high prices.70 The nature of the 
rice market makes that wish rather impossible, as high prices of rice inevitably tend 
to increase production in other countries, and as large stockpiles of perishable rice in 
warehouses keep prices low because buyers rationally expect the Thai government to 
sell (or to let rice rot).71 The office of the Ombudsman report in 2014 also suggests 
                                                          
67 Nipon Puapongsakorn and Jittakorn Jarupong, Rent Seeking Activities and The Political Economy 
of the Paddy Pledging Market Intervention Measures (Bangkok: Office of the National Anti-
Corruption Commission, 2010), Executive Summary (v) and 41. (in Thai) 
68 Puapongsakorn (2010), 191 and 214; Somporn Isawilanont, Thai Rice: Changes in Production and 
Distribution Structure (Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2010), 66-68. (in Thai) 
69 Puapongsakorn, (2010), 194. 
70 Mr. Kittirat Na-Ranong, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, quoted in Post Today 
Newspaper, “Expensive Lesson: From Paddy Pledging to Rubber Price Speculations,” July 19, 2012. 
(in Thai) 
71 Post Today Newspaper, "Expensive Lesson", (2012); Nipon Puapongsakorn quoted in Thai Publica 
(online), “An Interview with Niphon Puapongsakorn, Academic Master on Rice, on Things He Did 
Not Want to See in Paddy Pledging Scheme and Fear of Politics Destroying the Thai Rice Market,” 
September 21, 2011. (in Thai) 
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that the scheme is a failure as huge stocks of deteriorating rice are left unsold and the  
government has to borrow money to pay farmers.72 
 A study of the paddy pledging scheme between October 2011 to October 
2012 found that around 52 percent of the country's total rice production was under 
the control of the government through the pledging scheme. There is evidence that 
benefits were accrued mostly to middle and high income farmers rather than poor 
farmers.73 This could be because, for example, small-scale farmers did not have the 
means to transport their rice to the mills, so they had to sell to middlemen at lower 
prices.74 Moreover, those who benefit most live around irrigated areas which allow 
them to grow rice several rounds per year, whereas more marginalised farmers in the 
North and Northeast could only grow rice once a year.75 Estimated costs of the 
scheme for the year 2011/2012 alone (without taking into account corruption costs 
and that rice will be sold at lower prices) is 170,314 million baht, which is a massive 
drain on the government's budget to the extent that Thailand Development Research 
Institute (TDRI) suggests a better option would be to transfer 133,671 million baht 
of tax payers' money directly to 4 million farming households, so that the 
government can save 32,169 million baht instead of wasting money on rice pledge 
costs and on relatively well-off rice mills, warehouses and surveyors.76 There were 
also other costs arising from other forms of mismanagement.77 
                                                          
72 Sriracha Jaroenpanich et al., A Study of the Effects of the Paddy Pledging Scheme on Thai Farmers’ 
Quality of Life (Bangkok: Office of the Ombudsman Thailand, 2014), (13)-(14). 
73 Nipon Puapongsakorn, Thai Rice Strategy: Research and Development on Thai Rice and Looking 
Forward (Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2013), 7-1 and 7-4. (in Thai) 
74 Khaosod Newspaper, “Grassroot Voices Regarding the Rice Mortgage Scheme,” April 16, 2012. 
(in Thai) 
75 Jaroenpanich et al. (2014), (9). 
76 Puapongsakorn (2013), 7-6 and 7-7. 
77 Other costs include, for example, degraded rice and loss of Thai export market (Ibid, 7-8 and 7-13). 
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 Another main problem of the paddy pledging scheme is that it has increased 
the monopoly power of large rice mills.78 A study in 1997 suggests that rice farmers 
sold paddy through three main channels: 1) local middlemen (50.9 percent); 2) 
central markets (23.8 percent), and 3) rice mills (19.0 percent).79 However, since 
2004, rice mills became more influential as paddy collectors in the government's 
paddy pledging scheme. By 2007/2008, 90 percent of paddy was sold to rice mills 
and most central markets throughout the country had been closed.80 The rice 
pledging scheme has also benefited monopolistic large-scale rice mills in particular. 
Around 53 percent of medium-scale rice mills closed down between 2000 and 2008, 
while the number of large-scale rice mills increased by 32 percent.81 The 
geographical distribution of each rice mill throughout the country allows them to 
establish "few-buyers" markets where they have monopsony power over rice paddy, 
especially with the destruction of relatively more competitive central markets which 
used to be the main trading hubs of paddy.82 It has also been argued that some rice 
mills do not use fair and up-to-standard measuring equipments.83 
 Owing to the paddy pledging scheme, Thai rice supply chains have been re-
organised to benefit large business groups, and successful rice mills tend to be large 
ones which have good relations with government officials. Some researchers suggest 
                                                          
78 For example, see Jaroenpanich et al. (2014), (3)-(4) and (12)-(13). 
79 Research unit on agri-businesses at Kasetsart University, Strategic Commodity: Rice Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Natural Resource (Kasetsart University, 1997), quoted in Iswilanont 
(2010), 83. 
80 Isawilanont (2010), 83. 
81 Makasiri Chaowakul, Revision of Thai Rice Market Structure: A Complete Report for Thailand 
Research Fund (Naresuan University, 2009), quoted in Isawilanont (2010), 83. 
82 Isawilanont (2010), 91-92. The author would like to add that the discussion of central markets for 
paddy, as well as usage of studies from economic perspectives in this part of the thesis, do not intend 
to suggest that these central markets nor the (appearance of or ideal) "free markets" in the neo-
classical economics conception, which are concerned with price competitiveness, are the same as 
counter-hegemonic markets embedded in counter-hegemonic ideas and governance structures which 
reflect concerns for social and ecological sustainability. 
83 Chaowakul (2009) quoted in Isawilanont (2010), 92. 
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that rice traders have to pay agent fees to politically influential agents/companies to 
purchase rice from the government's stockpile.84 Former top rice exporting 
companies of Thailand had to take their business elsewhere, such as to Cambodia.85 
As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5, the scheme has also been criticised 
for destroying smaller-scale operators along rice supply chains and for discouraging 
the production of quality and organic rice.86 Producer rice mills, such as in Tambol 
Jedihak, Ratchaburi province, which used to mill 100 tons of paddy per month, 
milled only 10 tons of paddy per month due to the effects of the scheme.87 Other 
community enterprises that used to sell rice seeds and other products are also 
negatively affected.88 
 The paddy pledging scheme exacerbates environmental problems because it 
encourages the intensification of hegemonic industrial agri-food production methods 
discussed in chapter 3. Under the paddy pledging scheme, the government buys rice 
from all farmers without discriminating against low quality (the criteria is based only 
on the general type of rice, dampness and impurity), so farmers only care about 
increasing the quantity of paddy in order to increase their revenues. This has pushed 
them to increase their usage of chemical fertilisers, pesticides, and also to use seeds 
which have short harvest time that result in lower quality of rice. A lot of farmers 
tried to intensify their production to increase quantity, such as by harvesting rice 3 to 
                                                          
84 For example, see Puapongsakorn (2013), 7-24. 
85 Nipon Puapongsakorn and Ammar Siamwalla, “Transform Thailand with the Paddy Pledging 
Scheme: Facts for Ajarn Nithi and the Public,” published on TDRI website, November 24, 2012. (in 
Thai) 
86 Based on many interviews with farmers, civil servants, community rice mills managers and NGOs 
in the AAN such as Ms. Sompoi Jansang, manager of the Rice Fund Surin Organic Agriculture Co-
operative, 19 December 2012, Surin, Thailand, and also Jaroenpanich et al. (2014), (4), (12), (14) and 
31-32. 
87 Puapongsakorn and Siamwalla (2012). 
88 Ibid. 
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5 times a year (instead of just one or two) without resting land,89 which contributed 
to serious spreads of aphis.90 
 The paddy pledging scheme also produces a lot of opportunity costs which 
greatly affect the agri-food system in Thailand. Due to distorted higher prices of rice, 
a lot of resources have been switched to the production of rice. The costs of 
production (which were already quite high due to input prices, scarcity of labour, and 
high fossil fuel prices) increased as a response. There are, for example, reports that 
some landlords in Ayuthya and Lopburi provinces have increased land rents (50 to 
100 percent), stopped renting to landless farmers, or bought up more land as 
responses to this policy.91 A study suggests that rent in the Central Region increased 
from 800 to 1,000 baht per year to 1,000 baht per rai per harvest, and fertiliser costs 
also increased despite stagnations in the level of yields.92 There were also over-
expansions of rice mill capacity (currently Thailand has 90 million tons per year 
capacity even though it needs only 35 million tons),93 not to mention that there are 
huge opportunity costs of alternative public investments in other socially beneficial 
projects and infrastructures.94 The Ombudsman's study in 2014 criticises the paddy 
pledging scheme for not improving farming productivity, and suggests that the 
scheme has not helped secure higher farmer's income because of corresponding 
increases in production costs. Moreover, the scheme cannot provide sufficient 
income for farmers to purchase important factors of production such as land.95 
                                                          
89 Puapongsakorn (2013), 7-15; Jaroenpanich et al. (2014), (5) and (12). 
90 Puapongsakorn (2013), iv. 
91 Post Today Newspaper, “Farmers Complain to the Government about Exorbitant Land Rents”, 
October 3, 2011, B12. (in Thai) 
92 Puapongsakorn (2013), iv. 
93 Ibid, 7-14. 
94 Puapongsakorn and Siamwalla (2012). 
95 Jaroenpanich et al. (2014), (7)-(8), (10)-(11) and 30-31. 
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Landless farmers also have to pay higher land rents and are likely to be transformed 
into farm labourers with little occupation security.96 
 In early 2014, there were protests in many provinces by farmers who sold 
their paddy to the government almost half a year ago but had not received 
payment.97 The delayed payment caused significant negative repercussions 
throughout the rural economy and Thai agri-food sector, as purchasing power in 
rural areas dipped. In mid-February 2014, more than 1 million farmers had not been 
paid the total value of 130 billion baht for the paddy they pledged to the 
government.98 Many farmers had to borrow money through informal channels with 
high interest rates to invest in a new round of production or just to sustain 
themselves.99  
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of counter-hegemonic ideas, production-
distribution practices and governance structures of the SAM and the LRM. It has 
also discussed the SAM and the LRM as part of the search for alternative 
development paths in Thailand. This chapter has also discussed co-optation of 
agrarian movements, as well as how rural populist policies and polarised politics in 
Thailand open room for co-optation of oppositions. The following chapters will 
discuss counter-hegemonic attempts of the SAM and the LRM, as well as their 
obstacles and possibilities of co-optation in greater depth. The chapters will also 
                                                          
96 Ibid, (9)-(10). 
97 Bangkok Post (online), “Farmers End Protest in Phitsanulok.” (2014) and The Nation (online), 
“Stress Drives Another Farmer to Suicide,” February 16, 2014. 
98 Pitsinee Jitpleecheep and Piyachart Maikaew, “Delayed Scheme Payments Lead to Higher NPLs,” 
Bangkok Post, February 17, 2014. 
99 For example, see: Post Today Newspaper, “Farmers Complained That Late Payment Made Them 
Turn to Informal Loans,” January 08, 2014 and Manager Newspaper (online), “Farmers Bittered from 
Discriminatory Payment as the Government Only Paid Their Supporters,” January 29, 2014. (in Thai) 
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discuss how the lines between counter-hegemony and co-optation of oppositions can 
be quite blurred, especially given that predominantly hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic forces interact, adapt and evolve. 
 This chapter helps the thesis to advance six original contributions to 
knowledge which were outlined in chapter 1. Discussions on co-optation of 
oppositions,  rural populist policies, and the paddy pledging scheme, help the thesis 
to advance the first original contribution to knowledge, which is to bring new 
empirical information into existing literature on the mainstream agri-food system. 
An overview of the SAM's and the LRM's counter-hegemonic attempts, as well as 
the discussion of co-optation of oppositions in part 2, also help to advance the 
second, third and fourth contributions to knowledge. These contributions include: 
bringing new empirical information into existing literature on alternative agri-food 
movements; extending neo-Marxist and Gramscian theories on the analysis of 
alternative agri-food movements; as well as to provide new perspectives and data on 
Thai agrarian social movements. The discussion on polarised political discourses as 
co-optation of oppositions in this chapter also provides new perspectives on 
polarised politics in Thailand, which is the sixth contribution to knowledge of this 
thesis. Part 1 of this chapter has also briefly discussed Thai localism, which helps to 
advance the fifth contribution to knowledge. Nevertheless, chapters 5 and 6 will 
discuss Thai localism more substantially. 
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Chapter 5 
The Sustainable Agriculture Movement in Thailand 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has provided a comprehensive discussion of counter-hegemony 
and co-optation of oppositions in the agri-food system in Thailand. This chapter 
continues the discussion by providing a more in-depth exploration of the sustainable 
agriculture movement (SAM) in Thailand. It also elaborates on a few issues 
discussed in chapter 4, and also provides a foundation to discuss the land reform 
movement in chapter 6. 
 This chapter helps to support the second and third main arguments of the 
thesis; that although the mainstream agri-food system is dominated by hegemonic 
capitalist interests, domestic and transnational counter-hegemonic forces can 
influence some changes in the system even though they are faced with limitations 
and co-optation of oppositions. Discussions of counter-hegemonic ideas, production-
distribution practices, and governance structures of the SAM in Thailand help to 
advance main arguments of this chapter; that these symbiotic components are all 
vital integral components of counter-hegemony, and that the Thai SAM can be seen 
as part of global counter-hegemonic forces in the agri-food system. In addition, this 
chapter helps to support the fourth main argument of the thesis; that transformations 
of the agri-food system should be seen as an on-going, non-linear evolutionary 
process over a long period of time, where counter-hegemonic forces may sometimes 
retain hegemonic elements or be partially co-opted, which suggests that they should 
continually refine and develop clear counter-hegemonic ideas and practices. 
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Empirical exploration of the SAM in Thailand in this chapter also helps to re-affirm 
the appropriateness of the neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical perspective of the 
thesis.  
 This chapter uses secondary sources in English and Thai, as well as 
interviews of 55 people including farmers, activists, social entrepreneurs and civil 
servants. Most of them are involved in the SAM in Thailand. Many interviews were 
drawn from founders of the Alternative Agriculture Network (AAN) - established by 
NGOs and small-scale farmers in 1989 - as well as other individuals and groups, to 
give a comprehensive macro-view picture of the SAM in Thailand. As discussed in 
chapter 1, interviews and site visits for this chapter were based in 4 provinces in 3 
regions of Thailand: Bangkok and metropolitan area (Central), Chiang Mai (North), 
Surin and Yasothon (Northeast). In particular, the focus is on sustainable farmer 
groups and producer rice mills in Surin and Yasothon provinces. In Yasothon, these 
groups include Naso Rakthammachart group, Bak-rua rice farmer group, Nam-oom 
enterprise, Kammad sustainable agriculture group, and Thamma-ruamjai moral rice 
network. In Surin, the focus is on the Rice Fund Surin Organic Agriculture Co-
operative and its members, particularly Tamor, Ta-toom, Taptai and Ta-non 
sustainable farmer groups. A few interviews were also collected from Mae-ta 
sustainable agriculture group in Chiang Mai. These four provinces provide good 
sites for interviews because sustainable agricultural ideas and practice have been 
developing there for many decades. In addition to the methodology and data 
collection section in chapter 1, information on farmer groups and sustainable 
agriculture foundations discussed in this thesis can be found in Appendix 1. 
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 There are four main parts to this chapter. The first three parts discuss the 
SAM's counter-hegemonic ideas and discourses, production-distribution practices, 
and governance structures. It should be noted, however, that the order of counter-
hegemonic elements to be discussed does not signify varying importance, as they 
should be seen as integral parts of counter-hegemony. Parts 1 and 3 attempt to 
provide a comprehensive overview of counter-hegemonic ideas and governance 
structures of the movement using cross-reference analysis of different farmer groups. 
Aside from cross-reference analysis of different sustainable farming groups, part 2 
explores production and distribution practices of producer rice mills in Yasothon and 
Surin in greater depth. Part 4 of this chapter then discusses some grey areas between 
hegemony and counter-hegemony, as well as co-optation of oppositions which are 
relevant to the SAM. 
Part 1: Counter-hegemonic ideas and discourses 
This part of the chapter explores counter-hegemonic ideas and discourses of 
practitioners and supporters of sustainable agriculture in Thailand, such as activists 
and farmers who are main founders of the AAN, organic farmers and representatives 
of organic agri-food enterprises, as well as sympathetic civil servants. Section 1.1 
discusses how these actors' perceptions of the problems of the mainstream agri-food 
system are rather similar to the critique of the hegemonic agri-food system provided 
in chapter 3, although they employ different terms and discourses. Thai and non-Thai 
sources of counter-hegemonic inspirations are then discussed in section 1.2. Lastly, 
section 1.3 discusses main counter-hegemonic ideas and discourses of the SAM in 
Thailand. The discussion helps to suggest that ideas and discourses of the SAM in 
Thailand may embody some unique local characteristics, but they can also be seen as 
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part of counter-hegemonic global movements which aim to challenge the global 
hegemonic agri-food system. 
1.1) The SAM's critique of the mainstream agri-food system 
People who are involved in the SAM in Thailand generally criticise negative 
ecological consequences of the mainstream agri-food system,1 as well as low 
nutritional quality and toxin of agri-food products produced in this system.2 Similar 
to the critique of the hegemonic agri-food system provided in chapter 3, many people 
in the movement are concerned about excessive monopoly and political power of 
large agri-food businesses and retailers, not only in Thailand but also at the global 
level.3 Sometimes these critiques arose from personal experience and observation, 
such as of farmers' health problems arising from excessive usage of agricultural 
chemicals.4 Sustainable agriculture supporters in Thailand also criticise what they 
see as exploitative relations in the agri-food system where farmers lose their control 
over factors of production and household food security to market forces.5 Agri-food 
products under the current hegemonic system are seen as embodiments of 
exploitation of small-scale farmers. As Dr. Chomchuan Boonrahong, main founder 
of sustainable agriculture movement based in Chiang Mai described: "Thai 
consumers are used to buying cheap agri-food products but these cheap prices are 
                                                          
1 Mr. Samrit Boonsuk, president of the Community of Agro-ecology Foundation, interviewed 19 
December 2012, Surin; Decha Siripat, “Present and Future of Alternative Farmers in Thailand (first 
Published in 1987),” in The Path of Sustainable Agriculture, 2nd ed. (Samut-Sakorn: BioThai, 2011), 
87. (in Thai) 
2 Decha Siripat, “Present and Future of Alternative Farmers in Thailand,” (2011), 87. 
3 For example: Mr. Witoon Lienchamroon, BioThai Foundation, interviewed 5 April 2012; Mr. Decha 
Siripat, Khao Kwan Foundation, interviewed 14 October 2012; Mrs. Supha Yaimuang, SATHAI, 
interviewed 3 October 2012; Mr. Pat Apaimul, Mae-ta organic farmer, interviewed 1 November 2012; 
Mr. Chanuan Rattanawaraha, Agricultural Advisor Office, Department of Agriculture, interviewed 17 
January 2013; Mr. Prapat Panyachatrak, Chairman of National Farmer Council, interviewed 29 
January 2013. 
4 For example: Mr. Pakphum Inpan, natural farmer Group in Tambon Tamor, Ampur Prasart, 
interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin; Mr. Thamma Sangkalee and Mr. Bood-dee Piengprom, Ta-
toom Natural Farmer group, interviewed 22 December 2012, Surin. 
5 Decha Siripat, Khao Kwan Foundation, interviewed 14 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
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artificial..and are based on the exploitation of farmers' sweat and labour through 
monopoly power in the markets.6" Generally, Thai farmers in the mainstream agri-
food system are seen as being dependent on "outside forces" or exploitative market 
relations, which lead to higher costs of production, spending and debt.7 Due to 
widespread perceptions that small-scale farmers generally face financial hardships, 
younger generations of Thais who were born in rural areas tend to seek employment 
opportunities in other sectors of the economy and in urban areas. This has partially 
resulted in a higher average age of Thai farmers and a lack of farm labourers.8 
Moreover, rural households in Thailand are generally having what some call "hybrid 
livelihoods" where they divide their time between farm and non-farm activities.9 
 Sustainable agriculture discourses in Thailand frequently involve criticisms 
of transnational agri-businesses or large capital's exploitation of farmer, such as 
through patents of seeds.10 However, supporters of sustainable agriculture do not 
simply attribute negative effects of the hegemonic agri-food system to particular 
companies. Many supporters of sustainable agriculture in Thailand, such as activists, 
farmers and a developmental monk, explicitly explain the problems as stemming 
from the globalised capitalist system, as well as the belief in one-track modernisation 
                                                          
6 Dr. Chomchuan Boonrahong, lecturer at Mae-Jo University and one of AAN founders, interviewed 
3 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
7 For example, see: Decha Siripat, “Present and Future of Alternative Farmers in Thailand," (2011), 
87. 
8 Dr. Weerachai Nakwiboolwong, Director of Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO), quoted in 
Yupin Pongthong, “Solving Farmers Crisis through Professional Schools in 6 provinces,” Bangkok 
Business News, August 11, 2013. (in Thai) 
9 For example, see Jonathan Rigg and Sakunee Nattapoolwat, “Embracing the Global in Thailand: 
Activism and Pragmatism in an Era of Deagrarianization,” World Development 29, no. 6 (June 2001): 
945–960. 
10 For example, see: Krisda Boonchai et al., Ideas and Policies Regarding Agri-Food Resource Base 
(Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2007), 25; AAN farmer groups, “Kaen-Nakhon Manifesto: Local Rice, Secure 
Food and Farmer Livelihoods in E-Saan Local Rice Expo, 14-15 March 2009” (Khonkaen, 2009). (in 
Thai) 
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and neo-liberalism11 which allow large transnational Thai and non-Thai capital to 
exploit the Earth.12 Globalised capitalism is also seen as being responsible for 
hegemonic cultural norms and social relations, such as the "culture of 
individualism", which prevent people from forming groups to empower 
themselves.13  
 Mainstream media and educational system are also sometimes criticised for 
spreading consumeristic way of thinking about food consumption and for changing 
eating habits, such as by increasing preference for Western fast food rather than 
more nutritional food. Hegemonic agri-food consumption patterns are also seen as 
having negative effects on local agri-food systems, leading to destructions of local 
markets, negligence of traditional crops and reductions of biodiversity.14 Most 
importantly, the hegemonic capitalist agri-food system is criticised - often with 
Buddhist perspectives - for changing world views of farmers and farming practices 
in general. For example, Mr. Decha Siripat who is a founder of Khao Kwan 
Foundation discusses how the Green Revolution has changed the minds of Thai 
farmers who now see "plants merely as products", and select which crop to grow 
based on monetary gains in robotic and mechanistic manners with no respect to life 
and Mother Earth.15 Such agri-food production methods are seen as violent,16 
                                                          
11 For example, see: Nattapong Pattanapanchai, Food - Life or Commodity? Marketable Culture under 
the Control of Corporations, ed. Ubol Yoo-wah (Nonthaburi: SATHAI, 2008), 40-41 (in Thai); 
Decha Siripat, interviewed 14 October 2012, Nonthaburi; AAN farmer Groups, “Kaen-Nakhon 
Manifesto," (2009); Southern Alternative Farmer Group, “Manifesto of the Southern Alternative 
Farmer, 6 June 2009” (Patlung, 2009). (in Thai) 
12 Phra Promma Suphatto, a monk at Thamma-ruamjai forest temple, Ampur Pa-tiew, Yasothon, 
interviewed 23 December 2012, Yasothon. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Supha Yaimuang, SATHAI, interviewed 3 October 2012, Nonthaburi; Dr. Chomchuan 
Boonrahong, interviewed 3 November 2012, Chiang Mai; Thamma Sangkalee, interviewed 22 
December 2012, Surin; Boonsong Martkhao, Kammad Sustainable Agriculture group, interviewed 25 
December 2012, Yasothon. 
15 Decha Siripat, interviewed 14 October 2012, Nonthaburi. A few others also explain the problems in 
similar manners, such as Mr. Adisorn Puangchompoo, main founder of 1 rai-100,000 baht project, 
interviewed 13 January 2013, Nonthaburi. 
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greedy, and as lacking in mercy, because farmers do not hesitate to kill "pests" in 
their farms using agricultural chemicals.17 Moreover, they tend not to be concerned 
about toxin residues in agri-food products that harm consumers.18 
  Formal Thai state governance structures have also been criticised by many 
main supporters of the SAM in Thailand. The Thai state is generally criticised for its 
fundamental belief in neo-classical economics and its focus on promoting 
consumerism, as well as the production of cash crops for export and economic 
growth19 without much concerns whether small-scale farmers will be in debt or 
whether prices will plunge downwards due to excessive supply.20 The Thai state is 
also criticised for being bias in favour of large-scale enterprises.21 Many sustainable 
farmers interviewed criticise some rural populist schemes, particularly the paddy 
pledging scheme which, as discussed in the previous chapter, supports conventional 
rice production and hinders sustainable agriculture. Some sustainable farmers view 
the scheme as the Thai state's attempt to keep farmers and farmer groups weak,22 and 
as a method to re-enforce direct patron-client relations between politicians and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
16 San Saeng-arun Magazine, “In the Water There Are Fishes, in the Paddy Field There Is Rice: 
Farmer Livelihoods, Disintegration and Survival,” San Saeng-Arun Magazine (Bangkok, 2012), 24-
25. (in Thai) 
17 Decha Siripat, interviewed 14 October 2012, Nonthaburi and Pat Apaimul, interviewed 1 
November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
18 Mr. Ubol Yoowah, NGO activist based in Yasothon, interviewed 22 December 2012; Mr. 
Kankamkla Pilanoi, main co-ordinator at the Thamma-ruamjai moral rice network, interviewed 23 
December 2012, Yasothon. 
19 Adisorn Puangchompoo, interviewed 13 January 2013, Nonthaburi. 
20 Pat Apaimul, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai; Supha Yaimuang, interviewed 3 October 
2012, Nonthaburi; Phra Promma Suphatto, interviewed 23 December 2012, Yasothon; Mr. Jirapan 
Meesap, Thamma-ruamjai network, interviewed 23 December 2012; Dr. Chomchuan Boonrahong, 
interviewed 3 November 2012, Chiang Mai; Mr. Samrit Boonsuk, CAE, interviewed 19 December 
2012, Surin. 
21 Prapat Panyachatrak, Chairman of National Farmer Council, interviewed 29 January 2013, 
Bangkok. 
22 For example: Mr. Pakphum Inpan, Mr. Mitr Boontawee, Mr. Som Sadomsuk, Mr. Rungroj 
Kajadroka and Mr. Samrach Thong-iam, farmer members of the natural farmer Group in Tambon 
Tamor, Ampur Prasart, interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin. 
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farmers.23 Other policies are also criticised for being supportive of problematic 
production methods, such as policies to provide free agricultural chemicals in some 
provinces,24 or are criticised as encouragements for farmers to accumulate debts.25 
 Dissatisfactions with the mainstream agri-food system have led many people 
to experiment with alternatives. The following section discusses sources of counter-
hegemonic ideas for the SAM, such as transnational ideas regarding food security, as 
well as more regional and domestic sources of ideas. 
1.2) The SAM's sources of counter-hegemonic ideas 
Some existing literature have noted that many strands of thoughts such as Buddhism, 
Christianity, political economy and community culture school, have influenced the 
SAM in Thailand.26 This section attempts to give a more up-to-date and 
comprehensive overview of how the SAM in Thailand has been influenced by many 
Thai and non-Thai sources of counter-hegemonic ideas. This helps to suggest that 
although the movement may seem local and national oriented, it is nevertheless part 
of global counter-hegemonic forces which try to challenge and transform the 
hegemonic agri-food system. 
 The Thai SAM's ideas and discourses are quite similar to those in the 
progressive and radical trends of global agri-food counter-hegemonic movements. 
Notably, the progressive food justice discourse which supports local or community 
                                                          
23 For example, Mr. Rungroj Kajadroka, farmer member of the natural farmer Group in Tambon 
Tamor, Ampur Prasart, interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin. 
24 Mr. Kankamkla Pilanoi, Thamma-ruamjai moral rice network, interviewed 23 December 2012, 
Yasothon. 
25 Mr. Thamma Sangkalee, Ta-toom Natural Farmer group, interviewed 22 December 2012, Surin. 
26 For example, see: Anusorn Unno, Sustainable Agriculture Movement in Thailand and the Politics 
of Sustainable Agriculture Narratives (Nonthaburi: Sustainable Agriculture Foundation Thailand 
(SATHAI), 2003), 106. (in Thai) 
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supported agriculture, as well as the more radical concept of food sovereignty which 
emphasises  democratic control over food resource and re-distributive land reforms 
among other things.27 Global counter-hegemonic forums, such as the NGO Forum 
for Food Security in 1996 in Rome, have also produced ideas and concepts that have 
influenced and helped to legitimise the Thai SAM. Examples include the emphasis 
on human rights to food, support of decentralised governance structures, and 
promotion of farmer rights to genetic resources.28 A manifesto of a sustainable 
farmer group in Thailand in 2009, for example, utilises similar terms and calls for the 
state to protect rights of farmers and communities.29 Global social movements 
against genetically modified seeds and global social movements' concerns over the 
WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), have also influenced counter-hegemonic ideas of the SAM in Thailand.30 
Other sources of ideas include the global Occupy movement which inspired the 
"Occupy Your Life" manifesto of Mekong Youth Alliance for Organic Agriculture 
and Agro-ecology, which calls on young farmers to reclaim their roles in food 
production.31 Thai NGOs and sustainable farmer groups also exchange ideas with 
civil society groups in other countries through seminars and other forms of 
collaborations. Examples include La Vía Campesina, an umbrella body that 
encompasses more than 120 small-scale farmers’ and peasants’ organisations in 56 
                                                          
27 Eric Holt Giménez and Annie Shattuck, “Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food Movements: 
Rumblings of Reform or Tides of Transformation?,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 1 
(January 2011), 125 and 128. 
28 Nora Mckeon, “The FAO, Civil Society and the Global Governance of Food and Agriculture,” in 
The United Nations and Civil Society: Legitimating Global Governance - Whose Voice? (New York: 
Zed Books, 2009), 36-37. 
29 AAN farmer groups, “Kaen-Nakhon Manifesto: Local Rice, Secure Food and Farmer Livelihoods 
in E-Saan Local Rice Expo, 14-15 March 2009.” 
30 Mrs. Supha Yaimuang, SATHAI, interviewed 3 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
31 Mekong Youth Alliance for Organic Agriculture and Agro-ecology, "Occupy Your Life 
Manifesto," obtained at an academic form on agro-ecology, farmer rights, food sovereignty and 
farmer movements, 12 November 2012, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. It is an alliance of 
young small-scale diversified farmers from various Asian countries namely Bhutan, Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos. 
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countries such as the Landless Rural Workers Movement in Brasil,32 Biodiversity for 
Sustainable Agriculture Asia, Genetic Resources Action International in Spain,33 fair 
trade movements in the US34 and Europe,35 as well as organic agriculture 
movements from countries such as Canada, Germany, Philippines and Bhutan.36  
 Many promoters of sustainable agriculture in Thailand utilise counter-
hegemonic terms such as farmer rights and food sovereignty in similar manners to 
transnational social movements based in other countries. However, sustainable 
agriculture ideas and discourses in Thailand have also been developed further by 
domestic sources of ideas and by organic intellectuals. Some Thai academics have 
developed the "food resource base" concept to help promote sustainable agriculture 
in Thailand, which brings to attention the importance of social and natural 
foundation of agri-food production and distribution, which should be locally situated 
and are based on self-reliance, diversity and democratic participation in agri-food 
governance structures. The concept was developed from many sources of ideas such 
as food security and food sovereignty, cultural ecology, and human rights37 but with 
some differences. For example, the food resource base discourse tries to adopt a 
different approach from the food sovereignty discourse which focuses on small-scale 
farmers, to emphasise that the SAM in Thailand ought to build broader cross-class 
alliances.38 
                                                          
32Annette Desmarais, Globalization and the Power of Peasants: La Vía Campesina (London: Pluto 
Press, 2007), 34. 
33 Mr. Witoon Lienchamroon, BioThai, interviewed 5 April 2012, Nonthaburi. 
34 Mr. Pakphum Inpan, Tamor Natural Farmer group, interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin. 
35 Mr. Ubol Yoowah, NGO activist, interviewed 22 December 2012, Yasothon and Green Net Co-
operative, “About Green Net Cooperative,” accessed July 18, 2014, 
<http://www.greennet.or.th/about/greennet>. 
36 Chomchuan Boonrahong, Mae-Jo University, interviewed 3 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
37 Krisda Boonchai et al., Ideas and Policies Regarding Agri-Food Resource Base (Nonthaburi: 
BioThai, 2007), 23-27. (in Thai) 
38 Ibid, 49. 
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 Many Thais from middle class background help to shape ideas and strategies 
of the SAM in Thailand. Examples include public intellectuals and activists such as 
Rapee Sakrig, Saneh Jamarik, Prawase Wasi, and Rosana Tosritrakul, as well as 
green entrepreneurs who founded the Green Net Co-operative, Lemon Farm 
supermarkets,39 and green urban consumer networks such as the ones spearheaded 
by Suan-ngern Meema Publishing. It should be pointed out, however, that the term 
"middle class" in the Thai context does not have the same connotation as that of 19th 
century European bourgeoisie because most of the Thai middle class belong to the 
salariat, while others are small-scale entrepreneurs, academics, or those who work in 
the media.40 Some urban-based people also seek sustainable agricultural lessons 
from foundations such as Khao Kwan, because they want alternatives to office jobs 
and for ways to live off their own land for the sake of freedom and food security.41 
Some people from the health and medicine professions also help to promote 
sustainable agriculture.42 
 Many founders of the AAN and sustainable farmer groups are inspired by 
writings of E.F. Schumacher, Buddhist economics, and ideas regarding small-scale 
technologies.43 They are also inspired by Ghandi44 and natural farming principles of 
                                                          
39 Paranat Suksut and Wanna Jarusomboon, “The Identity of Sustainable Agriculture: A Case Study 
of the Middle Class,” in Sustainable Agriculture: Cultural Identity, Agricultural Problems and the 
Identity of Thai Farmers, ed. Anusorn Unno (Nonthaburi: Sustainable Agriculture Assembly 
Committee and Heinrich Bӧll Foundation, 2004), 198. (in Thai) 
40 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, “Power in Transition. Thailand in the 1990s.,” in Political 
Change in Thailand, ed. Kevin Hewison (London, 1997), 32, quoted in Mogens Buch-Hansen, “Is 
Sustainable Agriculture in Thailand Feasible?,” Journal of Sustainable Agriculture 18, no. 2–3 
(2001), 144. 
41 Mr. Decha Siripat, Khao Kwan Foundation, interviewed 14 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
42 For example, Ms. Pattarawan Jansiri, professional nurse and director at Kamkhuenkaew hospital, 
helps to promote organic agriculture in Yasothon, interviewed 24 December 2012. Also, many 
hospitals in Thailand become sites of local green markets. The Thai Health Fund is also supportive of 
SAM. 
43 For example: Chomchuan Boonrahong, interviewed 3 November 2012, Chiang Mai; Decha Siripat, 
interviewed 14 October 2012, Nonthaburi; Unno (2003), 104. Schumacher's influential book, first 
published in 1973, is called "Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics As If People Mattered" and has 
been translated into Thai. 
   
193 
 
Masanobu Fukuoka from Japan.45 Fukuoka's principles of natural farming extend 
beyond agricultural production to a way of life based on Zen Buddhism. Such 
principles received a lot of interests in Thai society, particularly from the middle 
class. Natural farming principles have also inspired the Santi Asoke movement 
Thailand which engages in sustainable agricultural production in Buddhist 
communes.46 In the early 1990s, Fukuoka visited Thailand and inspired many 
farmers groups such as Naso in Yasothon province.47 As part 2 of this chapter 
elaborates, many sustainable production-distribution practices in Thailand are also 
inspired by the Japanese Tekei system or Community Support Agriculture (CSA)48 
and Effective Micro-organism (EM) soil improvement technology of the Sekai 
Kyusei Kyo group.49 Many SAM groups have adapted these ideas and production 
knowledge further to suit local conditions.50 
 As part of the Thai civil society, counter-hegemonic ideas of the SAM have 
also been influenced by counter-hegemonic ideas of other social movements, such as 
anti-capitalist Marxist ideas which were popular among student activists in Thailand 
in the 1970s51 and the environmentalism current of other social movements. At 
times, people organisations' desire to develop sustainable agriculture in their local 
areas can be seen as manifestations of their disapproval of negative environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                    
44 Samrit Boonsuk, CAE, interviewed 19 December 2012, Surin. 
45 Samrit Boonsuk, interviewed 19 December 2012, Surin; Pakphum Inpan, Tamor Natural Farmer 
group, interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin; Chomchuan Boonrahong, interviewed 3 November 
2012, Chiang Mai. 
46 Unno (2003), 128. 
47 Ibid, 130. 
48 Chomchuan Boonrahong, Witaya Jantawongsri, and Tassanee Palee, Appropriate Alternative 
Markets for Sustainable Agricultural Products (Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2000), 14. (in 
Thai) 
49 Unno (2003), 131; Mr. Kittithanet Rangkaworaset, main founder of 1 rai-100,000 baht project, 
interviewed 13 January 2013, Nonthaburi. 
50 Mr. Man Samsri, Naso Rice Farmer group, interviewed 25 December 2012, Yasothon. 
51 Mr. Boonsong Martkhao, Kammad Sustainable Agriculture group, interviewed 25 December 2012, 
Yasothon. 
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effects of industrial development projects that they see in their communities or in 
other communities, such as in Maptaputh, Rayong province.52 Moreover, aside from 
widespread acceptance and usage of transnational counter-hegemonic terms, there 
are those who prefer to use predominantly local-based concepts in their discourses 
even though the counter-hegemonic essence, such as that of sustainable agricultural 
production and empowerment of small-scale farmers, are similar to movements in 
other countries. As the following paragraphs elaborate, one main source of counter-
hegemonic ideas regarding alternative development which has significant impact on 
Thai civil society and the SAM, is the community culture or localism school of 
thought. It is infused with Buddhist concepts and is often being associated with King 
Bhumipol's ideas of sufficiency economy. 
 Main founder of Thai localism or the community culture school of thought, 
Chatthip Nartsupha, criticises the capitalist way of thinking associated with 
consumerism that it is lacking in morality and generosity.53 He suggests that 
communities are basic foundations of Thai society, argues for an ideal utopian vision 
of a society based on generosity within and between communities in contrast to 
individualistic culture, and proposes a model of national development based on self-
reliance and dignity, which he thinks would correspond to the wishes of the people.54 
Chatthip also criticises the view that modernisation has only one path. Rejecting the 
view that modernisation is the same as Westernisation, he proposes that Thailand 
ought to find its own path to modernisation. This is to be done not through 
conservative ideals but through the concept of communities based on generosity, 
                                                          
52 Mrs. Supha Yaimuang, SATHAI, interviewed 3 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
53 Chatthip Nartsupha and Wanworn Ja-noo, “Editorial,” in Community Culture School of Thought in 
Thai Society, ed. Chatthip Nartsupha and Wanworn Ja-noo (Bangkok: Sangsan Publishing, 2012), 10. 
(in Thai) 
54 Chatthip Nartsupha, Modernisation and the “Community” School of Thought (Bangkok: Sangsan 
Publishing, 2010), 163-165. (in Thai) 
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where Thailand chooses to embrace only useful aspects of Western modernisation 
and of other civilisations.55 Generally speaking, the community culture school of 
thought can be seen as a strategy to offer a long-term way to integrate everyone into 
the national and international economy from the bottom up, where communities 
would build on their own wisdom and resources but not statically and not in 
isolation, and with help from modern ideas and technology.56 The state is seen as an 
agent of capitalism and oppositions to the state can be done through withdrawal into 
self-reliance or by endeavouring to change the state's character.57 As section 1.3 
discusses, some of the SAM's counter-hegemonic ideas and discourses, such as the 
focus on building strong self-help groups at local levels, resemble the community 
culture's ideas and discourses. 
 Thai localism is also associated with the concept of sufficiency, which has 
gained more attention after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and after King 
Bhumipol's speech of the same year which urged for a sufficient economy.58 
Sufficiency ideas have a foundation in Buddhist philosophy of moderation or the 
Middle Way.59 Generally, the core of a sufficiency economy is about moderation, 
reasonableness and self-immunity, where self-immunity is an ability to cope with 
shocks using knowledge and integrity.60 Although they are narrowly perceived as 
being limited to the King's New Theory of agriculture which emphasises the 
importance of diversified farms, sufficiency ideas are actually broad ideas that are 
                                                          
55 Ibid, 166-167 and 174, 177. 
56 Pasuk Phongpaichit, “Developing Social Alternatives. Walking Backwards into a Khlong,” in 
Thailand Beyond the Crisis, ed. Peter Warr (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 138. 
57 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 388. 
58 Phongpaichit (2005), 162. 
59 Peter Warr, “The Economics of Enough: Thailand’s ‘Sufficiency Economy’ Debate,” International 
Conference on “Happiness and Public Policy”, Organized by PPDO, Prime Minister’s Office, 
UNESCAP, UNCC, Bangkok, 18-19 July 2007 (2007), 8-9. 
60 For example, see UNDP, Thailand Human Development Report 2007: Sufficiency Economy and 
Human Development (Bangkok: UNDP, 2007), quoted in Unger (2009), 143. 
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applicable to all levels of the economy.61 When the concept of sufficiency is applied 
to economic development, a main concern is to be able to cope with possible 
negative effects of globalisation.62 Sufficiency economy has also been interpreted as 
a path towards ecological sustainability.63 Not all but a few people in the SAM 
interviewed for this thesis discuss how their experience let them to support 
sufficiency ideas,64 or suggest that sufficiency philosophy is compatible with their 
visions of sustainable agriculture based on self-reliance, diversified farms and local 
food security.65 
 Thai localist writings often give the impression that their development ideas 
are inspired by traditional essence of "Thai-ness" which infers a sense of 
nationalistic exclusivity. As part 4 discusses, this can counter-productively be 
interpreted as conservative sentiments which are anti-globalisation and are not 
relevant to the future progress of Thailand. However, it should be pointed out that 
localist ideas in Thailand resonate with ideas of many people and social movements 
around the world which try to find paths to alternative globalisation. For example, 
scholars have used counter-hegemonic localist terms and concepts such as 
                                                          
61 Thanwa Jitsanguan, “Sustainable Agricultural Systems for Small-Scale Farmers in Thailand: 
Implications for the Environment, Paper at Kasetsart University, Bangkok, 12 January 2001,” quoted 
in Unger (2009), 143. 
62 Self-sufficiency Philosophy drafted by King Bhumiphol Adulyadej, for publication by the National 
Economic Development Board (NESDB) and other agencies in  1999, quoted in Suthep Udomrat, 
“Self-sufficiency Philosophy,” in Safety and Stability Through Self-sufficiency Economy, ed. Pitaya 
Wongkul, Withithat. (Bangkok, 2008), 72. (in Thai) 
63 Saneh Jamarik, “Self-sufficient economy in the globalisation current,” in Safety and stability 
through self-sufficiency economy, ed. Pitaya Wongkul (Bangkok: Withithat Institute, 2008), 120. (in 
Thai) 
64 Pat Apaimul, Mae-ta organic farmer, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai; Kanya Oonsri, 
village leader and leader of Baan Taptai-Tanon Organic Agriculture group, interviewed 22 December 
2012, Surin; Adisorn Puangchompoo, 1 rai-100,000 baht project, interviewed 13 January 2013, 
Nonthaburi. 
65 Mr. Boonsong Martkhao, Kammad Sustainable Agriculture group, interviewed 25 December 2012, 
Yasothon. 
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"localization",66 "eco-localism",67 and "relocalization"68 to envision alternatives to 
capitalist globalisation, not to mention that there are many localist movements 
around the world.69 Ideas associated with transnational terms such as "food miles" 
also support the localism of agri-food production and distribution using 
environmental reasoning.70 From this light, localism in Thailand can be seen as more 
than just isolationist nationalistic ideas, and as part of the global counter-hegemonic 
trend that tries to transform the hegemonic capitalist system from the ground-up. As 
for sufficiency economy ideas, they can also alternatively be seen as efforts to 
localise contemporary norms of a globalised market economy to help marginalised 
people to cope with economic challenges, similar to some other countries' promotion 
thrift, hard work and self-reliant values.71  
 Another problem of Thai localism is that sometimes there is a tendency to 
insist that ideal local communities govern by co-operation and generosity do (or did) 
exist in Thailand, rather than to suggest that such ideal is something to strive toward. 
Similarly, it has been suggested that the conceptualisation of peasant "communities" 
in food sovereignty discourse, which suggests that peasant communities embody 
principles such as co-operation, reciprocity, and egalitarianisms,72 can potentially be 
problematic. This is because such conceptualisation obscure contradictions within 
                                                          
66 Colin Hines, Localization: A Global Manifesto (London: Earthscan, 2000), quoted in Starr and 
Adams (2003),  22. 
67 Fred Curtis, “Eco-Localism and Sustainability,” Ecological Economics 46, no. 1 (August 2003): 
83–102. 
68 Amory Starr and Jason Adams, “Anti-Globalization: The Global Fight for Local Autonomy,” New 
Political Science 25, no. 1 (March 2003): 19–42. Also Tim Lang and Colin Hines, The New 
Protectionism: Protecting the Future Against Free Trade (New York: New Press, 1993), quoted in 
Starr and Adams (2003), 22. 
69 For examples, see Starr and Adams (2003). 
70 Clare Hinrichs, “The Practice and Politics of Food System Localization,” Journal of Rural Studies 
19, no. 1 (January 2003), 35. 
71 Danny Unger, “Sufficiency Economy and the Bourgeois Virtues,” Asian Affairs: An American 
Review 36, no. 3 (2009), 140-141. 
72 Henry Bernstein, “Food Sovereignty via the ‘peasant Way’: A Sceptical View,” The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 41, no. 6 (January 08, 2014), 1045. 
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communities, such as with regards to inequality, gender and intergenerational 
relations.73 Such potential problems should be guarded against, and many localist 
scholars have come to recognise such problems. For example, as chapter 6 will 
discuss in further detail, the conceptualisation of communities in Thailand by Anan 
Ganjanapan does not insist on intrinsic and static nature of Thai communities.74 
 This section has discussed some important Thai and non-Thai sources of 
counter-hegemonic ideas of the SAM in Thailand and pointed out its similarities 
with movements in other countries, which suggest that counter-hegemonic ideas of 
the sustainable agricultural movement in Thailand are not constrained by local and 
national contexts, and that the Thai SAM can be seen as part of the global counter-
hegemonic forces which try to challenge and transform the mainstream agri-food 
system. The next section discusses how the SAM draws on these various sources of 
ideas to build counter-hegemonic ideas regarding alternative agri-food systems. 
1.3) Counter-hegemonic ideas of the SAM 
This section aims to give a comprehensive discussion of some of the main ideas and 
discourses of the SAM in Thailand. Due to the diversity of people and groups in the 
SAM in Thailand, the thesis is cautious not to engage in over-simplication and 
generalisation of their counter-hegemonic ideas and discourses. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to identify some unifying goals and values while recognising the diversity 
of ideas and discourses in the movement. The following paragraphs discuss the 
movement's visions of alternative production-distribution channels, supporting 
                                                          
73 Ibid, 1046. 
74 For example, see Anan Ganjanapan, “Village in Thai Society: Conceptual Critiques,” in The 
Community Dimension: Local Way of Thinking Regarding Rights, Power and Natural Resource 
Management (Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2001), 56. (in Thai) 
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counter-hegemonic ideas and discourses, as well as cultural identity struggles to 
empower small-scale farmers. 
 As the name suggests, the SAM in Thailand's main unifying goal is to 
promote sustainable agricultural production and also to promote more equitable 
distribution of surpluses through alternative green market arrangements. Part 2 of 
this chapter discusses different forms of counter-hegemonic production-distribution 
in greater detail. However, main ideas include using alternative markets to support 
sustainable agri-food production, as well as to ensure fair economic returns and 
treatment of producers.75 Some people in the movement prefer larger-scale trade 
arrangements as a way to promote sustainable agri-food production,76 while some 
people prefer to promote diversified production, local markets and local food 
security goals compare to longer-distance trading in bulk or export market channels. 
However, benefits of multi-level market channels are generally recognised.77 In 
addition, as the previous section has discussed, there are differences in the SAM's 
counter-hegemonic terms and discourses. Many groups, such as the BioThai and 
SATHAI foundations, tend to adopt transnational counter-hegemonic terms such as 
food security, food sovereignty and farmer rights, and promote them in Thai society. 
However, there are those who prefer terms and discourses which have more local 
and cultural appeals. Such differences in discourses have strategic values in enabling 
the movement to appeal to different groups of people in Thailand. However, 
depending on the audience, uses of certain terms can create misperceptions and 
alienate some people from the SAM. Modernist social critiques, for example, are 
                                                          
75 Boonrahong, Jantawongsri and Palee (2000), 35-37.  
76 This is usually the approach of social enterprises such as Green Net and export firms. 
77 Sajin Prachason et al., Market Options of Farmers: Structural Effects on Unfairness and Benefit 
Distribution (Bangkok: BioThai and the Social Research Foundation, Chulalongkorn University, 
2012), 285; Decha Siripat, “Diversified Farms: Solutions for Farmers (first Published in 1987),” in 
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quick to rail against sustainable farmers who advocate simple self-reliant lifestyles or 
use Buddhist concepts in their discourses.78 Despite different ideas and adoption of 
counter-hegemonic terms, what people in the movement generally agree on is the 
importance of sustainable agricultural production, supportive and fair market 
channels, as well as the promotion of partnership producer-consumer social relations 
and collaboration with other groups in society. 
 Promoters of sustainable agriculture in Thailand have used the critique of the 
current system, discussed in section 1.1, as a basis to legitimise their counter-
hegemonic ideas and discourses. The concept of "self-reliance", for example, is 
promoted as a counter-hegemonic concept to challenge farmers' over-dependence on 
conventional market relations and large-agri-businesses. Self-reliance can be achieve 
through, for example, practices such as biodiversity preservation, diversified agro-
ecological production methods, fair markets,79 and seed saving.80 As a response to 
the commodification of agri-food resources under capitalist agri-food system,81 some 
supporters of sustainable agriculture have appealed to traditional Thai beliefs, culture 
and non-price aspects of agri-food products to aid their counter-hegemonic 
discourses and the building of producer-consumer relations. For example, Decha 
Siripat insists that for Thai people, "rice is a core of life, not just food" because it 
embodies culture, belief system and ecological balance which have been developed 
                                                          
78 Kam Pakha, “‘Life Must Be Easy’ Is Just a Propaganda,” Mathichon Newspaper, September 18, 
2014; Kam Pakha, “Morality Leads Thailand towards Destruction,” Mathichon (weekly), January 
2011. (in Thai) 
79 AAN farmer groups, “Kaen-Nakhon Manifesto,” (2009); Southern Alternative Farmer Group, 
“Manifesto of the Southern Alternative Farmer,” (2009). 
80 Boonsong Martkhao, Kammad Sustainable Agriculture group, interviewed 25 December 2012, 
Yasothon. 
81 Krisda Boonchai et al., (2007), 25. 
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through many generations.82 Others also try to promote nutritious and preventive 
medicinal values of agri-food products.83 
 Discourses which portray farmer consciousness under the hegemonic agri-
food system as being greedy and lacking in mercy - sometimes harshly called "the 
killer consciousness",84 have also been used as negative contrasts to the main values 
of sustainable agriculture, which are often based on Buddhist virtues such as 
generosity.85 It has been suggested that farmers can practice Buddhist teachings or 
Dhamma in their everyday lives through sustainable agricultural practices because, 
for example, they refrain from killing other living beings using pesticides.86 Not all 
but many people, such as the Thamma-ruamjai moral rice network discusses in part 
2, are inspired by Buddhist teachings to develop their sustainable agricultural 
practices.87 In addition, many supporters see sustainable agriculture not only as 
production methods, but as a way to build new consciousness and mentality88 to 
challenge the hegemonic capitalist system and patron-client relations,89 to give 
individuals a sense of peacefulness,90 freedom and independence,91 as well as to 
transform society towards a better one that is based on sharing and environmental 
                                                          
82 Decha Siripat, Khao Kwan Foundation, interviewed 14 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
83 Boonsong Martkhao, Kammad Sustainable Agriculture group, interviewed 25 December 2012, 
Yasothon and Adisorn Puangchompoo, 1 rai-100,000 baht project, interviewed 13 January 2013, 
Nonthaburi. 
84 Ubol Yoowah, NGO activist, interviewed 22 December 2012, Yasothon. 
85 Pakphum Inpan, Tamor Natural Farmer group, interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin and 
Kittithanet Rangkaworaset, 1 rai-100,000 baht project, interviewed 13 January 2013, Nonthaburi. 
86 Phra Promma Suphatto, interviewed 23 December 2012, Yasothon. Similar views include: Rungroj 
Kajadroka and Pakphum inpan, Tamor Natural Farmer group, interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin. 
87 Mr. Nikhom Pechpa, main co-ordinator for the Thamma-ruamjai moral rice network, interviewed 
23 December 2013, Yasothon; Mr. Chaluay Kaewkong, quoted in Unno (2003), 118-119; Tamod 
Farmer group in Pattalung province in the South of Thailand, quoted in Wanna Prayukvong, “A 
Buddhist Economic Approach to the Development of Community Enterprises: A Case Study from 
Southern Thailand,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 29 (2005): 1171–1185. 
88 Prachathip Kata, Civil Society and the Path of Self-Reliance: Lessons from the Organic Agriculture 
Network in Yasothon (Bangkok: Society and Health Institute, 2005), 42. (in Thai) 
89 Phra Promma Suphatto, interviewed 23 December 2012, Yasothon. 
90 Unno (2003), 118-119. 
91 Mr. Pat Apaimul, Mae-ta organic farmer, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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sustainability.92 Some sympathisers of agro-ecology in other countries also have 
similar ideas and perceive agro-ecology not only as technical production techniques, 
but also as being related to counter-hegemonic social transformations.93 
 The SAM in Thailand also uses their counter-hegemonic ideas and discourses 
to engage in cultural identity struggles, where counter-hegemonic images of 
agriculture and of small-scale farmers are re-constructed to raise their negotiating 
power and importance. As mentioned briefly in section 1.1, mainstream agricultural 
activities are hardly desirable for people in rural areas who aspire to earn higher 
income, so many people seek jobs in other sectors of the economy and migrate. 
National statistics also seem to support the generally accepted view that income from 
non-agricultural sources are higher than income from agriculture for an average 
farming household. In 2012, national average net income from farming of an 
agricultural household is between 57,400 and 58,600 baht per household per year, 
which is around 37 to 40 percent of overall household net income between 2008 and 
2012.94 This, adding with Sakdina mentality, partially explain rather wide-spread 
condescending attitudes toward agriculture and farming as a profession in Thai 
society. The SAM in Thailand recognises the importance of the agricultural sector 
beyond monetary contributions, and is generally concerned about food security and 
the disintegration of social structures in rural communities. Hence, many people in 
the movement try to challenge condescending attitudes toward agriculture by 
creating counter-hegemonic images of agriculture and farmers, and by promoting 
                                                          
92 Nikhom Pechpa et al., A Complete Report of the Research Project on the Moral Rice Network 
(Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2009), English and Thai Abstract; Mr. Pakphum Inpan, Tamor 
Natural Farmer group, interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin. 
93 For example, see: Steve Gliessman, “Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems Agroecology: 
Growing the Roots of Resistance,” Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems 37, no. 1 (2013): 19–
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94 Office of Agricultural Economics (Thailand), Basic Information on Agricultural Economics of 
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203 
 
sustainable agricultural production-distribution as one viable solutions to the 
problems, as the following paragraphs elaborate. 
 SAM supporters often suggest that sustainable agriculture can help to 
rejuvenate the agricultural sector and give farmers back their dignity. They point out 
that the agricultural sector has proven to help alleviate economic problems in time of 
economic crisis.95 Agriculture and rural households in Thailand acted as social safety 
nets for migrated labour forces after the Asian economic crisis of 1997, where a lot 
of Thai workers who had been laid off returned to their original or familial homes in 
rural areas.96 Following the 2008 global financial crisis, a dry-season survey in 2009 
by the National Statistical Office found that 74 percent of the most recently migrated 
rural migrants was to return home.97 Moreover, sometimes those who work in the 
cities or other sectors of the economy face forced under-consumption or do not have 
enough time to raise their children, so they have to send their children to live in the 
family farms.98 In these cases, small-scale agriculture seems to be subsidising labour 
reproduction. Aside from typical seasonal migrants, when agricultural prices are 
high, some migrants (such as taxi drivers) also return to their rural family farms to 
help with agricultural production.99  
 The author's interviews of many farmers who are involved in the sustainable 
agriculture and the land reform movements suggest that sometimes, over a certain 
age (around 45 years or higher), low-skilled migrant labourers would like to return to 
                                                          
95 Supha Yaimuang, SATHAI, interviewed 3 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
96 Prayukvong (2005), 1172. 
97 J. W. Huguet, A. Chamratrithirong, and K. Richter, “Thailand Migration Profile,” in Thailand 
Migration Report 2011: Migration for Development in Thailand – Overview and Tools for 
Policymaker, ed. J. W. Huguet and A. Chamratrithirong (Bangkok: International Organization for 
Migration, 2012),7–15, quoted in Rigg, Promphaking and  Le Mare (2014), 190. 
98 Adisorn Puangchompoo, founder of  the 1 rai -100,000 baht training programme, reflects on how 
some high school students joined the programme in hope to earn enough income so that their parents 
can stop working in factories. 
99 Witoon Lienchamroon, BioThai, interviewed 5 April 2012, Nonthaburi. 
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rural areas and agriculture because their work in the industrial and service sectors 
were becoming detrimental to their health, or because it was getting difficult to gain 
employment.100 There are also other reasons why some rural labourers return to or 
prefer to work in "lower-income" agricultural-related work. For example, they feel 
that they have more freedom and that it is important in terms of maintaining healthy 
family ties.101 These are perhaps some of the reasons why, as a few studies also 
suggest, there seems to be continual linkages between Thai rural migrants and rural 
households.102 For example, Rigg, Promphaking and Le Mare's (2014) study of three 
villages in the Northeast found that of all 151 migrants, around 85 percent of 
migrants had or were expected to return to their villages of origin.103 The authors 
also suggest that lingering ties to rural villages compromise migrants' opportunities 
for upward mobility, and hinder Thailand's ability to move up from a middle-income 
country to a high-income country.104 Such view is compatible with some mainstream 
development perspectives, but it is generally at odds with counter-hegemonic 
attempts to promote non-monetary values of the agricultural sector and to challenge 
the capitalist economy as a whole. Promoters of sustainable agriculture in Thailand 
often voice their concerns over social problems and disintegration of families caused 
by rural migration.105 This is a legitimate concern, which is backed up by a study in 
2013 which suggests that internal migration where children are left in rural farms 
                                                          
100 A few interviewees mention these issues, such as Mr. Jai Kiti, a farmer from Mae-Oaw village, 
Lamphun, interviewed 30 October 2012 and Mr. Boonlue Jaroenmee, President of Klongyong co-
operative, interviewed 10 October 2012, Nakhon Pratom. They are both farmers in CLTD projects. 
101 Many sustainable farmers suggest this, such as Pakphum Inpan and Samrach Thong-iam, from 
Tamor Natural Farmer group, interviewed 12 December 2012, Surin. Mr. Samrach, for example, used 
to work in a factory and in a company before he migrated back after the economic crisis of 1997. He 
decided to stay on due to relatively higher freedom and independence as a farmer compare to his 
previous jobs. 
102 M. Amare et al., Rural–urban Migration and Employment Quality: A Case Study from Thailand, 
Economics Working Paper (Manila, 2012), quoted in Jonathan Rigg, Buapun Promphaking, and Ann 
Le Mare, “Personalizing the Middle-Income Trap: An Inter-Generational Migrant View from Rural 
Thailand,” World Development 59 (July 2014), 190. 
103 Rigg, Promphaking and Le Mare (2014), 190. 
104 Ibid, 195-196. 
105 Decha Siripat, “Present and Future of Alternative Farmers in Thailand,” (2011), 87. 
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tend to improve economic well-being of households, but there might also be some 
social and psychological costs to these children.106 
 Many people in the SAM suggest that the knowledge-intensive nature, as 
well as the social and environmental benefits of sustainable agriculture, can help 
redeem the dignity of farmers as a profession.107 Moreover, sustainable agriculture 
involves transformation of values, world views, livelihoods, and social relations 
between farmers and other groups in society.108 The preservation and development 
of local traditional rice strands by farmers, for example, have been used to build a 
more confident and dignified identity of farmers.109 The general public's perception 
of lowly status of Thai farmers as compare to other professions is problematic, 
because it is a hegemonic perception that helps to justify the inequitable vertical 
social relations of patron-client. It has been suggested that if farmers are not 
confident of themselves, it will be difficult for them to empower themselves and be 
critical of capitalist agriculture. For example, they will neglect to save seeds of 
traditional rice strands and opt to purchase seeds from agri-businesses or state 
institutions.110 
 There are many forms of counter-hegemonic discourses that try to construct a 
new identity of farmers to challenge the widespread perception that farming is a 
lowly occupation. For example, the term "local sage" is used to describe successful 
sustainable farmers who can pass on their production knowledge to other farmers. It 
                                                          
106 See Aree Jampaklai et al., What Happens to Children When Parents Moved Away: CLAIM Project 
with the Support of UNICEF. Academic Document No. 411 (Nakhon Pratom: Institute for Population 
and Social Research, Mahidol University, 2013). (in Thai) 
107 Southern Alternative Farmer Group, “Manifesto of the Southern Alternative Farmer,” (2009) and 
AAN farmer groups, “Kaen-nakhon Manifesto,” (2009). 
108 Krisda Boonchai et al., “Introduction,” in Sustainable Agriculture: Cultural Identity, Agricultural 
Problems and the Identity of Thai Farmers (Nonthaburi: Sustainable Agriculture Assembly 
Committee and Heinrich Bӧll Foundation, 2004), 7–26. (in Thai) 
109 Prachason et al. (2012), 232-233. 
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is a term constructed to establish a new cultural identity that commands respect and 
dignity for these farmers, which further supports SAM's cause.111 However, the term 
might be partially problematic, as discussed in part 4.112 Some people in the Thai 
middle and upper class, including urban farmers and white-collar workers, also help 
to propagate counter-hegemonic identity of farmers. Some of them have changed 
their professions to be full-time sustainable farmers and share their stories, using 
SAM's counter-hegemonic terms and discourses, on many media channels in 
Thailand.113 For example, Mr. Wilit Thechapaibul - heir to a famous hotel business - 
became a critique of the corporate agri-food system and an organic rice farmer who 
has his own organic shop call Ban-na Wilit in Bangkok. He is also active in 
promoting organic agriculture as well as in campaigning for the state to solve farmer 
debt problems.114 It has been suggested that middle class support of sustainable 
agriculture can also be seen as a rejection of mainstream middle class identity 
associated with materialism and consumerism, because embracing the identity 
associated with sustainable agriculture infers free, independent and self-reliant 
livelihoods.115 
 Overall, people in the SAM seem to believe in incremental changes over time 
through dissemination of counter-hegemonic ideas and values, that would not only 
challenge hegemonic agri-food ideas, but also transform identities, social relations 
and informal norms. For example, some people point out the importance of 
                                                          
111 Chalita Bantuwong, “Local Sage: Creation of Identity through Sustainable Agriculture,” in 
Sustainable Agriculture: Cultural Identity, Agricultural Problems and the Identity of Thai Farmers, 
ed. Anusorn Unno (Nonthaburi: Sustainable Agriculture Assembly Committee and Heinrich Bӧll 
Foundation, 2004), 238–239. (in Thai) 
112 Ibid, 268. 
113 For example, a female Thai movie star, Oom Siriyakorn, made a television show documenting her 
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Bangkok Business News, August 11, 2008. (in Thai) 
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promoting changes in the pattern of food consumption in favour of sustainable and 
fair agri-food products,116 and that a paradigm shift towards sustainable agriculture is 
not merely a technical issue because it requires a social transformation based on 
understanding and collaboration between producers and consumers.117 The 
movement tries to promote counter-hegemonic ideas through many channels such as 
books, newspaper articles, television programmes, public seminars, and by holding 
public events with invited speakers from sustainable agriculture movements in other 
countries.118 Thammasart and Sukothai Thammathirat universities have also opened 
sustainable agriculture courses.119 Local attempts to spread counter-hegemonic ideas 
include, for example, the Thamma-ruamjai moral rice network's local radio station 
which covers areas in 5 provinces (estimated 20,000 people).120 Nevertheless, it is 
not always easy to promote counter-hegemonic ideas. Middle class forces in the 
SAM are sometimes ridiculed or seen as hypocritical,121 while sustainable farmers 
are often mocked or seen as crazy by other farmers in their areas.122 Activists have 
also suggested that weaning farmers off of agricultural chemicals is a psychological 
problem comparable to that of weaning off an addiction.123 Promoters of sustainable 
agriculture generally recognise that changes in the mainstream agri-food system are 
likely to be gradual. However, some of them still hope that "crisis points" where 
                                                          
116 Krisda Boonchai et al, (2007), 25; Supha Yaimuang, SATHAI, interviewed 3 October 2012, 
Nonthaburi. 
117 Chomchuan Boonrahong, interviewed 3 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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119 Chanuan Rattanawaraha, Organic Agriculture (Nonthaburi: Biotech Center, Department of 
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120 Nikhom Pechpa, Thamma-ruamjai moral rice network, interviewed 23 December 2013, Yasothon. 
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2 (2011), 183. (in Thai) 
122 Ms. Sompoi Jansang, Manager of the Rice Fund Surin Organic Agriculture Co-operative Ltd, 
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Thamma Sangkalee, Ta-toom Natural Farmer group, interviewed 22 December 2012, Surin; Mr. 
Vitoon Panyakul, main founder of Green Net Co-operative, interviewed 23 January 2013, Bangkok. 
123 Decha Siripat, Khao Kwan Foundation, interviewed 14 October 2012, Nonthaburi and Samrit 
Boonsuk, President of CAE, interviewed 19 December 2012, Surin. 
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structural problems of the hegemonic agri-food system become more salient, such as 
environmental crises owing to intensive industrial agricultural production or deep 
plunges of cash crop prices following free trade arrangements, will serve as catalysts 
to expand the support base for sustainable agriculture in Thailand.124 
 It is important to point out that counter-hegemonic ideas discussed in this 
part of the chapter are not problems-free. Since the ideas are rather broad, there can 
be different interpretations and corresponding practices, as well as room for co-
optation of oppositions, as part 4 discusses in greater detail. The next part of the 
chapter discusses counter-hegemonic production-distribution practices developed by 
the SAM. It should be emphasised, however, that the realms of counter-hegemonic 
ideas and practice are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they seem to have 
evolved together as counter-hegemonic forces accumulate their experience. For 
example, successful sustainable farms re-affirm farmers' beliefs in agro-ecology 
based on sharing and natural balance. As the next chapter explores in greater depth, 
many people in the SAM have also come to believe, through experience, that land re-
distribution and progressive taxation of land are necessary to promote sustainable 
agriculture.125 
Part 2: Counter-hegemonic production-distribution practices 
This part of the chapter explores many forms of production, processing and 
distribution of sustainable agri-food products in Thailand, as well as evaluate their 
counter-hegemonic potential. Section 2.1 discusses sustainable agricultural 
production, while section 2.2 discusses the processing and retailing of sustainable 
                                                          
124 Mr. Sittiporn Bangkaew, Director of the Office of Commercial Affairs in Surin, interviewed 21 
December 2012, Surin and Decha Siripat, interviewed 14 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
125 Decha Siripat, interviewed 14 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
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agri-food products in Thailand. Section 2.3 then focuses on producer rice mills and 
sustainable farmer groups in Surin and Yasothon. Lastly, section 2.4 evaluates 
counter-hegemonic potential and current problems of sustainable agricultural 
practices in Thailand. 
2.1) Sustainable agricultural production in Thailand 
Many studies yield support to agro-ecological production methods and the 
proposition that the agricultural production system should be changed towards a 
more socially and ecologically sustainable one, with social concerns for producers 
and consumers.126 Jan van Aken, a contributor of the International Assessment of 
Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) 
report, for example, notes that a half hectare plot in Thailand can grow 70 species of 
vegetables, fruits and herbs, which provide far better nutrition and feed more people 
than a half-hectare plot of high-yielding rice.127  
 In Thailand, notable promoters of sustainable agricultural production include 
those in the Alternative Agriculture Network (AAN), which was formed as a loose 
network in 1989 by NGOs and small-scale farmers. By 1997, the AAN consisted of 
84 member organisations.128 An important regional AAN group is the AAN of the 
                                                          
126 For example, see Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) International Assessment 
of Agricultural Knowledge, Agriculture at a Crossroads. Global Report., 2009. This report based on a 
4 year study of over 400 scientists, sponsored by governments and international agencies including 
the FAO, UNEP and the World Bank. It was accepted by more than 60 governments in 2008, but 
largely downplayed or ignored by the agencies that sponsored it (Shelly Feldman and Stephen Biggs, 
“The Politics of International Assessments: The IAASTD Process, Reception and Significance,” 
Journal of Agrarian Change 12, no. 1 (2012), 144.). Other studies in support of agro-ecology or 
organic agriculture include, for example: De Schutter (2011); Altieri (2012); Badgley and Perfecto 
(2007). 
127 Geoffrey Lawrence and Philip McMichael, “The Question of Food Security,” International 
Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 19, no. 2 (2012), 137. 
128 Decha Siripat, “The Assembly of the Poor and Alternative Agriculture Policies (first Published in 
1997),” in The Path of Sustainable Agriculture, 2nd ed. (Samut-sakorn: BioThai, 2011), 96. (in Thai) 
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Northeast which includes 40 farmer organisations in 14 provinces.129 Main founders 
of the AAN include, for example, Mr. Witoon Lienchamroon of the BioThai 
Foundation in Nonthaburi, Mrs. Supha Yaimuang of the Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation (SATHAI) in Nonthaburi, Mr. Decha Siripat of the Khao Kwan 
Foundation in Suphanburi, Dr. Chomchuan Boonrahong - former director of the 
Institute for a Sustainable Agriculture Community (ISAC) in Chiang Mai, and the 
Community of Agro-ecology Foundation (CAE) in Surin. The AAN promotes 
different forms of sustainable agriculture in Thailand such as organic, agro-forestry, 
natural and integrated farming.130 Most organic products in Thailand are primary 
products such as rice, vegetables and fruits.131 In the Thai domestic market sales of 
organic rice account for around 43 percent of organic sales, followed by sales of 
vegetables, tea, coffee and other products. Organic rice is also the most important 
organic export product.132 Aside from the AAN, there are also other individuals and 
groups in Thailand that promote sustainable agriculture in their own ways, such as 
the Santi Asoke movement.133 
 Sustainable agricultural production methods in Thailand generally 
correspond to counter-hegemonic ideas, values and goals discussed in the previous 
part. The meaning of alternative or sustainable agriculture goes beyond agricultural 
production to include farmers' way of life. It is also concerned with the restoration 
                                                          
129 Unno (2003), 133. 
130 Witoon Lienchamroon, “Alternative Agriculture: A Path of Free and Independent Agriculture. A 
document summarising the academic content of the third congress of alternative agriculture (18-21 
November 2004 at Kasetsart University),” in Reform the Agricultural Sector for Food Security: 
Analysis and Practical Policies (Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2011), 167-173. (in Thai) 
131 Green Net Co-operative's research quoted in National Committee to Develop Organic Agriculture, 
National Strategic Plan to Develop Organic Agriculture 1 2008-2011 and National Practical Plan to 
Develop Organic Agriculture 2008-2011 (Bangkok: Sahamit Printing, 2008), 9. (in Thai) 
132 Green Net Co-operative's study in 2012, quoted in “National Strategic Plan to Develop Organic 
Agriculture 2 2013-2016 Draft," received from Ms. Wibulwan Wannamolee, Senior Specialist on 
Agri-Food Standards, National Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and Food Standards Office, 31 
January 2013, 20. (in Thai) 
133 Unno (2003), 145. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss Asoke Buddhist communes. 
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and preservation of the ecological and environmental balance, as well as fair 
economic and social returns that increase the quality of life of farmers, consumers, 
and local social institutions.134 Generally speaking, sustainable agricultural 
production is interpreted as methods which preserve and encourage bio-diversity and 
varieties of agri-food crops in farms. It is also seen as a way to reduce economic and 
food insecurity risks for small-scale farmers as they can rely on sales (and personal 
consumption) of a few crops instead of just one. In this sense, sustainable 
agricultural practices in Thailand challenge hegemonic commodification of agri-food 
resources, as well as conventional profit-led agri-food system discussed in chapter 3. 
 Many sustainable agriculture practitioners were inspired by some traditional 
methods of diversified farming such as fish raising in paddy fields, and the use of 
ecological balance to control predators and parasital insects.135 Some notable 
sustainable farmers who have developed successful techniques or "local sage" 
include Mahayoo Sunthornchai in Surin province who started to develop his 
diversified farming techniques in 1973,136 and Mr. Tool Sayamol who developed 
agro-forestry techniques.137 The AAN is also inspired by traditional practices of free 
seed exchanges which encourage biodiversity and counteract monopoly control over 
seeds. Some also promote production practices where different types of seeds are 
planted so that the products can be harvest at different times, to reduce risks from 
drastic weather changes due to global warming138 and to reduce labour costs.139 
                                                          
134 Witoon Lienchamroon and Supha Yaimuang, “Alternative Agriculture: From Individual Farmers 
to Social Movements,” in Reform the Agricultural Sector for Food Security: Analysis and Practical 
Policies, ed. Witoon Lienchamroon (Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2011), 269. (in Thai) 
135 Siripat, “Diversified Farms: Solutions for Farmers,” (2011), 79-82. 
136 Ibid, 83; Unno (2003), 109-111; Rojanapraiwong et al. (2004), 63. 
137 Unno (2003), 118. 
138 Dr. Permsak Mokarapirom, President of Thammakaset Community in Prajeenburi province and 
special lecturer at Mahidol University's Research Center for Peace Building, as well as Mr. Wiwat 
Salyakamthorn, President of the Agri-Nature Foundation, quoted in Bangkok Business Newspaper 
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Although sustainable agricultural practices in Thailand have developed before the 
popularisation of the King's sufficiency economy ideas and his New Theory of 
Agriculture, following the 1997 Asian economic crisis,140 there are also those who 
were inspired by the New Theory such as the 1 rai-100,000 baht training group. The 
group is also experimenting with diversified sustainable production methods of 
conventional cash crops such as rubber.141 
 Various attempts to preserve and develop different strands of seeds in 
Thailand can be seen as counter-hegemonic challenges to monopoly controls over 
seeds. As discussed in part 1, farmers' control over seeds is seen as part of farmer 
rights, independence, and counter-hegemonic identity. Preservation and development 
of traditional seeds can also be seen as a challenge to commodification of seeds and 
agri-food products, because nutritional quality and local tastes are given a priority, 
whereas the hegemonic agri-food system tends to encourage the development of 
chemical-responsive rice seeds with short harvest time (and arguably lower quality). 
Such views and practices are similar to that of sustainable agriculture movements in 
some other countries, such as counter-hegemonic ideas of Vandana Shiva and the 
seed saving movement in India. Notable groups engaging in seed saving and 
development in Thailand include, for example, Khao Kwan Foundation, Tamor 
natural farmer group in Surin,142 and Kammad sustainable agriculture group in 
Yasothon where there are 12 core households which have developed over 15 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(Jud-prakai section), “Natural Rice Production Method to Survive Flood,” Bangkok Business News, 
October 13, 2011. (in Thai) 
139 Sukran Rojanapraiwong et al., Local Genes and Sustainable Agriculture: A Document for the 
Third Alternative Agriculture Assembly 18-21 November 2004, Kasetsart University (Nonthaburi: 
Pim-dee Printing, 2004), 38-44. (in Thai) 
140 Witoon Lienchamroon, BioThai, interviewed 5 April 2012, Nonthaburi. 
141 Adisorn Puangchompoo, 1 rai-100,000 baht project, interviewed 13 January 2013, Nonthaburi. 
142 Prachason et al. (2012), 187 and 190. 
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traditional strands with help from academics from the Rice Center at 
Ubonratchathani province.143 
 Some people in the AAN often credit traditional Thai wisdom for inspiring 
sustainable agricultural practices. This can be seen as part of counter-hegemonic 
identity struggles discussed in part 1. Traditional knowledge is usually developed 
further by contemporary research and knowledge. Soil, for example, is treated with 
respect and not as a static container of elements, but as a place containing interacting 
living micro-organisms.144 There is a widespread usage of the effective micro-
organism (EM) soil improvement technology among SAM supporters.145 Examples 
include Mr. Kittithanet Rangkaworaset of the 1 rai-100,000 baht training project who 
received inspirations from Buddhist texts and training in Japan, which allowed him 
to develop EM techniques which prioritise localised adaptation to prevent 
monopolisation.146 Another example is Mr. Suchit Nokham of the Maeping Organic 
Company in Chiang Mai whose experimentation with probiotic micro-organisms in 
his own farm since 1992 has enabled him to diversified production to include many 
organic agri-food products such as longan, rice, soya, and chicken.147 According to 
the Land Development Department (LDD), at least 1.5 million farming households 
in over 15 million rai farmers used micro-organisms to improve soil, which 
translated to economic benefits of around 9,400 million baht in 2004.148 
                                                          
143 Ibid, 135. 
144 San Saeng-arun Magazine, “From Way of Life and Cultural Roots to Machine-like Farmers: 
Problems and Solutions in the View of Witoon Lienchamroon,” San Saeng-Arun Magazine (Bangkok, 
2012), 79. (in Thai) 
145 Unno (2003), 131. 
146 Kittithanet Rangkaworaset, 1 rai-100,000 baht project, interviewed 13 January 2013, Nonthaburi. 
147 Mr. Suchit Nokham, organic agriculture expert using probiotic microorganisms, Maeping Organic 
Limited Partnership Company, interviewed 2 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
148 BioThai, “Effects of Intellectual Property Rights on Biodiversity under the EU-ASEAN FTA 
(written 2009 for the ASEAN Civil Society Conference, 2009, Phetchaburi, Thailand),” in Reform the 
Agricultural Sector for Food Security: Analysis and Practical Policies (Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2011), 
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 Sustainable farmer groups in Thailand have developed varieties of techniques 
and production patterns to suit different local contexts. For example, Mae-ta 
sustainable agriculture group in Chiang Mai is located near well-preserved forest 
areas, so they use agro-forestry techniques as well as knowledge of micro-organisms 
in their organic farms.149 Some farmers also suggest that organic farming is possible 
even in small-scale farms if they are managed well.150 Taptai group in Surin 
province, for example, diversified their production from rice to organic pig to make 
use of small plots of land, with some advices from a lecturer at Ratchamongkol 
Esaan University of Technology, Surin.151 In urban areas, there is a growing 
movement of low income consumers who grow their own pesticide-free vegetables 
for health and economic reasons since the early 2010s. The movement is supported 
by the Thai Health Promotion Foundation and SATHAI's urban agriculture 
projects.152 It should be noted, however, that although a lot of emphasis of the SAM 
is on helping small-scale farmers, many SAM members do not support only small 
sustainable farms and are open to other forms of production arrangement.153 For 
example, part 3 of this chapter discusses organic farming arrangements organise by 
Khao Kwan Foundation. 
 
 
                                                          
149 Mr. Arpakorn Krueng-ngern, Mae-ta organic farmer, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
150 Mr. Rungroj Kajadroka, Tamor Natural Farmer group, interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin. 
151 Sukran Rojanaphraiwong, A Mission in Self-Reliance: Report of the Study on Taptai Community 
Way of Life, Surin, by Natpong Pattanapanchai and Arat Saeng-Ubol (Nonthaburi: Alternative 
Agriculture Network, 2008), 61. (in Thai) 
152 Mrs. Supha Yaimuang, SATHAI, interviewed 3 October 2012, Nonthaburi. Also: 
<http://www.thaicityfarm.com>.  
153 For example, Decha Siripat suggests that there are successful sustainable farms of various sizes, 
interviewed 14 October 2012, Nonthaburi. Others who suggest that large versus small size may not be 
the most crucial point in envisaging farming future, and that it is about how the farm is managed, 
include Ben White et al., “The New Enclosures: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Land Deals,” 
Journal of Peasant Studies 39, no. 3–4 (July 2012), 626. 
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2.2) Processing and retailing of sustainable agri-food products 
Promoters of sustainable agriculture in Thailand tend to recognise that it is 
insufficient to only promote sustainable agricultural production, and that there 
should also be complementary development of sustainable agri-food processing, as 
well as multi-level market channels (local, national and international) which respond 
to different production volumes and help to diversify sales opportunities. This is to 
help producers to earn higher income from sustainable premiums and to capture 
value-added from moving up along agri-food chains.154 Well-developed processing 
and market channels which help to guarantee short and medium term sources of 
income, where producers receive premium prices for producing sustainable products, 
are seen as crucial incentives for producers to make transitions towards sustainable 
agri-food production. Some have also emphasised, however, that sustainable 
production should lead the market and not the other way round. This means that 
alternative markets should accommodate agro-ecological practices such as by 
supporting sales of seasonal agri-food products, usage of environmentally friendly 
packaging, and also try to limit distribution radius as much as possible.155 This 
section provides a macro-view discussion of sustainable agri-food processing and 
market channels in Thailand, while counter-hegemonic market governance structures 
are discussed in greater detail in part 3. 
 In the late 1980s, some NGOs and academics in Thailand started to promote 
processing and marketing activities of sustainable agri-food products,156 but there 
                                                          
154 Prachason et al. (2012), 285. 
155 Boonrahong, Jantawongsri and Palee (2000), 35-37. 
156 Unno (2003), 145-146. 
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were a lot of difficulties due to the lack of interests from domestic consumers.157 In 
the mid 1990s, civil society groups such as the Green Net Co-operative, Puan-
thammachart group, Asoke group, and Imboon center in Chiang Mai (established in 
1994), managed to expand the number of green shops and consumer interests in 
Thailand. Such expansion was made possible by health concerns prevalent among 
Thai consumers, particularly the Thai middle class.158 This suggests that consumer 
support is crucial, and that it is important to promote counter-hegemonic ideas in 
wider society to aid counter-hegemonic practices. By 1996, there were around 33 
green shops in many big cities such as Bangkok (18 shops), Chiang Mai and 
Songkla.159 A lot of green shops closed down after the Asian economic crisis of 
1997, but the movement did not die off completely. By the early 2000s, modern 
trade players in the organic market became prominent, such as Lemon Farm 
supermarket.160  
 There are those who believe in the benefits of large-scale distribution of 
sustainable agri-food products, such as Mr. Vitoon Panyakul - one of the founders of 
the Green Net Co-operative in Thailand (established in 1993) - who argues for the 
importance of having centralised bodies to professionally manage logistics and 
distribution of agri-food products in large scale.161 Green Net is a member of the 
Fairtrade Labeling Organization International (FLO) and exports to many European 
countries. With its sister Earth Net Foundation, Green Net helps to promote the 
expansion of organic production in Thailand, such as in Yasothon province, and acts 
                                                          
157 Supha Yaimuang et al., Alternative Market: Partnership for a New Society (Bangkok: Pim-dee 
Printing, 1996), 35. (in Thai) 
158 Vitoon Panyakul and Jade-sanee Sukjirattikarn, Organic Market: Opportunities and Paths to 
World Organic Markets (Bangkok: Earth Net Foundation/Green Net Co-operative, 2003), 131-132 (in 
Thai); Ms. Pornpilai Lertwicha, researcher on Thai rural communities, skype interview 17 October 
2012; Mrs. Supha Yaimuang, SATHAI, interviewed 3 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
159 Unno (2003), 147. 
160 Panyakul and Sakjirattikarn (2003), 133. 
161 Ibid, 147 
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as a distribution center of over 100 organic products in Thailand and abroad, such as 
fruits, vegetable, rice, tea, etc.162 On the other hand, some main figures in the AAN 
prefer developing local markets and more direct forms of marketing channels, as 
well as to encourage smaller-scale farmer groups to produce different varieties of 
agri-food products and move up along agri-food chains.163 Notable local green 
markets in Thailand include the ones in Chiang Mai, Surin and Yasothon provinces, 
but there are also green alternative markets in other provinces such as Chachoeng-
sao and Bangkok.  
 In Surin, the main green market started to operate since 2003. In the early 
2010s, there are around 65 to 70 sellers of various products such as rice, vegetables, 
fish and organic pork.164 Organic farm visits are often organised and are seen as 
opportunities for consumers to learn more about organic agri-food production, which 
help them to have realistic demands regarding prices and quality of organic agri-food 
products.165 Active participants in the market include those from Taptai community 
in Surin. With relatively secured market channels, the group is able to purchase 
organic pork from members at 50 percent higher prices than in conventional markets, 
and also has a long-term plan to invest in small-scale industrial machineries to 
produce other organic pork products and develop their own brand.166 There are also 
smaller green markets in Surin and also in Yasothon which started to become more 
popular in the 2000s because of growing consumer support of organic products.167 In 
Chiang Mai, aside from green local markets such as the JJ Organic Market, Mae-ta 
                                                          
162 Suphachai Lorlohakarn, Organic Farming Business (Bangkok: National Innovation Agency and 
Asian Institute of Technology, 2007), 134 and 196-197. (in Thai) 
163 Supha Yaimuang, SATHAI, interviewed 3 October 2012, Nonthaburi and Chomchuan 
Boonrahong, interviewed 3 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
164 Prachason et al. (2012), 178-179 and 182 . 
165 Ibid, 183. 
166 Mrs. Kanya Oonsri, village leader and leader of Baan Taptai-Tanon organic agriculture group, 
interviewed 22 December 2012, Surin. 
167 Ubol Yoowah, NGO activist, interviewed 22 December 2012, Yasothon. 
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sustainable agriculture group also engages in Community Support Agriculture 
(CSA); a direct selling of pre-paid vegetable boxes to around 16 to 50 consumer 
households (depending on the season).168  
 This section has provided an overview of different types of alternative 
processing and market channels which help to promote the production of sustainable 
agri-food products in Thailand. The next section focuses on producer rice mills and 
sustainable farmer groups in Yasothon and Surin provinces as examples of farmer 
groups which produce, process and sell their own products. 
2.3) Producer rice mills and sustainable farmer groups in Surin and Yasothon 
This section discusses a few notable AAN groups and producer rice mills in Surin 
and Yasothon which try to process and sell their own products to bypass middlemen 
and to fully benefit from sustainable and fair trade premiums. They also try to 
capture value-added that comes with moving up along agri-food supply chains. 
These groups aim to fairly distribute their profits to farmer members, encourage 
member participation, support community welfare and encourage sustainable 
farming in a wider scale. As chapter 1 discussed, these groups provide interesting 
examples of counter-hegemony in the agri-food system because they are well-
established widely networked groups with a long history of learning from 
experience, which allow them to develop different varieties of practical counter-
hegemonic alternatives. First, this section discusses relatively large-scale producer 
rice mills and sustainable production of their member groups. These rice mills 
include Rice Fund Surin Organic Agriculture Cooperative in Surin province, as well 
as rice mills of Naso Rakthammachart group, Bak-rua organic farmer group, and 
                                                          
168 Arpakorn Krueng-ngern, Mae-ta organic farmer, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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Nam-om community enterprise in Yasothon province. To give a fuller picture, 
smaller-scale producer rice mills with distinct characteristics are also discussed, 
namely Kammad Sustainable Agriculture group and Thamma-ruamjai moral rice 
network in Yasothon. Factual information and contact detail of each group can be 
found in Appendix 1. 
 Alternative agriculture movements in Surin and Yasothon started to develop 
since the 1980s. In 1995, the AAN of the Northeast was formed to promote 
production, processing, and marketing of sustainable agri-food products, as well as 
to create venues for member groups to exchange their ideas and knowledge.169 
Farmer founders in many groups became interested in alternative agriculture because 
they experienced what they perceived to be unfair and unjust trading practices, 
where they felt exploited by middlemen and rice mills because they lacked 
knowledge and bargaining power. In addition, they had also observed negative 
health and ecological effects of Green Revolution agricultural methods.170 Founders 
of Naso Rakthammachart group, for example, were inspired to find alternatives to 
the mainstream agricultural production after seeing a lot of fish died in the paddy 
field due to agricultural chemicals. Moreover, they also experienced rising costs of 
production while paddy prices, determined by powerful middlemen and rice mills, 
seemed to stagnate.171 Such instances ignite many people's interests in herbal 
medications and sustainable agriculture.172 They were also inspired by Fukuoka's 
visit and his ideas of natural farming, and developed their own techniques further to 
                                                          
169 Rojanapraiwong et al. (2004), 67. 
170 Prachason et al. (2012), 160-161. 
171 Kanoksak Kaewthep, “Rakthammachart Rice mill: Naso Community, Ampur Kudchum, Yasothon 
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suit local conditions.173 Another example is Mr. Boonsong Martkhao, founder of 
Kammad and former member of the Naso group, who started to experiment with 
sustainable agriculture between 1989 and 1995 because he experienced high costs of 
production, rising debt, and deteriorating health conditions.174 
 In Surin, the Farmer Rice Seller Network was formed in 1987 to collect 
paddy in bulk from Sahatham for Development, Ta-toom Natural Agriculture, and 
Surin Natural Agriculture groups. It was hoped that this would increase market 
power of farmers in relation to rice mills and middlemen. The network received 
support from many groups and people such as NGOs, Green Net Co-operative, 
Saneh Jamarik, 175 as well as Luang-po Naan - a monk from Ta-sawang temple, who 
helped to raise funds from the locals and state development programmes to build a 
producer-controlled rice mill. Through a Swiss NGO called CLARO, the network 
started to export pesticide-free rice to European and fair trade markets for the first 
time in the early 1990s.176 In 2002, it received funding from the state-funded pilot 
programme (discussed in part 3) to build a 24 tons per day capacity rice mill and to 
build a warehouse that could hold 500 tons of rice. In 2003, the rice mill was 
registered as a co-operative, with smaller producer groups named according to the 
areas such as Tamor, Ta-toom, and Taptai.177 In 2012, the Rice Fund Surin Organic 
Agriculture Co-operative had 250 out of 326 members who passed organic 
certification.178  Since 2005, it was certified a Fairtrade producer group by FLO179 
                                                          
173 Kata (2005), 21. 
174 Boonsong Martkhao, Kammad Sustainable Agriculture group, interviewed 25 December 2012, 
Yasothon. 
175 Ms. Sompoi Jansang, Manager of the Rice Fund Surin Organic Agriculture Co-operative Ltd, 
interviewed 19 December 2012, Surin. 
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and took over marketing activities from Green Net Co-operative.180 In 2012, the 
Surin rice mill sold its rice through its retail store in Surin call "Khao-hom" and 
directly to consumers in Bangkok (40 percent), while the rest was exported to 
France, the US, the UK and Australia (60 percent).181   
 In Yasothon, Naso Rakthammachart and Bak-rua groups seem to have some 
similar experiences in the building up of their counter-hegemonic ideas and 
practices. Naso group thought that members' economic situations would improve if 
they could bypass middlemen by having their own rice mill to process and sell their 
own rice.182 Between 1991 and 1993, the group lobbied for a budget from the state to 
build their own producer rice mill and encouraged other farmer groups in the 
province to do the same.183 Similar to the case of Naso, some farmers in Bak-rua 
community started to form a group in 1976 to increase their bargaining power in 
relation to paddy middlemen.184 In 1994, Bak-rua group managed to use community 
savings and provincial budget to build a community rice mill.185 In 2012, Naso rice 
mill had 243 members and milled around 650 to 700 tons of rice (conventional and 
organic) per year.186 Bak-rua rice mill also had around 200 members and milled 600 
tons of rice per year (400 out of 600 tons were organic rice).187 Both Bak-rua and 
Naso producer rice mills export their organic and fair trade rice through Green Net 
Co-operative since the mid 1990s. Naso also sells directly to consumers in local and 
urban areas through many brands, shops and Yasothon local markets.188 It also tries 
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to establish linkages with other co-operatives such as a fruit-selling co-operative in 
Jantaburi province, as well as socially conscious companies and organisations in 
Thailand which purchase rice from the group.189 Both Naso and Bak-rua require 
members to invest some shares in the rice mills. In return, members will receive 
dividends. In addition, both groups have community saving banks which help with 
the rice mills' cash flow, especially with paddy payment.190 There are also 
collaborations between community rice mills in Yasothon with regards to cash flow, 
price setting, and to develop other rice products such as rice bran capsules.191 
 A relatively newer Nam-oom sustainable farming group in Yasothon was 
established around 1999, and was aided by an academic, Dr. Seri Phongpit, who 
helped to facilitate discussions between 12 villages regarding problems facing 
farmers. The discussions encouraged many people, including village leaders, to turn 
to organic rice production as a partial solution.192 The group registered as a 
community enterprise in 2008 and received some funding from the Bank of 
Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operative (BAAC) to expand their rice mill 
capacity. Members have grown from 100 to 538 people by 2012.193 The enterprise 
received organic standards such as BCS in 2002 and exports organic rice to fair trade 
and organic markets in Europe with the help of Aden company. By 2012, the mill 
processed over 700 to 800 tons of rice a year on average.194 The enterprise is 
managed by a 15 member committee and also has a profit sharing scheme according 
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to members' shares in the enterprise.195 Nam-oom community enterprise, as well as 
Naso and Bak-rua community rice mills, are usually considered "success" cases of 
community rice mills in Thailand, but as section 2.4 discusses in detail, such success 
is based on certain conditions that might not be available to other groups. In 
addition, the rice mills sometimes face financial and management problems, as well 
as other limitations. 
 Other relatively newer producer rice mill groups in Yasothon, such as 
Kammad and the moral rice network, have developed their counter-hegemonic 
practices to suit their particular conditions and also as a response to perceived 
problems of older groups such as Naso. Kammad group, for example, branched out 
from Naso in 2010 even though some members still sell some paddy to Naso rice 
mill. This is because most of the land in that area (around 6,000 rai in 4 Tambol) 
falls under the jurisdiction of the Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO) so 
members could receive some support from ALRO. The group also receives help 
from some academics and some companies' corporate social responsibility projects. 
By 2012, the group had around 100 organic farmer members in total.196 One 
distinctive feature of the group is that they focus on producing traditional rice strands 
and direct domestic sales, such as to individuals and restaurants. The group preserves 
over 100 strands of traditional rice and 12 households produce organic rice seeds.197 
 Kammad members reflected on their experience during the pilot programme 
(discusses in part 3) and concluded that to reduce risks and costs, they should shorten 
management chains. In addition, since Kammad is a relatively small group, members 
prefer using a decentralised management system where there is no centralised space 
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to hold the paddy. Instead, members hold paddy in their own barns. When there are 
orders from consumers, paddy is milled at the central mill and then directly 
transported to the consumers. One main benefit of such an arrangement is that the 
group does not have to borrow from banks to purchase paddy, and hence does not 
have to pay interest rates.198 Similarly, Thamma-ruamjai moral rice network in 
Yasothon has a central headquarter which relies on small-scale rice mills in different 
communities to reduce costs. In 2012, the group had 9 small rice mills and were 
going to build another 12 mills to service 20 of their centers. Meetings are held to 
plan organic rice production according to consumer demands, and the headquarter 
also checks the quality of rice before distribution.199 Some members also engage in 
the preservation and development of traditional rice strands, with the aim to provide 
good quality, inexpensive, and nutritious organic rice for domestic consumers rather 
than to export.200 
 As part 1 has discussed, actors in the SAM in Thailand employ different 
varieties of counter-hegemonic terms and discourses. Most organic farmers 
interviewed in Yasothon tend to employ secular terms and discourses to describe 
their counter-hegemonic ideas and practices. However, as the name suggests, those 
in the moral rice network explicitly adopt Buddhist ideas and incorporate them in 
their sustainable agricultural practices. In 2006, the groups' farmer manifesto was 
written to set some guidelines of how members would agree to adopt some moral 
standards, such as to give up on liquor, smoking and gambling. In 2006, around 100 
people joined the group but only 38 people passed both organic and morality 
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standards. By 2012, there were around 100 members who met the standards.201 The 
group has established 16 learning centers across the province to promote sustainable 
agricultural production and facilitate knowledge sharing,202 as well as 16 saving 
funds in the area.203 Monks from Thamma-ruamjai temple also help to promote 
morality standards, while the groups' radio station helped to promote their ideas and 
sustainable agricultural knowledge in Yasothon and nearby provinces.204 
 The moral rice network has also developed through collaborations with other 
groups in Thailand. For example, researchers from the Institute of Co-operative 
study at Kasetsart University in Nonthaburi had helped the group with setting-up 
capital. They also helped to find market channels, such as by connecting the moral 
rice network with Paragon and The mall department stores. Burapha television 
company also helped by establishing a consumer network which pre-orders organic 
rice to help producers with production planning and cash flow situation.205 In 2009, 
the moral rice group managed to set their organic rice price higher than the prices of 
organic jasmine rice in the same area by 25 percent.206 In 2012, the group also 
started to search for other distribution channels, such as through postal service and 
other forms of direct sales.207 
 This section has discussed producer rice mills and organic rice farmer groups 
in Yasothon and Surin as examples of counter-hegemonic groups which produce, 
process and distribute sustainable agri-food products. The next section evaluates the 
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counter-hegemonic potential of such alternative agri-food practices. Benefits and 
limitations of these producer rice mills are also explored alongside some other 
examples of sustainable agriculture groups, to give a fuller picture of counter-
hegemonic potential of sustainable agricultural practices in Thailand. 
2.4) Counter-hegemonic potential of sustainable agri-food practices 
This section explores counter-hegemonic potential of sustainable agri-food 
production-distribution practices discussed in the previous sections. The first sub-
section discusses some evidence of viability and benefits of sustainable agri-food 
practices. The following sub-section then discusses current limitations of sustainable 
agri-food practices. Ownership and access to agricultural land also affect the 
transition towards sustainable agriculture, but this issue will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 Evidence in support of counter-hegemonic potential 
There is evidence to suggest that sustainable agri-food practices, if properly managed 
and implemented under supportive conditions, can yield many material and non-
material benefits. Sustainable agriculture activists and farmers suggest that 
sustainable agricultural production leads to lower costs of production and similar 
levels of yield as conventional production,208 especially after a few transitional 
years.209 Many individual success stories where sustainable farmers managed to raise 
                                                          
208 Sompoi Jansang, Rice Fund Surin rice mill, interviewed 19 December 2012, Surin; Decha Siripat, 
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their quality of life are used to back up these arguments.210 In many cases, the costs 
of organic production can roughly be the same as conventional production due to 
higher labour costs.211 A study of harvest year 2005/2006 of 80 farmers in Surin, for 
example, suggests the organic jasmine rice farming can help to improve economic 
situations of farmers because of higher yield (an average of 411 compare to 379 kg. 
per rai) and higher price (around 10 compare to 7 or 8 baht per kg.), while the costs 
of production are roughly the same (2,662 baht per rai for organic compare to 2,619 
baht per rai for conventional production).212 Another study in 2009 of 80 people in 5 
producer groups in Chiang Mai who grow products such as longan and rice, suggests 
that organic farmers in the transitional period received a higher level of income per 
year on average compare to conventional farmers.213 
 Interviews of sustainable farmers in Surin and Yasothon also suggest that 
average organic rice paddy yield is comparable to that of conventional production. 
For example, farmer members of Tamor and Ta-toom in Surin reported their average 
yield to be between 350 and 500 kg. per rai, which is similar to conventional yield in 
the same region.214 Similarly, Bak-rua members' average organic rice paddy yield 
was around 350 kg. per rai or more.215 Average rice paddy yield in other parts of the 
country, such as in the Central plain, tends to be higher due to better irrigation and 
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215 Somwang Chomchuen, Bak-rua rice mill, interviewed 24 December 2012, Yasothon. 
   
228 
 
soil quality. For example, in Chiang Mai, Maeping Organic Company's rice paddy 
fields reportedly produce an average yield of 600 kg. per rai.216 For those who sell 
their products through organic and fair trade channels in Yasothon and Surin, a study 
in 2011 of around 145 households suggests that they had significantly lower costs of 
production for organic rice paddy (a difference of around 7,600 baht per a ton of 
paddy), and hence net profit for sustainable farmers (revenue minus production and 
marketing costs) was 5,533 baht per ton of paddy on average, while conventional 
farmers in the same areas received an average of -2,293 baht per ton of paddy.217 
Sustainable farmers also received additional benefits from a wider range of agri-food 
products and from fair trade premiums.218 The diversity of output throughout the 
year can also help to reduce production risks and costs of living.219  
 One main difference between conventional and sustainable agricultural 
practices, is how sustainable producers have opportunities to increase their 
bargaining power in the market and embed values in their agri-food products. For 
example, Mr. Thamma Sangkalee of Ta-toom Natural Farmer group in Surin 
suggests that when farmers grow cash crops, they lack power to influence prices and 
have to "beg" others to buy their products.220 With sustainable agri-food products 
and alternative market channels, farmers have more say in price setting.221 Kammad 
group also wants to be able to discuss with consumers the setting of fair prices, and 
chooses not to deal with consumers who do not understand the value of their work 
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and sustainable products.222 By selling through socially conscious enterprises such as 
Green Net Co-operative, members of Naso Rakthammachart group can discuss their 
production problems and participate in price setting, which give them more power 
compare to selling through conventional business channels.223 At the Surin rice mill, 
members can participate in paddy measuring and other activities, which makes the 
paddy selling process more transparent compare to private rice mills.224 In addition, 
multi-channel alternative markets provide more options for producers.225 For 
example, farmers in Yasothon and Surin can be members of more than one group 
and can sell their organic rice directly to consumers in green markets or to the rice 
mills.226 
 Alternative green markets have also been credited as positive forces for job 
creations and as important additional sources of income. For example, CSA and 
green market initiatives in Chiang Mai create jobs for young people in Mae-Ta 
community.227 Individual situations differ, but many Naso farmers who sell their 
produce at the Yasothon local green market receive around 10,000 to 20,000 baht per 
month,228 while some farmers from Taptai group reportedly earn 100,000 baht per 
person per year from the local green market in Surin.229 For Taptai, income from 
local green market is comparable to that from selling organic and fair trade rice. In 
addition, drought could reduce a person's earning from organic rice to 50,000 baht 
                                                          
222 Prachason et al. (2012), 151-152. 
223 Ibid, 151. 
224 Ibid, 195. 
225 Ibid, Executive Summary page (4). 
226 Ibid, 147 and 149 and 1164. Example includes Mr. Uthai Juansang, Bak-rua organic farmer who 
has a household-scale mill and sells organic rice in local markets in addition to selling through Bak-
rua rice mill (interviewed 24 December 2012). 
227 For example, Arpakorn Krueng-ngern, a young Mae-ta organic farmer, interviewed 1 November 
2012, Chiang Mai. 
228 Chutima Muangman, Naso rice mill, interviewed 25 December 2012, Yasothon. 
229 Kanya Oonsri, leader of Baan Taptai-Tanon group, interviewed 22 December 2012, Surin. 
   
230 
 
per year230 which suggests that diversifying sources of income, such as through local 
green markets, help to reduce economic risks. The earnings from local green markets 
are not insignificant. According to the statistics in 2011, the average monthly income 
per household in the Northeast was 18,217 baht per month.231 A farm operator 
household in the Northeast earned around 14,300 to 14,400 baht per month 
(excluding those in forestry and fishery activities), while farm workers earned 9,437 
baht per month of monetary income.232 Taptai group's plan to produce other organic 
pork products233 and Nam-oom enterprise's plan to encourage younger members to 
learn English to help with marketing, 234 are also examples of how sustainable agri-
food production-distribution channels can create jobs. Moreover, NGO activists 
point to the benefits of local markets in fostering interactions and understanding 
between consumers and producers.235 
 Some discussions and evaluations of sustainable agriculture in Thailand only 
focus on a few aspects, such as monetary returns, costs of production and yield, 
which are typical of mainstream economic analyses. However, since the SAM's 
goals and values extend beyond these issues and cover other non-material aspects of 
life, it is important to evaluate sustainable agri-food practices on these criteria as 
well. Aside from monetary rewards, it has been noted that sustainable agriculture has 
many positive benefits such as in terms of local food security from diversified 
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farming methods,236 improved health conditions, and social ties.237 Some farmers 
who used to work as low-skilled labourers and faced health problems, for example, 
reportedly benefited from green markets and organic farming in Surin, which gave 
them options not to have to continue working as low-skilled labourers.238 In addition, 
some have noted how sustainable agri-food production and alternative markets give 
career options for parents in rural areas, so that they do not necessarily have to 
migrate.239 Stronger family ties are also seen as being linked to personal happiness 
and prevention of social problems such as teenage drugs addiction.240 
 In terms of gender equality, the research did not uncover serious obstacles 
facing women from engaging in sustainable agri-food practices. Some promoters of 
sustainable agriculture suggest that for a farming household to successfully make a 
transition to sustainable agriculture, it is important to provide sustainable agriculture 
training for both men and women in the household.241 Moreover, it has been noted 
that women are particularly active in the marketing and processing of sustainable 
agri-food products,242 which can help to improve their economic situations. In 
Chiang Mai green market, for example, an average female seller could earn an 
income of 15,000 baht per month.243 Women also managed to gain leadership 
positions in many organisations such as in Naso, Bak-rua, and Surin producer rice 
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mills,244 as well as in Baan Taptai organic farmer group and Baan Tanon organic 
herb and vegetable processing group in Surin.245 In many sustainable agriculture 
groups, however, leaders were mostly men.  
 Sustainable farmer groups can also create positive externalities which benefit 
not only their members but local communities. Aside from providing production 
support, some producer rice mills such as Bak-rua and Naso provide welfare benefits 
and monetary aids to their members and local communities.246 For example, Naso 
uses some of its earning from the fair trade premium to fund farmers who are making 
transitions toward organic agriculture, and also contribute to the natural disaster 
relief fund.247 
 Current problems and counter-hegemonic limitations 
Despite some progress, sustainable agricultural development in Thailand is still 
rather limited from a national perspective. In 2012, the share of organic farmland in 
total agricultural land in Thailand was estimated to be only around 0.2 percent.248 In 
a well-known organic rice production area such as Surin, it is estimated that organic 
agricultural practices constitute only 1 percent of all agricultural activities in the 
province.249 The following paragraphs explore some important problems associated 
with sustainable agri-food production, processing and marketing channels, which 
limit their counter-hegemonic potential. In sum, problems include how farmers can 
                                                          
244 In 2012, managers of these rice mills were all female. 
245 Nanta Haitook, President of Baan Tanon Organic Herb and Vegetable Processing Group, 
interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin. 
246 Somwang Chomchuen, Bak-rua rice mill, interviewed 24 December 2012, Yasothon and 
Prachason et al. (2012), 148-149. 
247 Prachason et al. (2012), 133. 
248 Research Institute of Organic Agriculture (FiBL) and International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), The World of Organic Agriculture. Statistics and Emerigng 
Trends 2014, ed. Helga Willer and Lernoud Julia (Frick and Bonn: FiBL and IFOAM, 2014), 186. 
249 Sompoi Jansang, Rice Fund Surin mill, interviewed 19 December 2012, Surin. 
   
233 
 
be deterred from changing their production methods to sustainable agriculture, such 
as organic farming, because of many technical problems they will face in the first 
few years which can lower their income, and because of the knowledge-intensive 
nature of sustainable production. Migration to urban areas and the lack of farm 
labourers also contribute to high costs of production. The problems are also 
connected to the governance structures of sustainable agri-food products. As part 3 
discusses, the costs of certification of sustainable agri-food products can alienate 
some farmers and also add significant costs to producer groups. 
 In the first few transitional years toward sustainable agriculture, there can be 
many technical problems and yield will tend to drop before soil quality improves.250 
Some farmers who are deeply convinced of the benefits of creating sustainable agri-
food alternatives will accept such risks and persevere, but most farmers are 
motivated by short and medium term monetary gains due to necessity. Since 
sustainable agriculture requires a lot of time and labour to change the whole 
production system, farmers tend to back out when they start to face serious 
obstacles.251 It has also been suggested that in local Surin/Khmer culture, some 
farmers care a lot about "losing face" if their rice or paddy fields are not as 
physically pleasing as other farmers', which deter them from organic rice farming.252 
 Difficulties in changing the production system to a more sustainable one can 
also be attributed to the lack of agro-ecological knowledge and research in Thailand. 
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There are very few academic courses which teach sustainable agricultural practices, 
such as at Thammasart and Majoe Universities.253 Moreover, in contrary to some 
mainstream perceptions that sustainable agriculture means "doing nothing" to the 
farm or simply just applying some standard techniques and organic fertilisers, many 
people in the movement point to the need to develop new and more extensive 
knowledge of agro-ecology which meet distinct needs of different areas.254 For 
example, some farmers think that applying home-made organic fertilisers are 
sufficient to improve soil, but such practice can be improved by using laboratory 
analyses and other types of technology to develop probiotic micro-organisms in the 
soil.255 In addition, many practitioners suggest that research in universities should be 
more relevant to real farming conditions, or should perhaps be in joint-cooperation 
with farmers.256 As part 3 discusses, there is no comprehensive national plan to 
encourage research in sustainable agricultural methods in Thailand, although there 
are some support from some state offices. 
 The lack of farm labourers in the agricultural sector also affects the 
expansion of sustainable agricultural production, because it tends to require more 
effort compare to conventional production. The problem is partly accrued to the 
growing average age of farmers and migration of younger generations, which add 
significantly to the costs of sustainable agricultural production.257 Some have argued 
that agro-ecological production and diversified farms, where different varieties of 
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crops aid each other's growth, can help reduce labour requirement and costs.258 
Additionally, some have pointed out the need to innovate inexpensive agricultural 
technology that can help small-scale farmers reduce their labour efforts.259 Kammad 
group has tried to promote interests in organic agri-food production among the 
younger generation, such as by working with local schools to open organic 
agriculture courses.260 As part 1 has discussed, aside from economic problems and 
risks facing farmers, farming is generally seen as a lowly profession in Thailand, and 
hence attempts to create counter-hegemonic identities of farmers are important. 
 Owing to limited expansion of agri-food production and other production 
problems, sustainable agri-food processing industry in Thailand is not well-
developed. It has been argued that to successfully manage the processing and 
distribution of agri-food products, certain scales need to be reached for efficiency.261 
However, there are still few processed organic agri-food products in Thailand due to 
insufficient and inconsistent supply.262 Moreover, as part 3 discusses in greater 
detail, some forms of pre-arranged planning and co-operation between producers, 
processors, and retailers, whether through formal contract or informal long-term 
social relations based on trusts, are important to develop value-added agri-food 
products in larger scales. Without such arrangements, farmers might be more 
reluctant to expand their production. On the other hand, if organic farmers suddenly 
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refuse to sell to green retail shops because short-term prices in conventional market 
are exceptionally high, it will damage the retailers.263 
 Aside from sustainability certifications (discusses in part 3), retailers and 
consumers in domestic and international markets also tend to impose physical 
appearance standards on agri-food products and their packaging,264 which at times 
can be rather unrealistic. When coupled with contract farming arrangements, 
unrealistic physical standards can negatively affect sustainable agricultural 
production. For example, it has been suggested that some organic contract farmers in 
the Northern part of Thailand face strict appearance standards in addition to organic 
standards, which cause a lot of producers to lose profits because when they could not 
pass the appearance standards, they received much lower prices. Because of this, 
many farmers were disheartened to produce in larger scale, and decided to grow 
organic vegetables only for their own consumption or for local markets.265 
Nevertheless, there seems to be some retailers which form long-term relations with 
producer groups, such as Lemon Farm, and try to be flexible with regards to physical 
appearances of agri-food products. In addition, due to the unpredictability of the 
weather and production conditions, sometimes Lemon Farm purchases more than it 
initially planned to, so as to help reduce economic problems of producers that they 
have long-term relations with.266 Part 3 discusses in greater detail the importance of 
social relations as a form of informal counter-hegemonic agri-food governance, 
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while part 4 discusses problems with retailers that sell organic agri-food products but 
do not necessary share counter-hegemonic ideas and goals of the SAM. 
 There are also some mainstream hegemonic perceptions on the side of 
consumers which provide obstacles to the expansion of sustainable agriculture. Due 
to globalised consumption patterns, urban consumers in Thailand tend to prefer cold-
climate vegetables such as broccoli, which can be problematic for producer groups, 
because they do not have control over these seeds and local farm conditions might 
not be suitable.267 Some of these vegetables also require a lot of water to produce, 
which makes them risky choices for producers, given erratic weather patterns due to 
climate change.268 Moreover, it has been suggested by green retailers that generally, 
Thai consumers are used to cheap food and are not willing to pay for organic 
products which have higher prices due to sustainability premiums.269 Nevertheless, 
consistent promotion of counter-hegemonic ideas (discussed in part 1) and 
exchanges of ideas through producer-consumer networks, as well as other types of 
relationships (discusses in part 3), may help to overcome these perceptions. 
 Some sustainable agri-food producers and retailers suggest that there are 
insufficient interests from domestic consumers to accommodate the expansion of 
sustainable agri-food production in Thailand,270 so they try to solve the problem by 
exporting to organic and fair trade markets in the US and in Europe.271 These 
alternative market channels, however, are not without their problems. Thai organic 
                                                          
267 Arpakorn Krueng-ngern, Mae-ta organic farmer, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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270 Mr. Pisit Werawaitaya, Earth Born Co. Ltd. (virgin coconut oil), email exchange date 18 January 
2013 and Mrs. Piyanat Na-Nakhon, Southeast Asia Organic Co. Ltd, email exchange date 16 January 
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and fair trade exporters have to engage in price competitions with countries with 
lower costs of production (eg. lower labour costs or special trading privileges), 
which provide limits to price premiums.272 This is not too dissimilar to conventional 
international trading channels where price competitions between developing 
countries to export agri-food commodities put downward pressures on prices. It has 
been suggested that in some cases, buyers from Europe manage to bargain prices of 
organic products down significantly.273 In addition, such long-distance trading 
arrangements make it difficult to establish partnership consumer-producer relations. 
This is because, for example, organic products are often sold under house brands so 
consumers did not feel loyal to particular suppliers, while retailers tend to prioritise 
price competitiveness.274 As for fair trade, minimum prices of fair trade rice are not 
flexible enough to take into account fluctuations in mainstream market prices, so 
sometimes the minimum prices are lower than conventional market prices.275 The 
global economic crisis of 2007/2008 also reduced demands for fair trade products in 
Western countries.276  
 Interviews of managers of producer rice mills in Surin and Yasothon also 
suggest some limitations of organic and fair trade markets. Rice Fund Surin, Bak-
rua, and Nam-oom rice mills report that despite the premiums, they do not retain 
much profits and their cash flow problems led them to borrow from banks, so the 
                                                          
272 Chomchuan Boonrahong, interviewed 3 November 2012, Chiang Mai; Sunthorn Sri-tawee of 
River Kwae International agri-business, quoted in Lorlohakarn (2007), 132; Mr. Pisit Werawaitaya, 
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interest rates add to even higher costs of production.277 Bak-rua rice mill, for 
example, receives around 170,000 baht per year of profit after dividends are paid to 
members. However, it also has to spend some of the profit on community 
development projects, and usually has to borrow from the BAAC to purchase paddy 
from members.278 As for Nam-oom enterprise, it had to borrow around 11 million 
baht from the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operatives (BAAC) at 6 
percent interest rate to pay for paddy in 2011.279 Leading members suggest that it 
will take them another few years to be able to purchase second-handed equipments 
and machineries that they needed.280 Despite these financial problems, the rice mills 
do not seem to think they can negotiate for higher prices because they are concerned 
that foreign buyers will purchase from organic producer groups in other countries 
with lower costs of production, such as Vietnam.281  
 Some trade partners help the producer rice mills with their cash flow 
problems by agreeing to pay 50 to 80 percent of the total costs of rice in advance.282 
There are also other attempts to improve cash flow, such as by asking members to 
purchase more shares in the mills.283 Rice Fund Surin, for example, suggests that the 
group has a four-year contract with fair trade Swiss buyers. However, such 
relationships are rare even in fair trade markets.284 Quoting the manager of Rice 
Fund Surin: "what we learn from them is that business is just business".285 In 
                                                          
277 Ibid, 171. Sompoi Jansang, Rice Fund Surin, interviewed 19 December 2012; Somwang 
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oom enterprise, interviewed 23 December 2012. 
283 Prachason et al. (2012), 171. 
284 Ibid, 173. 
285 Sompoi Jansang, Rice Fund Surin, interviewed 19 December 2012, Surin. 
   
240 
 
addition, as part 4 discusses in greater detail, in the early 2010s, producer rice mills 
in Yasothon and Surin face significantly higher costs of production due to the 
government's paddy pledging scheme, and hence were at even greater risks of losing 
foreign organic and fair trade buyers.  
 High production and management costs of producer rice mills can be linked 
back not only to high labour costs (compare to some other developing countries), but 
also to current technologies which are not suitable for small-scale production. As 
suggested by relatively larger-scale rice mills such as Naso and Bak-rua, the mills 
have high fixed costs due to the scale of the mills. However, they had to invest in 
large-scale mills in the first place to meet export quality standards, such as to reduce 
number of broken rice. Naso, for example, has a 7,000 tons per year capacity but 
could only purchase 3,000 tons of paddy, so their costs of production are higher than 
bigger rice mills in conventional markets. Out of this amount, only one-third is 
organic rice which receives high premium.286 In the case of Bak-rua, around 10,000 
baht worth of organic rice (refers to as "cleaning costs") needs to be counted as 
conventional rice when the mill changes from processing conventional paddy to 
organic paddy.287 As discussed previously, newer groups such as Kammad and the 
moral rice network in Yasothon try to avoid such problems by using smaller rice 
mills and decentralised management.  
 Overall, it seems that although exports of widely-traded agri-food products 
such as rice in organic and fair trade markets have some benefits, there are still 
certain limitations. At times, producer rice mills face rather serious management and 
financial problems. In early to mid 1990s, the Rice Fund Surin group struggled as a 
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business, partially due to low quality of produce. However, after the national 
Thailand Organic label was established in 1996, there was a renewed attempt to 
export organic rice in 1999.288 Naso group also faced financial difficulties around 
2006 and 2007 because of unpredictable rice prices, and also because the group 
could not sell off large supply of rice while having to pay high interest rate from 
bank loans that they borrowed to purchase paddy, resulting in 4 consecutive years of 
negative profits.289 This further serves to explain why many NGO activists think that 
farmers do not earn enough income from organic rice selling to improve their 
livelihoods, and try to develop local markets for sustainable agri-food products, as 
well as encourage producers to diversify their production and produce value-added 
products.290 As previously discussed, by doing so, farmers do not have to rely only 
on the sales of one or two items such as organic rice, and hence have different 
sources of income throughout the year. Additional measures include using the 
Organic Thailand standard to meet slowly blooming domestic (and regional) 
demands, develop Thailand's own fair trade standards,291 or rely on sales based on 
reputation.292 Some have also criticised mono-crop production of organic products 
for not focusing on ecological balance293 and for adopting Ricardian comparative 
advantage mentality similar to the mainstream agri-food system.294 Similarly, a study 
suggests that even though fair trade rice value chain in Thailand benefits all actors 
along the chain, it is insufficient to elevate small-scale farmers from poverty and that 
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other activities, such as vegetable and fish production or value-added projects should 
be used to generate additional income.295 
 The problems and limitations of sustainable agricultural practices discussed 
in this part of the chapter can also be attributed to hegemonic governance structures 
that favour conventional agri-food production-distribution practices. The next part of 
the chapter also discusses attempts to challenge hegemonic agri-food governance 
structures in greater depth.   
Part 3: Counter-hegemonic agri-food governance structures 
The previous part of the chapter has discussed different forms of direct and indirect 
market arrangements which give importance to values such as ecological balance 
and fairness.296 What distinguish these production-distributional channels from 
conventional market channels (and neo-classical economics' ideas about free 
competitive markets) are different forms of governance structures which ensure that 
agri-food practices are embedded in counter-hegemonic values. This part of the 
chapter also argues that counter-hegemonic policy and legal governance structures 
are important to support the expansion of sustainable agriculture in Thailand. First, 
section 3.1 discusses counter-hegemonic market regulations and informal social 
relations which govern sustainable agri-food production-distribution. Section 3.2 
then discusses counter-hegemonic movements' attempts to challenge hegemonic 
agri-food policy and legal governance structures at local, national and global levels. 
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This section also argues that their extent of success is dependent on the political 
situation and the strength of civil society at that particular period of time. 
3.1) Governance structures of sustainable agri-food production-distribution 
There are local, national and international private and state labels that have been 
used to govern alternative agri-food production-distribution in Thailand. In 1993, the 
AAN collaborated with the private sector and the International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) to develop an organic certification system in 
Thailand to help export Jasmine rice to Europe, Canada, Australia and Japan.297 The 
Thai state also developed the "Organic Thailand" national standard and by 2008, 
there were 7 types of alternative agri-food certifications in Thailand that were 
developed by the state and the private sector (Thai and non-Thai). However, it was 
estimated that over 50 percent of all organic land in Thailand were certified by 
international non-Thai private bodies.298 In 2012, representatives from the Green Net 
Co-operative in Thailand were also invited to join the committee to develop a new 
standard for the World Fair Trade Organization.299 The benefits of sustainability 
certifications, such as in helping to establish consumer trusts, are well recognised. 
However, as part 4 discusses in greater depth, relatively high costs of certification 
and lack of participation in the setting of standards can obstruct the expansion of 
SAM in Thailand and open room for co-optation of oppositions. 
 Aside from international and national standards, there are also local standards 
such as the one being used in Chiang Mai since 2001, which was developed by the 
Northern Organic Standard - an independent organisation founded by ISAC in 1995. 
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The standard was inspired by Canadian and German organic standards, as well as 
domestic experience and from exchanges of ideas with farmers in neighbouring 
countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia.300 In addition to sustainable and fair 
certification labels, there are other forms of governance of direct trading 
arrangements of sustainable agri-food products. Local sustainable market 
arrangements have an advantage over long-distance trade in terms of making it easier 
for both producers and consumers to engage in continuous dialogues and to 
participate more equally in regulation and price setting. For Surin green market, a 
committee consisting of people from different areas and professions discuss fair 
prices for both producers and consumers based on the costs of production.301 Selling 
quotas are also used to ensure that producers with high production capacity do not 
disproportionately benefit from the market.302 In the case of the moral rice network, 
members should follow the Buddhist 5 Precepts and refrain from three main vices, 
which include alcohol, cigarette and gambling, in addition to organic standards.303 
Another similar example is Asoke, which is a well-known religious group in 
Thailand that produces and sells pesticide-free agri-food products among other 
things. Some consumers tend to trust these groups even if they do not have organic 
certifications.304 
 Many have suggested that farmers need certainty that there are markets for 
their organic products before they produce,305 and hence there are some merits to 
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contract farming arrangements for sustainable agri-food products. The term "contract 
farming" receives a rather negative image among some groups in civil society in 
Thailand, due to many examples of contract farming arrangements where producers 
seem to be at significantly disadvantaged positions, as discussed in chapter 3. In 
addition, as discussed in part 2, physical appearance standards coupled with contract 
farming can discourage sustainable agri-food production. The lack of contract 
farming regulations in Thailand also does not inspire confidence that producer rights 
are sufficiently protected. Nevertheless, there are some promising contract farming 
arrangements of sustainable agri-food products that aim to be fair to both producers 
and buyers. For example, Khao Kwan Foundation suggests that many farmers 
appreciate financial certainty promised by contract farming arrangements, so it has 
agreed to work with local rice mills to develop a contract farming system to create 
Suphanburi province's own brand of organic rice. Rice seeds that are used were 
developed and selected by Khao Kwan and farmers in the programme. It has been 
argued that all sides benefit: 1) the foundation can promote organic production, give 
advice on production methods and inspects the quality; 2) farmers receive a price 
that is higher than the market price, and can also rely on the foundation for technical 
advice and for ensuring fair contracts with the local rice mills; 3) the local rice mills 
can create unique marketing identity which enable them to compete with larger rice 
mills; 4) price setting also takes into account fairness for consumers.306 The first 
batch of organic rice was sold in October 2012 and reportedly, the costs of 
production was less than 3,000 baht per ton which allowed farmers the profit of 
10,000 baht per ton.307 Another example is Maeping Organic Company in Chiang 
Mai's rice contract farming arrangement, where the company advices farmers on 
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production methods using probiotic micro-organisms and ensures high farm prices. 
The company distributes organic rice domestically and also exports to Singapore.308 
 There are also informal social relations and behaviours which can be seen as 
part of counter-hegemonic agri-food governance. The moral rice network, for 
example, wants to sell rice to consumers that producers "can see and connect 
with."309 In addition to pre-payment arrangements in the form of CSA, Mae-ta group 
also organises farm visits and other activities to foster understanding and good 
relations between farmers and consumers,310 which encourage continual support of 
the CSA scheme. Exchanges of ideas between producers and consumers can also 
help to reduce problems arising from unrealistic physical appearance standards. 
Formal business arrangements, on the other hand, can further partnership social 
relations within and between consumers, retailers and producers groups. Part 2 has 
already discussed how producer rice mills in Yasothon and Surin allow members to 
participate in the paddy purchasing process and pay dividends according to member 
shares, which encourage equitable sense of partnership and horizontal social 
relations. Another example is how Lemon Farm tries to go beyond contractual 
business arrangements by establishing long-term supportive relations with producer 
groups, and also work to raise consumer awareness about organic agriculture and 
sustainable farmer groups.311 A study in 2012 makes a similar suggestion that 
alternative markets where values such as health, the environment, and self-reliance 
are embedded in the market mechanisms, help to establish new social relations 
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which govern the markets.312 In this sense, consumption can be seen as having the 
potential to introduce changes in society through altering social relations. However, 
the report also recognises that there are other macro-level structures such as laws and 
policies that need to be address.313 This issue is discussed in the next section. 
 As part 1 has discussed, some people in the movement see sustainable 
agriculture's way of thinking not only as counter-hegemonic ideas regarding 
agricultural production, but also as counter-hegemonic ideas which re-think 
relationships between humans, society and the ecological system. For example, an 
organic farmer in Surin suggests that sustainable agriculture for him means changing 
one's attitude; from being a conventional farmer who was willing to kill insects and 
go against the seasons to produce for profits, to a more patient farmer who tries to 
understand the ecological system, and are willing to allow some pests in the spirit of 
sharing and co-existence.314 A few other people in the movement also emphasise the 
importance of introducing counter-hegemonic changes at the individual level (not 
just for farmers but also consumers), which lead to changes in how individuals 
conduct social relations, which then affect society as a whole.315 For example, Phra 
Promma who helps the moral rice network in Yasothon argues that to challenge the 
capitalist system and patron-client relations, one needs knowledge and mindfulness 
so that one can use technology appropriately and not be led by consumerism.316 
Similarly, the moral rice network emphasises on changing individual behaviours to 
raise quality of life, such as by controlling gambling habits to curb spending and to 
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promote saving.317 Dhamma (Buddhist teachings) is also seen as an important 
component to curb individuals' greed and prevent co-optation of farmer leaders.318 
Part 4 of this chapter also discusses co-optations of opposition, and how attempts to 
alter individual's ideas and social relations using Buddhist terms may cause 
misinterpretation that hinder support for the SAM. 
 It is not an easy task to alter individuals' way of thinking and form counter-
hegemonic social relations due to deep-rooted hegemonic ideas and practice. It has 
been noted by sustainable agriculture promoters, for example, how the individualistic 
culture and mainstream market relations are ingrained in farmers' minds, especially 
those in the areas which have easy access to globalised capitalist markets such as in 
the Central plain of Thailand. However, in some areas, social relations such as 
community and family ties can still play significant roles to ignite interests in 
sustainable agriculture.319 Another point to note is that sustainable producer groups 
are in different positions to establish supportive social relations with other groups in 
society. As part 2 has discussed, relatively successful groups benefited from building 
alliances with other groups in society, such as academics and the media. The moral 
rice network and Kammad group, for example, benefited from national media's 
attention on their leading members, which help them to establish relationships with 
consumers that help their economic situations. In the case of the moral rice network, 
TV Burapha has interviewed and gave an award to Mr. Kankamkla Pilanoi - a 
relatively young farmer who works to develop traditional rice strands -  as well as 
helped to find market channels for the moral rice producer group.320 As for 
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Kammad, aside from receiving help from ALRO, one of its leading member also 
sometimes receives media coverage which help the group to find new customers.321 
Some producer groups, however, may not be as fortunate in terms of their ability to 
build supportive networks. 
 This section has discussed the importance of counter-hegemonic market 
regulations and social relations governing agri-food production-distribution. 
However, these governance structures are insufficient if one wants to promote 
sustainable agriculture in larger scales, or to challenge and transform the hegemonic 
agri-food system. Local, national, and global policies, as well as legal frameworks, 
are undeniably important governance structures which shape the mainstream agri-
food system in Thailand. For example, many people have suggested that the 
irrigation physical infrastructure in the Central plain of Thailand was built to support 
mono-crop rice paddy, which is incompatible with diversified ecologically 
sustainable agricultural production, as smaller-scale irrigation are arguably more 
suitable.322 If one does not change the national policy framework which focuses on 
building large-scale irrigation projects that encourage centralisation of control over 
water resource, then larger-scale transitions toward sustainable agricultural 
production methods will be difficult to achieve. The next section discusses the 
SAM's attempts to build counter-hegemonic agri-food policy and legal governance 
structures. 
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3.2) Counter-hegemonic agri-food policy and legal governance structures 
This section first discusses the Thai state's promotion of sustainable agriculture 
before focusing on the pilot programme to promote sustainable agriculture which 
was under the control of the AAN. Then, it discusses counter-hegemonic attempts to 
shape the legal structures governing the agri-food system, particularly relating to the 
governance of seeds, intellectual property rights and the signing of free trade 
agreements. 
 The Thai State's promotion of sustainable agriculture 
There are some state offices at national and local levels, as well as civil servants, 
who are sympathetic to diversified farms and sustainable agriculture.323 In the early 
2010s, this includes ALRO which works with Kammad group in Yasothon to expand 
sustainable agricultural production,324 as well as the Thailand Research Fund (TRF) 
which gives some funding to participatory research projects, such as to preserve and 
develop traditional rice strands.325 TRF funding, however, is inconsistent and is 
dependent on the government's policy direction. Some sustainable farmer groups 
also recognise the benefits of building alliances with local administration offices to 
promote organic farming, such as Tamor group in Surin.326 One former governor of 
Surin implemented serious sustainable agriculture development policy for six 
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years,327 and had a lot of positive influence on the SAM in the Northeast,328 but after 
he retired there was a change in policy.329 
 Mae-ta group in Chiang Mai interestingly managed to create supportive 
political space that greatly enhance their work by supporting one of its member to a 
local administrative position. This political space, however, is available because of 
more than a decade of civil society's pressure for the Thai state to decentralise 
power.330 By 2012, Mr. Kanoksak Duangkaewruan from Ampur Mae-ta was elected 
three times as Chief Executive of the Sub-district Administrative Organisation 
(SAO), and had used his 9 years in office to focus on natural resource management, 
which includes the promotion of sustainable agriculture and policies to curb negative 
social and ecological effects of conventional farming.331 The SAO utilises resources 
of the bureaucracy and academics to form 5 to 10 year development plans and 
zoning maps to manage negative externalities, particularly from animal farms. In 
addition, it provides funding for farmers to adjust their production to reduce negative 
impact on the environment, and encourage sustainable agri-food processing activities 
to promote local food security and job creations.332 The case of Mae-ta is interesting 
because, from past experience, many in the SAM found that expansions of 
sustainable agricultural activities tend to depend on government and other private 
external organisations' budget and projects, which can be rather inconsistent.333 With 
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the support of the SAO which receives a budget of 15 million baht per year, Mae-ta 
is able to implement longer-term plans.334  
 There have also been attempts to introduce sustainable agriculture as part of 
Thailand's national development agenda, notably in the 8th National and Economic 
Social Development (NESD) plan written in 1996. The plan was steered by public 
intellectuals such as Dr. Prawase Wasi to reflect people-centered development 
philosophy, and incorporated some ideas and feedback from civil society groups 
such as the AAN.335 With regards to sustainable agriculture, the plan explicitly 
suggests that 20 percent of agricultural land in the country or at least 25 million rai 
should be transformed to sustainable agricultural areas.336 As the next sub-section 
discusses, there were some resistance from the bureaucracy and the plan was never 
implemented, which led the AAN to demand for the national pilot programme for 
sustainable agriculture to be managed by civil society groups in the network.337 
 It is not uncommon in Thailand for some national policy plans to be 
announced but are not seriously followed through. In 2001, the Thai Rak Thai 
government announced a policy to develop Thailand as a center of organic 
agricultural production, but without significant practical plans of implementation.338 
Another state-led plan was the first National Strategic Plan to Develop Organic 
Agriculture (2008-2011), which was criticised for not involving civil society and 
other organic agriculture stakeholders.339 An evaluation at the end of the plan 
suggests that there are still a lot of unaddressed problems such as insufficient 
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knowledge on organic farming in the country and the lack of databases on organic 
agriculture,340 which call into question the state's seriousness in the promotion of 
organic agriculture. Aside from domestic civil society's demands, the Thai state 
sometimes show interests in sustainable agriculture because of transnational 
influence. However, such interests are limited to special projects to promote 
sustainable agriculture, usually in collaboration with organisations such as the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), NGOs and farmer groups, and 
are based in marginalised land areas rather than prime agricultural land areas.341 
Other important criticisms include how the state does not provide support for farmers 
during the transitional period to sustainable agriculture, nor promote consumer 
demands for organic products in the country.342 
 Another reason why the Thai state gives some funding to promote sustainable 
agriculture is because of King Bhumipol's support of diversified agriculture and 
sufficiency ideas. For example, the royalist government established after the 2006 
coup d'état (2006 to 2007) was led by a Prime Minister who was a former member of 
the King's privy council, and tried to follow some sufficiency economy ideas and 
provided budget for sustainable agricultural projects, as well as local sage centers 
which help to propagate sustainable agricultural techniques.343 The King has also 
founded the Chaipattana Foundation, which aims to help citizens through 
development projects in ways that are more flexible and faster than the bureaucracy, 
                                                          
340 “National Strategic Plan to Develop Organic Agriculture 2 2013-2016 Draft," Received from Ms. 
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in line with the King's sufficiency philosophy and his other development ideas.344 
The effects of the monarchy's involvement in the promotion of sustainable 
agriculture, however, are rather complicated, as part 4 of the chapter discusses in 
greater detail. 
 There are many explanations for the lack of progress in the state's promotion 
of sustainable agriculture. As chapter 3 discussed, the Thai state generally promotes 
the hegemonic capitalist agri-food system. When the bureaucracy has to promote 
sustainable agriculture, it focuses on quantifiable outcome rather than quality, such 
as the number of households that they can claim to be covered by their projects.345 
An organic farmer, who is often invited by the bureaucracy in Yasothon to train 
other farmers, also makes a similar point and suggests that the bureaucracy generally 
does not care to encourage farmers to form self-help sustainable agriculture groups 
nor to do post-training follow-ups.346 In addition, it has been noted that civil servants 
tend to look at the promotion of organic agriculture as being the same as promoting 
certain organic inputs, rather than to change the system as a whole or to study agro-
ecological methods. Hence, they tend to adopt a one-day training approach in 
organic agricultural methods and provide organic input handouts, instead of devising 
more effective longer-term participatory training process.347 Such an approach can 
also partly be attributed to compartmentalised agricultural education and knowledge 
internalised by Thai civil servants, which was discussed in chapter 3. In many ways, 
                                                          
344 In 2014, the King is the Honourary President of the foundation and the crown princess is the 
committee chair, <http://www.chaipat.or.th/chaipat/index.php/th/about-the-chai-pattana-
foundation/about-us>, retrieved 10 July 2014. 
345 For example, see: Sompan Techa-artik, Diversified Farms Save Lives and Dhamma: Self-Reliance 
and Growing Wealth in the Soil Sustainably (Bangkok: Research and Development Institute, Khon-
Kaen University, 1995), 174-175 quoted in Unno (2003), 186. 
346 Mr. Lun Saneh-ha, Naso organic farmer member, interviewed 25 December 2012. 
347 Panyakul and Sakjirattikarn (2003), 145. 
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such interpretations of sustainable agricultural production can also be considered a 
form of co-optation of oppositions, which is discussed in greater detail in part 4. 
 The previous part of the chapter has discussed how organic agriculture is a 
knowledge-based production which requires a lot of supporting research that the 
state ought to encourage,348 as the private sector and civil society in Thailand tend to 
have limitation in terms of funding.349 However, the Thai state generally spends little 
in research - only 0.24 percent of GDP according to a study in 2008 - in comparison 
to 2 percent in developed countries.350 Research on organic agriculture accounted for 
20 million baht or 0.12 percent of the research budget of the whole country.351 The 
TRF, for example, funded Ratchapat Utaradit University to research on low-costs 
machineries suitable for the production of organic rice.352 Aside from some 
examples of promising research projects, criticisms remain that there is still no 
national-level research network which equitably distribute benefits or guarantee 
access to all types of stakeholders,353 and not enough attention is being paid to 
participatory technological research.354 
 The Thai state's half-hearted promotion of sustainable agriculture is revisited 
in part 4 of this chapter, which discusses some attempts by the state to promote 
sustainable agriculture as possible co-optation of oppositions. In the next sub-
section, the discussion is shifted to civil society groups' attempt to wrestle for control 
                                                          
348 Ibid, 145. 
349 For example, Ms. Akinee Jiwattanapaiboon (B.Pharm), Marketing Manager of Xondur Thai 
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of some of the government's budget to promote sustainable agriculture in Thailand 
by themselves. 
 The AAN's national pilot programme to develop sustainable agriculture 
As previously discussed, the 8th NESD plan supports the transformation of 20 
percent of agricultural land in the country to sustainable agricultural areas. 
Nevertheless, practical plans and implementation of the goal were under the full 
control of the bureaucracy.355 Some civil servants in the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Co-operatives clearly suggested that they disapproved of the goal and tried to resist 
by not putting the agenda in practical plans.356 As discussed in chapter 3, the 
bureaucracy generally believes in mainstream Green Revolution production 
methods. The AAN tried to follow up on this issue and joined the Assembly of the 
Poor - a loosely structured umbrella organisation established in 1995 to represent 
voices and demands of different marginalised groups of people in Thailand - to 
increase its bargaining power. 357 
 In early 1997, the Assembly of the Poor staged a much larger protest than 
usual where 20,000 people camped outside of the Government House for 99 days. 
They presented 125 demands to the government, mostly regarding conflicts over the 
usage of land and forests. The Assembly of the Poor managed to gain some 
concessions from the Thai state, but some of these concessions were revoked later 
on.358 As part of the Assembly of the Poor, the AAN proposed the establishment of a 
fund to promote sustainable agriculture to the Chavalit Yongchaiyut government in 
                                                          
355 Lienchamroon and Yaimuang (2011), 295. 
356 Decha Siripat, interviewed 8 August 2001, quoted in Unno (2003), 159. 
357 Siripat, “The Assembly of the Poor,” (2011), 96-97. 
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December 1996.359 However, the establishment of a national fund to support 
sustainable agriculture is a lengthy process which requires subsidiary laws to be 
passed, so the AAN changed its demand and asked for a fund for a "pilot 
programme" to develop sustainable agriculture instead360 because according to the 
8th NESD plan, citizens have the right to propose development projects and manage 
the budget themselves.361 In addition, the AAN thought it would be more efficient to 
operate outside of conventional bureaucratic structures.362 
 The Chavalit government approved a 950 million baht budget for a four year 
pilot programme to promote sustainable agriculture, to be implemented between 
1998 and 2001.363 There were special circumstances which explained why the 
Chavalit government made some concessions to the Assembly of the Poor: 1) the 
party relied on votes from poor Northeastern farmers who formed a major part of the 
Assembly of the Poor movement; 2) the government's legitimacy and credibility 
were almost non-existent during the Asian Economic crisis of 1997, so the 
government felt the need to do whatever they could to appease the population.364 
Nevertheless, the succeeding Democrat government led by Chuan Leekphai 
(November 1997 to February 2001) adopted a conservative stand and revoked most 
of the concessions made to the Assembly of the Poor. The government could not, 
however, cancel the pilot programme because it had already been approved by 
                                                          
359 Summary of initial demands of the Assembly of the Poor, 14 January 1997, and Decha Siripat, 
interviewed 8 August 2003, quoted in Anusorn Unno, Social Movements for Common Resource 
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(Nonthaburi: Alternative Agriculture Fair Committee, 2004), 231-232. (in Thai) 
360 The Pilot Project to Develop Sustainable Agriculture for Small-scale Farmers, Lessons and 
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various departments, so the government slowed it down; it took three years for the 
cabinet to finally approve the funding of 633 million baht to be implemented 
between 2001 and 2003.365 
 The pilot programme operated in 9 areas in 37 provinces, covering 27,100 rai 
of land.366 It aimed to encourage self-reliance of small-scale farmers through 
sustainable agriculture and sustainable management of coastal resources to ensure 
food security, environmental sustainability, and economic security at household and 
community levels. The fund received from the government was used to develop 
production, processing and marketing techniques of sustainable agri-food products, 
as well as to support organisations and networks of small-scale farmers, and to 
campaign for the public's support.367 The fund was used in different ways according 
to local needs, such as to sponsor farmer training, to build small-scale irrigation,368 
and to sponsor research on traditional rice strands.369 Surin green market, for 
example, received some funding from the pilot programme between 2002 and 2003, 
and started to become more established by 2003.370 Rice Fund Surin Organic 
Agriculture Co-operateive also received some funding from the pilot programme in 
2002 to build a 24 tons capacity rice mill and 500 tons capacity warehouse.371 A self-
evaluation report suggests that the pilot programme yielded positive benefits and 
allowed more farmers to make transitions to sustainable agriculture. For example, 
surveys indicated that after the programme, farmers in the network used less 
chemical fertilisers (from 65.6 percent to 36.7 percent) and instead use organic 
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fertilisers. In addition, households had greater food security due to diversified 
farms.372 
 The pilot programme should be credited as a significant step for the SAM, as 
it is the first time the movement was able to push for some decentralisation of the 
state's developmental budget to civil society. In addition, the funding has helped to 
propagate counter-hegemonic ideas and sustainable production-distribution, at least 
in the AAN circles and within the limits of the budget. However, the pilot 
programme had limitations not only in terms of budget, but also in terms of 
implementation time and personnel, not to mention that they were closely monitored 
by the Thai government for any slight mistakes that would allow the pilot 
programme's work to be discredited.373 The pilot programme which focused on 
funding small practical projects also left macro-level hegemonic governance 
structures rather untouched. The next sub-section discusses some other attempts by 
the AAN to challenge hegemonic legal governance structures. 
 Counter-hegemonic attempts to shape legal agri-food governance  
In the 1990s and early 2010s, AAN core groups and other environmental 
movements, such as  BioThai and Green Peace, engage in national and international 
campaigns to hinder legal governance structures which support the hegemonic agri-
food system. The following paragraphs discuss a few important examples of such 
campaigns, which are related to the governance of seeds, intellectual property rights, 
and the signing of free trade agreements (FTAs). There are also other initiatives, 
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such as to pass Farmer Rights law and laws to protect contract farmers,374 but they 
are beyond the scope of this thesis. These examples suggest that the sustainable 
agriculture movement has tried to challenge some hegemonic governance structures 
at domestic as well as at global levels, although there are other hegemonic 
governance structures which the movement have not addressed. 
 The SAM in Thailand has strong interests in the issues of biodiversity and 
patents of seeds since the early 1990s. Spurred by the signing of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992 and attempts to patent a traditional Thai plant by 
a Japanese firm, NGOs and academics formed a Network of the Right of Thai Local 
Wisdom in 1994 to support farmer and community rights over biological resource 
and traditional wisdom.375 In 1998, there was also a movement against the patent of 
Jasmine rice strand (Jasmati) by an American company.376 Owing to strong interests 
from civil society on the issues of seeds and intellectual property rights, a committee 
was set up by the Ministry of Commerce in 1998 to gather public opinions, such as 
from academics and NGOs, regarding the intellectual property rights regime of the 
TRIPS agreement that would be in effect in 1999.377 As a result, on 30 November 
1998, a formal letter from the Department of Intellectual Property, Ministry of 
Commerce, was submitted to the Thai representative at the WTO to object clause 
27.3b of TRIPS which supports property rights regime of seeds along the lines of the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant in 1991 (UPOV 
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1991).378 Moreover, through India's leadership, Thailand was among a group of 
countries which includes Brazil, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela, that submitted a paper 
to the TRIPS Council of the WTO calling for amendments in TRIPS to harmonise it 
with the CBD.379  
 The attempts to amend the TRIPs agreement was unsuccessful. However, at 
the domestic level, the AAN and the Assembly of the Poor successfully pushed for a 
law to protect local plant genetics in 1999,380 which is seen by the AAN as a 
compromise which balance between the interests of agri-businesses to commercialise 
seeds, and farmer rights to seeds along the lines of UPOV 1978 and CBD.381 Other 
notable attempts to create counter-hegemonic governance structures of biological 
resources, agri-food products and local wisdom, include transnational collaborations 
with countries such as India and the Philippines to develop Community Intellectual 
Right law,382 and transnational collaborations to support the extension of 
geographical indicators (GI) from alcohols to cover agri-food products in 2001.383 
 As both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces operate continuously to 
shape their terrains, counter-hegemonic gains should not be considered permanent. 
Chapter 3 section 1.1 discussed civil society's successful attempts to block the 
commercial plantation and open-field testing of genetically modified (GM) seeds, 
but also suggested that there are renewed attempts to introduce pro-GM agri-food 
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regulations in Thailand, as recently as in 2014.384 Even though civil society groups 
managed to halt open-field testing of GM seeds before a biosafety law can be put in 
place, at the time of writing, there are still some concerns that agri-businesses and 
the Thai bureaucracy will rush to pass a careless biosafety law.385 In 2013, the 
Department of Agriculture also proposed a new law to replace the 1999 law 
governing the use of plants genetics, which will be more in accordance with UPOV 
1991. There are concerns that the new law will increase the power of agri-
businesses, and it is also seen partially as a result of lobbying attempts during the 
Thai-EU FTA negotiation in the early 2010s.386 This issue was also discussed in 
section 2.2 of chapter 3.  
 Since events are still unfolding at the time of writing, it is difficult to draw a 
conclusion. However, from historical experience, it is plausible to suggest that 
counter-hegemonic gains can be reversed depending on the strength of counter-
hegemonic forces and political space at particular periods of time. For example, it 
has been noted that before 2005, civil society groups were not strong enough to 
inspect agri-food related clauses in Thailand's FTAs with China and Australia. 
However, in 2005, civil society groups consisting not only of the AAN but also 11 
other networks such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) patients and four-
region slum network, were strong enough to successfully block the US-Thailand 
FTA in Chiang Mai, which would had imposed strict pro-business property rights 
regime in Thailand.387 After the coup d'état in Thailand in early 2014, some groups 
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such as FTA Watch were concerned that the military government would push 
through the Thailand-EU FTA in hope to improve its international image without 
consulting civil society. However, at the time of writing it is too early to assess. In 
addition to the discussion of co-optation in chapter 4, part 4 of this chapter also 
discusses how political polarisation in Thailand has weakened counter-hegemonic 
forces in the agri-food system in Thailand. 
 Many attempts to lobby for counter-hegemonic changes at the national 
governance structures have so far been rather unsuccessful, such as the campaign to 
increase tax and control over agricultural chemicals. AAN activists believe that this 
is due to lobbying power of Thai and non-Thai agri-businesses, and suggest that the 
influence of these companies extended to all governments and all political parties.388 
Some activists have admitted that the AAN needs to expand their allies to further 
increase their bargaining power.389 Other reactions, however, include the perception 
that perhaps it is better to spend time and effort on building alternative agri-food 
production-distribution channels rather than hoping to change the Thai state's 
policies and legal structures.390 On the one hand, this sounds like a rational strategy 
for individuals, but on the other hand, it implies the acceptance that sustainable 
agriculture is just an "alternative" to serve niche markets, rather than a counter-
hegemonic possibility that can lead to the transformation of the mainstream agri-
food system. 
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 As previously discussed, there were some attempts to challenge global 
governance structures such as TRIPs in collaboration with other countries. However, 
other aspects of hegemonic global governance are rarely discussed, such as the lack 
of regulations over speculations of agricultural commodities and the World Bank's 
framework regarding land investments in developing countries. Although these 
issues might seem rather far-removed from immediate problems in the agri-food 
system in Thailand, they are nevertheless significant elements of the hegemonic 
global agri-food order which Thailand is a part of, as discussed in chapter 3. One 
may suggest that the SAM in Thailand can try to affect changes at the global 
governance level through transnational social movements such as La Vía Campesina. 
However, as the next chapter will discuss, Thai members of La Vía Campesina 
which include the Assembly of the Poor and the Northern Peasants Federation (part 
of the land reform movement), face some difficulties participating in the 
international arena due to language barriers and other reasons.391 In the next part of 
the chapter, grey areas between hegemony and counter-hegemony, as well as co-
optation of oppositions, are explored as obstacles which limit counter-hegemonic 
potential of the SAM. 
Part 4: Grey areas and co-optation of oppositions 
Part 4 of the previous chapter discussed some examples of co-optation of oppositions 
in the agri-food system in Thailand, and explored how political polarisation and 
populist policies can also be seen as co-optation of oppositions. This part of the 
chapter continues the discussion by focusing on examples of co-optation of 
oppositions which are relevant to the SAM, as well as grey areas between hegemony 
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and counter-hegemony. First, section 4.1 evaluates some critiques of localism and 
sustainable agriculture which portray them as conservative forces. This section 
argues that while it is important to guard against conservative interpretations and 
practices, open-minded analysis beyond the modernisation world view allow one to 
see that there can be some counter-hegemonic potential to localism and sustainable 
agriculture. Section 4.2 discusses grey areas and co-optation of oppositions by the 
private sector in sustainable agri-food markets. Lastly, section 4.3 considers the Thai 
state's promotion of sustainable agriculture from the light of co-optation of 
oppositions. It also discusses the effects of the paddy pledging scheme - a policy of 
co-optation of oppositions discussed in the previous chapter - on producer rice mills 
in Yasothon and Surin. 
4.1) Counter-hegemonic extent of localism and sustainable agriculture 
As part 1 has discussed, Thai localist ideas have been influential in the building up 
of counter-hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand, and have inspired many 
people to search for an alternative development paradigm which is suitable to the 
Thai context. However, as the following paragraphs elaborate, Thai localism and 
sufficiency ideas have been criticised by some academics as backward conservative 
forces which are not relevant to contemporary Thailand. Such interpretations of Thai 
localism are sometimes mapped onto the SAM, and unintentionally aid polarised 
political and rural development discourses in Thailand. These polarised discourses 
are problematic, and can be seen as a form of co-optation which benefits Thai 
political elites by distracting the population from structural problems underlying the 
mainstream agri-food system. This section first evaluates some main critiques of 
Thai localism, and suggests that their interpretations tend to over-simplify Thai 
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localist ideas. Nevertheless, these critiques serve as useful tools to warn against 
conservative interpretations and practical translations of localist ideas that limit their 
counter-hegemonic potential. The section then argues that despite some conservative 
examples and elements, Thai localism should still be credited as attempts to build 
national-popular strategies to rally Thais behind counter-hegemonic projects. In 
addition, the SAM can be recognised as part of global counter-hegemonic forces 
which try to challenge the hegemonic capitalist agriculture and food system, rather 
than seen as an insular movement that tries to retreat to the past. 
 Some scholars have inferred that Thai localism and sufficiency imply 
advocacies of autarkic closed communities that are hostile to market relations.392 For 
example, Hewison (2002) interprets localism as a strategy to encourage farmers to 
"de-link from market economy and return to subsistence" and suggests that these are 
"backward-looking strategies.393 However, as part 1 has discussed, the community 
culture school of thought advocates using local wisdom and resources to help people 
integrate into national and international economy, and it does not imply that they 
have to develop in isolation without help from modern ideas and technology.394 
Despite the emphasis on community and local-level development, localist ideas do 
not oppose trade and collaborations with other parts of society.395 In addition, 
autarkic sufficiency would contradict the Buddhist belief in moderation. As for 
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sufficiency ideas, the King's speeches suggest that full sufficiency - that every family 
must produce all the basic needs for themselves - is impossible.396 
 Another popular critique, relating to the first, is that Thai localism infers anti-
globalisation, anti-outsiders, anti-urban and anti-industrialisation sentiments. Rigg 
and Nattapoolwat (2001), for example, describes NGO activists, journalists and 
academics sympathetic to localism as having "fears of globalization" and suggests 
that localists are trying to retreat to "traditional forms of production"397 even though 
globalisation open up economic opportunities for rural people.398 The study, 
however, did not give specific reference to localist authors who made such 
arguments. Similarly, Hewison (2002) suggests how localist discourses draw both 
conservative and radical Thais together to oppose "globalization, neo-liberalism, and 
capitalist industrialisation"399 and that "there is no place for large-scale 
industralization or urbanization"400 for localists. Moreover, the study suggests that 
anti-urban bias can and does preclude political alliances across the supposed rural-
urban split.401 On the contrary, localist scholars such as Prawase Wasi clearly 
advocate building alliances with other sectors in Thai society, including the state and 
the private sector.402 Anan Ganjanapan, for example, emphasises on how 
communities can adapt over time and are not necessarily geographically based. In 
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addition, communities should also establish alliances with other groups in civil 
society such as progressive middle class Thais.403  
 Criticising the globalised capitalist economy does not simply equate to being 
anti-globalisation, anti-industrialisation, anti-Western, or anti-progress. Localist 
discourses place a lot of emphasis on the development of sustainable agricultural 
production, community enterprises and self-help groups. However, this is 
understandable because they are basic economic activities based on natural resources 
that marginalised people can gain easier access to, as compare to industrial 
production which require more capital. As for the SAM, previous parts of the chapter 
have discussed how critiques of the market-led capitalist agri-food system and 
Western-dominated globalisation are used as foundations to envision better forms of 
globalisation embedded in values such as sustainability, fairness and partnership, to 
ensure that the majority of people benefit from globalisation in equitable manners. In 
addition, part 2 has discussed how promoters of sustainable agriculture do not object 
to industrial production, and encourage producers to move up along agri-food chains. 
The SAM also puts a lot of emphasis on building alliances with other groups in 
Thailand and abroad. Moreover, sustainable markets help to alter conventional 
market relations and provide alternatives, but they do not encourage farmers to be 
fully self-sufficient.404  
 When Thai localism is portrayed as being backward and anti-development, it 
sometimes seems to reflect the authors' adoption of modernist assumptions regarding 
the nature of development (which might also be equated with "progress") as having 
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to follow more or less a single one-directional path. In Hewison (2002), a quote from 
Prawase Wasi suggesting that self-reliance entails standing on one's own feet to 
achieve sustainable development from one's own initiatives, is somehow interpreted 
as a perspective which can be "anti-development".405 In McCargo (2001), the study 
felt the need to mention that virtually all of the Thai intellectuals sympathetic to 
localism were Western-educated,406 even though it is hardly relevant because one 
does not have to either reject or embrace (Western) globalisation, nor refrain from 
criticising the global economic status quo just because one was Western-educated. 
Another good example is Rigg, Promphaking and Le Mare (2014) which suggests 
that localist discourses and their focuses on villages and rural communities as places 
to return to, or as places of retirement and refuge, are obstacles for Thailand's 
economic progress and for Thais to reach their human potential.407 
 Thai localism's appeal to traditional wisdom and Buddhist values, as well as 
the King's support for self-reliance and sufficiency concepts, have also led critiques 
to conflate Thai localism with the King's concept of sufficiency, and to see such 
ideas and discourses as being fundamentally conservative, nationalist and royalist. 
For example, McCargo (2001) suggests that localism is a call to return to Thai 
agrarian roots, which is conservative and nostalgic, and also closely resemble the 
official Thai nationalism which is elitist and statist.408 Another study by Hewison 
(2002) suggests that Thai localism resembles right-wing nationalist trinity in 
Thailand of Nation, Religion and King.409 This, however, is arguably the opposite of 
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localist views. As discussed in Pasuk and Baker (1995), Thai localists are skeptical 
of the centralised Thai state and oppose conservative views which imagine rural 
Thailand as a society of contented peasants owing allegiance to the state epitomised 
by the trinity of Nation, Religion and King.410 Another study, Rigg (1991), suggests 
that Thai NGOs want to build on traditional village structures with patron-client ties, 
not create new ones.411 However, the thesis finds that localist discourses clearly 
emphasise the need to decentralise power and to build democratic horizontal social 
relations. Nartsupha, for example, was inspired by some strands of anarchist 
thoughts. He also explicitly states his concerns with Sakdina mentality and top-down 
co-optation by the state of Thai communities, and argues in favour of encouraging 
the spirits of freedom, international understanding, equality, generosity and 
democracy to undermine the power of the state and hierarchical culture.412 His 
conception of communities does not infer hierarchical social structures nor violent 
intimidation within households or within communities.413 Other scholars who share 
similar views with Nartsupha and support decentralisation of power include Seksan 
Prasertkul, who suggests that self-organised people's groups can be used to counter-
balance the power of the state and market forces, and Anek Thammathas who 
suggests that self-organised community groups and their networks can help people to 
break free from patron-client relations and hierarchical social structure.414 As 
previous parts have discussed, there are examples of sustainable producer groups 
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Foundation: Building Local Administration and a Foundation for Democracy (Bangkok: Thammasart 
University, 2009), quoted in Nartsupha (2010), 175-176. (in Thai) 
   
271 
 
which encourage partnership social relations within and between groups, rather than 
to support unequal vertical social relationships. 
 Some authors have gone further to interpret sufficiency ideas and discourse 
as determined efforts by conservative forces to repress the aspirations of poor Thais 
for political inclusion and material well-being, although Unger (2009) suggests little 
evidence to support such an interpretation.415 While section 4.3 of this chapter 
discusses some conservative sufficiency programmes implemented by the 
bureaucracy and, as discussed in chapter 3, large amount of land holding by the 
Crown Property Bureau undermines counter-hegemonic images of the monarchy, 
these instances do not suggest that sufficiency as ideas should fundamentally be 
generalised as attempts to repress the aspirations of poor Thais, or that they are 
devoid of counter-hegemonic potential. Sustainable agricultural groups are 
sometimes portrayed as being co-opted by conservative forces, and indeed there are 
some sustainable agriculture groups which adopt rather royalist discourses, such as 
the Agri-Nature Foundation.416 However, as part 1 has discussed, there are many 
sources of ideas not exclusively limited to Thailand that give rise to varieties of 
practices within the SAM, which have started before the popularisation of 
sufficiency ideas and the King's New Theory of Agriculture following the 1997 
economic crisis. There are also different interpretations of sufficiency and self-
reliance, which suggest that they are not completely monopolised by elite groups. 
Previous parts of the chapter have also discussed similarities of the Thai SAM with 
those in other countries, which suggest that it is more appropriate to view the SAM 
in Thailand as localised counter-hegemonic responses to structural problems in the 
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global agri-food system. Understandably, vehement rejection (as well as uncritical 
embrace) of localism and sufficiency ideas often reflect evaluations of the King and 
perception of his role in Thai politics, at least as much as the content of the ideas.417 
To further complicate the situation, polarised political conflicts in Thailand in recent 
years also add fuel to conservative interpretations of Thai localism, sufficiency ideas, 
and sustainable agricultural practices, because of their association with the King of 
Thailand. 
 By pointing out that Thai localism and SAM should not be treated simply as 
the opposite end of development and progress, nor generalised as royalist 
conservative attempts to suppress the people's aspirations, the thesis does not mean 
to suggest that Thai localism and SAM are unproblematically counter-hegemonic, 
but that they deserve just and careful consideration. Insinuations that sustainable 
agriculture groups in Thailand are generally part of the conservative forces, ignoring 
structural political-economic causes which gave rise to these groups, serve to de-
politicise and undermine the SAM which tries to challenge the hegemonic capitalist 
agri-food system, similar to critiques which try to portray sustainable farmers as 
"hippies" or merely as just another lifestyle choice.418 
 It is possible that such critiques of Thai localism partially stemmed from the 
writing styles of some Thai localists, which may seem romantic and unclear compare 
to Western academic writings. Nevertheless, as part 1 of this chapter has argued, 
localist ideas have relevance to some Thais who search for an alternative 
development paradigm, and there are those in the SAM who utilise similar ideas and 
concepts as localists. As discussed in chapter 2, a Gramscian perspective suggests 
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that social agents can draw on materials from their social and cultural contexts to 
build counter-hegemonic ideas. Such ideas can be fragmentary and contradictory, 
open to multiple interpretations and hence potentially supportive of emancipatory 
social visions and political projects.419 For example, on the one hand, religions can 
be used as a key component in the construction of hegemony, but on the other hand, 
religions can also be used to advance counter-hegemonic project.420 Brazil's 
Landless Rural Workers' Movement  (MST) - an important member of La Vía 
Campesina - has made used of religious ideas as well as socialist, nationalist and 
communitarian ideas to build up their counter-hegemonic movement, which both 
practically and ideologically challenge the hegemonic status quo.421 Therefore, 
similar to many social movements around the world, localist and sustainable 
agriculture ideas and practices in Thailand, which employ stereotypically 
conservative elements such as those relating to Buddhism, should be seen as 
national-popular strategies or as attempts to build locally situated counter-hegemony 
based on various sources of inspirations.  
 As part 1 has argued, SAM members use different types of terms and 
discourses to aid their counter-hegemonic project. To a certain extent, such varieties 
help to encourage different groups of people in Thai society to become interested in 
sustainable agriculture. For example, some people use localist and Buddhist terms, 
while some people prefer transnational counter-hegemonic terms such as food 
sovereignty (which appeal more to younger generations and middle class Thais). 
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What they generally agree on, however, is the importance of developing a 
sustainable and fair agri-food system. Some promoters of sustainable agriculture 
have been seen as subscribers of the community culture school of thought, even 
though they suggest that it is their experience rather than social theory which led 
them to work on developing alternative agri-food production-consumption networks 
at local levels.422  
 While the thesis argues in favour of different varieties of counter-hegemonic 
discourses and practices, it recognises the importance of critical reflections and non-
judgmental discussions to evaluate counter-hegemonic potential of these ideas and 
practices, to find room for improvement and to guard against co-optation of 
oppositions. Such discussions can also be enriched by different sources of counter-
hegemonic ideas and practices, and by participations of different groups in society. A 
good example is how it has been pointed out that the term "local sage", which is used 
to construct a counter-hegemonic identity of sustainable Thai farmers, can partially 
be problematic because it tends to be associated with male farmers who have their 
own land.423 In this case, a gender perspective is used to enrich the building of 
counter-hegemonic identity of farmers. Undeniably, conservative interpretations of 
counter-hegemonic ideas and practices relating to sustainable agriculture probably 
do exist, such as some state programmes to promote sufficiency discussed in section 
4.3. In addition, as part 1 has discussed, localist ideas allow for challenges to the 
state and capitalism to include withdrawal into self-reliance at local levels,424 which 
can potentially be problematic if macro-level hegemonic governance structures are 
left unchallenged. Indeed, there are those in the SAM who prefer to develop 
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alternative production-distribution channels without trying to change national and 
global governance structures. As previously argued, developing alternative agri-food 
production-distribution channels is useful, but it is unlikely to lead to large-scale 
transformation of the current agri-food system by itself. Another issue to consider is 
whether some people in the SAM embrace sufficiency ideas because of their 
counter-hegemonic potential or because of their loyalty to the King. In the latter 
case, such loyalty can affect critical evaluations and hinder attempts to improve on 
sufficiency ideas and practices. 
4.2) Grey areas and co-optation of oppositions by the private sector 
Concerns over transformative counter-hegemonic potential and co-optation of 
oppositions of alternative agri-food production-distribution channels, such as organic 
agriculture and fair trade, are well documented in existing literature, as discussed in 
part 4 of chapter 2. For example, some people welcome increased involvements of 
large agri-businesses in organic markets because it implies that organic products will 
be traded in larger scales, or suggest that large agri-businesses can co-exist with 
smaller-scale producers in organic markets.425 However, there are those who argue 
that increased domination of large agri-businesses opens up opportunities for a 
hijacking of organic agriculture426 as large agri-businesses have power to push out 
smaller competitors.427 The following paragraphs discuss some examples from 
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Thailand where the lines between hegemony an counter-hegemony are not so clear, 
which create opportunities for co-optation of oppositions by the private sector. 
 Reflecting the trends in other parts of the world, some corporations in 
Thailand have adopted counter-hegemonic terms such as sustainable agriculture and 
self-reliance, but dilute or re-define the meanings through discourses and production-
distribution practices. Many large agri-businesses in Thailand have entered the 
organic market even though they are still major players which sell chemical inputs 
and engage in hegemonic agri-food production and distribution. Large agri-
businesses sometimes label their activities using counter-hegemonic terms even 
though their activities do not reflect counter-hegemonic intent. An example is how 
the Charoen Pokapand group (CP) has many corporate social responsibility 
programmes which involve agricultural projects that claim to be inspired by King 
Bhumipol's integrated farms and sufficiency ideas.428 While these projects are very 
minor parts of CP's transnational agri-business operations, they help CP to portray 
itself, with help of counter-hegemonic terms, as being responsive to environmental 
and social concerns Aside from its 24 hours new channel (TNN24), CP also benefits 
from stories of pro-CP farmers advertised in many large media channels.429 Such 
actions confuse the meaning of counter-hegemonic ideas such as self-reliance and 
sustainable agriculture, and hence undermine counter-hegemony in the agri-food 
system in Thailand. The CP group has also tried to engage in organic farming in the 
Northeast of Thailand.430 Other large agri-businesses have also started organic 
contract farming programmes, where farmers ought to purchase seeds and organic 
fertilisers from the companies in exchange for production loans. In many of these 
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cases, it has been argued that farmers lack the freedom and power to negotiate terms, 
and organic farming in this manner is arguably just another profit-making tactic.431  
 Some large-scale distributors and retailers of sustainable agri-food products 
engage in both conventional and alternative agri-food markets. By 2007, Capital 
Rice (Nakhon Luang) - a major exporter of conventional rice - has also become one 
of the largest organic rice exporter, alongside Green Net Co-operative.432 In some 
cases, counter-hegemonic potential is clearly limited, such as when physical 
appearance standards are strictly enforced, which have adverse effects on farmers. 
Moreover, the unchallenged dominant position of supermarkets as agri-food sellers 
give them some degree of monopoly power, which make their entries into the 
organic market problematic. Many supermarkets allow a few organic items on their 
shelves even though they have no further interest to promote sustainable agriculture, 
and they also mark up the prices more significantly relative to the prices that they 
paid producers.433 Naso group had supplied their rice to a supermarket in the past, 
but found that the supermarket charged a lot of fees so it was not profitable to 
continue supplying to the supermarket.434  
 To a certain extent, developing clear counter-hegemonic ideas, production-
distribution practices, as well as supportive governance structures can help to 
ameliorate problems of co-optation of oppositions. This is a difficult task even in 
supposedly counter-hegemonic organic and fair trade markets, where there also seem 
to be grey areas between hegemony and counter-hegemony. As part 2 has discussed, 
there are those in the SAM who criticise large scale exports of mono-crops through 
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organic and fair trade channels, because such an approach retains some similar ideas 
and practices as that in the hegemonic agri-food system. Some academic studies 
have voiced similar concerns. For example, it has been argued that organic 
agriculture regulations should understand organic agriculture as production and 
distribution processes which encompass social and ecological dimensions, rather 
than mere usage of organic inputs or "cookie-cutter" organic practices, which allow 
large corporations to engage in large scale mono-crop plantations of organic agri-
food products.435 
 Private sustainability and fairness standards can also be seen as potentially 
problematic governance structures. Understandably, to sell to distant markets, it is 
necessary to pass sustainability standards such as organic and fair trade which are 
accepted in those countries.436 However, the certification process can be complicated 
and prices can be high, which implies a bias in favour of large scale farms because 
small-scale farmers are likely to require external help, such as from export or 
distribution companies. For example, Bak-rua community rice mill pays around 
300,000 baht certification fee for 100 of their members which means that even 
though organic producers have low costs of production, the mill has rather high 
management costs.437 As part 2 has discussed, even if farmers managed to receive 
certifications, there is no guarantee that their products can be sold in international 
markets. There are a lot of competition from producers in other developing 
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countries438 who have advantages over Thai producers due to cheaper labour costs 
and historical colonial ties with European countries.439 
 Other problems facing sustainable farmer groups which were discussed in 
part 2 include: 1) difficulties in establishing long term consumer-producer relations 
and to explain local problems to distant buyers; 2) profits received from the sales of 
one or two items are still insufficient to raise living standards of producers and of 
farmer groups, and; 3) unavailability of appropriate production technology for small-
scale enterprises. These problems call into question the counter-hegemonic extent of 
organic and fair trade production-distribution practices. There are studies which also 
voice similar concerns, suggesting that private sustainability and fair trade standards 
require high level of investments that favour large-scale producers440 and can act as 
non-tariff trade barriers.441 In addition, there is also a question of participation and 
democratic legitimacy in setting such private standards.442 On the other hand, local 
and national market channels such as green markets and CSA also have limited 
counter-hegemonic potential as they are constrained by smaller market size, smaller 
transaction volumes and limited geographical coverage. The next section discusses 
the Thai state's sustainability certification and how different certifications can 
confuse consumers and open up room for co-optation of oppositions. 
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4.3) Grey areas and co-optation of oppositions by the Thai state  
As part 3 has discussed, the Thai state makes some attempts to promote sustainable 
agriculture. However, it has been noted that the bureaucracy tends to promote diluted 
versions of alternative agriculture with only mild changes in the production 
system.443 For example, in some publications, the definition of alternative agriculture 
still allows for the use of some chemical inputs,444 and there is no emphasis on 
helping farmers to reduce the costs of production nor to use resource as efficiently as 
possible.445 In addition, some have observed that the bureaucracy tends to promote 
growing different crops in a farm, but is not concerned with how each crop aids one 
another in an ecological manner, which is not very different from promoting a few 
mono-crops in one farm.446 
 Since the Thai state's publications often conflate sustainable agriculture with 
the King's sufficiency economy philosophy,447 one might expect the bureaucracy's 
interests and acceptance of the King's sufficiency concept to be a positive motivating 
factor. However, it has been argued that the bureaucracy's mechanical promotion of 
sufficiency economy and sustainable agriculture has become a tool of bureaucratic 
ideological control,448 where the bureaucracy uses sufficiency programmes to 
impose some moral values on the locals, uses the people's fear of authority to force 
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them to co-operate, or uses the King's name to legitimise their projects.449 Often, 
standardised sustainable agriculture or sufficiency programmes are implemented on 
every region without taking into account local differences nor involve local farmers 
in the decision making process,450 which suggest a markedly different understanding 
of sustainable agriculture and sufficiency as discussed in the previous parts of this 
chapter. These can be seen as examples of co-optation of oppositions, where the 
bureaucracy subsumes potentially counter-hegemonic ideas into Sakdina patron-
client top-down mentality through implementations of their development projects. 
Farmers' difficulties in making transitions toward sustainable agriculture, after they 
received training from the bureaucracy, have also been interpreted as individual 
failings on farmers' part.451 
 There are some interests in the Ministry of Commerce to promote organic 
agriculture but this is mainly because the Ministry sees opportunities to export 
organic products to serve growing niche markets in advanced capitalist countries,452 
not because the Ministry is motivated to transform the agri-food system in Thailand 
as a whole. As a national policy, the Thai state also seems more interested in food 
safety and good agricultural practice (GAP) standard which allow the use of some 
pesticides, rather than sustainable agriculture.453 In 2004, the Thai government 
declared a year of food safety and introduced a public standard for GAP called Q-
GAP, which is fully managed by the government. By 2010, Q-GAP certificates were 
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issued to around 212,000 farmers, covering 3.7 percent of the country's farm 
households and 1.2 percent of the country's arable and permanent cropland.454 Q-
GAP, however, becomes one of many competing alternative state and private agri-
food labels with different sustainability criteria that serve to confuse consumers. A 
survey of 848 respondents in Bangkok in 2005, for example, suggests that 
consumers who purchase organic vegetables cannot clearly differentiate between 
various pesticide-safe labels and organic labels, and are unsure of the differences in 
production methods.455 Some have also argued that Q-GAP and other safe food 
labels increase market competitions, which hinder development of organic 
agriculture and other forms of agro-ecological production organic products.456 In 
addition, Q-GAP may not lead to safer food or more sustainable agricultural 
practices. A study in Northern Thailand, for example, suggests that Q-GAP fruit and 
vegetable producers did not use fewer nor less hazardous pesticides due to many 
reasons, such as poor implementation of farm auditing and too rapid Q-GAP 
programme expansion.457 
 As the previous chapter discussed, agri-food related populist policies, such as 
the paddy pledging scheme, can also be seen as a form of co-optation of oppositions. 
This is because the scheme claims to help solve rice farmers' economic problems and 
portrays the government as being on the side of small-scale producers, even though 
the scheme actually intensifies problems of the hegemonic agri-food system. 
Interviews of producer rice mill managers in Yasothon and Surin also suggest that 
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the paddy pledging scheme hinders organic rice production and undermines small-
scale rice enterprises.458 The scheme significantly raised the purchase price for 
paddy, which reduced the difference between prices of organic and ordinary paddy. 
In 2011, the price of Jasmine paddy under the scheme was higher than organic 
Jasmine paddy price (20 baht per kg. compare to 17 to 18 baht per kg.).459 The 
producer rice mills in Yasothon and Surin had to increase their purchase price for 
organic paddy to be able to fulfil their export orders. If they did not raise their 
purchase price, some of their farmer members might chose to sell elsewhere or even 
switch back to intensive conventional production.460 In the case of Bak-rua rice mill 
in 2011, only around 130 members out of the usual figure of 200 sold their paddy to 
the rice mill.461 With lower volumes of paddy to process, the rice mills lose more 
profits due to sunk costs.462 Raising paddy purchase price, however, was problematic 
because of cash flow problems and because the rice mills could not receive higher 
export prices from buyers who tended not to understand the domestic situation in 
Thailand,463 and are also searching for suppliers in other countries.464 
 This section has discussed lingering hegemonic influence in the state's 
promotion of sustainable agriculture. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the 
Thai state should not simply be seen as a monolithic hegemonic entity, and that 
within the state apparatus there is also tension between hegemonic and counter-
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hegemonic forces, similar to some large corporations which engage in both 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic practices. As previously discussed, there are 
some state managers and offices which seem genuinely supportive of SAM. The 
support, however, also depends on policy direction at the top-levels and can be 
inconsistent. Moreover, even though some state officials embrace counter-
hegemonic agri-food ideas to certain extents, their positions in the Thai state's 
apparatus force them to find compromises. This is because they have to follow 
policy directions of the ruling political parties, such as with regards to the paddy 
pledging scheme,465 or because many people in their local districts (and many Thais 
in general) still believe that agricultural chemicals are necessary as organic 
agriculture cannot produce enough food to ensure Thai and global food security.466 
Conclusion 
As hegemonic forces try to adapt and subsume dissenting forces which challenge the 
status quo, they might allow some changes in the agri-food system which serve to 
appease and obstruct the transformation of the agri-food system as a whole. This 
suggests that counter-hegemonic forces need to continuously develop clear ideas, 
practices and governance structures to guard against co-optation, and that counter-
hegemony should be seen as a process over a long period of time rather than a one-
off chance at transformative change that can be judge as either success or fail. It is 
unrealistic to assume or to expect that counter-hegemonic movements should 
embody purely counter-hegemonic elements, because counter-hegemony is still an 
                                                          
465 Sittipon Bangkaew, Director of the Office of Commercial Affairs in Surin, interviewed 21 
December 2012. 
466 Mr. Thaspong Tonklang and Mr. Thanachote Jaikla, Director and Vice Director of the local 
administration office in Tambol Tamor, Surin, interviewed 20 December 2012. Also the views of, for 
example, Mr. Songpun Kuldilokrat, Managing Director at Arysta LifeScience Co., Ltd, email 
correspondent 21 January 2013; Dr. Kriengsak Suwantharadol, Syngenta (Thailand), email 
correspondent 14 March 2013. 
   
285 
 
ongoing process, not to mention that movements often have to compromise as short 
to medium term strategies so that they can survive in the dominantly hegemonic 
agri-food system. Some existing literature, however, do not address the 
heterogeneity and evolving nature of counter-hegemonic agri-food practices, nor try 
to understand structural problems in the agri-food system. For example, a case study 
of organic agriculture in Ubolratchathani province in 2011 is useful in pointing out 
some current problems with organic agriculture in Thailand, but goes too far in 
arguing that organic agriculture in Thailand as a whole has developed under the 
control of the Thai state and capital.467 
 Discussions of the SAM in this chapter help the thesis to advance six original 
contributions to knowledge which were outlined in chapter 1. Through an empirical 
exploration of the SAM in Thailand, this chapter brings new empirical information 
into existing literature on alternative agri-food movements, which is the second 
contribution to knowledge of the thesis. The discussion on co-optation of oppositions 
also helps to advance the first original contribution, which is to bring new empirical 
information from the Thai case study into existing literature on the corporate agri-
food system. Arguably, co-optation attempts can be seen as an essential element in 
the dynamics of the hegemonic agri-food system, which adapts to subsume dissent 
and to maintain the status quo. 
 This chapter also helps to advance the third and fourth contributions to 
knowledge; to extend neo-Marxist and Gramscian theories on the agri-food system 
in Thailand, as well as to provide new perspectives and data on Thai agrarian 
development and social movements. The neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical 
                                                          
467 Natedao Thaotawil, “‘Barely Sufficient’: A Question Regarding Self-Reliance of Organic Farmers 
in the Age of Globalisation and Development,” Journal of Sociology and Anthropology 30, no. 2 
(2011), 84-85. (in Thai) 
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perspective adopted in this thesis is used as a conceptual frame to explore the SAM 
in Thailand, which allows the chapter to provide new perspectives on the SAM. 
Discussions on counter-hegemonic ideas, practices and governance structures of the 
SAM suggest their interconnections and point out out some possible counter-
hegemonic limitations of the SAM. On the other hand, engagement with empirical 
data suggests that some theoretical concepts cannot be as neatly defined in reality as 
in theory. As part 4 has discussed, the lines between hegemony, counter-hegemony 
and co-optation of oppositions are not always clear. In addition, section 4.1 of this 
chapter helps to advance the fifth contribution to knowledge by providing new 
perspectives on Thai localism. In sum, the section argues that Thai localism can be 
seen as a counter-hegemonic national-popular strategy rather than an attempt to cling 
to the past, even though it retains some problematic elements. This chapter's brief 
discussion of how some people are skeptical of sustainable agriculture groups, 
because of their associations with the King's sufficiency ideas and the monarchy's 
(perceived) role in the polarised political conflict, also helps to advance the sixth 
contribution to knowledge which is to provide new perspectives on polarised politics 
in Thailand. 
 The next chapter will discuss the land reform movement in Thailand to give a 
fuller picture of counter-hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand. Members of 
the land reform movement tend to be marginalised farmers and workers, whereas 
sustainable farmers discussed in this chapter tend to have their own land. 
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Chapter 6 
The Land Reform Movement in Thailand 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has discussed the sustainable agriculture movement in 
Thailand. This chapter focuses on the case study of the contemporary land reform 
movement (LRM) in Thailand, where members tend to consist of relatively more 
marginalised farmers and labourers without or with insufficient land. Aside from 
discussions on counter-hegemonic ideas and practices of the LRM, this chapter also 
explores how land issues are related to the development of sustainable agriculture in 
Thailand. In addition, this chapter provides a foundation to discuss future areas of 
research in the last chapter of the thesis, especially regarding the interconnections of 
natural resource management issues. 
 Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter helps to support the second and 
third main arguments of the thesis; that although the mainstream agri-food system is 
dominated by hegemonic capitalist interests, domestic and transnational counter-
hegemonic forces can influence some changes in the system even though they are 
faced with limitations and co-optation of oppositions. This chapter argues that the 
LRM tries to develop complementary counter-hegemonic ideas, governance 
structures, as well as production-distribution practices, to promote a more equitable 
distribution of land from social justice and food security perspectives. Overall the 
LRM can be seen as part of global counter-hegemonic forces consisting of 
transnational as well as many local and national movements, which similarly try to 
de-commodify and promote equitable distribution of land. This chapter also supports 
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the fourth main argument of the thesis and suggests that even though the LRM faces 
some difficulties, its hegemonic project should be seen as an on-going process that 
evolves over time under specific political-economic conditions, and that lingering 
hegemonic elements should be addressed rather than sentenced as failures. 
 Empirical information in this chapter is based on secondary sources in 
English and Thai, as well as interviews of 27 people who are involved in the LRM 
such as land occupiers, activists, and academics. Additional interviews of people 
outside of the LRM are also used, such as interviews of civil servants. In this 
chapter, the LRM is conceptualised as broad and unstructured networks consisting of 
different groups and individuals from all regions of Thailand who are united by 
similar ideas and goals. Notable groups include the Northern Peasants Federation, 
Esaan Land Reform Network, Southern Peasants Federation, and Bantad Mountain 
Land Reform Network. As discussed in chapter 1, interviews and site visits for this 
chapter were based in three main provinces in two regions of Thailand, including 
Bangkok and metropolitan area (such as Nonthaburi and Nakhonpratom) in the 
Central region, as well as Chiang Mai and Lamphun in the Northern region. The 
focus of site visits was on community land title deed (CLTD) projects in the North 
where CLTD ideas and practice originated from, as well as Klongyong CLTD 
project in Nakhonpratom. Interviews of LRM members from other regions, such as 
the South, were conducted during the protest in front of Government House in 
Bangkok in October 2012. This chapter also discusses the Agricultural Land Reform 
Office (ALRO) and its role in distributing land to small-scale farmers. 
 The first part of this chapter discusses counter-hegemonic ideas of the LRM 
to provide a background to understand counter-hegemonic governance structures and 
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production-distribution practices. The LRM's main focus is on the governance of 
land so unlike the previous chapter, counter-hegemonic governance structures are 
discussed first in part 2, while counter-hegemonic production-distribution practices 
are discussed in part 3. Part 4 then discusses some important obstacles facing the 
movement such as violence, legal suits, as well as possibility of co-optation of 
oppositions. Contact information of CLTD projects discussed in this chapter can be 
found in Appendix 2. 
Part 1: Counter-hegemonic ideas and discourses 
This part of the chapter provides an overview of the LRM's counter-hegemonic 
ideas. First, section 1.1 discusses the LRM's critique of hegemonic land governance 
structures which give primacy to private individual rights and encourage the 
commodification of land. This section also reviews academic literature on 
hegemonic land governance. Section 1.2 then discusses counter-hegemonic ideas of 
the LRM, particularly ideas regarding the complexity of rights, that inspire 
community land title deed (CLTD) practices. 
1.1) The LRM's critique of hegemonic land governance 
Between 1982 and 1986, the Thai state started to implement a formal titling 
programme in the country with encouragements from the World Bank and other 
international institutions which gave loans to Thailand.1 Formal titling increased 
land values throughout the country.2 There were also more land transactions and 
increased borrowing against land from formal financial institutions, as well as 
                                                          
1 Sayamon Kraiyoorawong et al., A Study of Land Conflicts in Thailand Phase 1 (Bangkok: Thailand 
Research Fund, 2005), 43. (in Thai) 
2 Achara Rakyutitham et al., Land and Freedom (Bangkok: Black Lead Publishing, 2005), 40. (in 
Thai) 
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increased fiscal revenues from land, which all led to the Thai formal titling 
programme's receipt of the World Bank Award for Excellence in 1997.3 The World 
Bank also promoted similar market-led agrarian reform schemes in other countries in 
the 1990s, such as in Brazil, South Africa and the Philippines.4  
 Some academics and members of the LRM point out that formal land titling 
resulted in increased land speculation. Some people used land as collateral to take 
out loans from commercial banks to purchase more land,5 which were then often left 
under-utilised.6 After the Asian economic crisis of 1997, fallen land prices led to a 
lot of non-performing loans. Many land plots were confiscated by banks and left 
unused.7 Similar to the situations in many other countries, dispossessions of 
relatively poorer parts of the population, such as farmers, become notable effects in 
Thailand because land sales favour those who have access to capital and greater 
ability to purchase land.8 Some academic studies and members of the LRM also 
point to widespread corruption in the issuing of formal titling documents,9 as well as 
in the rental and usage of state-owned land. In Suratthani province, Thai and foreign 
companies continued to use 60,043 rai of reserved forest land even though their 
                                                          
3 Derek Hall, Philip Hirsch, and Tania Murray Li, Powers of Exclusion: Land Dilemmas in Southeast 
Asia (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011), 37-38. 
4 Haroon Akram-Lodhi, “Land, Markets and Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian Political Economy 
Perspective,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 8 (December 2007), 1437-1438; Olivier De Schutter, 
“How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-Scale Investments in Farmland,” 
Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 2 (March 2011), 269. 
5 Rakyutitham et al. (2005), 40; Methee Singsootham, Practical Action Research Report on 
Sustainable Land Reform and Management by the People (Nonthaburi: Land Reform Network and 
Local Act, 2010), 12. (in Thai) 
6 Singsootham (2010), 40. 
7 Kraiyoorawong et al. (2005), 43; Singsootham (2010), 14. A study also suggests that land 
speculation bubbles contributed to the 1997 economic crisis. (Warin Wongharnchao and Land 
Institute Foundation, A Study of Ownership and Usage of Land, as Well as Economic and Legal 
Measures to Maximise Land Usage (Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2001). (In Thai)) 
8 Singsootham (2010), 39; Kraiyoorawong et al. (2005), 43; Walden Bello, Shea Cunningham, and Li 
Kheng Pho, A Siamese Tragedy. Development and Disintegration in Modern Thailand (New York: 
Zed Books, 1998), 161; De Schutter (2011), 270. For an account of dispossession and landlessness 
problems and conflicts up to the 1970s - 1980s, see Bello, Cunningham and Li (1998), 138-152. 
9 Singsootham (2010), 13 and 71; Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011), 38; Kraiyoorawong et al. (2005), 88. 
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license had already expired, and 68,500 rai of palm oil plantations also continued 
their operations even though their licenses had expired.10 The capturing of the titling 
process by elites is, however, not specifically unique to the Thai context.11  
 LRM members often use the term "commodification of land" (การทําให้ที่ดนิเป็น
สินค้า) to describe the consequences of market-led governance of land,12 or sometimes 
as the work of Neo-liberalism.13 Commodification of land is also criticised as being 
responsible for over-usage of land which has negative effects on the ecological 
system. One frequently cited example is eucalyptus plantations which lead to land 
and water degradation in nearby areas.14 Even though they did not use academic 
terms, some LRM members interviewed express feelings of alienation from the legal 
system and from state land policies,15 criticise the centralisation of political power in 
Bangkok, 16 as well as linkages between large capital and the Thai state which stop 
land reform issues from being taken seriously.17 One LRM member describes how 
the legal system is skewed in favour of capital and that this is part of the ongoing 
"natural resource war".18 Although the Constitution (1997 as well as 2007) accepts 
principles of community rights in resource management, legally there can only be 
                                                          
10 The Land Reform Network and Local Act, A Report on the Study “Land Management and Social 
Justice: A Case Study of the Land Reform Network”, Part of the Project to Encourage Social Justice, 
Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Social 
Research Institute, 2010), 107. (in Thai). 
11 For example, see De Schutter (2011), 269. 
12 Mr. Direk Kong-ngern, farmer leader from Baan Pong, Chiang Mai and Mr. Wacharin Ouprajong, 
farmer leader from Baan Huafai, Ampur Chaiprakarn, Chiang Mai, interviewed Nonthaburi, 30 
September 2012; Singsootham (2010), 12. 
13 Singsootham (2010), 12. 
14 Ibid, 13. 
15 Mrs. Wilaiwan Konka, Vice-president of Baan Pae-tai, interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
16 Mr. Long Pechsood, LRM member from Bantad Mountain group, Ampur Palian, Trang, 
interviewed during the demonstration in front of Government House, 1 October 2012, Bangkok. 
17 Mr. Direk Kong-ngern, LRM member from Baan Pong, Chiang Mai, interviewed 30 September 
2012, Nonthaburi. 
18 Mr. Sawai Malai, LRM member from Yasothon  province, quoted during the discussion panel on 
land problems at the second National Reform Assembly, 2012, Bangkok, Thailand. 
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either state or private land19 similar to many other countries. In addition, forestry 
laws encourage the Forestry Ministry's vertical and monopoly control over many 
sites of land whose ownerships are being contested.20 These issues are discussed in 
greater detail in section 2.2. 
 To be fair, the Thai state has made some (allegedly weak) attempts to re-
distribute land and to promote equitable ownership of land. Owing to pressures from 
social movements in the 1970s which called for land reform, the Thai state passed 
the Land Reform Act and established the Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO) 
in 1975.21 The Land Reform Act stipulated a maximum holding of 50 rai of land 
with surplus land liable to expropriation and distribution to peasants after 
compensation at market value.22 In practice, however, the law is generally not 
enforced on the landlords.23 As for ALRO, most land that it managed to re-distribute 
to small-scale farmers were state owned or deforested public land. Only 383,760 rai 
of farmland had been purchased from private landowners by 1993.24 By 2012, 
ALRO claimed to re-distribute 34 million rai of land to 2.26 million farmers in 70 
provinces.25 However, data in 2010 suggests that only 29 percent of farmers own 
land.26 ALRO is also haunted by the Sor Por Kor 4-01 scandal during the Chaun 
Leekpai administration which came into power in 1993, where some ALRO land 
                                                          
19 A Parliamentary Committee to Consider Land Problems, A Report on How to Solve the Problems 
Regarding Land Use, Land Laws, and the Rushed Property Rights Document Process (Bangkok: A 
Parliamentary Committee to Consider Land Problems, 2009), 17. (in Thai) 
20 Ibid, 67. 
21 Dr. Weerachai Narkwibulwong, Secretary General of ALRO, interviewed 14 February 2013, 
Bangkok, and Singsootham (2010), 10-11. 
22 Bello, Cunningham and Li (1998), 149. 
23 Singsootham (2010), 10-11. 
24 Bello, Cunningham, and Li (1998), 152. 
25 Weerachai Narkwibulwong, “37 Years of Land Reform and the Adaptation of Sufficiency 
Economy,” in 37 Years of the Agricultural Land Reform Office (Bangkok: ALRO, 2012), 15. (in 
Thai) 
26 Dr. Duangmanee Laowakul, Faculty of Economics, Thammasart University, research presentation 
at the Food Security Assembly 2014 in Thailand, quoted in “Macro View of Land in Thailand 
Reveals Inequality and Highly Concentrated Land: Wealth in Poor People’s Tears,” Isra News, July 
14, 2014. (in Thai) 
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were accused of being given to rich and influential allies of the government in the 
South.27 A few studies also suggest that re-distributed state land given to small-scale 
farmers have changed hands despite prohibitive laws.28 As the next section discusses 
in greater detail, the LRM also suggests that individual titling deeds open room for 
dispossessions of small-scale farmers through market forces. Moreover, exchanges 
of ideas with transnational social movements, such as La Vía Campesina , also 
increase LRM members' awareness of the new wave of global land grabs which 
arises from food-energy scarcity concerns. 
1.2) Counter-hegemonic ideas regarding land governance 
The LRM has developed its counter-hegemonic ideas and practices over time by 
learning from experience and through discussions between local farmers, NGOs and 
academics. Many people in the contemporary LRM in the North were inspired by the 
leftist Peasants Federation of Thailand (PFT) 29 which mobilised to pressure for land 
reform in the 1970s but was brutally suppressed by the military and right-wing 
groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s.30 Discussions among Northern farmer 
networks, which led to the establishment of the Northern Peasants Federation on 22 
October 1999, concluded that many problems facing farmers such as those relating 
to land, water, forest, agricultural prices and debt, are similar to the problems back in 
1972.31 Members of the LRM also suggest that one failure of the ALRO is that it 
distributes land in the form of individual title deeds, which allows these land to be 
                                                          
27 For more information on the scandal, see Bello, Cunningham, and Li (1998), 155-158. 
28 A Parliamentary Committee to Consider Land Problems (2009), 18. 
29 Mr. Wacharin Ouprajong, Baan Huafai, Ampur Chaiprakarn, Chiang Mai, interviewed 30 
September 2012, Nonthaburi; Mr. Rangsan Sansongkwae, Baan Raidong, interviewed 30 October 
2012, Lamphun; Mr. Somkiat Jai-ngarm, Northern Peasants Federation activist, interviewed 30 
October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
30 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, 1995, Thailand: Economy and Politics. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 307-308. 
31 Mr. Prayong Doklamyai, advisor to the Northern Peasants Federation, interviewed 1 November 
2012, Chiang Mai. 
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sold off to non-farmers and enables relatively easy appropriation by businessmen 
and landlords who have higher economic power.32 As a potential solution to this 
problem, many people in the LRM are drawn to community rights ideas which, as 
discussed in previous chapters, are seen by many NGOs and activists in Thailand as 
inspirations to find alternatives to the capitalist system. In addition, Anan 
Ganjanapan's work on the "complexity of rights" (สิทธิเชิงซ้อน) are often referred to by 
the LRM. 
 Some scholars warn against romanticising community-based governance of 
natural resources where community is conceptualised as territorially fixed, small, 
and homogenous entity.33 Ganjanapan's and the LRM's ideas, however, are not as 
simplistic as that. Ganjanapan's major contribution to community school of thought's 
literature in Thailand is to point out that communities should not be seen as static 
ideal or essentialised units which remain unchanged over time, nor as isolated units 
with no relations to wider society, the state, or market. Instead, it is important to see 
communities as changeable and re-creatable, as well as to recognise power 
ideologies and social relations in the constructions of communities which can be 
harmonious or conflict-prone. A community's boundaries are not limited by 
geographical space, but by multiple sets of boundaries such as at household and 
village levels, as well as by wider networks that may not occupy the same 
                                                          
32 Many leading members and general members of the LRM have made these points such as Prapart 
Pintoptang, lecturer of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, interviewed 16 October 2012, 
Nonthaburi; Prayong Doklamyai, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai; Sangwal Kantham, 
LRM local leader from Ban Mae-aow, interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun; Nop Mangkornmai, 
Raidong member in the Raidong/Mae-aow CLTD project, interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
33 Arun Agrawal and Clark C. Gibson, “Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community 
in Natural Resource Conservation,” World Development 27, no. 4 (April 1999), 636. 
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geographical space.34 As social situations continue to change, such as through 
dialogues and disagreements involving different groups of people in the society, a 
community's values and rules can be adjusted to suit changing situations. In other 
words, "community" can be seen as a unit, as well as an identity, which is constantly 
being re-created or reproduced through community members' engagement with 
wider society. 35 
 Community rights discourse can also be seen as a reaction to existing "mono-
right" mentality and legal system which violate the "complexity of rights" practices 
in some rural societies.36 Complexity of rights refer to multiple management 
principles where different forms of rights can overlap within a geographical unit. It 
also implies a sense of generosity and self-help in the community to help secure 
everyone's ability to meet basic needs.37 For example, one may have an ownership 
right over a piece of land but others may benefit from by-products of the land. 
Leading supporters of CLTD tend to see complexity of rights and community rights 
as innovations that challenge the capitalist way of thinking.38 Complexity of rights 
ideas and writings of other academics such as Chalartchai Ramitanont have also been 
used to develop community forests ideas and practices in Thailand.39 In a way, 
                                                          
34 Anan Ganjanapan, “Village in Thai Society: Conceptual Critiques,” in The Community Dimension: 
Local Way of Thinking Regarding Rights, Power and Natural Resource Management (Bangkok: 
Thailand Research Fund, 2001), 56. (in Thai) 
35 Anan Ganjanapan, “Community Rights in Development,” in The Community Dimension: Local 
Way of Thinking Regarding Rights, Power and Natural Resource Management (Bangkok: Thailand 
Research Fund, 2001), 246 and 250. (in Thai) 
36 Ibid, 236 and 244. 
37 Ibid, 241 and 243. 
38 For example, see Prayong Doklamyai, “From Discourse to Practical Innovation: Land Reform by 
Communities. Transcript of the Presentation at a Conference on Anan Ganjanapan’s Complexity of 
Rights, 8 March 2008,” in “I Don’t Have the Answer”: 60 Years Professor Dr. Anan Ganjanapan 
and 20 Years of Social Movement on Community Rights and Natural Resources Management (Chiang 
Mai: Sustainable Development Foundation, 2008), 251. (in Thai) 
39 Achara Rakyutitham, “Anan’s Dynamic: From Culture, Na-Moo to Complexity,” in “I Don’t Have 
the Answer”: 60 Years Professor Dr. Anan Ganjanapan and 20 Years of Social Movement on 
Community Rights and Natural Resources Management (Chiang Mai: Sustainable Development 
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CLTD can be seen as ideational extensions of community forest ideas regarding the 
management of some forest land. 3940  
 As some have argued, communities do not always engage in the defense of 
the commons and often want private land rights.41 The LRM and CLTD groups have 
not claimed to speak for all communities in Thailand. In some places, LRM groups 
assert their ancestral rights to land, but generally, CLTD can be seen as a recently 
constructed land governance mechanism not preservations of traditional social 
governance structures. In sum, CLTD is a form of local land governance based on 
democratic rule-setting, where members are allocated individual plots of land to use 
for agricultural and housing purposes. CLTD reflects the complexity of rights 
concept as land is owned collectively (such as in the form of a co-operative), while 
individual members receive the right to use individual plots of land.42 It should be 
noted that CLTD does not imply giving exclusive rights to local groups, but that 
other parties such as the state and civil society can be involved in the governance of 
natural resources in a form of checks and balances.43 CLTD is discussed in greater 
detail in part 2 
 Main ideas embedded in CLTD are that land is not merely a commodity, and 
that secure land tenure for small-scale farmers is a matter of social justice with 
implication towards poverty reduction.44 In CLTD projects, land is de-commodified 
in the sense that members cannot sell their individual land plots through market 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Foundation, 2008), 14. For more information on community forests see: Matsumura (1994); Johnson 
and Forsyth (2002); Zurcher (2005); Salam, Noguchi, and Pothitan, (2006). 
40 Doklamyai (2008), 251. 
41 Hall, Hirsch, and Li (2012), 13-14. 
42 Prof. Dr. Anan Ganjanapan, lecturer of Sociology and Anthropology, Chiang Mai university, 
interviewed 29 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Land Reform Network and Local Act (2010), 10 and Singsootham (2011), 23. 
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channels, and can only sell their usage rights back to the group at pre-arranged non-
market prices. This also helps to prevent land grabs and to secure land tenure for 
members, as well as future generations.45 This does not mean, however, that the 
younger generations are "locked-in" to the farming profession. As discusses by 
Ganjanapan, CLTD should be seen as "cushions" or safety nets for marginalised 
people, especially in time of economic crisis, given that existing market governance 
structures are bias in favour of large capital. From this perspective, CLTD ideas and 
practice should be seen as a strategic adaptive tool to empower marginalised people, 
particularly in the short and medium run, rather than a static universal solution. In 
this contemporary period, agriculture is still one of the primary sources of income 
that requires little capital investment.46 However, without their own land, farm 
workers can be a risky profession in terms of health and employment opportunities. 
With access to land, at least these people will have some kind of life security.47 As 
part 2 discusses in greater depth, the economic necessity of having nil or insufficient 
land after the 1997 Asian economic crisis prompted some people to occupy land and 
to join the LRM.48 Some LRM members also discuss during interviews how their 
aging physical conditions prevent them from continuing to work as low-skilled 
labourers in the industrial sector, and that gaining access to land in CLTD projects 
help them to earn income.49 
                                                          
45 Rangsan Sansongkwae, LRM local leader from Ban Raidong, interviewed 30 October 2012, 
Lamphun; Long Pechsood, Bantad Mountain group, Ampur Palian, Trang, interviewed 1 October 
2012, Bangkok; Wacharin Ouprajong, Baan Huafai, Ampur Chaiprakarn, Chiang Mai, interviewed 
Nonthaburi, 30 September 2012, Nonthaburi. 
46 Anan Ganjanapan, interviewed 29 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
47 Anan Ganjanapan interviewed in Rakyutitham et al. (2005), 201. 
48 Achara Rakyutitham et al. (2005), 118-119. 
49 Mr. Nop Mangkornmai and Mr. Jai Kiti, Raidong/Mae-aow members, interviewed 30 October 
2012, Lamphun. Also, to a certain extent, Mr. Boonlue Jaroenmee, Klongyong Co-operative, 
interviewed 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom. 
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 Owing to environmental and food security concerns,50 as well as a strategic 
need to gain acceptance from wider society,51 the LRM and its CLTD discourse also 
promote sustainable management of natural resource and agricultural production. At 
least at the leadership level, CLTD is portrayed as a mechanism to safeguard 
agricultural land for small-scale farmers for food security and for the development of 
sustainable agricultural food production.52 Part 3 discusses attempts to promote 
sustainable agriculture in greater detail. 
 It is recognised that not everyone in the same areas as that of CLTD projects 
agree with the LRM's ideas. Even within LRM community groups, there are still a 
lot of disparity in terms of understanding and acceptance of CLTD ideas,53 not to 
mention some feelings of alienation with academic terms used by some members of 
the LRM.54 It has been noted that original CLTD communities in the North tend to 
have firm beliefs in CLTD principles, whereas late-comer groups only joined the 
movement because they saw an opening of political space which might allow them 
to gain access to land.55 Many people joined the LRM not necessary because they 
believe in CLTD ideas, but because they hope to increase their bargaining power 
and, in the case that they receive CLTD from the state, to stop harassment from the 
                                                          
50 Members of the LRM who criticise industrial agriculture or are concerned with environmental 
degradation include, for example, Direk Kong-ngern, interviewed 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai and 
Long Pechsood, Bantad Mountain group, Ampur Palian, Trang, 1 October 2012, Bangkok. 
51 Land Reform Network and Local Act (2010), 11. 
52 Pongthip Samranjit, “A Summary of Research on Ground-up Land Reforms by Communitites,” 
July 22, 2011, <http://www.landreformthai.net.> (in Thai) 
53 Ms. Sawitta Teeronwattanakul, Northern Peasants Federation activist, interviewed 29 October 
2012, Chiang Mai; Mr. Pachoen Choosang, Bantad Mountain group, Trang, 1 October 2012, 
Bangkok; Mr. Boonlue Jaroenmee, Klongyong Co-operative, interviewed 10 October 2012, 
Nakhonpratom. 
54 Mr. Sukaew Fungfoo, President of the Baan Pae-tai CLTD project, interviewed 30 October 2012, 
Lamphun. 
55 Ms. Chuleerat Jaroenpon, researcher on the LRM and lecturer from Faculty of Social Innovation, 
Rangsit University, interviewed 4 October 2012, Pathumthani. 
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authorities.56 Some CLTD members prefer to receive individual title deeds but settle 
for CLTD because they think there is no chance that they will receive the former.57 It 
took a while, for example, for a majority of Klongyong co-operative members to 
mobilise, join the LRM and promote CLTD, because initially they were used to 
trusting and obeying the bureaucracy. By 2012, there were still a few people in the 
minority who disagree with the CLTD approach and prefer to have individual title 
deeds.58 Nevertheless, many Klongyong members eventually became convinced of 
the benefits of CLTD because it guarantees that at least their children will have some 
access to land.59 Those in other CLTD projects also reflect similar sentiments. For 
example, a member of Bantad Mountain group reflects how "money runs out...but 
land is an asset that we have to protect and give to future generations."60 
 Counter-hegemonic ideas of the LRM resonate with some academic literature 
and global counter-hegemonic initiatives which similarly question whether the 
current private property right regime helps to ensure security of tenure.61 For 
example, the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development 
(ICARRD), which was organised by FAO and Brazil in March 2006 in Porto Alegre, 
helps to form a new normative basis for future international land governance that 
                                                          
56 For example, Mr. Rachata Rangsiri, LRM farmer from Tambol Mae-faeg, Chiang Mai, interviewed 
during the demonstration in front of Government House, 1 October 2012, Bangkok, and Mr. Jai Kiti, 
Mae-aow member in the Raidong/Mae-aow CLTD project, interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
57 Boonlue Jaroenmee, Klongyong Co-operative leader, interviewed 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom 
58 Ibid. 
59 Mrs. Wantana Iamsuwan, one of the nine management committee members, Klongyong Co-
operative, interviewed 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom, and Mrs. Wilaiwan Konka, Vice-president of 
Baan Pae-tai CLTD project, interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
60 Pachoen Choosang, Bantad Mountain group, Trang, interviewed 1 October 2012, Bangkok. 
61 De Schutter (2011), 268-269. Also see W. Assies, “Land Tenure, Land Law and Development: 
Some Thoughts on Recent Debates,” Journal of Peasant Studies 36, no. 3 (2009): 573–589, quoted in 
De Schutter (2011), 269; Matias E. Margulis, Nora McKeon, and Saturnino M. Borras, “Land 
Grabbing and Global Governance: Critical Perspectives,” Globalizations 10, no. 1 (2013), 12; Marc 
Edelman et al., “Introduction: Critical Perspectives on Food Sovereignty,” The Journal of Peasant 
Studies 41, no. 6 (October 15, 2014), 923. 
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also include collective land rights.62 Contrary to neo-liberal economic thinking, it 
has been suggested that limiting land sales can protect small-scale farmers from 
being pressured to cede their land and protect usage rights over communal land.63 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food argues that allowing the emergence 
of a market for rental rights is a more pro-poor option compare to individual titling 
schemes which imply the marketability of land rights. Alternatives to individual 
titling include the adoption of anti-eviction laws in combination with the registration 
of use rights based on customary forms of tenure.64 While restrictions on land sales 
prevent further commodification of land, formal legal recognition of customary 
rights can provide effective security, promote access to credit, and long-term 
investment on the land.65 In addition, distributing land to small-scale farmers can be 
used to promote productive, equitable, and environmentally sustainable use of 
land.66 
 The LRM receives help from a few media channels such as ThaiPBS to 
spread its ideas. It also links up with other groups in society, often under the name P-
Move or People's Movement for a Just Society, which is an umbrella organisation 
consisting of 10 networks including the Four-Region Slum Network, the Assembly 
of the Poor's Pakmun group, and the Contract Farmer Network. Other allies include 
Local Act Organisation, Southern Fishermen Network, and the Alternative 
                                                          
62 Margulis, McKeon and Borras (2013), 7. 
63 J.W. Bruce et al., Land Law Reform: Achieving Development Policy Objectives. World Bank Law, 
Justice, and Development Series (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2008), quoted in De Schutter 
(2011), 271. 
64 UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, “Access to Land and the Right to Food, Interim 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, to the 65th Session of the 
General Assembly, UN Doc. A/65/281,” 2010, quoted in De Schutter (2011), 271. 
65 For an example from India, see: K. Deininger, S. Jin, and H.K. Nagarajan, “Efficiency and Equity 
Impacts of Rural Land Market Restrictions: Evidence from India. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper Series 3013” (2006), quoted in De Schutter, 271. 
66 De Schutter (2011), 258. 
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Agriculture Network.67 There are also many international collaborations and 
exchanges of ideas. After land occupations in the North, many leading members 
visited Brazil's Landless Rural Workers' Movement (MST),68 the Zapatista in 
Mexico, and the land movement in Peru.69 Site visits and exchanges of ideas inspired 
the LRM in Thailand but many people also commented on very different social 
contexts in those countries compare to Thailand.70 The LRM is also a member of La 
Vía Campesina  (through the Northern Peasants Federation) and participations in 
international conferences also help to promote interests in the problems of the global 
agri-food system, as well as the principles of food sovereignty.71 
 This part of the chapter has discussed the LRM's critique of hegemonic land 
governance and the LRM's counter-hegemonic ideas, specifically complexity of 
rights ideas and CLTD. The next part of the chapter discusses in greater detail how 
land occupiers in Northern Thailand practice CLTD governance, and how the LRM 
also tries to challenge hegemonic national land governance structures by calling for 
the establishment of land banks and progressive land taxation. 
Part 2: Counter-hegemonic governance of land 
This part of the chapter discusses the LRM's campaign for counter-hegemonic land 
governance which encompasses two dimensions: 1) the development of CLTD as 
practical examples of democratic local governance of land and; 2) a national 
campaign to challenge hegemonic legal and policy governance structures. Sections 
                                                          
67 See a longer list in Rakyutitham et al. (2005), 32. 
68 Interviews with various people such as Prayong Doklamyai (1st November 2012, Chiang Mai), 
Direk Kong-ngern (31 October 2012, Chiang Mai), Wacharin Uprachong (30 September 2012, 
Bangkok), Switta Teeronwattanakul (29 October 2012, Chiang Mai), Rangsan Sansongkwae (30 
October 2012, Lamphun), and Montri Bualoi (31 October 2012, Chiang Mai). 
69 Land Reform Network and Local Act (2010), 7. 
70 Prayong Doklamyai, Northern Peasants Federation, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai and 
Ransang Sansongkwae, Baan Raidong, interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
71 Direk Kong-ngern, Baan Pong, interviewed 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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2.1 and 2.2 discuss these dimensions. Arguably, the CLTD democratic form of local 
land governance helps to challenge hegemonic hierarchical ideas and informal social 
relations discussed in chapter 3. National mobilisation as a social movement also 
helps to alter members' mentality; from those who tend to wait for help from the 
bureaucracy to citizens who feel that they can negotiate with the Thai state, as well 
as participate in the decision making process and natural resource management.72 
Section 2.3 takes a step back to explore potential limitations of CLTD and ALRO as 
counter-hegemonic projects. This section also discusses how CLTD and ALRO can 
continue to change and adapt over time to overcome their limitations, but suggests 
that it is unlikely for any single form of land governance to be a universally 
appropriate counter-hegemonic solution that fits all occasions. 
2.1) Ground-up land reform and CLTD 
As previously discussed, the agricultural sector in Thailand can be seen as a kind of 
social safety net for low-skilled workers. After the Asian economic crisis in 1997, a 
lot of workers in Thailand lost their jobs in the industrial and service sectors and 
returned home to rural parts of the country. In some places, they found that common 
land they were once able to used, such as to grow and harvest food, had become 
private properties often owned by people from outside of the communities for 
speculative purposes and are left un-utilised. The economic necessity of having nil or 
insufficient land for subsistence and to produce in exchange for income prompted 
                                                          
72 As reflected by, for example, Boonlue Jaroenmee, Klongyong Co-operative leader, interviewed 10 
October 2012, Nakhonpratom. 
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many people in the North to form groups to occupy land in their local 
communities.73 
 Land occupations in the North, which started around 1998 in Lamphun and 
Chiang Mai, have developed into the ideas and practice of CLTD which are then 
accepted by many groups in other parts of the country. In many places, land conflicts 
arise from contestations between citizens and the Thai state over the boundaries of 
reserved forest.74 Generally, CLTD members are allocated some private plots of land 
for agricultural purposes, but minor parts of these land can be used as living spaces. 
Land use and exchanges are locally governed to make sure those who receive access 
to each plot of land truly work on the land, as well as to prevent land grabs. Usage 
rights to individual land plots can be inherited, and those who would like to return 
their plots of land to the group will receive compensation according to pre-arranged 
non-market prices. Members have regular meetings such as to discuss community 
development progress. Depending on groups, members are able to participate in the 
collective management of land and other collective decisions through direct voting 
and/or by voting to select representatives to make day-to-day decisions. 
 This section first discusses CLTD projects in the North (Baan Sritia, Baan 
Pae-tai, Baan Raidong/Mae-aow and Baan Pong), which were the focus of site visits. 
Then, prominent CLTD examples in other parts of the country are discussed, such as 
Bantad Mountain group and Suratthani's land reform groups in the South, Samsiew 
group in the Northeast, and Klongyong co-operative in the Central region. The 
                                                          
73 Rakyutitham et al. (2005), 118-119. Most land occupiers interviewed seem to agree on this point 
such as Rangsan Sansongkwae and other members from Raidong/Mae-aow such as Jai Kitti, Nop 
Mangkornmai, and Oonjai Akaruan (interviewed 30 October 2012). 
74 Examples include Bantad Mountain in the South (Pachoen Choosang and Long Pechsood, LRM 
member from Bantad Mountain group, interviewed 1 October 2012, Bangkok) and other cases such as 
in Naan (Mr. Wichai, a LRM farmer member from Ampur Wiangsa, Naan province, interviewed 
during the demonstration in front of Government House, 1 October 2012, Bangkok). 
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examples suggest that, while the nature of land conflicts and practice of CLTD can 
be quite different, these groups are similar with regards to their acceptance of land 
reform goals and main CLTD principles. 
 LRM groups in the North and the origin of CLTD 
Sritia was considered the first village that started to occupy and allocate land to 
members. The land movement in Sritia started around 1989 when the Nongplasawai 
land re-distribution project of 15,000 rai, which also included common land (ป่าแพะ), 
was unsuccessful and hence allowed people from Chiang Mai and Bangkok to apply 
for land titling in these areas. Locals from Baan Sanpooluey, Sri-tia, and Nong-khiad 
in Lamphun then started to protest but the movement halted after one leader was 
assassinated.75 By 1995, members of Baan Sritia created governing rules to prevent 
outsiders (whom they refer to as "capitalists") from using common land in their 
community area. Pressured by the effects of the Asian economic crisis, some locals 
started to occupy and divide the land for individual usage in 1997.76 One of its 
leader, Mr. Thana Yasopa, also joined the Assembly of the Poor's protest in Bangkok 
in 1997 to pressure the government to solve land problems.77 Sritia land occupiers 
consisted of both young and old people and managed to build allies in other groups 
of society such as lawyers.78 Discussions on the lack of land between Sritia and other 
villages also spurred land occupations in nine nearby villages between 1997 and 
                                                          
75 Kingkarn Samnuanyen, Dynamics of Social Movement Tactics: The Case of the Land Rights 
Movement in Lumphun province. An Unpublished Masters Thesis at the Faculty of Political Science, 
Chulalongkorn Univeristy (Bangkok, 2006), 68 (in Thai); Rakyutitham et al. (2005), 116. 
76 Samnuyanyen (2006), 69 and 80. 
77 Ibid, 81. 
78 Ibid, 75 and 78. 
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2002, including Baan Pae-tai which occupied around 200 rai of land,79 Baan 
Raidong/Mae-aow in Lamphun, and Baan Pong in Chiang Mai. 
 On 9 November 2000, around 300 people from Raidong, Mae-aow and 
Nongsamanatai villages occupied around 426 rai of land which was left unused for 
around 30 to 40 years. In 2001, the land reform network in Lamphun managed to 
pressure Lamphun's governor to set up a committee to investigate land problems.80 
With regards to the Raidong/Mae-aow case, the Nanthakwang family initially 
claimed ownership over 426 rai of land occupied by the locals but official 
investigation found that only 290 rai were covered by legal deeds81 which 
supposedly belong to ALRO.82 After land occupation, participants measured total 
land area to allocate land equally to approximately 282 members (around 1 rai per 
each member). If members no longer require the land for productive purposes, they 
can sell their usage rights back to the group and receive some pre-agreed monetary 
compensation for their work on the land, which is not as high as the market price. 
This measure aims to prevent the community from losing control over the land and 
to ensure that land are used productively by small-scale farmers. Later on, such 
principles of local-level land governance became known as community land title 
deed (CLTD).83 Raidong/Mae-aow group also keeps 10 rai of land as common land, 
which have been used to grow crops to earn income for the group's collective fund.84  
                                                          
79 Ibid, 81 and 83. By 2012, Baan Pae-tai had around 70 members, which is less than when they first 
started to occupy land (Mr. Sukaew Fungfoo, President of the Baan Pae-tai CLTD project, 
interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun). 
80 Samnuyanyen (2006), 92. 
81 Phu Chiangdao, “Lamphun Land: Our Heart Is the Land,” in Land of Life, ed. Ngao-sil Kongkaew 
and Phu Chiangdao (Nonthaburi: Local Act and Community Organisations Development Institute, 
2010), 190-193. (in Thai) 
82 Rangsan Sansongkwae, Baan Raidong, interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
83 Chiang-dao (2010), 198-199, 203, and Rangsan Sansongkwae, interviewed 30 October 2012, 
Lamphun. 
84 Interviews with Rangsan Sansongkwae, Nop Mangkornmai and Oonjai Akaruan, 30 October 2012, 
Lamphun. 
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 Another strong CLTD group in the North which learned from the experience 
of Sritia and Raidong/Mae-aow is Baan Pong in Chiang Mai. The group consists of 
around 79 households or 412 members85 who occupied over 458 rai of land.86 
Initially, the land were common land that were sold off to people outside of the 
community for speculation purposes, real estate projects, or as securities to take out 
loans, but since then been mostly foreclosed by banks.87 Baan Pong members 
occupied the land in 2002 because of economic pressures from having insufficient 
farm land, which became more acute after the 1997 Asian economic crisis.88 In Baan 
Pong CLTD project, around 60 percent of land is used for agricultural production, 30 
percent for housing, and 10 percent for common purposes (guesthouse, meeting 
place, collective farm, roads).89 Each household receives around 2 rai of land for 
private usage.90 Individual usage rights of land can be passed on to their children, but 
members must not sell the land without the approval of the management committee 
nor leave the land unutilised for more than 2 years.91 
 Baan Pong members elect 5 committee officers and meet every month to vote 
on issues affecting the community.92 In addition, members contribute either personal 
labour or money for agri-food production in collective land to raise money for Baan 
Pong's community fund.93 An interesting feature of Baan Pong is the establishment 
of the community's "land bank" which serves as a community welfare fund, a source 
                                                          
85 Singsootham (2010), 36. 
86 Land Reform Network and Local Act (2010), 235. 
87 Ibid, 235 and Direk Kong-ngern, interviewed 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
88 Pongthip Samranjit et al., A Documental Report on the Research on What Thailand Will Lose 
without Land Reform: Land Management and Social Justice - a Case Study of the Land Reform 
Network in Thailand (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute, 2012), 231 (in 
Thai) and The Land Reform Network and Local Act (2010), 224. 
89 Land Reform Network and Local Act (2010), 236. 
90 Singsootham (2010), 39-40. 
91 Land Reform Network and Local Act (2010), 233-234. Also, Direk Kong-ngern and Montri Bualoi, 
interviewed 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
92 Samranjit et al. (2012), 233 and Mr. Direk Kong-ngern, interviewed 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
93 Direk Kong-ngern, Baan Pong, interviewed 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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of loans for agricultural purposes, and as a fund for political mobilisation. If the fund 
becomes significant enough, it will also be used to purchase land. The source of 
funding comes from compulsory monthly saving and exchanges of individual land 
usage rights; out of 30,000 baht price per plot of land, 10,000 baht is given to the 
original user of land, 16,000 baht to the land bank, and 4,000 baht to Baan Pong 
communal fund.94 The LRM's attempt to pressure the state to establish land banks at 
the national scale is discussed in section 2.2. 
 CLTD in the South and Northeast 
Ideas of the LRM and CLTD land governance practice in the North spread to other 
regions of the country through many channels, such as through the media and 
existing civil society networks, which gained the movement more allies. The 
following paragraphs explore the diversity of CLTD projects using examples from 
the South and Northeast, namely Bantad Mountain group where members are located 
across Trang, Krabi and Pattaloong provinces (South), as well as Sai-ngarmpattana 
groups in Suratthani province (South) and Samsiew group in Chaiphum province 
(Northeast). The examples suggest that CLTD practices differ depending on local 
contexts, and that one should be cautious not to analyse the LRM as a homogenous 
movement. 
 Bantad Mountain group consists of around 80 households or 400 people who 
occupy over 2,100 rai of land in mountainous area.95 Most members claim that their 
ancestors had lived in the area long before the Thai state declared it a reserve forest 
                                                          
94 Land Reform Network and Local Act (2010), 235. 
95 Ngao-sin Kongkaew, The Event Occured at Bantad Mountains (Bangkok: Bantad Mountain Land 
Reform Network and the Thai Health Organisation, 2011), 116. (in Thai) 
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area and started to arrest some of the locals in 1989.96 Baan Tra community in Trang 
province were influenced by the Communist movement in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Since 1991, some members started to mobilise to assert their right to their ancestors' 
land.97 They joined the Assembly of the Poor and exchanged ideas with their 
"brothers and sisters" from other regions of Thailand, who faced similar problems 
relating to the control over natural resources.98 
 On 14 October 2000, Bantad Mountain Land Reform Network was 
established, consisting of 15 member organisations from Trang, Krabi and 
Pattaloong provinces.99 Around 1,200 rai of Bantad Mountain land are used for 
agricultural and housing purposes while the other 900 rai are designated community 
forest area.100 Bantad group adopts a CLTD style of local land governance where the 
community manifesto and rules, such as regarding natural resource management and 
saving groups, are established by democratic means.101 It has also been noted that 
women are active participants in day-to-day community management of resources as 
well as in political mobilisation.102 Since Bantad is a remote area bordered with well-
preserved forests, Bantad group tries to establish rules to prevent the destruction of 
the forest, water resource and wild life, such as to promote little or no usage of 
agricultural chemicals103 and to require additional trees to be planted when members 
need to cut down some trees.104 
                                                          
96 Ibid, 130 and 135. Also Pachoen Choosang, LRM member from Bantad Mountain group, Trang, 
interviewed during the demonstration in front of Government House, 1 October 2012, Bangkok. 
97 Kongkaew (2011), 136-147. 
98 Pachoen Choosang, Bantad Mountain group, interviewed1 October 2012, Bangkok. 
99 Singsootham (2010), 53. 
100 Kongkaew (2011), 116. 
101 Ibid, 66 and Pachoen Choosang, Bantad Mountain group, interviewed 1 October 2012, Bangkok. 
102 Pachoen Choosang, Badtad Mountain group, interviewed 1 October 2012, Bangkok. 
103 Kongkaew (2011), 67. 
104 Long Pechsood, Bantad Mountain group, interviewed 1 October 2012, Bangkok. 
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 The experience of Suratthani's land movement in the South is markedly 
different from the previous groups discussed. Santipattana, Klongsaipattana, and Sai-
ngarmpattna communities were accepted as part of the 35 pilot CLTD projects 
during the Abhisit administration in 2010, and yet violent oppositions against land 
reform members in these communities did not cease. As briefly discussed in chapter 
3, there are a lot of large-scale palm oil plantations in Suratthani.105 Out of around 
830,000 rai of palm oil plantations in the province, only 10 percent belong to 
(around 29,000) farming households.106 In a 3,000-rai plantation owned by a capital 
group, only 20 people were hired as labour.107 Many Thai and foreign companies 
received license to rent a total of around 200,000 rai of reserve forest areas in 
Suratthani, and some palm oil plantations continued their operation even though 
their license (over 68,500 rai of land in total) had already expired.108 Since around 
2002, there were large-scale land occupations and some violent retaliations.109 In 
2008, six communities - Santipattana, Klongsaipattana, and Sai-ngarmpattana 1 to 4 
- formed the Southern Peasants Federation and joined the LRM, calling for the state 
to redistribute land and for legal persecutions of private companies whose plantation 
license already expired.110 By 2010, ALRO took back some of the land under their 
jurisdiction from private companies so that around 400 small-scale farmers could use 
the land.111 However, there are still some violent conflicts during the time of 
research, as section 4.1 discusses. 
                                                          
105 Land Reform Network and Local Act (2010), 106. 
106 Ibid, 108. 
107 Ibid, 108. 
108 Ibid, 107. 
109 Ibid, 108-113. 
110 Ibid, 113. 
111 Ibid, 113. 
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  A relatively new CLTD project includes Samsiew which adopted the CLTD 
land governance approach in 2007.112 Land struggles in Samsiew, however, started 
since 1932 when the state declared common land over some people's land and tried 
to evict them.113 The community which consisted of 24 households in 401 rai of land 
created its own manifesto which outlines member-agreed rules regarding collective 
land ownership and management.114 Unlike Bantad Mountain group which 
encourages all members to participate in the day-to-day decision making process, 
Samsiew prefers a more indirect democracy management style where members elect 
15 representatives to form a management committee.115 Samsiew members were also 
inspired by Baan Pong's experience116 but unlike Baan Pong, the division of land 
between members is based on existing divisions of land among families.117 
However, those who have a lot of land sometimes informally allow others to work 
on their land.118 As part 3 discusses in greater detail, Samsiew is an example of a 
CLTD project which is committed to develop sustainable agricultural production. 
 Klongyong co-operative 
While the Raidong/Mae-aow group received a certificate from the Prime Minister 
office to support its existence as a CLTD project, the legal status of the certificate is 
not the same as a land title deed signed by the Department of Land.119 By 2014, 
Klongyong co-operative which covers a total area of around 1,803 rai and consists of 
                                                          
112 Singsootham (2010), 72. 
113 Mr. Hemrach Lobnongbua quoted in Prachathai News, “Report from the Seminar ‘CLTD and 
Solutions to Land Conflicts in Thailand,’” Prachathai Online News, July 04, 2009. (in Thai) Also 
Singsootham (2010), 7 and 70-71. 
114 Singsootham (2010), 72 and 74. 
115 Ibid, 79. 
116 Hemrach Lobnongbua quoted in Prachathai (2009). 
117 Singsootham (2010), 74-75. 
118 Ibid, 80. 
119 Rangsan Sansongkwae, Baan Raidong, interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
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180 households (969 people)120 is the only LRM group which received a legal title 
deed in February 2011 during the Abhisit Vejchacheewa administration, which is 
certified by the Department of Land. This is partly due to its unique status as a rent-
to-buy co-operative established in 1980.121 In 2006, the Co-operative Promotion 
Department transferred Klongyong land to the treasury department, which then 
increased land rent significantly from between 3,000 to 4,000 baht to around 40,000 
to 50,000 baht per 20 rai per year. In addition, the treasury also allowed non-farmers 
to rent the land.122 Most of Klongyong co-operative members then protested against 
the hike in rental price in 2008, and compiled documents to show that Klongyong 
co-operative was initially set up as a rent-to-buy land co-operative to help small-
scale farmers. In 2009, Klongyong joined the LRM123 and most members also agreed 
to adopt the CLTD land management approach.124 
 Klongyong leaders received help from Prapart Pintoptang - an academic from 
Chulalongkorn University - to bring their problems to national attention.125 Media 
exposures from ThaiPBS, a national television news station, also encouraged 
Klongyong members to be less afraid of local village headmen and treasury 
department officials.126 Media exposures also helped Klongyong to build alliances 
with other groups in similar situations, such as in Utraraditr and Utaithani 
                                                          
120 Kom Chad Luek Newspaper, " Mae-aow villagers smile for the second CLTDs from the Prime 
Minister,"  March 18, 2011. (in Thai) 
121 Klongyong community leaders, “A Summary of the Struggles of the Klongyong Community (a 
Document Prepared by the Locals for Visitors), Obtained 10 October 2012,” 1-3. (in Thai) 
122 Ibid, 2 and Land Reform Network and Local Act (2010), 322. 
123 Klongyong community leaders (2012), 3. 
124 Boonlue Jaroenmee, Klongyong Co-operative, interviewed 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom and 
Shoti Saiyuenyong, one of the nine management committee member, Klongyong Co-operative, 
interviewed 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom. 
125 Prapart Pintoptang's family owns some land in the co-operative. (Boonlue Jaroenmee, Klongyong 
Co-operative, interviewed 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom) 
126 Boonlue Jaroenmee, Klongyong Co-operative, interviewed 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom. 
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provinces.127 Klongyong has an advantage over other CLTD projects due to its close 
proximity to Bangkok and its ability to establish a wide supportive network. As 
section 4.1 discusses, some CLTD groups in other regions face more obstacles such 
as violent retaliations from landlords, or are at a more disadvantaged position to 
build national networks and to receive media coverage. In addition, aside from 
Klongyong and (to a certain extent) Raidong/Mae-aow, CLTD projects will continue 
to be vulnerable as long as national laws and policies do not support CLTD 
principles. The next section focuses on the LRM's counter-hegemonic attempts to 
reform current laws and state policies regarding land governance in Thailand. 
2.2) Laws and policies regarding land governance 
Some studies point to the key role of the state in the maintenance of hegemonic land 
governance and in facilitating land grabs. The state, for example, has the control over 
the definition and classification of land and is also able to justify large-scale land 
investments, as well as appropriations and reallocations of land.128 In addition, it is 
suggested that land grabs are not merely contests for control over resources, but also 
contests for authority over institutions.129 As this section discusses, the LRM also 
attempts to change the Thai state's legal and policy structures to promote land re-
distribution and prevention of land grabs, in addition to "ground up" CLTD land 
reform projects. Building on the community rights discourse and its own experience, 
by the early 2010s the LRM started to campaign for four laws to be passed to 
support: 1) progressive land tax; 2) the establishment of land banks; 3) community 
                                                          
127 Ibid and Land Reform Network and Local Act (2010), 317. 
128 For example, see Saturnino M. Borras, Jennifer C. Franco, and Chunyu Wang, “The Challenge of 
Global Governance of Land Grabbing: Changing International Agricultural Context and Competing 
Political Views and Strategies,” Globalizations 10, no. 1 (2013), 167. 
129 Margulis, McKeon, and Borras (2013), 11. 
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rights in the management of land and natural resource; and 4) the establishment of a 
Justice Fund to help marginalised citizens with their legal fees. 
 As previous chapters have discussed, community empowerment is a popular 
idea among Thai civil society groups and some public intellectuals in Thailand. The 
1997 Constitution is the first Constitution which embodies decentralisation of power 
ideas, such as in Articles 284 and 290, as well as recognises community rights 
ideas.130 The 2007 Constitution also recognises community rights in Articles 66 and 
67131 which helps LRM members to legitimise their cause.132 Many subsidiary laws 
relating to natural resource management, however, contradict community rights and 
instead legitimise the centralisation of power in the hands of the government, while 
laws aimed to decentralise power to local administration are unclear, resulting in the 
lack of checks and balance system which would allow local citizens to participate in 
the decision making process.133 It is suggested that land conflicts occur in roughly 6 
types of land including forest, public/common, slum, ALRO, private, and state's 
land.134 A lot of land conflicts occur in around 6.4 million rai of forestry areas due to 
unclear borders.135 Many people in the LRM argue that sometimes reserved forest 
areas were declared over populated areas.136 Forestry laws also give a lot of power to 
the Ministry of Forestry which supports top-down hierarchical control of the state 
                                                          
130 Ittipol Srisaowalak et al., A Project to Study Appropriate Land Rights for Communities (Bangkok: 
Thailand Research Fund, 2007), 165. (in Thai) 
131 Wich Jeerapat, “Reflection on Thai Community Right Ideas,” Julniti Journal 3, no. 38 (2010), 40. 
(in Thai) 
132 A few interviewees refer to the fact that the Thai Constitution recognises community rights, such 
as Pachoen Choosang, Bantad Mountain group, 1 October 2012, Bangkok. 
133 Ittipol Srisaowalak et al., A Study Project on the Law to Manage Local Areas (Bangkok: Thailand 
Research Fund, 2001), Abstract page II and III (in Thai) and Kraiyoorawong et al. (2005), 88. 
134 Singsootham (2010), 2. 
135 A Parliamentary Committee to Consider Land Problems (2009), 18. 
136 Prayong Doklamyai, Northern Peasants Federation, interviewed 30 September 2012, Nonthaburi. 
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over natural resource, and contradict community rights ideas and practices in many 
areas.137  
 The LRM initially focused on revoking formal land title deeds which were 
not obtained legally but they faced many obstacles. The Department of Land has the 
authority to revoke land title deeds but rarely does so. Another possible channel is to 
take individual cases to the administrative court for a ruling, which is a slow and 
time consuming process. In the case of Raidong/Mae-aow community, a committee 
consisting of state officials and local citizens found that most of land deeds in areas 
now occupied by Raidong/Mae-aow members should not had been issued and should 
be revoked, but it took a long time for the Department of Land to revoke the 
deeds.138 Moreover, in legal cases involving land conflicts between individual 
citizens and the state or private companies, the court tends to give higher weight to 
titling documents even though they had been obtained through illegitimate practices, 
compare to witnesses and other lines of arguments, such as arguments based on 
community rights and anthropological evidence.139 
 Difficulties in revoking formal land deeds led the LRM to advocate other 
strategies, such as to push for an establishment of land banks funded by progressive 
land taxation.140 Since around 2008, the LRM puts forward three main demands for 
the government: 1) to support CLTD land governance; 2) to establish land banks 
and; 3) to implement progressive land taxation. The main goal is to re-distribute land 
                                                          
137 A Parliamentary Committee to Consider Land Problems (2009), 67. 
138 Sawitta Teeronwattanakul, Northern Peasants Federation, interviewed 29 October 2012, Chiang 
Mai. 
139 For example, anthropological evidence which suggests that the land was previously occupied by 
local communities since ancestral time (Dr. Permsak Mokarapirom, quoted during the discussion 
panel on land problems at the second National Reform Assembly, 2012, Bangkok, Thailand). Also 
see Kraiyoorawong et al. (2005), 88 and other problems in A Parliamentary Committee to Consider 
Land Problems (2009), 18. 
140 Sawitta Teeronwattanakul, Northern Peasants Federation, interviewed 29 October 2012, Chiang 
Mai. 
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in the form of CLTD to groups which have established reliable democratic local 
governance systems. Land banks, partially funded by progressive land tax, will also 
aid CLTD by helping to facilitate land purchases for re-distribution to small-scale 
farmers and as a fund to facilitate land exchanges within CLTD projects.141 
Progressive land taxation is suggested as a measure to encourage those who have 
large holdings of land to release these land and to discourage land speculations.142 
Some studies have also noted, for example, that land tax has relatively low 
enforcement costs and is easy to implement, compare to other options.143 Over the 
years, the LRM has built alliances with other groups in society such as academics, 
lawyers, and even a few politicians, as well as linkages with other civil society 
groups such as the Fishermen Network and Farmer Debt Network.144 The National 
Reform Committee led by Prawase Wasi, as well as a Parliamentary Committee to 
Study Land Problems, also support similar land reform ideas as the LRM such as the 
enforcement of maximum land holding limit, the establishment of land banks, the 
protection of agricultural land, and progressive land taxation.145 
 In 2011, the Abhisit Vejchachewa government (December 2008 to August 
2011) made a few sympathetic moves. By 31 of January 2012, 435 communities or 
242,798 people in around 2.2 million rai of land across 47 provinces in Thailand had 
                                                          
141 Singsootham (2010), 30. 
142 A summary based on interviews with various people in the movement and from Pongthip 
Samranjit, "A summary of research on ground-up land reforms by communitites," July 22,  2011, 
<http://www.landreformthai.net>, retrieved November 2012. (in Thai) 
143 V. Songwe and K. Deininger, “Foreign Investment in Agricultural Production: Opportunities and 
Challenges. Agriculture and Rural Development Notes, Issue 45, World Bank,” 2009, quoted in De 
Schutter (2011), 272. 
144 See Samnuanyen (2006), 110-113. 
145 National Reform Committee, How to Reform Thailand: A Proposal for Political Parties and 
Voters (Bangkok: National Reform Committee, 2011), 22-24 (in Thai) and A Parliamentary 
Committee to Consider Land Problems, (2009), 61-62, 65 and 68. 
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applied for CLTDs from the government.146 Out of 435 communities which had 
applied for CLTDs, only Klongyong and Raidong/Mae-aow were granted CLTDs on 
12 February 2011 and 26 March 2011 respectively.147 As previously discussed, only 
Klongyong was given a legal land title deed signed by the Department of Land.  In 
early 2011, the Abhisit government also agreed to a budget of 167 milion baht to 
fund community land banks in five pilot communities, which include Rai-dong/Mae-
aow and Baan Pong.148 This is not to say, however, that the Abhisit government was 
actively promoting CLTD, national land bank and land reforms. It can be argued that 
they could have done more by, for example, drafting a law on CLTD instead of 
relying on the Office of the Prime Minister to issue a CLTD certificate to 
Raidon/Mae-aow because the certificate has lower legal status. 
 Succeeding the Abhisit government (Democrat party) in August 2011 was 
the Yingluck Shinnawatra government (Phua Thai party). In late 2012, interviewees 
seem to believe that the Yingluck government is not committed to continue the work 
of the previous regime when it comes to CLTD and land banks, even though Phua 
Thai party advocated these land reform measures during its election campaign and 
also in its policy statement after coming into power. The government established a 
committee to consider land reform proposals suggested by the LRM and promised to 
speed up the process of passing the law to guarantee community rights in the 
management of land, forests, water and the sea. However, in practice there was more 
                                                          
146 Community Land Title Deeds Office, Prime Minister's Office, "Document for Distribution 
Regarding the Latest Progress date 31 January 2012", 
<http://www.opm.go.th/OpmInter/content/oclt/default.asp>, retrieved 24 April 2013. (in Thai) 
147 Kom Chad Luek Newspaper,"Mae-aow Villagers Smile for the Second CLTDs from the Prime 
Minister," March 18, 2011. (in Thai) 
148 Isra News, "P-move Reminds the Government of the Promises on Land Banks and the Protection 
of CLTDs Areas," February 23, 2013. (in Thai). 
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or less no follow-up.149 The LRM held protests to pressure the government in 2012 
and 2013 but to little effect.150  
 Building on the original three proposals, the LRM started to campaign for 
"four laws for the poor" in 2014151 which include laws regarding progressive land 
taxation, land bank and community rights in the management of land and natural 
resource (CLTD law), as well as a law to support the establishment of a Justice Fund 
for marginalised citizens who need help with their legal fees.152 After the coup d'état 
on 22 May 2014, through Order 64/2557 and the Master Plan to End Deforestation, 
the military-led government clearly adopted a hard-lined position to remove 
"encroachers" from reserved forest, which intensified land conflicts between the 
state and many communities.153 The LRM continues with its campaign and 
mobilisation despite martial law. Although the LRM's campaign events are often 
obstructed by the military,154 the government seems to take notice of land problems 
and announces a policy to give 53,000 rai of land to marginalised people through co-
operatives between December 2014 and February 2015.155 However, the policy was 
criticised by the LRM for being too rushed in its formulation and for its lack of a 
follow-up evaluation process.156 
                                                          
149 Prayong Doklamyai, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. Also see P-move Declaration 18, 
26 April 2013. 
150 P-move Declaration 18, 26 April 2013. 
151 Drafts of the proposed laws can be found at <http://www.landwatchthai.com/index.php/th/4>. 
152 Acharawadee Buaklee, “The North Pushes for 4 Land Laws,” ThaiPBS, April 04, 2014. (in Thai) 
153 Paul Sullivan and Wilder Nicholson, “Is The Master Plan to Solve the Deforestation or Yet 
Another Strategy to Remove and Evict People?,” December 12, 2014, 
<http://www.esaanlandreformnews.com >. 
154 Matichon Newspaper, “Prapart Pintoptang - Politics Lecturer from Chulalongkorn Was Arrested 
after Soldiers Cancelled the Walk for Land Reform Event,” November 09, 2014. (in Thai) 
155 Isra News, “Concerned That Giving Away 53,000 Rai Plan Will Fail, Prayong Doklamyai 
Suggests 35 CLTD Pilot Projects Instead,” December 07, 2014. (in Thai) 
156 Ibid. 
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 At the time of writing (December 2014), it is unclear how the situation will 
unfold under the military government. It has been suggested that the LRM almost 
has to "start from zero" every time there is a change in government.157 Nevertheless, 
what seems clear from history is the lack of political will by Thai state managers, 
civilian or military, to decentralise power and control over the management of 
natural resource. Similar to the discussion in chapter 3, the autocratic bureaucratic 
culture entrenched in the Thai state,158 where issues are "frozen" unless the Prime 
Minister chairs the committees to solve those particular issues, can be seen as part of 
the hegemonic structures which obstruct the progress of the LRM. Needless to say, 
there are also conflict of interests regarding land issues as 507 politicians from 11 
main political parties held a total of 35,786 rai of land worth 15.7 million baht in 
2013. Phua Thai politicians own an average of 85 rai of land per person, while 
Democrat politicians own an average of 63 rai of land per person.159 
 Limited success by the LRM to challenge hegemonic laws and national 
policies serve as obstacles which further constrain the potential of existing CLTD 
projects. Raidong/Mae-aow and Baan Pong, for example, need legal legitimacy and 
financial support to purchase some land that they are currently occupying, as well as 
to develop public utilities in the areas. However, the lack of policy clarity obstructed 
these developments.160 Aside from the constraints of national laws and policies, the 
                                                          
157 Prayong Doklamyai, Northern Peasants, interviewed 30 September 2012, Nonthaburi. 
158 Kraiyoorawong et al. (2005), 87. 
159 Research based on information from the Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, June 
2013, by Dr. Duangmanee Laowakul, Faculty of Economics, Thammasart University, quoted in 
“Landlords from 11 Political Parties Hold 35,000 Rai: Phua Thai, Democrat and Phumjaithai in the 
Lead,” Prachachat Turakiij (online), June 19, 2014. (in Thai) 
160 Interviews from community leaders such as Direk Kong-ngern, Montri Bualoi (from Ban-Pong 
village, interview date 31 October 2012), Rangsan Sansonkwae and Sangwal Kantham (30 October 
2012, Rai-dong/Mae-aow villages, Lamphun), as well as Sarawut Wongnikorn, Northern Peasants 
Federation, interviewed 30 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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next section discusses other potential limitations of CLTD and ALRO forms of land 
governance. Part 4 then continues the discussion on obstacles facing the LRM. 
2.3) Possible limitations to the potential of CLTD and ALRO land governance 
This chapter has focused on CLTD and ground-up land reform initiatives of the 
LRM. However, the thesis recognises that CLTD is not necessary the best form of 
property ownership that is appropriate in all contexts.161 There can be other forms of 
counter-hegemonic governance mechanisms and complementary measures that can 
help guard against land grabs, as well as to ensure access to land by small-scale 
farmers on the basis of farmer rights and food security or food sovereignty. This 
section discusses some potential limitations of CLTD and ALRO, as they are the 
most important form of land governance and institution concerned with small-scale 
farmers' access to land. Other counter-hegemonic governance measures are beyond 
the scope of this thesis. The discussion in this section suggests that CLTD and 
ALRO as land governance mechanisms have their merits and limitations, and should 
be seen as evolving governance mechanisms which can be adapted to suit changing 
social contexts. 
 As discussed previously, CLTD has much potential as a local land 
governance mechanism to encourage small-scale farmers' access to land and to guard 
against land grabs. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that CLTD projects may only 
work in areas with strong family relations and/or a sense of community such as in 
Baan Pong, which help them to organise and collaborate.162 In most places, such as 
in the Central region and areas near the cities, such a sense of community probably 
                                                          
161 For a similar view, see Edelman et al. (2014), 924. 
162 Samranjit et al. (2012), 220. Also, interviews with Direk Kong-ngern, Baan Pong, Chiang Mai (31 
October 2012, Bangkok) and Pachern Chu-saeng, Bantad Mountain group (1 October 2012, 
Bangkok). 
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no longer exists (or never existed in the first place). Moreover, by 2014, most land 
occupations and CLTD projects are on marginal land. There is also a question of 
whether the second generation of CLTD members will adhere to the principles of 
CLTD.163 Arguably, the LRM could also do more in their national campaigns, such 
as to push for a reform of the process to revoke land deeds that were improperly 
obtained. 
 Despite these questions and potential problems, one could still argue that the 
main benefits of CLTD and of the LRM are that they stimulate debates on how to 
implement equitable distribution and just governance of resources. Practical 
examples of CLTD can be used as inspirations, and to show that that people can 
organise to empower themselves so that they have more say in Thai society. This 
could be a stepping stone towards the building up of larger social movements which, 
through further discussions and collaborations, might push for other (perhaps even 
better) demands that contest the current centralisation of political-economic power 
and hegemonic land governance. Moreover, CLTD projects provide short-term 
economic relief for marginalised people. As Anan Ganjanapan argues, CLTD might 
not provide a long-term solution but for now it does provide cushions against 
economic downturns for marginalised people and small-scale farmers/farm 
labourers.164 
 To a certain extent, CLTD was created as a reaction to the perceived 
ineffectiveness of ALRO in preventing re-distributed land from being sold off to 
non-farmers. In the early 2010s, however, it seems that ALRO has rather genuinely 
been trying to improve its performance. With the help of satellite photographs, 
                                                          
163 Weerachai Narkwibulwong, Secretary General of ALRO, interviewed 14 February 2013, Bangkok. 
164 Anan Ganjanapan, Chiang Mai University, interviewed 29 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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ALRO can sue and re-take misused land more efficiently compare to the past where 
they lacked human resources to inspect over 30 million rai of ALRO land.165 
Although it is still difficult for ALRO to take on some politically and economically 
powerful landlords, ALRO hopes to send a message that it is taking the issue 
seriously to encourage other landlords to start releasing ALRO land in their 
holdings.166 Moreover, ALRO considers altering its rules to allow for some 
compensation (perhaps 55 percent of land price) when farmers want to return their 
land, to act as an incentive for farmers to return land to ALRO so that ALRO can 
allocate land to other farmers.167 However, despite the fact that ALRO has 
jurisdiction over 29.3 percent of agricultural land in Thailand, most of them are 
marginal land with poor soil quality in rain-fed or dry areas. Only 2.9 percent of 
ALRO land are in irrigated areas.168 The Secretary General of ALRO argues that the 
state has the legitimacy to safeguard prime agricultural areas for food security 
purposes because a lot of public investments were spent on irrigation in these areas, 
such as in Klong Rangsit area. However, so far there is no national policy to do 
so.169 
 The discussion on ALRO above suggests that one should not be too quick to 
rule out ALRO as a counter-hegemonic potential despite its past problems. 
Moreover, although ALRO and CLTD land governance seem like polar opposites - 
top-down bureaucratic management versus ground-up democratic local management 
- there is still room for collaborations and exchanges of ideas. As section 3.3 of this 
                                                          
165 Weerachai Narkwibulwong, interviewed 14 February 2013, Bangkok; Narkwibulwong (2012), 20; 
“Taking Back 5 Million Rai of ALRO Land,” Post Today, September 29, 2014. Another source 
suggests ALRO has 34.76 million rai of land under its jurisdiction in 2014 (Dr. Duangmanee 
Laowakul, Faculty of Economics, Thammasart University, quoted in “Macro View of Land,” Isra 
News, July 14, 2014.) 
166 Weerachai Narkwibulwong, interviewed 14 February 2013, Bangkok. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Narkwibulwong (2012), 37. 
169 Weerachai Narkwibulwong, interviewed 14 February 2013, Bangkok. 
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chapter discusses, the LRM and (the current policy direction of ) ALRO are also 
both receptive of sustainable agriculture. 
Part 3: Counter-hegemonic production-distribution practices 
The previous part of the chapter has discussed the LRM's attempts to promote land 
reform and build counter-hegemonic land governance. This part of the chapter 
discusses another counter-hegemonic goal of the LRM, which is to promote 
sustainable agricultural production-distribution practices. Section 3.1 reviews 
relevant literature and the LRM's recognition that to address land grabs and access to 
land for small-scale farmers, one has to address structural production-distribution 
problems of the mainstream agri-food system as well. This section also discusses 
linkages between the LRM and sustainable agriculture groups in Thailand. Section 
3.2 then discusses the development of sustainable agriculture in CLTD projects, 
while section 3.3 discusses ALRO's promotion of sustainable agriculture as a parallel 
counter-hegemonic attempt. 
3.1) Land and sustainable agriculture  
It has been suggested that land grabs should be seen as "control grabbing" or contests 
over the future of global agriculture regarding what should be grown, how, by 
whom, and for what markets.170 Although studies on land grabs tend to focus on the 
role of companies and states, it has been pointed out that small-scale farmers can 
also be seen as potential agents of land grabbing to grow cash crops (boom crops), 
where the consequences are not that dissimilar from large-scale plantations.171 
Contract eucalyptus farming arrangements by smallholders in Thailand with an 
                                                          
170 Margulis, McKeon, Borras (2013), 3 and 14. 
171 Derek Hall, “Land Grabs, Land Control, and Southeast Asian Crop Booms,” Journal of Peasant 
Studies 38, no. 4 (October 2011), 838. 
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average holding of 30 to 50 rai, for example, were quite common and were 
encouraged by the Royal Forestry Department between 1994 and 1997.172 As the 
following paragraphs discuss, the LRM's concerns are not limited to egalitarian land 
re-distribution but also sustainable agricultural production. 
 At the leadership level (farmer leaders, NGOs and academics), the goals of 
the LRM include safeguarding agricultural land and promoting sustainable 
agriculture to counter problems of the current agri-food system.173 As Prayong 
Doklamyai suggests, one cannot address the problems of land by analysing land in a 
vacuum or as being isolated from other issues.174 Realising that production and 
marketing of agri-food products are related to small-scale farmers' ability to hold on 
to their land, some of the leading members were initially very idealistic and wanted 
to develop all CLTD projects as sustainable agricultural areas. For example, Mr. 
Suebsakul Kijnukorn who, along with the Raidong/Mae-aow community, was 
credited for being one of the originators of CLTD term, suggests that land reform is a 
base for food sovereignty and food security.175 Some people in the movement also 
wanted to reject mono-crops in favour of diversified farms176 and looked for 
alternatives to the capitalist economy, such as from sufficiency principles and 
sustainable agriculture.177 Such ideas seem to resonate with the transnational 
counter-hegemonic food sovereignty discourse where land is seen as a necessary 
                                                          
172 Keith Barney, “Re-Encountering Resistance: Plantation Activism and Smallholder Production in 
Thailand and Sarawak , Malaysia,” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 45, no. 3 (2004), 331. 
173 Samranjit (2011); Prayong Doklamyai, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai; Land Reform 
Network, CLTDs - We Can: A Handbook (Bangkok: Land Reform Network, 2012). (in Thai) 
174 Prayong Doklamyai quoted in Rakyutitham (2008), 250-251. 
175 Rakyutitham et al. (2005), 177. 
176 Prayong Doklamyai quoted in Rakyutitham (2008), 250-251. 
177 Wacharin Ouprajong, LRM member from Baan Huafai, Chiang Mai, interviewed Nonthaburi, 30 
September 2012. 
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foundation for creating a just food system,178 as well as with ideas of many 
sustainable agriculture groups in Thailand. 
 Many sustainable farmers and NGO activists interviewed suggest that 
farmers' control over land is crucial to the development of sustainable agriculture.179 
Farmers who tend to switch their production methods to sustainable agriculture tend 
to have their own land.180 Without their own land, they find it difficult to, for 
example, develop small-scale water sources and to develop farm areas that are 
suitable for agro-ecological production.181 A study suggests that organic jasmine rice 
production in Surin province can have pro-poor effects under some conditions. For 
example, it was noted that producers surveyed had average holding of land between 
12.5 and 36.8 rai, as well as access to good quality rice seeds.182 Aside from 
practical matters, some sustainable farmers also see farmers' right to land as a core of 
sustainable agriculture, calling it "soul of sustainable agriculture" where employment 
in large-scale (even organic) plantations would reduce farmers to workers in 
factories183 rather than allowing them to be their own bosses.184 It is also suggested 
                                                          
178 Edelman et al. (2014), 922. 
179 For example: Chomchuan Boonrahong, lecturer at Mae-Jo University, interviewed 3 November 
2012, Chiang Mai; Witoon Lienchamroon, BioThai Foundation, interviewed 5 April 2012, 
Nonthaburi; Pat Apaimul from Mae-ta, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
180 Kiatsak Chatdee, Co-ordinator at the Institute for a Sustainable Agriculture Community (ISAC), 
interviewed 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai, and Aarat Sang-ubol, Co-ordinator at the Community of 
Agro-ecology Foundation, interviewed 19 December 2012, Surin. 
181 Lienchamroon and Yaimuang (2011), 298-299. Landlords usually do not allow tenants to dig a 
pond because land value will drop. 
182 Manus Losirikul and Prasit Karnchan, The Possibility of Hom Mali Rice Production in Organic 
Farming Systems as an Alternative Farming Career with Poverty Alleviation Potential for Lower-
Northeastern Farmers: A Case of Surin province (Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2006). (in Thai) 
183 Nanta Haitook, President of Baan Tanon Organic Herb and Vegetable Processing Group, 
interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin. 
184 Pat Apaimul, sustainable farmer in Mae-ta, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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that diversified agricultural production help to encourage farmers not to look at land 
as mere commodities.185 
 Some LRM members also suggest that the Abhisit government's support of 
CLTD in 2011 was based on the condition that CLTD projects should implement 
environmentally-friendly agricultural practices.186 This is perhaps another reason 
why some LRM members became interested in sustainable agriculture. As section 
3.2 discusses, some members of CLTD projects have received trainings in 
sustainable agricultural methods. The LRM is also working with sustainable 
agriculture groups, such as with Dr. Chomchuan Boonrahong and the Institute for a 
Sustainable Agriculture Community (ISAC), to develop governance mechanisms to 
ensure fair contract farming arrangements187 as well as to promote sustainable 
agriculture and fair markets in CLTD projects.188 Nevertheless, people and groups in 
the LRM are not as equally committed ideologically, and leaders in the movement 
have come to recognise that it is not easy to convince other people in the movement 
to change their production methods to sustainable agriculture.189 As chapter 5 
discussed, sustainable agriculture requires a lot of knowledge, time and labour, 
which means it is often not the first choice for CLTD members. Understandably, it is 
more risky for poorer farmers to enter organic markets because yield tends to drop 
during the first few years. Instead, poorer farmers who cannot afford the risks 
usually rely on conventional agricultural methods, which are less labour intensive, to 
free up their time for low or semi-skilled labour jobs in and outside of the 
                                                          
185 Kanoksak Duangkaewruan, Chief Executive of the Subdistrict Administrative Organisation (SAO) 
from Tambol Mae-ta, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai.  
186 Boonlue Jaroenmee, Klongyong Co-operative leader, interviewed 10 October 2012, 
Nakhonpratom. 
187 Prayong Doklamyai, Northern Peasants Federation, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
188 Chomchuan Boonrahong, lecturer at Mae-Jo University, interviewed 3 November 2012, Chiang 
Mai. 
189 Prayong Doklamyai, quoted in Rakyutitham (2008), 250-251. 
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agricultural sector.190 The problems with the promotion of sustainable agriculture in 
CLTD projects are discussed in greater detail in section 3.2. 
3.2) Sustainable agricultural production-distribution in CLTD projects 
Some members of a few CLTD projects have started to engage with sustainable 
agriculture. A rather special case is Mae-ta community (discussed in chapter 5) 
which is an important sustainable agriculture group, as well as the only CLTD 
project where the Subdistrict Administrative Organisation (SAO) supports the 
management of over 1,200 plots of land in the form of CLTD and also tries to 
establish a land bank.191 Nevertheless, Mae-ta is an exceptional case because it had 
experimented with sustainable agriculture for decades before the adoption of CLTD 
land governance approach. Generally, progress in the development of sustainable 
agricultural production in CLTD projects is rather limited. The following paragraphs 
use examples of CLTD projects from different regions of the country to suggest that 
difficulties include insufficient land as well as the lack of labour and time to learn 
about sustainable agriculture. In addition, this section discusses some problems 
facing CLTD members, such as the lack of bargaining power compare to middlemen, 
which reflect structural problems of the hegemonic agri-food system discussed in 
chapter 3. 
 In the North, land allocated to each member in CLTD projects tend to be 
rather small. Many CLTD members tend to have debts and were accustomed to 
being landless labourers. Hence, they prefer to rely on informal jobs and grow 
whatever they are used to in conventional production methods which do not require 
                                                          
190 Sajin Prachason et al., Market Options of Farmers: Structural Effects on Unfairness and Benefit 
Distribution (Bangkok: BioThai and the Social Research Foundation, Chulalongkorn University, 
2012), 148. (in Thai) 
191 Kanoksak Duangkaewruen, Mae-ta, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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much of their presence on the farm.192 The need to earn quick cash from mono-crops 
to pay off debts also reduces CLTD members' bargaining power in the market.193 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that gaining access to these land made no 
significant improvement on the material well-being of members. In Baan Pae-tai, for 
example, members received just a bit over 1 rai of land each and most members 
manage to earn between 50,000 to 60,000 baht net income per year from sales of 
longans while some people manage to earn up to 100,000 baht per year, whereas 
previously they had no other source of income.194 Despite economic benefits, 
interviewees convey similar stories of having to rely on both agriculture and off-farm 
employment because mono-crops do not yield produce all year round so they need 
other sources of income.195 However, some people who have reached a certain age 
tend to rely completely on their CLTD land plots.196 
 There are some Raidong and Mae-aow members who are interested in 
sustainable agriculture. With the support of one of the community's leaders, Ms. 
Sangwal Kantham, some members (around 33) received training in organic 
agriculture methods from the sustainable agriculture network in the North.197 In 
addition, some members experiment with growing organic potatoes in common land 
and to produce organic fertilisers, although they still lack equipments and require 
additional help from the local administration.198 A LRM member of another CLTD 
project from Chiang Mai also reflects on the lack of support from local 
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193 Mr. Sukaew Fungfoo, President of the Baan Pae-tai CLTD project, interviewed 30 October 2012, 
Lamphun. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Mr. Oonjai Akaruan and Mr. Rangsan Sansongkwae, interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
196 Mr. Jai Kiti, Mae-aow member, interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
197 Ms. Sangwal Kantham (local leader from Mae-aow), Mr. Nop Mangkornmai (Raidong member), 
Mr. Oonjai Akaruen (Mae-aow member), interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
198 Interviews with Rangsan Sansongkwae, Nop Mangkornmai, and Jai Kiti, as well as Sarawut 
Wongnikorn (Northern Peasants Federation activist), interviewed 30 October 2012, Lamphun and 
Chiang Mai. 
   
328 
 
administration, even though a lot of locals were interested to learn about alternative 
agriculture.199 
 Members of Baan Pong CLTD project grow Cha-om (climbing wattle) as 
well as mangoes, longans, and other vegetables. It has been estimated that each 
household receives an average income of 30,000 baht per year from the sales of their 
produce (the highest revenue was 60,000 baht per year in 2007).200 Both male and 
female members between the age of 18 and 30 tend to work in factories to earn 
additional income201 but some members, such as Mrs. Lom Panyathip, rely 
completely on her farm. Her rationale is that when she was a low-skilled labourer, 
income was irregular and unstable. Agricultural production on her own farm, on the 
other hand, makes her feel more independent and also allows her to save up some 
money.202 Nevertheless, interviews of members in December 2012 suggest that 
monopoly power of middlemen has reduced prices that farmers received quite 
significantly.203 Most members still rely on conventional practices but a few 
households have tried to switch their production methods to sustainable 
agriculture.204 Problems that they experience include the lack of time and labour 
(especially that they often have to mobilise politically to lobby the state on land 
issues) to fully engage in what is described as "sophisticated and delicate" 
agricultural production.205 As a compromising measure, Baan Pong promotes safe 
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usage of agricultural chemicals alongside restrictions on industrial animal farming 
which produces a lot of environmental externalities.206 
 A few CLTD groups in other regions also attempt to develop sustainable 
agriculture in their own ways. In the Northeast, perhaps as a reaction to negative 
environmental consequences of eucalyptus plantations, Samsiew CLTD project puts 
a lot of emphasis on the development of sustainable agriculture. For example, Mr. 
Sawai Kamyoi, President of Samsiew, hopes to promote food sovereignty and self-
reliance207 while clause six in Samsaew's charter states that the community 
advocates sustainable agriculture as well as the promotion of integrated farming and 
diversity of agri-food products.208 There are also some exchanges of ideas and 
knowledge with sustainable agriculture groups. Nevertheless, members' interest in 
general is rather limited.209 In the South, some households in Bantad Mountain group 
are interested in sustainable agriculture such as organic farming and/or diversified 
farming.210 One famous sustainable farmer include Mr. Kimpong 
Sangwongkittiwuth from Tapkhua-plakmoo community, who developed a type of 
diversified farm consisting of rubber trees, food crops and herbal medicinal plants, 
which is what he calls a practice of "food sovereignty in a rubber forest" or "four-
level agriculture".211 In the case of Klongyong, there is an attempt to encourage 
households to grow small plots of organic or pesticide-free vegetables because 
Klongyong leaders felt it is a more effective strategy than asking members to stop 
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using chemicals completely.212 Currently around 50 out of 240 households started to 
experiment with sustainable production.213 Taking advantage of its close proximity 
to Bangkok, Klongyong members sell their organic/pesticide-free products in many 
green markets (such as in universities) in Bangkok.214 
3.3) ALRO and sustainable agri-food production-distribution 
ALRO's mandate includes supporting agricultural production of small-scale farmers 
in areas under its jurisdiction. A qualitative research of 43 ALRO farms in 4 
provinces found that sustainable agricultural methods have lesser economic risks and 
yield higher income as well as food security compare to conventional cash-crop 
agricultural production.215 Dr. Weerachai Narkwibulwong, Secretary General of 
ALRO, expresses clearly his view that "organic or pesticide-free agriculture is the 
only way [for small-scale farmers] to survive" and that "it is not even an 
alternative."216 To achieve this vision, ALRO focuses on building model projects in 
a few places, such as the establishment of Kammad Sustainable Agriculture group 
(discussed in chapter 5), and qualitative expansions of such projects.217 It also 
promotes Good Agricultural Practice (GAP), safe usage of pesticides to reduce 
production costs and improve health of farmers, and tries to act as a connection hub 
for farmers and agro-processing industries.218 Another ideological influence that 
affects ALRO's work is the King's sufficiency economy philosophy, where 
sufficiency economy implies building immunity and self-reliance to reduce risks 
                                                          
212 Boonlue Jaroenmee, Klongyong Co-operative, interviewed 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom. 
213 Shoti Saiyuenyong, Klongyong Co-operative, interviewed 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom. 
214 Wantana Iamsuwan, Klongyong Co-operative, interviewed 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom. 
215 Weerachai Narkwibulwong, Arpapan Pattanapan, and Arthita Pongprom, Efficient Usage of ALRO 
Land: A Case Study of Maximum of 10 Rai per Household Land Plot (Bangkok: Thailand Research 
Fund, 2011), abstract and 147. (in Thai) 
216 Weerachai Narkwibulwong, Secretary General of ALRO, interviewed 14 February 2013, Bangkok. 
217 Narkwibulwong (2012), 20. 
218 Weerachai Narkwibulwong, interviewed 14 February 2013, Bangkok. 
   
331 
 
from crises but does not imply isolation from society.219 ALRO tries to translate this 
idea to policies such as by encouraging farmers to form supportive networks which 
would also promote learning. ALRO also works with local leaders and sustainable 
agriculture groups such as Inpang in the Northeast to spread useful production 
knowledge.220 
 As discussed in previous chapters, there can be conservative interpretations 
and top-down implementations of sufficiency ideas by the Thai bureaucracy which 
tend to alienate some civil society groups from working with the bureaucracy. 
Although more empirical research is needed to evaluate ALRO's promotion of 
sustainable agriculture and its working relations with other groups in society, it 
seems that top-level management ideas and policy directions of ALRO in early 
2010s are (at least partially) compatible with those of the LRM and many sustainable 
agriculture groups. This suggests that further collaborations should not be ruled out 
as collaborations do not necessarily imply co-optation of oppositions. The next part 
of the chapter discusses the possibility of co-optation of oppositions in greater detail. 
Part 4: Current obstacles and the possibility of co-optation of oppositions 
This part of the chapter explores current obstacles facing the LRM as well as the 
possibility of co-optation of oppositions, given the global context and contemporary 
Thai politics. Section 4.1 discusses problems of violence and legal persecutions 
facing the LRM, as well as how the Community Forest law serves as a reminder to 
be careful of future co-optation of CLTD law. The following section 4.2 discusses 
how some narrow framings of the red-yellow political polarisation in Thailand 
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weaken the LRM and people's movements, as well as open room for co-optation of 
oppositions. This section also discusses how some analytical discourses, such as 
those which frame development options as either conservative or modern, can 
potentially be problematic. Section 4.3 then evaluates the LRM's attempts to link up 
with transnational movements and possible benefits from engaging with counter-
hegemonic struggles at the global level. 
4.1) Violence, the law, and co-optation of oppositions 
Land occupations sparked violent retaliations in many places. On 13 April 2002, the 
first Thaksin Shinnawatra administration promised to help LRM protesters which 
were occupying Chiang Mai city hall. However, a cabinet order on 23 April 2002 
urged relevant authorities to strictly enforce the law on land occupiers, which led to 
increased number of people being arrested.221 Often, excessive force was used 
during arrests.222 In Lamphun, local village headmen were mobilised to resist land 
occupiers such as by accusing them of being communists and violators of tradition 
and Buddhist morality.223 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinnawatra, on the other hand, 
described NGOs which joined the protest against the cabinet order as "crazy" 
organisations on national television on 30 July 2002.224 To destroy their legitimacy, 
he claimed that the NGOs create work for themselves to attract foreign funding.225 
At times, it is difficult to locate the sources of violent retaliations. In the North, there 
was an attempt assassination of Mr. Wacharin Ouprajong on 16 June 2002, and an 
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assassination of Mr. Kaew Pinpanma on 23 June 2002.226 In Suratthani in the South, 
violent retaliations against the land reform movement in December 2003 caused the 
movement to disperse into smaller groups that acted independently. In 2007, 3,000 
people occupied 1,600 rai of palm plantation operated by Thaksin palm company in 
Ampur Kiriratnikhom, but were then violently dispersed by combined police, 
soldiers and volunteer forces which led to two deaths.227 During the research period 
of this thesis, two female members of the Southern Federation of Farmers from 
Klongsaipattana community were assassinated by M16 war gun(s) in December 
2012.228 
 As part 2 has discussed, the Abhisit government gave some support to CLTD 
ideas and practice, but it can be argued that the government could have done more, 
such as by passing a CLTD or local natural resource management law. Moreover, the 
government did not seem interested to re-distribute private land229 and legal 
persecutions of LRM members continued. Between 2007 and 2008, there were 9,336 
cases of people trespassing to use land in forest areas230 and in 2011, there were over 
800 legal cases relating to land conflicts known to the LRM where around 300 to 
400 of these cases directly involve LRM members.231 By 2012, around 20 people 
involved in land conflicts in the LRM network were in prison.232 Even if the Thai 
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government attempts to introduce a CLTD law, the case of the Community Forest 
law suggests that extreme caution and serious scrutiny are needed to prevent co-
optation. After many years of campaign by civil society, the Royal Forestry 
Department (RFD) proposed its own version of the Community Forest law where 
local farmers are allowed to grow tree plantations in forest areas under the 
supervision of RFD,233 which can clearly be seen as co-optation of oppositions. 
There were attempts to revise the law by civil society groups but after the law was 
passed in 2007, civil society groups decided to reject it because it does not reflect the 
spirit of participatory local management of resource.234 In 2010, the Thai 
Constitutional Court ruled that the process of passing this law was not legitimate so 
the law was dropped, and in mid 2015 (at the time of writing) there is a new attempt 
to introduce a Community Forest law by the National Reform Assembly, which was 
established by the military government.235 
 Another potentially problematic issue is how CLTD projects ought to be 
registered as co-operatives. Some Raidong/Mae-aow members suggest that they had 
to register as a co-operative to receive CLTD certified by the Office of the Prime 
Minister. However, existing co-operative law allows the bureaucracy to inspect 
financial accounts of co-operatives, which gives power to the bureaucracy to 
pressure co-operatives to engage in commercial activities (such as to sell agricultural 
inputs) or to give out loans so that there are "some movements in the account" or the 
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co-operatives will be cancelled.236 However, such suggestions create tensions 
because Raidong/Mae-aow leaders saw such proposed activities as promotions of 
conventional agricultural production, and encouragements for individual members to 
accumulate debt. Instead, Raidong/Mae-aow leaders want to help members to reduce 
their costs of production, such as by producing and promoting the use of organic 
fertilisers.237 This issue suggests that perhaps there is also a need to rethink and 
reform laws governing co-operatives in Thailand.  
4.2) The red-yellow divide, discourse, and co-optation of oppositions 
Chapter 4 already suggested that political polarisation or the red-yellow divide in 
Thailand weakens social movements. Some academics and activists in the LRM also 
voice this issue in interviews.238 After the coup de'tat which ousted Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinnawatra in 2006, there was "a blank" in terms of social movement 
mobilisation because NGOs were divided on strategies, such as whether to establish 
dialogues with the military-established government.239 Similarly, after the coup 
de'tat in 2014 which ousted Prime Minister Yingluck Shinnawatra, people's 
movements were also rather divided. Some groups oppose the coup de'tat through 
symbolic actions while some groups want to use government mechanisms, such as 
the National Reform Assembly, to push through their reform agenda. Others prefer 
grass-root mobilisation which includes building the people's forum for reform and 
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civil society's campaign for a new Constitution that supports participatory 
democracy.240 
 Differences in opinions which divide people's movements into factions partly 
stem from narrow framings of the political situation based on the red-yellow divide, 
which seem to benefit elites rather than the general population. As previous chapters 
have discussed, the red shirts portray their movement as being representative of the 
class of poor marginalised peasants who are opposing the elites.241 However, such 
claim is problematic because the red shirts movement benefits Thaksin Shinnawatra 
who is "one of Thailand's greatest capitalist."242 Moreover, Thai "peasants" are more 
diverse and politically divided than what is being suggested by the red shirts 
movement.243 Interviews of LRM members in Chiang Mai, supposedly the 
stronghold of the Shinnawatra family, and interviews of LRM members in other 
parts of the country also suggest that there is a mixed of political ideologies among 
members of CLTD projects.244 
 Those who are supposedly elitists (those who oppose Phua Thai) often do 
support reform measures that would benefit marginalised people including land 
reforms. As previously discussed, the Democrat party gave some support to CLTD 
and the LRM, while the National Reform Committee led by Prawase Wasi, often 
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portrayed as "ammart" by red shirt supporters,245 helped provide forums and support 
for social movements such as the LRM. After the 2014 coup, many individuals and 
civil society groups try to work with the military government to push through 
genuine reform measures to benefit the population, which suggests that they cannot 
neatly be placed in the "ammart" box. To a certain extent, hard-core red and yellow 
(anti-Thaksin) shirts have more in common than they might realise. On the one hand, 
there are some anti-Thaksin people who refuse to criticise some of the military 
government's policies even though these policies cause damage to marginalised 
population not too dissimilar to Phua Thai party's policies. On the other hand, in a 
similar manner, many red shirts refrain from criticising Phua Thai and the 
Shinnawatra. Overall, these examples suggest that reality is more complicated than 
what the "Phrai vs. ammart" class struggle discourse suggests. One should question 
such framing of Thai politics as well as analyses which either portray the red shirts 
or anti-red shirts movements in a heroic light. 
 Discourse which portrays the red shirts as "the real" people's movement 
represented by Phua Thai political party tends to infer that other movements are 
small and insignificant by comparison.246 It can also obscure political-economic 
problems of the capitalist system and crowd out other movements. It has been 
suggested that the red shirts movement tends to concentrate on promoting abstract 
democracy issues rather than material/basic need issues, while relying mainly on 
individual rights and elections for policy support from Thai Rak Thai and Phua Thai 
governments.247 Policies which focus on establishing state patronage of individuals, 
however, can turn out to be a form of co-optation of oppositions. As suggested by a 
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leading LRM activist, some of Thaksin government's poverty reduction policies, 
such as the registering of poor people's names in 2004 to receive future help from the 
state, fostered the people's reliance on the government as individuals. While such 
policies achieved little in the end, they hindered the LRM's network building and 
collective mobilisation.248 
 As previous chapters discussed, analytical frameworks which offer only two 
main development options - conservative or modern - can help to preserve the 
capitalist hegemonic status quo. Some women movements in Africa, for example, 
oppose customary tenure of communal land ownership because of its patriarchalism, 
but instead of finding other alternatives, they embrace a neo-liberal land privatisation 
programme despite its dispossession effects.249 The danger of such mental trap is 
also present in Thailand. Community rights are viewed skeptically by the red shirts 
as conservative discourse and practice advocate by those who like to support military 
governments.250 However, as this chapter has discussed, CLTD is a recently 
constructed local land governance mechanism based on democratic principles. 
Advocacy of community rights can be seen as a form of "strategic essentialism" - a 
term coined by G. C. Spivak to suggest how it can be advantageous for a group of 
people to temporarily essentialise their identity to achieve certain agenda.251  
 Another potentially problematic type of discourse is one that tends to place 
smallholders' attempts to secure access to land on the same plane as larger and more 
powerful actors, such as national states and capital groups. Hall, Hirsch and Li 
(2011), for example, tries to draw attention to the fact that smallholders can also be 
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agents of enclosure and dispossession, such as through the discourse of common 
property,252 although it does not discuss the contemporary LRM in Thailand directly. 
What the book does not make sufficiently clear of, however, is that the power of 
agents to enclose land and dispossess others are massively different, not to mention 
that why and how different actors want to secure their access to land are qualitatively 
different, especially from perspectives of ecological sustainability, social justice, and 
human or farmer rights. Whereas corporations may engage in land grabs for 
speculation purposes, or to grow agro-fuel inputs to feed mostly the demands of the 
world's wealthier population, some less powerful agents need access to land just to 
meet their basic needs. De Schutter (2011), for example, discusses the opportunity 
costs of large-scale land grabs which have less poverty-reducing impact than if 
access to land and water were improved for local farming communities.253 Omitting 
to address differences in power relations help to reduce the legitimacy of civil 
society groups that engage in community-based resource management, which has 
political implication that favours the maintenance of the hegemonic status quo.  
4.3) The global dimension of land governance and the Thai LRM 
Discussions on land conflicts in this chapter, such as in Chiang Mai and Lamphun, 
tend to focus on the roles of domestic actors such as land occupiers, the Thai state 
and landlords. However, it is important not to forget that the current land governance 
structures in Thailand can be seen as part of the global hegemonic land governance 
structures, maintained by global institutions and actors such as the World Bank. In 
addition, as chapter 3 discussed, foreign land grabs can also manifest through 
domestic nominees in Thailand. In this sense, the LRM's national campaign to 
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promote local governance and more equal distribution of land is relevant to and can 
be seen as part of the global counter-hegemonic forces which try to challenge the 
hegemonic global land governance system. The following paragraphs first discuss 
contemporary debates on the benefits and difficulties of connecting local, national 
and international or transnational social movements. Relationships between the Thai 
LRM and La Vía Campesina are then explored. There are some limitations in linking 
up with transnational movements and the LRM tends to concentrate on local and 
national struggles. In the future, the LRM could perhaps engage more with global 
counter-hegemonic initiatives such as the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land and Other Natural Resources. 
 Some studies suggest that land contests are becoming globalised and are 
taking place in multi-scale terrains of multiple actors, institutions and frameworks.254 
It has been suggested that the informal complex of transnational land governance can 
be used to protect vulnerable populations subjected to illegal and violent 
dispossessions of their land.255 However, it is not a simple task to orchestrate 
through the transnational governance network. Rural social movements can justify 
global engagement only if it generates support for local struggles and open up 
national political space,256 but there can be many problems trying to link up with 
transnational social movements such as with regards to representation and 
accountability.257 A few national agrarian groups might be able to link up with 
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transnational movements while other groups are left behind.258 In addition, 
transnational agrarian movements tend to look for counterparts in their "image and 
likeness" so if they found nothing of the sort in other countries and regions, they tend 
to assume the absence of movements or that there are weak movements.259 Within a 
transnational agrarian movement, some groups also have more resources and 
influence than others.260 
 One of the biggest and most critical transnational agrarian social movement 
is La Vía Campesina , which currently represents more than 150 (sub)national rural 
social movement organizations from 56 countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, North America, (Western) Europe, Asia and Africa.261 It tries to connect 
local, national and international groups and involve their members through the 
"externalisation" of national-local issues or the vertical projection of domestic claims 
onto international institutions or foreign actors.262 Issues in countries important to La 
Vía Campesina  tend to be swiftly externalised,263 but there is still room for 
improvement. For example, the "gate keeper" problem where one national 
organisation relegates other movements to the margin, such as with the case of India 
and Indonesia,264 can hinder the representation claim of La Vía Campesina. In 
addition, La Vía Campesina has no presence in some countries such as China even 
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though Chinese peasants and the rural dispossessed have forged collective identities 
that potentially provide a basis for conceptualising alternatives to neo-liberal 
capitalism.265 Overall, it has been suggested that La Vía Campesina  needs to address 
the diversity of land issues beyond the ones that their main members are concerned 
with.266 
 In the case of Thailand, the Assembly of the Poor and the Northern Peasants 
Federation (an important member of the LRM) are members of La Vía Campesina. 
These organisations also help to connect Vía Campsina with other civil society 
groups in Thailand, such as the Alternative Agriculture Network (AAN) in the 
Northeast. As part 1 has discussed, many local leaders in CLTD projects visited 
movements in other countries such as Brazil and Philippines, as well as joined La 
Vía Campesina's international conferences such as the one in Mali in 2011.267 The 
statement of the Global Alliance Against Land Grabbing, convened by La Vía 
Campesina and allies in Mali in November 2011, extends the understanding of land 
governance beyond Western private property ideas to include communal and 
community property regimes.268 Such an instance would seem to suggest that 
through La Vía Campesina, the LRM can make its voice heard at the global level. 
Nevertheless, there are still some current obstacles. While the Thai representatives 
learned about food sovereignty and that land grab is a global phenomenon, they had 
language barrier problems and could not fully share their ideas such as with regards 
                                                          
265 Kathy Le Mons Walker, “From Covert to Overt: Everyday Peasant Politics in China and the 
Implications for Transnational Agrarian Movements,” in Transnational Agrarian Movements 
Confronting Globalization (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 311 and 315-316. 
266 Borras (2008), 113-114. 
267 Direk Kong-ngern, interviewed 30 September 2012, Nonthaburi and 31 October 2012, Chiang 
Mai. 
268 Borras, Franco and Wang (2013), 171. 
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to CLTD.269 In addition, a leading activist from the Northern Peasants Federation 
comments that La Vía Campesina often focuses on what he perceives to be rather 
abstract issues but when policy issues are discussed, the Thai counterparts are often 
more or less asked to disseminate information in top-down manners. Aside from 
international conferences and joint declarations every now and then, there is still a 
gap in co-ordination between the Thai movement and La Vía Campesina.270 Thai 
LRM (and sustainable agriculture movement) members could also be encouraged to 
participate more in international exchanges of ideas and other forms of 
collaborations. For example, there was a small-scale farmer conference organised by 
La Vía Campesina and the Thai Community Agroecology Foundation in Surin in 
November 2012, but a lot of Surin sustainable farmers interviewed for this thesis 
suggest that many farmers in their network did not attend the conference.271  
 The discussion on existing problems in this section does not mean to 
demoralise people in the LRM and La Vía Campesina, but to identify room for 
improvement and to strengthen the movements. More research is needed, but a 
question should also be raised whether the red-yellow divide in Thailand does/will 
act as a form of "gate keeper" problem in Thailand. As previously discussed, class-
based approach to the analysis of Thai politics, where the red shirts are presented as 
true representatives of the peasants and the marginalised, is problematic and needs to 
be questioned. Uncritical adoption of such an analytical approach can constrain 
strategy options, potential alliances, and overall effectiveness of social movements. 
Some groups which appear "yellow" (or have middle/upperclass origins) might be 
excluded even though they have counter-hegemonic agenda. This will be a loss 
                                                          
269 Arat Sang-ubol, AAN activist, interviewed 19 December 2012 in Surin. Also Direk Kong-ngern 
and Montri Bua-loi from Baan Pong, interviewed 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
270 Prayong Doklamyai, Northern Peasants Federation, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
271 For example, farmers from Tamor and Ta-toom groups in Surin, previously discussed in chapter 5. 
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because, as previously discussed, the LRM (as well as the sustainable agriculture 
movement) benefits from cross-class alliances. 
 Aside from collaborations with transnational agrarian movements, the Thai 
LRM could also benefit from engaging with global counter-hegemonic initiatives to 
challenge hegemonic land governance as well as to stay ahead of global co-optation 
trends. At the global level, the food, energy and climate crises narrative can be used 
to justify large-scale land investments,272 which can be seen as a form of co-optation 
of oppositions that the LRM should be aware of. The Principles for Responsible 
Agricultural Investment (PRAI) launched by the World Bank, FAO, IFAD, and 
UNCTAD in January 2010, for example, are criticised for presenting large-scale 
investments as solutions to rural poverty and hunger.273 One notable counter-
hegemonic response include the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance 
of Tenure of Land and Other Natural Resources, negotiated with involvement of 
rural social movements and formally adopted at a special session of the Committee 
on World Food Security on 11 May 2012.274 The Voluntary Guidelines take into 
account important issues such as the protection of customary tenure, community 
consultations, and states’ obligations to regulate their corporations’ operations 
beyond their borders.275 The Thai LRM can perhaps use them to aid their national 
and local campaigns. However, by early 2014 there does not seem to be any 
discussion about the Voluntary Guidelines nor other transnational initiatives. It is 
also unclear how international governance instruments such as the Voluntary 
                                                          
272 Ben White et al., “The New Enclosures: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Land Deals,” Journal 
of Peasant Studies 39, no. 3–4 (July 2012), 631. 
273 For example, see Olivier De Schutter, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food 
presented to the 65th General Assembly of the United Nations (A/65/281): Access to land and the 
right to food (New York: United Nations), quoted in McKeon (2013), 110. 
274 McKeon (2013), 110-111. 
275 Ibid, 111. 
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Guidelines can translate to national governance structures.276 Even if supportive laws 
and policies have been passed, political interactions between different actors will 
shape their interpretations and implementation.277 This can open room for co-
optation, especially if the Thai LRM and/or other concerned groups in society do not 
pay sufficient attention to the issue, which would be a waste of an opportunity. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the contemporary Thai land reform movement's counter-
hegemonic ideas, as well as its attempts to promote counter-hegemonic land 
governance structures and agricultural production-distribution practices. The last part 
of the chapter has also discussed current obstacles and the possibility of co-optation 
of oppositions facing the LRM. Overall, this chapter helps the thesis to advance six 
original contributions to knowledge which were outlined in chapter 1, as the 
following paragraph elaborates. 
 Similar to the previous chapter, empirical exploration of the LRM in 
Thailand adds to existing literature on agrarian movements, which is the second 
contribution to knowledge of this thesis. The discussion on co-optation of 
oppositions - an essential element of the hegemonic agri-food system which adapts 
to maintain the status quo - also helps to advance the first original contribution, 
which is to bring new empirical information from Thailand into existing literature on 
the corporate agri-food system. In addition, this chapter helps to advance the third 
contribution to knowledge, which is to extend neo-Marxist and Gramscian theory on 
the agri-food system, such as by exploring the complementarities of ideas and 
                                                          
276 Borras, Franco and Wang (2013), 175 and McKeon (2013), 117. 
277 Jennifer C. Franco, “Peripheral Justice? Rethinking Justice Sector Reform in the Philippines,” 
World Development 36, no. 10 (2008): 1858–1873, quoted in Borras, Franco and Wang (2013), 172. 
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practice in the building of the LRM's counter-hegemonic project e.g. the complexity 
of rights and CLTD. Using a critical international political economy theoretical 
perspective to analyse the LRM, on the other hand, helps to advance the fourth 
contribution to knowledge, which is to provide new perspectives and data on Thai 
agrarian development and social movements. For example, the LRM's call for CLTD 
and land reforms are discussed as part of global counter-hegemonic forces (local, 
national and transnational) which try to find alternatives to the global hegemonic 
land governance structures. Complementing the discussions in previous chapters, 
this chapter helps to advance the fifth and sixth contributions to knowledge by 
providing new perspectives on Thai localism as well as polarised politics in 
Thailand. For example, this chapter argues that the red-yellow divide weakens the 
LRM and that the concept of "community" in CLTD projects does not necessary 
imply conservative appeal to the past, but a contemporary counter-hegemonic 
attempt to create a mechanism for local governance of land based on democratic 
principles. 
 This chapter has discussed some current and potential problems facing the 
LRM as of early to mid 2014. However, the research on the LRM uncovered some 
issues that should be analysed but are beyond the scope of this thesis. More research 
is needed, but it is possible that uncontested land valuation methods based on market 
prices can obstruct counter-hegemonic land reform initiatives. It has been noted, for 
example, that if land banks can be established, they could facilitate a rent-to-buy 
type of land purchases for co-operatives in CLTD projects.278 However, if land 
prices continue to climb, it is unclear how long it will take to complete each 
purchase. In the case of Klongyong CLTD co-operative, land prices are very high 
                                                          
278 Prayong Doklamyai, Northern Peasants Federation, interviewed 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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because the location is close to Bangkok. A few Klongyong members have also 
questioned whether the group can keep to agricultural production when there is 
increasing pollution from nearby sources, and when it is a lot more profitable to use 
the land for other purposes.279 As the next and last chapter of the thesis will discuss, 
land management and the agri-food system are inevitably related to other sectors of 
the economy. This suggests that future research should take into account the 
interconnections between different sectors of the economy to understand the 
problems more fully and to shed light on the prospects of counter-hegemony. 
                                                          
279 Boonlue Jaroenmee, Klongyong Co-operative, interviewed 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion   
This concluding chapter recapitulates the thesis' main arguments and contributions to 
knowledge. It also reflects on the research design and process, as well as on future 
areas of research. The first part of this chapter restates the central research question 
and provides a summary of main arguments. The second part reviews six conceptual 
and empirical original contributions to knowledge of the thesis, and discusses their 
possible wider implications for knowledge. The third part of this chapter reflects on 
the theoretical framework, methodology, and research process of the thesis. The last 
part suggests some future areas of research. 
Part 1: Central research question and summary of main arguments 
To answer the central research question – "How have hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic forces shaped the agri-food system in Thailand (1990 to 2014)?" – this 
thesis has developed a combined neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical framework 
in chapter 2, which has guided empirical explorations of the dynamics of the Thai 
and global agri-food system in chapters 3 to 6. Overall, the thesis has advanced four 
main arguments, as the following paragraphs elaborate. 
 First, the thesis has argued that the mainstream agri-food system in Thailand 
has been shaped to aid capital accumulation by domestic and transnational 
hegemonic forces, and is sustained through the maintenance of hegemonic agri-food 
production-distribution, governance structures and ideational order. Chapter 3 
focuses primarily on advancing this first argument. 
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 The second main argument of the thesis is that, through the Thai sustainable 
agriculture and land reform movements, counter-hegemonic ideas, production-
distribution practices, and governance structures have to certain extents managed to 
influence the agri-food system in Thailand and offer alternatives. Even though the 
movements mostly operate within local and national boundaries, they can be seen as 
part of global counter-hegemonic forces in the agri-food system. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
have advanced this second main argument: chapter 4 has reviewed counter-
hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand, while chapters 5 and 6 have focused 
on the sustainable agriculture and land reform movements. 
 Chapters 4 to 6 have also advanced the third and fourth main arguments of 
this thesis. The third main argument is that hegemonic forces have many measures to 
co-opt dissent, alternative and reformist forces into hegemonic structures, which 
weakens counter-hegemony. Moreover, lines between hegemony and counter-
hegemony are not always clear. This is related to the fourth main argument of the 
thesis, which is that counter-hegemony can be seen as an un-linear ongoing process 
over a long period of time, where predominantly counter-hegemonic forces may at 
times retain some hegemonic elements. The threat of co-optation also suggests that 
counter-hegemonic forces should continually refine and develop clear ideas and 
practices to guard against co-optation. 
Part 2: Summary of contributions to knowledge 
Through its study of hegemony and counter-hegemony in the agri-food system in 
Thailand, the thesis makes six main original contributions to knowledge, as the 
following paragraphs elaborate. 
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 First, the thesis brings new empirical information from Thailand into existing 
literature on the corporate agri-food system and agrarian political economy. In 
particular, discussions in chapter 3 have brought new information on issues such as 
unsustainable industrialised production methods, land grabs, the food-fuel nexus, 
financial speculations of agri-food commodities, and monopoly power in the context 
of the agri-food system in Thailand. Chapters 4 to 6 have also contributed new 
empirical information through their discussions of co-optation of oppositions in the 
agri-food system. Co-optation of oppositions can be seen as an essential element in 
the dynamics of the hegemonic agri-food system, as co-optation helps the system to 
subsume dissent and to maintain the status quo. The paddy pledging scheme, for 
example, was discussed in chapter 4 as an important co-optive hegemonic agri-food 
policy in Thailand, even though the Phua Thai government and its supporters portray 
the policy as counter-hegemonic. 
 Second, the thesis brings new empirical information from Thailand into 
existing literature on alternative agri-food and agrarian movements. Chapter 4 has 
provided an overview of counter-hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand. 
Chapter 5 has focused on the sustainable agriculture movement and provided 
empirical information on, for example, sustainable production-distribution practices, 
producer rice mills in Thailand, as well as linkages between Thai and transnational 
sustainable agriculture groups. Chapter 6 has focused on the land reform movement 
and provided empirical information on, for example, ideas and practices of 
community land title deeds, collaborations with La Vía Campesina, and attempts to 
pass and implement national land reform laws. 
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 Third, the thesis extends neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical perspectives 
in the study of the agri-food system. Chapter 2 has provided an outline of the 
combined neo-Marxist and Gramscian theoretical framework, while chapters 3 to 6 
have discussed empirical information through this theoretical lens. Important 
theoretical concepts utilised include commodification, accumulation by 
dispossessions, appropriation of surplus, hegemony, counter-hegemony, and co-
optation of oppositions, which were adapted in this thesis to suit discussions on the 
Thai and global agri-food system. On the one hand, such a theoretical framework has 
enabled the thesis to articulate the symbiosis of ideas and practices in the agri-food 
system. On the other hand, empirical explorations have suggested that concepts of 
hegemony, counter-hegemony and co-optation of oppositions are not always clear-
cut in practice. 
 Fourth, the thesis provides new perspectives and recent data on Thai agrarian 
development and social movements, through discussions in chapters 3 to 6. Chapter 
3 has discussed important contemporary issues in the Thai agri-food system and, 
unlike most mainstream studies, has analysed structural problems in the mainstream 
Thai agri-food system in terms of inter-related ideational and material structures at 
local, national, and global scales. Chapter 4 has suggested that the sustainable 
agriculture and land reform movements can be understood partly as a lineage of past 
agrarian movements in Thailand, and as part of Thai civil society's search for 
alternative development paths. Aside from providing up-to-date empirical 
information, chapters 5 and 6 have also provided new perspectives on Thai agrarian 
social movements by suggesting the importance of counter-hegemonic ideas, 
production-distribution practices, as well as governance structures at local, national, 
and global scales. 
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 Fifth, the thesis provides new perspectives as well as recent data on practices 
and discourses of Thai localism, through discussions in chapters 4 to 6. Chapter 4 
has briefly discussed Thai localism, while chapter 5 has explored discourses and 
practices of Thai localism in greater detail. Chapter 5 has also indicated how the 
Thai sustainable agriculture movement is partially inspired by Thai localism, and 
provides new perspectives on Thai localism. The analysis has rejected a polarised 
conception of development as having only two options – either a traditional 
backward localist choice or a modern choice – and argues that Thai localism can be 
seen as having counter-hegemonic potential, even though there can be some 
elements that are potentially problematic. Chapter 6 has also elaborated this 
argument through its discussions of the land reform movement, which was partially 
inspired by Thai localism. 
 Sixth, the thesis brings new perspectives on polarised politics in Thailand 
through discussions in chapters 4 to 6. As discussed in the introduction chapter, 
existing literature on polarised Thai politics often focuses on issues such as 
nationalism, the role of Thai monarchy in politics, elections and the nature of 
democracy in Thailand, or tends to portray polarised politics as a manifestation of 
class-based struggles. Discussions in chapter 4, however, have given new 
perspectives and suggest that polarised political discourses can be seen as a form of 
co-optation of oppositions which affect the agri-food system in Thailand, such as 
through a narrow framing of problems of the agri-food system. Moreover, polarised 
political discourses also help to create divisions and weaken social movements. 
Chapter 6 has substantiated this argument through its exploration of the land reform 
movement in Thailand, while chapter 5 has suggested that some people are skeptical 
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of sustainable agriculture groups because of their associations with King Bhumipol's 
sufficiency ideas and the monarchy's (perceived) role in polarised political conflicts. 
 Overall, the thesis has made some novel and important contributions to the 
study of the corporate agri-food system and alternative agri-food movements. Not 
only does the thesis bring in new empirical information on the corporate agri-food 
system and alternative social movements from an under-studied area (Thailand), but 
it also traces local-global linkages of the agri-food system which serves as a 
reminder not to overly-generalise characteristics of the corporate agri-food system in 
different parts of the world. For example, the thesis demonstrates that, unlike a 
stereotypical portrayal of land grabs as large-scale acquisition of land by foreign 
capital from major developed countries, land grabs can also occur through networks 
of smaller-scale agents and domestic nominees, or are driven by capital groups from 
developing countries such as Thailand. In addition, analysing structural problems of 
the agri-food system in Thailand as part of the global capitalist system has important 
implications, not just academically, but also practically. Many people in Thailand 
tend to focus on domestic factors such as the Thai state and agri-businesses when 
they discuss how to reform the agri-food system in Thailand, or have not gone far 
enough to critically reflect on ways to challenge the global capitalist agri-food (and 
economic) system. Hence, this study can help them to reflect on how to improve 
their counter-hegemonic ideas and strategies. Moreover, the thesis' discussion of the 
exploitation of nature and labour under the capitalist system suggests a foundation 
that counter-hegemonic agri-food movements can build on, in order to link up with 
other social movements and expand their networks. 
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 By bridging a gap between materialist analysis in the Marxist tradition and 
more subjectivist analytical perspectives, this thesis highlights the importance of the 
interconnections of ideas and practices, whether hegemonic or counter-hegemonic, 
which operate at interconnected local-to-global scales. Through the Thai case study, 
the thesis argues that transformative change in society should be seen as an un-linear 
process over a long period of time, and that counter-hegemony should take place at 
both ideational and material levels. Conceptualising counter-hegemony in this 
manner challenges the Marxist pre-occupation with "crisis and change". Moreover, 
through the Gramscian concept of "national-popular strategies" and Stephen Gill's 
"post-modern Prince" idea about political agency, the thesis takes into account 
heterogeneity within and between social movements in different social contexts, and 
does not simply dismiss the SAM and the LRM, which were partially inspired by 
Thai localism, as fundamentally insular and conservative. Instead, the thesis suggests 
that these movements bear seeds of counter-hegemonic transformation, even though 
they do not necessarily resemble stereotypical images of politicised, structured, and 
leftist national movements. 
 This thesis has also explored the relationships between the SAM, the LRM 
and the wider state-society complex in which they are enmeshed, particularly cross-
class alliances that further or frustrate counter-hegemonic movements. Such 
empirical exploration supports the thesis' argument that predominantly counter-
hegemonic movements may at times retain some hegemonic elements, and that the 
lines between hegemony, counter-hegemony, and co-optation of oppositions are 
often blurred. Hence, counter-hegemonic movements should constantly re-invent 
themselves in order to remain counter-hegemonic. By providing new perspectives on 
Thai localism and polarised politics in Thailand, this thesis points to the importance 
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of analysing social movements in relation to established political authority, and also 
reminds one to be mindful that academic and public discourses can have political-
economic implications. Whether intentionally or not, discourses can help to 
challenge or justify the hegemonic status quo. For example, to suggest that the 
polarised political conflict in Thailand is rooted in class struggles, where the red 
shirts unproblematically represent the oppressed, help to legitimise some elites while 
helping to divide and weaken people's movements. 
Part 3: Reflections on research design and process 
This part of the chapter reflects on the theoretical framework, methodology, and 
research process of the thesis. Although the thesis suggests that the combined neo-
Marxist and Gramscian theoretical framework is appropriate for the study of the 
agri-food system in Thailand, there are four main points on which it can be 
improved. First, although the neo-Marxist framework helps the thesis to 
conceptualise and explore capital accumulation through the mainstream agri-food 
system, the concept of "accumulation by dispossession" is rather broad and 
encompasses a variety of processes ranging from land grabs to financial 
speculations. In particular the process of accumulation by dispossession through 
finance capital deserves further theorisation. Second, although the Gramscian 
concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony are useful as broad categories of 
forces that shape the agri-food system, they may give the impression that hegemony 
and counter-hegemony are exclusive polar opposites. However, as this thesis has 
argued, the lines between hegemony and counter-hegemony can be blurred in some 
instances, especially as predominantly hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces 
continue to change and adapt over time. Third, there are other theoretical 
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perspectives that might yield additional insights to the study of the agri-food system 
but are not addressed in this thesis due to the lack of writing space and time. 
Anarchist perspectives, for example, might shed new light on localist ideas and 
practices in Thailand, as well as on the conceptualisation of counter-hegemonic 
movements. Fourth, the thesis could do more to explore the consumption side of the 
agri-food system and heterogeneity (gender, class, age, ethnicity) within agri-food 
movements. Although there is a minimum wage in Thailand, further empirical study 
on the conditions of farm labourers is likely to yield additional insights regarding the 
exploitation of labour and nature through the mainstream agri-food system. 
Nevertheless, there was not enough time nor space to explore these issues in detail in 
this thesis. 
 As this thesis adopts an international political economy approach, it focuses 
on the study of the agri-food system in Thailand at the macro-level. This means that 
the thesis cannot explore all issues in full detail. The author tried to gather much 
relevant information from a variety of reliable sources, but there are few sources and 
studies on certain topics such as land grabs and the effects of financial speculations 
on agri-food producers in Thailand. Limitations of time and resources prevented the 
author from conducting extensive investigations into these topics. In addition, some 
issues were still unfolding at the time of writing, such as the paddy pledging scheme 
and the effects of the 2014 coup d'état, but the thesis could only take into account 
developments through 2014. 
  A five-month field research period in Thailand allowed for some flexibilities 
with interviews, and greatly helped the author to collect extensive primary and 
secondary source. The author's lack of prior relations with social movements in 
   
357 
 
Thailand meant that interview requests were sometimes denied. Nevertheless, the 
number and scope of interviewees were sufficient for this thesis, and interviews of 
87 people have been used extensively throughout chapters 3 to 6. The use of semi-
structured interviews also appropriately helped the author to gain important 
perspectives into the sustainable agriculture and land reform movements in Thailand. 
Part 4: Reflections on future areas of research 
The end of one research exercise always holds seeds for future projects, and so it is 
also with this thesis. Although this thesis has focused on the agri-food system in 
Thailand, it has sometimes come across issues related to other sectors of the 
economy. In addition, it will be interesting to see if the combined neo-Marxist and 
Gramscian theoretical framework adopted in this thesis can appropriately be used to 
explore the agri-food systems in other social and political contexts. The following 
paragraphs consider a few issues and questions raised by this research before 
outlining future research projects. 
 It has been noted that global land grabs are associated with the rise of "flex 
crops" and commodities with multiple uses across food, feed, fuel and other 
industrial sectors, which blur sectoral boundaries and sectoral governance 
instruments.1 This suggests the importance of further analysing the agri-food system 
in relation to the governance of other natural resources, as well as other sectors of the 
economy. Moreover, chapter 5 discusses how many sustainable producer groups in 
Thailand try to develop add-value agri-food products to earn higher income and 
create more jobs. This raises many questions that should be investigated further, 
                                                          
1 Saturnino M. Borras, Jennifer C. Franco, and Chunyu Wang, “The Challenge of Global Governance 
of Land Grabbing: Changing International Agricultural Context and Competing Political Views and 
Strategies,” Globalizations 10, no. 1 (2013), 162 and 165. 
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particularly regarding what kinds of agro-processing and industrial development can 
be compatible with sustainable agriculture principles and appropriate for small-scale 
rural producers.  
 Some technical problems facing sustainable agriculture groups in Thailand 
are also related to wider social and economic structures. For example, the sustainable 
agricultural movement can expand faster if governance structures which determine 
which research issues are prioritised or who gets funded become more favourable in 
promoting sustainable technologies. Another example is how high costs of organic 
products in urban centers, such as Bangkok, can partially be explained by high 
transport costs, which are related to the current logistical system and city planning. 
More research is needed, but it seems that such issues can also be traced back to the 
dependency on fossil fuels and the capitalist economy which encourages polarisation 
between urban and rural areas. In addition, as discussed in chapter 6, many members 
of the land reform movement occupied land because they had no jobs following the 
1997 Asian economic crisis, or because working as labourers in other sectors of the 
economy was detrimental to their health. Some people in Thailand have also become 
interested in sustainable agriculture as a way to make a living because they have seen 
the negative environmental effects of some industrial activities, or because they feel 
alienated from office jobs.2 These examples point to the interconnections of different 
sectors of the economy, indicating that many important issues in the agri-food 
system are inseparable from the capitalist system's cyclical boom and bust tendency, 
creations of reserve armies of labour, as well as capitalist tendency to exploit and 
alienate both nature and labour in a comprehensive manner. 
                                                          
2 Mr. Long Pechsood, Bantad Mountain farmer from Trang Province, interviewed 1 October 2012 in 
front of Government House, Bangkok and Mrs. Supha Yaimuang, SATHAI, interviewed 3 October 
2012.  
   
359 
 
 Building on this doctoral work, the author hopes to pursue several lines of 
further research. One future research project could be a comparative study of 
hegemony and counter-hegemony in the agri-food system in Thailand with that of 
other countries in Asia, America, Africa or Europe. Such a comparative study can 
flesh out how specific local, national and regional conditions influence the 
mainstream agri-food systems and counter-hegemonic agri-food movements in these 
countries. This would provide new insights into the dynamics of the global agri-food 
system, as well as draw out interesting similarities and differences within and 
between agri-food social movements. As chapter 5 has discussed, the SAM in 
Thailand received some influence from agri-food movements in India and Japan, 
such as with regards to seed sovereignty ideas, natural farming principles, and 
effective micro-organisms technology. However, further study is needed to explore 
whether regional Asian perspectives on counter-hegemony in the agri-food system 
can be generalised. Aside from contributions to knowledge, it is also hoped that such 
comparative studies will help counter-hegemonic agri-food movements from 
different social and political contexts to learn from each other and to refine their 
counter-hegemonic ideas and practices. For example, the Thai sustainable agriculture 
movement can perhaps learn from counter-hegemonic forces in other countries 
which have more experience in connecting sustainable agricultural production 
groups with sustainable agro-processing and other industries. 
 To conclude, this research on the agri-food system in Thailand has yielded 
some useful insights which inspire the author to conduct further studies, such as a 
comparative study of the agri-food system in Thailand and that of other countries. In 
the longer run, the author also hopes to study the possibility that the primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy can be geared towards more socially 
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and ecologically sustainable paths, or to positively and radically transform the 
capitalist economy as a whole.  
361 
 
Appendix 1 
Sustainable Agriculture Groups in Thailand 
This part of the thesis provides some factual information and contact detail of 
sustainable agriculture groups and institutions in Thailand which have been 
discussed in this thesis. The main focus is on producer rice mills and sustainable 
farmer groups in Yasothon and Surin provinces, as well as sustainable agriculture 
foundations in the Alternative Agriculture Network. 
Producer Groups in Yasothon 
 Naso Producer Group 
After the commercialisation of rice production in Thailand, locals in Naso 
community experienced rising costs of production while the prices of rice were 
determined solely by middlemen or rice mills.1 Some Naso locals thought that their 
situation could improve if they could bypass the middlemen by building their own 
rice mill to process and sell their own rice.2 The mill started to operate in August 
1991, and by 2007 its organic rice is also being exported to Europe and other Asian 
markets.3 Naso had also experimented with local currency and other local 
development initiatives.  
Address: 57 Moo 2 Baan Sokkhumpoon, Tambol Naso, Ampur Kudchum, Yasothon 
province, 35140 
                                                          
1 Kanoksak Kaewthep, “Rakthammachart Rice Mill: Naso Community, Ampur Kudchum, Yasothon 
Province,” in Community Organised Welfare (2): Production Groups. Journal of Political Economy 
(for the community) 18 (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 2001), 124-125. (in Thai) 
2 Ibid, 126-127. 
3 Bangkok Business Newspaper, “Naso, Yasothon: An Example of Self Sufficient Agriculture,” 
Bangkok Business Newspaper, January 22, 2007. (in Thai) 
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 Bak-rua Producer Group 
Similar origin to that of Naso, the first Bak-rua producer-owned rice mill was 
established in 1989. In 1994 the group took a loan to develop a medium size rice 
mill4 and started to mill both conventional and organic rice. With Naso producer 
group, Bak-rua tries to develop other rice products such as rice bran capsules.5 
Address: 118 Moo 4, Baan Donphueng, Tambol Bakrua, Ampur Mahanachai, 
Yasothon province, 35130 
 Nam-oom Sustainable Agriculture Social Enterprise 
Nam-oom enterprise was set up in 1999 and by 2012, it managed to collect and mill 
over 700 to 800 tons of rice annually which are exported or sold in domestic 
market.6  The enterprise is managed by a 15 member committee from 12 villages, 
and it is aided by the Ministry of Commerce and Aden company, which help to 
export organic and fair trade rice to Europe.7 
 Address: 27 Moo 10, Baan Siripattana, Tambol Nam-oom, Ampur Korwang, 
Yasothon province, 35160 
 Kammad Sustainable Agriculture Group 
Founding members of Kammad used to be part of the Naso group, but branched out 
in 2010. Unlike Naso, Kammad relies on a small-scale rice mill and decentralised 
                                                          
4 Suphachai Lorlohakarn, Organic Farming Business (Bangkok: National Innovation Agency and 
Asian Institute of Technology, 2007), 202. (in Thai) 
5 Mrs. Somwang Chomchuen, Manager of Bak-rua rice mill, interviewed 24 December 2012, 
Yasothon. 
6 Mr. Kamnueng Maneebool, advisor and former president of Nam-oom Sustainable Agriculture 
Social Enterprise, interviewed 23 December 2012, Yasothon. 
7 Mr. Boonyuen Arj-arsa, a committee member of Nam-oom Sustainable Agriculture Social 
Enterprise, interviewed 23 December 2012, Yasothon, 
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management style. There are around 300 member whose land are under ALRO's 
jurisdiction. Many members also work to preserve and develop over100 strands of 
traditional rice.8  
Address: 61 Moo 3 Baan Noanyang, Tambol Kammad, Ampur Kudchum, Yasothon 
province, 35140 (co-ordinator: Mr. Boonsong Martkhao 169 Moo 17, Baan 
Noanyang, Tambol Kammad, Ampur Kudchum, Yasothon province, 35140) 
 The Moral Rice (Thamma-ruamjai) Network 
In 2006, Thamma-ruamjai sustainable farmer members agreed to adopt moral codes 
of conduct which include, for example, giving up on liquor, smoking and gambling. 
Between 2006 and 2009, there were around 100 to 160 farmers who participated in 
the moral rice network.9 The group has also established 16 learning centers in 
Yasothon and nearby provinces.10 It focuses on domestic sales, such as through TV 
Burapha network.11 For more information see: <http://www.moralrice.net/>.  
Address: 80 Moo 8, Tambol Krajai, Ampur Pa-tiew, Yasothon province, 35150 
Producer Groups in Surin 
 Rice Fund Surin Organic Agriculture Co-operative 
In 1987, an organised network called "Farmer rice seller network" was formed to 
collect rice in large bulks to increase market power of farmers. It consisted of 
Sahatham for Development, Ta-toom Natural Agriculture, and Surin Natural 
                                                          
8 Mr. Boonsong Martkhao, Kammad group, interviewed 25 December 2012, Yasothon. 
9 Juthatip Patrawart, “Branding as the Marketing Strategy for Organic Products: A Case Study on 
Moral Rice,” Asian Journal of Food and Agro-Industry no. Special Issue (2009), 256. 
10 Ibid, 256. 
11 Mr. Nikhom Pechpa, main co-ordinator of the Moral Rice Network, interviewed 23 December 
2013, Yasothon. 
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Agriculture groups. The network struggled a lot as a business but after the Thailand 
Organic label was established in 1996, there was a re-newed attempt to develop 
organic agricultural production. In addition, new groups such as Taptai and Tanon 
joined the network. The network received funding in 2002 from the pilot programme 
to develop sustainable agriculture (discussed in chapter 5) to build a rice mill of 24 
tons/day capacity, as well as a warehouse which can store 500 tons of rice. In 2003, 
it was registered as a co-operative (สหกรณ์เกษตรอินทรียก์องทุนขา้วสุรินทร์จาํกดั) with smaller 
producer groups named according to their areas such as Tamor and Ta-toom.12 Since 
2005, Surin rice mill was certified a Fairtrade producer group by FLO and started to 
market its own produce.13 In 2012, around 250 out of the total of 326 farmer 
members received organic certifications.14 For more information, see: 
<http://www.ricefund.com/>  
Address: 88 Moo 7, Tambol Kae-yai, Ampur Muang, Surin province, 32000 
 Tamor Group 
Natural farming group in Tambol Tamor started to organise in 1992. It consists of 
members from Baan Doan-leng North and South, Baan Yang and Baan Kockpech.15 
Around 10 members work on the preservation and development of traditional seeds 
and are all certified organic farmers.16 In Tambol Tamor in 2012, there were over 
                                                          
12 Sajin Prachason et al., Market Options of Farmers: Structural Effects on Unfairness and Benefit 
Distribution (Bangkok: BioThai and the Social Research Foundation, Chulalongkorn University, 
2012), 167-168. (in Thai) 
13 Manager interviewed 6 November 2012, quoted in Prachason et al. (2012), 168. 
14 Ms. Sompoi Jansang, manager at the Rice Fund Surin Organic Agriculture Co-operative Ltd., 
interviewed 19 December 2012, Surin. 
15 Chonlakanda Nakthim, The Roles of Leaders in Knowledge Management of the Farmers’ Organic 
Rice Farming: A Case Study of Natural Farming Group in Thamo Sub-District, Prasat District, Surin 
Provice. Thesis from the Department of Social Service, Thammasart University (Bangkok, 2008), 54. 
(in Thai) 
16 Prachason et al. (2012), 187 and 190. 
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3,000 farmers in the area, but there were only around 100 certified organic farmers 
and another 200 farmers who practiced diversified farming.17 
Address: 99 Moo 9, Baan Doan-leng Nua, Tambol Tamor, Ampur Prasart, Surin 
province, 32140 
 Ta-toom Group 
The group started to form since 1992. Initially, it focused on producing pesticide free 
rice then moved on to produce certified organic rice. In 2012, it had around 200 
members and 10 main leaders who preserved and developed traditional rice 
strands.18  
Address: Baan Nongbua, Tambol Nongbua, Ampur Ta-toom, Surin province, 32130 
 Taptai Group 
Tap-tai is a small village consisting of 87 households in Tambol Tamor, Surin 
province.19 The group started by selling sustainable rice and vegetables in local 
green markets, but many members then diversified their production to include 
organic pork production, which is more suitable to members' relatively small plots of 
land. The group received production advices from a lecturer at Ratchamongkol 
Esaan University of Technology, Surin.20  
Address: 24 Moo 10, Baan Tap-tai, Tambol Tamor, Ampur Prasart, Surin province 
32140 
                                                          
17 Mr. Pakphum Inpan, Tamor group, interviewed 20 December 2012, Surin. 
18 Mr. Thamma Sangkalee, Ta-toom group, interviewed 22 December 2012, Surin. 
19 Sukran Rojanaphraiwong, A Mission in Self-Reliance: Report of the Study on Tap-tai Community 
Way of Life, Surin, by Natpong Pattanapanchai and Arat Saeng-Ubol (Nonthaburi: Alternative 
Agriculture Network, 2008), 18. (in Thai) 
20 Rojanaphraiwong (2008), 61. 
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Sustainable Agriculture NGOs in Thailand 
 BioThai Foundation  
BioThai Foundation (มูลนิธิชีววิถี) originated in 1995 by networks of activists, farmers, 
academics, civil servants and members in rural areas. They are interested in bio-
resources, local wisdom, community rights, food security and food sovereignty, 
agriculture and sustainable development, as well as fair trade. BioThai started out as 
the Thai Network on Community Rights and Biodiversity, then transformed into the 
Biodiversity and Community Rights Action Thailand in 1999. It was registered as a 
foundation in 2006 and is based in Nonthaburi province.21  
For more information, see: <http://www.biothai.net> or <http://www.biothai.org>. 
 Sustainable Agriculture Foundation Thailand  (SATHAI) 
Founded in 1998, SATHAI (มลูนิธิเกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืน) promotes sustainable agriculture based 
on principles of self-reliance for households and communities under different 
cultural, ecological, and changing Thai-global contexts. With a headquarter in 
Nonthaburi province, some of its work include developing techniques of sustainable 
agriculture, strengthening local organisations, collaborating with other sectors in the 
society, as well as developing linkages between producer and consumer groups.22  
For more information, see: <http://www.sathai.org/>. 
 
                                                          
21 BioThai Foundation, “About BioThai,” accessed July 17, 2014, < http://www.biothai.net/about>. 
(in Thai) 
22 SATHAI, “Sustainable Agriculture Foundation (Thailand),” accessed July 17, 2014, 
<http://www.sathai.org/th/about-saft.html>. (in Thai) 
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 Khao Kwan Foundation  
Khao Kwan (มลูนิธิข้าวขวญั) is an NGO whose work involves developing agricultural 
technology which is appropriate to local contexts. The foundation develops a variety 
of rice seeds, researches on the effects of agricultural chemicals, and develops 
practical sustainable agricultural options with farmers. Although it was registered as 
a foundation in 1998, its sustainable agricultural promotion work started since 1984. 
Khao Kwan's headquarter is in Suphanburi province in the Central region of 
Thailand.23 Khao Kwan also offers hand-on training courses for farmers and any 
interested individuals.24  
For more information, see: <http://www.khaokwan.org/>. 
 Institute for a Sustainable Agriculture Community (ISAC) 
ISAC (สถาบนัชมุชนเกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืน) in Chiang Mai, Thailand, works to promote sustainable 
agricultural production and markets, such as through training programmes of over a 
thousand farmer in 15 to 18 Ampur in the North.25  
Contact information:  363 Moo 4, Chiang Mai Mae-Jo Road, Tambol Nongjom, 
Ampur Sansai, Chiang Mai province 50210. Also see: 
<https://www.facebook.com/isacchiangmai>. 
  
 
                                                          
23 “Khao Kwan Foundation,” accessed July 18, 2014, <http://www.khaokwan.org/khaokwan.html>. 
(in Thai) 
24 “Farmer School,” accessed July 18, 2014, <http://www.khaokwan.org/farmerschool.html>. (in 
Thai) 
25 Mr. Kiatsak Chatdee, Co-ordinator at ISAC, interviewed 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
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 Community of Agro-ecology Foundation (CAE)   
CAE (มลูนิธิชมุชนเกษตรนิเวศน์) was founded in 1983. It is a non-profit organisation based in 
Surin which aims to promote sustainable agriculture practices and the importance of 
sustainable agriculture to health. It helps to found a green local market in Surin 
province alongside other initiatives.26  
For more information, see: <http://www.caesurin.com>. 
 Green Net Co-operative 
Green Net Co-operative was registered as a cooperative in 2001. It focuses on 
domestic marketing and exporting of organic and fair trade agri-food products, as 
well as the promotion of sustainable agricultural production. It exports organic 
jasmine rice to many European countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, 
and France.27  
For more information, see: <http://www.greennet.or.th/en/about/greennet>. 
                                                          
26 “Community of Agro-Ecology Foundation,” accessed November 11, 2012, 
<http://www.caesurin.com/main/index.php>. (in Thai) 
27 Green Net Co-operative, “About Green Net Cooperative,” accessed July 18, 2014, 
<http://www.greennet.or.th/about/greennet>. (in Thai) 
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Appendix 2 
Community Land Title Deed Groups in Thailand 
This part of the thesis provides some information and contact detail of community 
land title deed (CLTD) groups in Thailand that the author visited during the 
fieldwork of this thesis.  
For more information, see the land reform movement's website at 
<http://www.landwatchthai.com/index.php/en/> and also Local Action Thailand's 
website at < http://www.landactionthai.org/>. 
CLTD Projects in the North 
  Baan Raidong/Mae-aow 
In 2011, Raidong/Mae-aow group received a certificate from the Office of the Prime 
Minister to support its existence as a CLTD project. However, the legal status of the 
certificate is not the same as a land title deed signed by the Department of Land. 
After land occupation in 2000, around 1 rai per member was allocated to 
approximately 282 members. The group keeps 10 rai of land as common land, which 
have been used to grow crops to earn income for the group's collective fund.1 
Address: Baan Raidong/Mae-Aow, Moo 1, Lamphun-Lee road, Tambol Nakhon 
Jedi, Ampur Pasang, Lamphun Province, 51120 
 
                                                          
1 Interviews with Rangsan Sansongkwae, Nop Mangkornmai and Oonjai Akaruan, 30 October 2012, 
Lamphun. 
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 Baan Pong  
Baan Pong group consists of around 79 households or 412 members2 who started to 
occupy over 458 rai of land in 2002.3 In Baan Pong's CLTD project, around 60 
percent of land is used for agricultural production, 30 percent for housing, and 10 
percent for common purposes (guesthouse, meeting place, collective farm, roads).4 
Each household receives around 2 rai of land for private usage.5 An interesting 
feature of Baan Pong is the establishment of the community's "land bank" which 
serves as a community welfare fund, a source of loans for agricultural purposes, and 
as a fund for political mobilisation.6 
Address: Baan Pong, Moo 2, Tambol Mae-faeg, Ampur Sansai, Chiang Mai 
Province, 50290 
 Baan Pae-tai 
Pae-tai members occupied around 200 rai of land in 1997. By 2012, there were 
around 70 members (when they first started to occupy land, there were around 100 
households) who were allocated around 1 rai of land each. Around 100 rai of land is 
treated as common land for Pae-tai CLTD members.7  
Address: Baan Pae-tai, Moo 11, Tonphueng-Jomthong Road, Tambol Nonglong, 
Ampur Wieng non-long, Lamphun Province, 51120 
                                                          
2 Methee Singsootham, Practical Action Research Report on Sustainable Land Reform and 
Management by the People (Nonthaburi: Land Reform Network and Local Act, 2010), 36. (in Thai) 
3 Mr. Direk Kong-ngern, interviewed 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
4 Land Reform Network and Local Act, A Report on the Study “Land Management and Social 
Justice: A Case Study of the Land Reform Network”, Part of the Project to Encourage Social Justice, 
Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Social 
Research Institute, 2010), 236. (in Thai) 
5 Singsootham (2010), 39-40. 
6 Land Reform Network and Local Act (2010), 235. 
7 Mr. Sukaew Fungfoo, President of the Baan Pae-tai CLTD project, interviewed 30 October 2012, 
Lamphun. 
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CLTD Project in the Central region 
 Klongyong Co-operative 
Klongyong co-operative covers a total area of around 1,803 rai and consists of 180 
households (969 people).8 It is the only CLTD group which received a legal title 
deed in February 2011 during the Abhisit Vejchacheewa administration, which is 
certified by the Department of Land. This is partly due to its unique status as a rent-
to-buy co-operative established in 1980.9 
Address: Klongyong co-operative, Moo 8, Tambol Klongyong, Ampur 
Puttamonton, Nakhonpatom Province 73170 
                                                          
8 Kom Chad Luek Newspaper, " Mae-Aow Villagers Smile for the Second CLTDs from the Prime 
Minister,"  March 18, 2011, <http://www.komchadluek.net/detail/20110318/91899>, retrieved 24 
April 2013. (in Thai) 
9 Klongyong community leaders, “A Summary of the Struggles of the Klongyong Community (a 
Document Prepared by the Locals for Visitors), obtained on 10 October 2012,” 1-3. (in Thai) 
372 
 
Bibliography 
A Parliamentary Committee to Consider Land Problems. A Report on How to Solve 
the Problems Regarding Land Use, Land Laws, and the Rushed Property Rights 
Document Process. Bangkok: A Parliamentary Committee to Consider Land 
Problems, 2009. 
 (คณะกรรมาธิการวิสามญัพิจารณาแกไ้ขปัญหาท่ีดินทาํกิน กฏหมายเก่ียวกบัท่ีดินและเร่งรัดออกเอกสารสิทธ์ิแก่ประชาชน 
สภาผูแ้ทนราษฏร. รายงานผลการพิจาณาแก้ไขปัญหาท่ีดินทาํกิน กฏหมายเก่ียวกับท่ีดิน และเร่งรัดออกเอกสารสิทธ์ิแก่
ประชาชน. กรุงเทพฯ: คณะกรรมาธิการวิสามญัพิจารณาแกไ้ขปัญหาท่ีดินทาํกินฯ, 2552.) 
AAN farmer groups. “Kaen-Nakhon Manifesto: Local Rice, Secure Food and Farmer 
Livelihoods in E-Saan Local Rice Expo, 14-15 March 2009.” Khonkaen, 2009. 
 (ปฏิญญาแก่นนคร: ขา้วพ้ืนบา้น อาหารมัน่คง ดาํรงวิถีชาวนา ในงานมหากรรมขา้วพ้ืนบา้นอีสาน 52 ณ ลานวฒันธรรม
ริมึงแก่นนคร อ.เมือง จ.ขอนแก่น 14-15 มีนาคม 2552) 
Aanthong, Akrapong. “Organic Product Standards: Symbolic Declaration from Civil 
Society.” In NGOs for Social Benefits...and Social Processes Based on 
Knowledge and Wisdom, edited by Sombat Hesakul, Supaporn Worapornpan, 
and Akrapong Aanthong, 53–73. Bangkok: National Health Foundation, 2004. 
 (อคัรพงษ ์อั้นทอง. "มาตรฐานสินคา้เกษตรอินทรีย:์ สญัลกัษณ์ของคาํประกาศภาคประชาสงัคม." ใน องค์กรพัฒนาเอกชน
สาธารณประโยชน์...กับกระบวนการทางสังคมบนฐานความรู้-ปัญญา. สมบติั เหสกุล, สุภาภรณ์ วรพรพรรณ และ อคัรพงษ ์
อั้นทอง บรรณาธิการ, 53-73. กรุงเทพฯ: มูลนิธิสาธารณสุขแห่งชาติ, 2547.) 
Abbott, Jason P., and Owen Worth. “Introduction: The ‘Many Worlds’ of Critical 
International Political Economy.” In Critical Perspectives on International 
Political Economy, edited by Jason P. Abbott and Owen Worth. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 
Agarwal, Bina. A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Agrawal, Arun, and Clark C. Gibson. “Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role 
of Community in Natural Resource Conservation.” World Development 27, no. 
4 (April 1999): 629–649. 
Akram-Lodhi, A. Haroon. “Land, Markets and Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian 
Political Economy Perspective.” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 8 (December 
2007): 1437–1456. 
Allen, Patricia, and Carolyn Sachs. “Women and Food Chains: The Gendered 
Politics of Food.” International Journal of Sociology of Food and Agriculture 
15, no. 1 (2007). 
373 
 
Altieri, Miguel A. “Agroecology: The Science of Natural Resource Management for 
Poor Farmers in Marginal Environments Agriculture.” Ecosystems & 
Environment 93, no. 1–3 (2012): 1–24. 
Altieri, Miguel A., and Peter Rosset. “Ten Reasons Why Biotechnology Will Not 
Ensure Food Security, Protect the Environment and Reduce Poverty in the 
Developing World.” AgBioForum 2, no. 3&4 (1999): 155–162. 
Altieri, Miguel A., and Victor Manuel Toledo. “The Agroecological Revolution in 
Latin America: Rescuing Nature, Ensuring Food Sovereignty and Empowering 
Peasants.” Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 3 (July 2011): 587–612. 
Amanor, Kojo Sebastian. “Global Food Chains, African Smallholders and World 
Bank Governance.” Journal of Agrarian Change 9, no. 2 (April 2009): 247–
262. 
Amare, M., L. Hohfeld, S. Jitsuchon, and H. Waibel. Rural–urban Migration and 
Employment Quality: A Case Study from Thailand. Economics Working Paper. 
Manila, 2012, quoted in Rigg, Promphaking and Le Mare (2014), 190. 
Amekawa, Yuichiro. “Reflections on the Growing Influence of Good Agricultural 
Practices in the Global South.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental 
Ethics 22, no. 6 (2009): 531–557, quoted in Schreinemachers et al. (2012), 520. 
Amsterdam, Robert. "White Paper: Thailand – The Plot Against Democracy," March 
18, 2014 <http://robertamsterdam.com/thailand/category/red-shirts/>. 
Appadurai, Arjun. The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, quoted in Goodman and DuPuis 
(2002), 9. 
Araghi, A. “Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990.” Atlantic 36, no. 2 (1995): 337–
368. 
Araghi, Farshad. “Food Regimes and the Production of Value: Some Methodological 
Issues.” Journal of Peasant Studies 30, no. 2 (2003): 41–70. 
              . “The Invisible Hand and the Visible Foot: Peasants, Dispossession and 
Globalization.” In Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural 
Transformation and the Agrarian Question, edited by A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi 
and C. Kay. Oxon: Routledge, 2009. 
Arce, A., and T. K. Marsden. “The Social Construction of International Food: A 
New Research Agenda.” Economic Geography 69, no. 3 (1993): 293–311. 
Archetti, E., and S. Aass. “Peasant Studies: An Overview.” In International 
Perspectives in Rural Sociology, edited by Howard Newby, 107–129. New 
York: John Wiley, 1987. 
374 
 
Arghiros, D. “The Local Dynamics of the ‘New Political Economy’: A District 
Business Association and Its Role in Electoral Politics.” In Money and Power in 
Provincial Thailand, edited by R. McVey, 123–53. Copenhagen: NIAS, 2000, 
quoted in Bjarnegård (2013), 145. 
Assies, W. “Land Tenure, Land Law and Development: Some Thoughts on Recent 
Debates.” Journal of Peasant Studies 36, no. 3 (2009): 573–589, quoted in De 
Schutter (2011), 269. 
Aydin, Zulkuf. “Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture.” Journal of 
Agrarian Change 10, no. 2 (2010): 149–187. 
Badgley, C., and I. Perfecto. “Can Organic Agriculture Feed the World?, Renewable 
Agriculture and Food Systems” 22, no. 2 (2007): 80–85. 
Baker, Chris. “Pluto-Populism: Thaksin and Popular Politics.” In Thailand beyond      
 the Crisis, edited by Peter Warr. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005. 
Bangkok Business Newspaper (กรุงเทพธุรกิจ). “Naso, Yasothon: An Example of Self 
Sufficient Agriculture,” Bangkok Business Newspaper, January 22, 2007. 
              . “Wilit Techapaibul...revolutionary Farmer,” Bangkok Business Newspaper, 
August 11, 2008. (วิลิต เตชะไพบูลย ์..ชาวนา ปฏิวติั) 
              . “President of Thai Farmers’ Association Reports to DSI about Foreign 
Land Grabs of Rice Fields,” Bangkok Business Newspaper, August 06, 2009. 
(ปธ.ชาวนาไทยแจง้DSI ต่างชาติฮุบท่ีปลูกขา้ว) 
              . “Natural Rice Production Method to Survive Flood.” Bangkok Business 
Newspaper. October 13, 2011. (ปลูกขา้วหนีนํ้าดว้ยวิธีธรรมชาติ) 
              . “EU Warns against GM Papaya.” Bangkok Business Newspaper, July 03, 
2012. (อียอูอกโรงเตือนภยัมะละกอGM) 
              . “Yingluck Government Lied about G-to-G Rice Deal - Damages to the 
Budget and Rice Stock,” Bangkok Business Newspaper, January 17, 2014. (ปม
ร้อน!เขยา่รัฐบาลยิ่งลกัษณ์ ขายขา้ว "จีทูจี" ลวงโลก งบ-สตอ็กขา้วเสียหาย) 
              . “Thida Condemns Doctors for Joining PDRC,” January 21, 2014. 
<http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/home/detail/politics/politics/20140121/5576
33/ธิดาประณามแพทยร่์วมกปปส.ผิดหลกัสากล.html>. ('ธิดา'ประณามแพทยร่์วมกปปส.ผิดหลกัสากล) 
Bangkok Post (online). “Farmers End Protest in Phitsanulok,” January 28, 2014. 
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/391947/farmers-end-protest-in-
phitsanulok>. 
375 
 
              . “NAAC Decides to Impeach Yingluck,” May 08, 2014. 
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/408766/nacc-decides-to-impeach-
yingluck-in-the-senate>. 
              . “Fresh Struggle Kicks off to Halt GM Crops.” Bangkok Post Online, 
October 24, 2014. 
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/439241/fresh-struggle-kicks-
off-to-halt-gm-crops>. 
Bantuwong, Chalita. “Local Sage: Creation of Identity through Sustainable 
Agriculture.” In Sustainable Agriculture: Cultural Identity, Agricultural 
Problems and the Identity of Thai Farmers, edited by Anusorn Unno, 238–270. 
Nonthaburi: Sustainable Agriculture Assembly Committee and Heinrich Bӧll 
Foundation, 2004. 
 (ชลิตา บณัฑุวงศ.์ ""ปราชญช์าวบา้น": การ (ถูก)สร้างอตัลกัษณ์ผา่นเกษตรกรรมย ัง่ยนื." ใน เกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืน: อัตลักษณ์
ทางวัฒนธรรมกับปัญหาการเกษตรและอัตลักษณ์ชาวนาไทย, อนุสรณ์ อุณโณ บรรณาธิการ, 238–270. นนทบุรี: 
คณะกรรมการจดังานมหกรรมเกษตรกรรมย ัง่ยนื และ Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2547.) 
Barndt, Deborah. Women Working the NAFTA Food Chain: Women, Food and 
Globalization. Toronto, ON: Sumach Press, 1999. 
              . Tangled Routes: Women, Work, and Globalization on the Tomato Trail. 
UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008. 
Barney, Keith. “Re-Encountering Resistance: Plantation Activism and Smallholder 
Production in Thailand and Sarawak, Malaysia.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 45, no. 
3 (2004): 325–339. 
Bates, Thomas R. “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony.” Journal of History of 
Ideas 36, no. 2 (1975): 351–366. 
Behrman, Julia, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Agnes Quisumbing. “The Gender 
Implications of Large-Scale Land Deals.” Journal of Peasant Studies 39, no. 1 
(2012): 49–79. 
Bello, Walden, Shea Cunningham, and Li Kheng Pho. A Siamese Tragedy. 
Development and Disintegration in Modern Thailand. New York: Zed Books, 
1998. 
Belton, Ben, and David Little. “The Development of Aquaculture in Central 
Thailand: Domestic Demand versus Export-Led Production.” Journal of 
Agrarian Change 8, no. 1 (December 12, 2007): 123–143. 
Berg, Bruce L., and Howard Lune. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social 
Sciences. New Jersey: Pearson, 2012. 
Bernstein, Henry. “Food Sovereignty via the ‘Peasant Way’: A Sceptical View.” The 
Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no. 6 (January 08, 2014): 1031–1063. 
376 
 
Bieler, Andreas, and Adam David Morton. “A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, 
World Order and Historical Change Neo-Gramscian. Neo-Gramscian 
Perspectives in International Relations.” In Global Restructuring, State, Capital 
and Labour. Contesting Neo-Gramscian Perspectives, edited by Andreas 
Bieler, Werner Bonefeld, Peter Burnham, and Adam David Morton. Hampshire 
and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
              . “Class Formation, Resistance and the Transnational Beyond Unthinking 
Materialism.” In Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour. Contesting 
Neo-Gramscian Perspectives, edited by Andreas Bieler, Werner Bonefeld, Peter 
Burnham, and Adam David Morton. Oxon: Routledge, 2006. 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. “Agricultural Development Strategy, 2008–
2011.” 2008, quoted in Holt Gimenez and Shattuck (2011), 116. 
BioThai Foundation, Thai life Foundation (RRAFA), and Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation Thailand. Public Policies’ Implications on Food Security, ASEAN 
Free Trade Arrangements, and Effects on Farmers, Natural Resources, and the 
Agricultural Sector. Bangkok: BioThai, 2009. 
BioThai Foundation. “Report on the Problems of Hybrid Rice Seeds: Case Study of 
Hybrid Rice Owned by the Charoenpokapand Group,” 2009. 
<http://www.biothai.net/node/150>. (รายงานวิเคราะห์ปัญหาของพนัธุ์ขา้วลูกผสมศึกษากรณีพนัธุ์ขา้ว
ลูกผสมของบริษทัเจริญโภคภณัฑ)์ 
              . People’s Handbook about Food (in)security and Thailand's Solutions. 
Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2010. (คู่มือประชาชนเร่ืองความ(ไม่)มัน่คงทางอาหาร กบัทางออกของประเทศไทย) 
              . “Effects of Thai-EU FTA on Plant Genes, Biodiversity, and Food 
Security,” February 26, 2013. <http://www.biothai.net/node/16573>. (ผลกระทบของ
ความตกลงการคา้เสรีไทย-สหภาพยโุรป ต่อพนัธุ์พืช ความหลากหลายทางชีวภาพและความมัน่คงทางอาหาร) 
              . “Civil Society Is on Guard against the Passing of GMO Law That Will 
Benefit Transnational Seed Companies,” January 21, 2015. 
<http://www.biothai.net/node/25705>. (ภาคประชาสงัคมจบัตาการผลกัดนักฏหมายจีเอม็โอผา่นสภา
นิติบญัญติัแห่งชาติ เอ้ือบรรษทัเมล็ดพนัธุ์ขา้มชาติ) 
Bjarnegård, Elin. “Who’s the Perfect Politician? Clientelism as a Determining 
Feature of Thai Politics.” In Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and 
Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, edited by 
Dirk Tomsa and Andreas Ufen. London and New York: Routledge, 2013. 
Blakeney, M. “Recent Developments in Intellectual Property and Power in the 
Private Sector Related to Food and Agriculture.” Food Policy 36 (2011): 109–
113, quoted in Sage (2013), 72. 
Boonchai, Krisda, et al. “Introduction.” In Sustainable Agriculture: Cultural 
Identity, Agricultural Problems and the Identity of Thai Farmers, 7–26. 
377 
 
Nonthaburi: Sustainable Agriculture Assembly Committee and Heinrich Bӧll 
Foundation, 2004. 
 (กฤษฏา บุญชยั และคณะ. "บทนาํ." ใน เกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืน: อัตลักษณ์ทางวัฒนธรรมกับปัญหาการเกษตรและอัตลักษณ์
ชาวนาไทย, อนุสรณ์ อุณโณ บรรณาธิการ, 195-236. นนทบุรี: คณะกรรมการจดังานมหกรรมเกษตรกรรมย ัง่ยนื และ 
Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2547.) 
Boonchai, Krisda, Bantoon Setsirot, Witoon Lienchamroon, and Anuch Arpapirom. 
Ideas and Policies Regarding Agri-Food Resource Base. Nonthaburi: BioThai, 
2007. 
 (กฤษฏา บุญชยั, บณัฑูร เศรษฐศิโรตน์ วิฑูรย ์เล่ียนจาํรูญ และ อนุช อาภาภิรม. แนวความคิดและนโยบายฐานทรัพยากร
อาหาร. นนทบุรี: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2550.) 
Boonrahong, Chomchuan, Witaya Jantawongsri, and Tassanee Palee. Appropriate 
Alternative Markets for Sustainable Agricultural Products. Bangkok: Thailand 
Research Fund, 2000. 
 (ชมชวน บุญระหงษ,์ วิทยา จนัทะวงศศ์รี, ทศันีย ์ปาลี. ระบบตลาดทางเลือกท่ีเหมาะสมสาํหรับสินค้าเกษตรกรรมยั่งยืน. 
กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2543.) 
Boonthuan, Karnda. “Technology That Changes Paddy Fields.” Bangkok Business 
Newspaper. January 02, 2014. (เทคโนโลยพีลิกมุมนาขา้ว) 
Borras, Saturnino M. “La Vía Campesina and Its Global Campaign for Agrarian 
Reform” 8, no. July (2008): 258–289. 
              . “La Via Campesina and Its Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform.” In 
Transnational Agrarian Movements Confronting Globalization, edited by 
Saturnino M. Borras, Marc Edelman, and Cristóbal Kay, 91–122. Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2008. 
Borras, Saturnino M., Marc Edelman, and Cristóbal Kay. “Transnational Agrarian 
Movements: Origins and Politics, Campaigns and Impact.” In Transnational 
Agrarian Movements Confronting Globalization, edited by Saturnino M. 
Borras, Marc Edelman, and Cristóbal Kay, 1–36. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2008. 
Borras, Saturnino M., and Jennifer C. Franco. “From Threat to Opportunity? 
Problems with the Idea of a ‘Code of Conduct’ for Land-Grabbing.” Yale 
Human Rights and Development Law Journal 13, no. 2 (2010): 507–523, 
quoted in White et al. (2012), 637. 
Borras, Saturnino M., Jennifer C. Franco, and Chunyu Wang. “The Challenge of 
Global Governance of Land Grabbing: Changing International Agricultural 
Context and Competing Political Views and Strategies.” Globalizations 10, no. 
1 (2013): 161–179. 
378 
 
Bridge, G., P. McManus, and T. Marsden. “The next New Thing? Biotechnology and 
Its Discontents.” Geoforum 34 (2003): 165–174, quoted in Dibden, Gibbs and 
Cocklin (2011), 60. 
Bruce, J.W., R. Giovarelli, L. Rolfes, D. Bledsoe, and R. Mitchell. Land Law 
Reform: Achieving Development Policy Objectives. World Bank Law, Justice, 
and Development Series. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2008, quoted in De 
Schutter (2011), 271. 
Buaklee, Acharawadee. “The North Pushes for 4 Land Laws.” ThaiPBS, April 04, 
2014. http://www.citizenthaipbs.net/node/4015. (เหนือดนัร่างกฏหมายท่ีดิน 4 ฉบบั) 
Buch-Hansen, Mogens. “Is Sustainable Agriculture in Thailand Feasible ?” Journal 
of Sustainable Agriculture 18, no. 2–3 (2001): 137–160. 
Buck, Daniel, Christina Getz, and Julie Guthman. “From Farm to Table: The 
Organic Vegetable Commodity Chain of Northern California.” Sociologia 
Ruralis 37, no. I (1997): 3–20. 
Buranin, Pechra. "Four laws for the poor campaign." October 10, 2014. 
<http://4laws.info/2014/10/10/603/>. 
Burch, David, and Geoffrey Lawrence. “Towards a Third Food Regime: Behind the 
Transformation.” Agriculture and Human Values 26, no. 4 (July 31, 2009): 
267–279. 
Busch, Lawrence, and Carmen Bain. “New! Improved? The Transformation of the 
Global Agrifood System.” Rural Sociology 69, no. 3 (2004): 321–346. 
Busch, Lawrence. “The Private Governance of Food: Equitable Exchange or Bizarre 
Bazaar?” Agriculture and Human Values 36, no. 3 (2009): 1–8, quoted in 
Schreinemachers et al. (2012), 520. 
Business Thai. “Thanin-Jaroen: 2 Rich Men Are Revolutionising Thai Agriculture!,”  
         May 08, 2008. <http://www.businessthai.co.th>. (ธนินทร์-เจริญ "2 เจ้าสวั"ปฏิวตัิเกษตร    
              ไทย!) 
Callahan, W., and Duncan McCargo. “Vote-Buying in Thailand’s Northeast: The 
July 1995 General Election.” Asian Survey 36, no. 4 (1996): 376–92, quoted in 
Bjarnegård (2013), 145. 
Cameron, Angus, and Ronen Palan. “Empiricism and Objectivity: Reflexive Theory 
Construct in a Complex World.” In Routledge Handbook of International 
Political Economy: International Political Economy as a Global Conversation, 
edited by Mark Blyth, 112–125. London: Routledge, 2007. 
Cargill. “Food Security: The Challenge,” 2014. 
<http://www.cargill.com/wcm/groups/public/@ccom/documents/document/na3
059573.pdf>. 
379 
 
Chaowakul, Makasiri. Revision of Thai Rice Market Structure: A Complete Report 
for TRF. Naresuan University, 2009, quoted in Iswilanont (2010), 83. 
 (มาฆะสิริ เชาวกุล. การทบทวนโครงสร้างตลาดข้าวของประเทศไทย” ร่างรายงานฉบับสมบูรณ์เสนอต่อสาํนักงานกองทุน
สนับสนุนการวิจัย คณะวิทยาการจัดการและสารสนเทศ มหาวิทยาลัยนเรศวร, 2552, อา้งใน Iswilanont (2010), 83.) 
Chen, C., J. Yang, and C. Findlay. “Measuring the Effect of Food Safety Standards 
on China’s Agricultural Exports.” Review of World Economics 144, no. 1 
(2008): 83–106, quoted in Schreinemachers et al. (2012), 520. 
Chiangdao, Phu. “Lamphun Land: Our Heart Is the Land.” In Land of Life, edited by 
Ngao-sil Kongkaew and Phu Chiangdao. Nonthaburi: Local Act and 
Community Organisations Development Institute, 2010. 
 (ภู เชียงดาว."ท่ีดินลาํพนู หวัใจของเรานั้นคือท่ีดิน." ใน ผืนดินแห่งชีวิต, เงาศิลป์ คงแกว้ และ ภู เชียงดาว บรรณาธิการ. 
นนทบุรี: กลุ่มปฏิบติังานทอ้งถ่ินไร้พรมแดน, 2553.) 
Chiengkul, Witayakorn. The Effects of Capitalist Penetration on the Transformation 
of the Agrarian Structure in the Central Region of Thailand (1960-1980). 
Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute, 1983. 
Clapp, Jennifer. “Food Price Volatility and Vulnerability in the Global South: 
Considering the Global Economic Context.” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 6 
(September 2009): 1183–1196. 
Clunies-Ross, T. “Organic Food: Swimming against the Tide?” In Political, Social 
and Economic Perspectives on the International Food System, edited by T. 
Marsden and J. Little, 200–214. Aldershot: Avebury, 1990, quoted in Lyons et 
al. (2004), 118. 
CODI (The Community Organizations Development Institute). “Community Forest Network 
Rejects the Community Forest Bill,” n.d. 
<http://www.codi.or.th/index.php/news/documentary-communities-news/42-2009-09-
22-05-47-57/848-2010-09-06-06-01-33>. Retrieved 27 November 2014. (เครือข่ายป่าชุมชน
ประกาศไม่รับ พ.ร.บ.ป่าชุมชน) 
Collier, P. “Politics of Hunger: How Illusion and Greed Fan the Food Crisis.” 
Foreign Affairs, 2008, quoted in White et al. (2012), 625. 
Cone, C.A., and A. Kakaliouras. “Community Supported Agriculture: Building 
Moral Community or an Alternative Consumer Choice.” Culture and 
Agriculture 51/52 (1995): 28–31. 
Coombes, Brad, and Hugh Campbell. “Dependent Reproduction of Alternative 
Modes of Agriculture: Organic Farming in New Zealand.” Sociologia Ruralis 
38, no. 2 (1998): 127–145, quoted in Lyons et al. (2004), 124-125. 
CorpWatch-Thailand. “Connections between CP, Politicians and Thai Bureaucracy.” 
In CP and Thai Agriculture. Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2008. 
380 
 
 (กลุ่มติดตามบทบาทบรรษทั. "ความสมัพนัธ์ระหวา่งซีพี นกัการเมือง และขา้ราชการไทย." ใน ซีพีกับเกษตรกรรมไทย. 
นนทบุรี: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2008.) 
CorpWatch-Thailand and BioThai. “Critiques of the Twin Policies: For National or 
Corporate Benefits?” In CP and Thai Agriculture. Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2008. 
 (กลุ่มติดตามบทบาทบรรษทั และ มลูนิธิชีววิถี. "วิพากษท์ฤษฏีสองสูง ขอ้เสนอทางนโยบายเพ่ือผลประโยชน์ชาติหรือ
บรรษทั?." ใน ซีพีกับเกษตรกรรมไทย. นนทบุรี: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2008.) 
Cox, Robert W. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory.” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 10 (1981): 
126–155. 
              . Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of 
History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 
              . “Global Perestroika.” In The Socialist Register: New World Order?, edited 
by R. Miliband and L. Panitch. London: Merlin Press, 1992, quoted in Morton 
(2011), 158. 
CP Foods, Kitchen of the World: Annual Report 2003, quoted in Delforge (2007), 4. 
Crispin, S. “Thailand’s Classless Conflict.” In Bangkok May 2010: Perspectives on a 
Divided Thailand, edited by Michael Montesano, 109–119. Singapore: ISEAS, 
2012, quoted in Nishizaki (2014), 18. 
Curtis, Fred. “Eco-Localism and Sustainability.” Ecological Economics 46, no. 1 
(August 2003): 83–102. 
Dailynews (เดลินิวส์). “Foreign Force Swallows Million Rai of Paddy Field. President of 
Thai Farmers’ Association Exposed Dangerous Sign; Foreign Force's Land 
Grab Goals in Central and Northeastern Regions.” August 04, 2009. (ต่างชาติเขมือบ
ผืนนาลา้นไร่นายกสมาคมชาวนาไท ย เผยสญัญาณอนัตราย ต่างชาติตั้งเป้ากวา้นซ้ือท่ีดินแปลงใหญ่ภาคกลาง-อีสาน) 
Daly, Herman E., and Joshua Farley. Ecological Economics: Principles and 
Applications. Washington DC: Island Press, 2004. 
Dawe, David. “Have Recent Increases in International Cereal Prices Been 
Transmitted to Domestic Economies? The Experience in Seven Large Asian 
Countries.” ESA Working Paper. Rome: Agricultural Development Economics 
Division, FAO, 2008. 
De Schutter, Olivier. “How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three Critiques of 
Large-Scale Investments in Farmland.” Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 2 
(March 2011): 249–279. 
              . UN Human Rights Council: Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Food, 2011. http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/ 
officialreports/20110308_a-hrc-16-49_agroecology_en.pdf. 
381 
 
Deininger, K., S. Jin, and H.K. Nagarajan. “Efficiency and Equity Impacts of Rural 
Land Market Restrictions: Evidence from India. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper Series 3013” (2006), quoted in De Schutter (2011), 271. 
Delforge, Isabelle. Contract Farming in Thailand: A View from the Farm. A Report 
for Focus on the Global South. Bangkok: Focus on the Global South group, 
2007. 
DeLind, Laura, and Philip Howard. “Safe at Any Scale? Food Scares, Food 
Regulation, and Scaled Alternatives.” Agriculture and Human Values 25, no. 3 
(2008): 301–317, quoted in Schreinemachers et al. (2012), 520. 
Department of Industrial Promotion. A Study of the Feasibility of Ethanol 
Production from Cassava 2009. Bangkok: Ministry of Industry, 2009. 
 (ส่วนการบริหารจดัการขอ้มูลและปรึกษาแนะนาํ สาํนกับริหารยทุธศาสตร์ กรมส่งเสริมอุตสาหกรรม. การศึกษาความ
เป็นไปไดข้องการผลิตเอทานอลจากมนัสาํปะหลงัปี 2552. กรุงเทพฯ: กระทรวงอตุสาหกรรม, 2552) 
Desmarais, Annette. Globalization and the Power of Peasants: La Vía Campesina. 
London: Pluto Press, 2007. 
              . La Vía Campesina: Globalization and the Power of Peasants. London: 
Pluto, 2007, quoted in Borras and Edelman (2008), 187. 
Dibden, Jacqui, David Gibbs, and Chris Cocklin. “Framing GM Crops as a Food 
Security Solution.” Journal of Rural Studies 29 (November 2011): 59–70. 
Doklamyai, Prayong. “From Discourse to Practical Innovation: Land Reform by 
Communities. Transcript of the Presentation at a Conference on Anan 
Ganjanapan’s Complexity of Rights, 8 March 2008.” In “I Don’t Have the 
Answer”: 60 Years Professor Dr. Anan Ganjanapan and 20 Years of Social 
Movement on Community Rights and Natural Resources Management. Chiang 
Mai: Sustainable Development Foundation, 2008. 
 (ประยงค ์ดอกลาํไย. "จากวาทกรรมสู่นวติักรรมการปฏิรูปท่ีดินโดยชุมชน." ถอดเทปจากงานสมัมนา ประมวลแนวคิดสิทธิ
เชิงซอ้นของอาจารย ์อานนัท ์กาญจนพนัธุ์ จากทฤษฏีสู่ภาคปฏิบติัขององคก์รชาวบา้นและองคก์รเอกชน 8 มีนาคม 2551. 
ใน "ผมไม่มีคาํตอบ" 60 ปี ศ.ดร.อานันท์ กาญจนพันธ์ุ กับ 20 ปี ขบวนการเคล่ือนไหวทางสังคมด้านสิทธิชุมชนและการ
จัดการทรัพยากรธรรมชาติ. อจัฉรา รักยติุธรรม บรรณาธิการ. กรุงเทพฯ: มูลนิธิเพ่ือการพฒันาท่ีย ัง่ยนื, 2551.) 
Dolan, Catherine. “On Farm and Packhouse: Employment at the Bottom of a Global 
Value Chain.” Rural Sociology 69, no. 1 (2004): 99–126. 
Edelman, Marc, Tony Weis, Amita Baviskar, Saturnino M. Borras, Eric Holt-
Giménez, Deniz Kandiyoti, and Wendy Wolford. “Introduction: Critical 
Perspectives on Food Sovereignty.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no. 6 
(October 15, 2014): 911–931. 
Eimer, David. “Burmese Smugglers Get Rich on Yingluck Shinawatra’s £13 Billion 
Thai Rice Subsidies.” The Telegraph. February 04, 2014. 
382 
 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/10618134/Burmese
-smugglers-get-rich-on-Yingluck-Shinawatras-13-billion-Thai-rice-
subsidies.html>. 
Elias, Marlène, and Magalie Saussey. “‘The Gift That Keeps on Giving’: Unveiling 
the Paradoxes of Fair Trade Shea Butter.” Sociologia Ruralis 53, no. 2 (April 
01, 2013): 158–179. 
Elinoff, E. “Smoldering Aspirations: Burning Buildings and the Politics of 
Belonging in Contemporary Isan.” South-East Asia Research 20, no. 3 (2012): 
381–397, quoted in Nishizaki (2014), 2. 
ETC group. “Concentration in Corporate Power.” Communiqué 91 (2005). 
              . “Global Seed Industry Concentration.” Communiqué 90 (2005). 
FAO. Project on Livestock Industrialisation. Trade and Social-Health-Environment 
Impacts in Developing Countries, 2003, quoted in Delforge (2007), 11. 
              . How to Feed the World in 2050. Rome, 2009. 
<http://www.fao.org/.../How_to_Feed_the_World_in_2050.pdf>. 
FAO, IFAD, and WFP. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2013. The Multiple 
Dimensions of Food Security. Rome, 2013. 
Federici, Silvia. “Women, Land Struggles, and the Reconstruction of the Commons.” 
Working USA: The Journal of Labor and Society 14 (2011): 41–56. 
Feldman, Shelly, and Stephen Biggs. “The Politics of International Assessments: 
The IAASTD Process, Reception and Significance.” Journal of Agrarian 
Change 12, no. 1 (2012): 144–169. 
Femia, Joseph. “Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci.” 
Political Studies 23, no. 1 (2006). 
Fernandez, Rebec A. “Agricultural Value Chain Financing in Thailand.” In 
Financial Access and Inclusion in the Agricultural Value Chain, edited by 
Benedicto S. Bayaua, 81–92. Bangkok: APRACA, 2008. 
Fine, Ben. The Political Economy of Diet, Health and Food Policy. London: 
Routledge, 1998, quoted in Pimbert et al. (2001), 4. 
Forsyth, Tim. “Thailand’s Red Shirt Protests: Popular Movement or Dangerous 
Street Theatre?” Social Movement Studies 9, no. 4 (November 2010): 461–467. 
Foundation for Labour and Employment Promotion, Four Regions Slum Network, 
and Committee of Thai Labour Solidarity. A Survey of 9 Consumer Products 
Prices and Effects on the People. Bangkok, 2008, quoted in Prachason (2008), 
44. 
383 
 
 (มูลนิธิเพ่ือการพฒันาแรงงานและอาชีพ เครือข่ายสลมัส่ีภาค และคณะกรรมการสมานฉนัทแ์รงงานไทย. การสาํรวมราคา
สินค้าอุปโภคบริโภค 9 ตัวอย่าง ท่ีส่งผลกระทบต่อประชาชน. กรุงเทพฯ, 2008, ใน Prachason (2008), 44.) 
Fox, Jefferson, and Jean-Christophe Castella. “Expansion of Rubber ( Hevea 
Brasiliensis ) in Mainland Southeast Asia: What Are the Prospects for 
Smallholders?” Journal of Peasant Studies 40, no. 1 (January 2013): 155–170. 
Franco, Jennifer C. “Peripheral Justice? Rethinking Justice Sector Reform in the 
Philippines.” World Development 36, no. 10 (2008): 1858–1873, quoted in 
Borras, Franco and Wang (2013), 172. 
Frank, André Gunder. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: 
Historical Studies of Chile and Brasil. New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1976. 
Freidberg, S. The Contradictions of Clean: Supermarket Ethical Trade and African 
Horticulture. London, 2003, <http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/6361IIED.pdf>, 
quoted in Niles and Roff (2008), 6. 
Friedmann, Harriet. “From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: A Social Movements 
and Emergence of Food Regimes.” In New Directions in the Sociology of 
Global Development: Research in Rural Sociology and Development Volume 
11, edited by F. Buttel and P. McMichael. Oxford: Elsevier, 2005. 
Ganjanapan, Anan. Dynamics of Communities in Resource Management: Ideological 
Framework and Policies. Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2000, quote in 
Nartsupha (2010), 159-160. 
 (อานนัท ์กาญจนพนัธุ์. พลวัตของชุมชนในการจัดการทรัพยากร กระบวนทัศน์ และนโยบาย. กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2543, อา้ง
ใน Nartsupha (2010), 159-160.) 
              . “Community Rights in Development.” In The Community Dimension: 
Local Way of Thinking Regarding Rights, Power and Natural Resource 
Management. Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2001. 
 (_____. "สิทธิชุมชนในการพฒันา." ใน มิติชุมชน: วิธีคิดท้องถ่ินว่าด้วย สิทธิ อาํนาจ และ การจัดการทรัพยากร. กรุงเทพฯ: 
สาํนกังานกองทุนสนบัสนุนการวิจยั, 2544.) 
              . Economic Culture in an Economy of No Culture. Bangkok: Kopfai, 2001, 
quoted in Nartsupha (2010), 159-160. 
 (_____. วัฒนธรรมทางเศรษฐกิจในเศรษฐกิจไร้วัฒนธรรม. กรุงเทพฯ: คบไฟ, 2544, อา้งใน Nartsupha (2010), 159-160.) 
              . “Village in Thai Society: Conceptual Critiques.” In The Community 
Dimension: Local Way of Thinking Regarding Rights, Power and Natural 
Resource Management. Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2001. 
384 
 
 (_____. "หมู่บา้นในสงัคมไทย: ขอ้โตแ้ยง้ทางความคิด." ใน มิติชุมชน: วิธีคิดท้องถ่ินว่าด้วย สิทธิ อาํนาจ และ การจัดการ
ทรัพยากร. กรุงเทพฯ: สาํนกังานกองทุนสนบัสนุนการวิจยั, 2544.) 
Getz, Christina, and A. Shreck. “What Organic and Fair Trade Labels Do Not Tell 
Us: Towards a Place-Based Understanding of Certification.” Journal of 
Consumer Studies 30, no. 5 (2006): 490–501, quoted in Niles and Roff (2008), 
6. 
Gill, Stephen. “Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism.” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 24, no. 3 (1995): 399–423. 
              . “Toward a Postmodern Prince? The Battle in Seattle as a Moment in the 
New Politics of Globalisation.” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 
29, no. 1 (January 01, 2000): 131–140. 
Gill, Stephen, and D. Law. “Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital.” 
International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1989): 475–99, quoted in Bieler and 
Morton (2006), 18. 
Glassman, Jim. “Economic Nationalism in a Post-Nationalist Era: The Political 
Economy of Economic Policy in Post-Crisis Thailand.” Critical Asian Studies 
36, no. 1 (2004), quoted in McCargo and Pathmanand (2005), 181. 
Gliessman, Steve. “Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems Agroecology: 
Growing the Roots of Resistance.” Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems 
37, no. 1 (2013): 19–31. 
Global Harvest Initiative. Accelerating Productivity Growth: The 21st Century 
Global Agriculture Challenge. A White Paper on Agricultural Policy, 2009. 
<http://www.globalharvestinitiative.org/>. 
Glover, Dominic. “Is Bt Cotton a Pro-Poor Technology? A Review and Critique of 
the Empirical Record.” Journal of Agrarian Change 10, no. 4 (2010): 482–509. 
Glover, Dominic, and L.T. Ghee. Contract Farming in Southeast Asia: Three 
Country Studies. Edited by D. Glover and L.T. Ghee. Kuala Lumpur: Institute 
Pengajian Tinggi/Institute for Advanced Studies, 2008. 
Goldberg, R.J. “Environmental Concerns with the Development of Herbicide-
Tolerant Plants.” Weed Technology 6 (1992): 647–652. 
Goodman, David, and Melanie E. DuPuis. “Knowing Food and Growing Food: 
Beyond the Production-Consumption Debate in the Sociology of Agriculture.” 
Sociologia Ruralis 42, no. 1 (January 2002): 5–22. 
Goodman, David, and Michael Redclift. “Internationalization and the Third World 
Food Crisis.” In Refashioning Nature: Food, Ecology and Culture, 133–166. 
London: Routledge, 1991. 
385 
 
Goodman, Michael K. “Reading Fair Trade: Political Ecological Imaginary and the 
Moral Economy of Fair Trade Foods.” Political Geography 23, no. 7 
(September 2004): 891–915. 
Goss, Jasper, and David Burch. “From Agricultural Modernisation to Agri-Food 
Globalisation: The Waning of National Development in Thailand.” Third World 
Quarterly 22, no. 6 (2001): 969–986. 
Goss, Jasper, David Burch, and Roy E. Rickson. “Agri-Food Restructuring and 
Third World Transnationals: Thailand, the CP Group and the Global Shrimp 
Industry.” World Development 28, no. 3 (2000): 513–530. 
GRAIN. Making a Killing from Hunger, 2008. 
<http://www.grain.org/article/entries/178-making-a-killing-from-hunger>. 
              . Seized! The 2008 Land Grab for Food and Financial Security. Barcelona: 
GRAIN, 2008. 
Green Net Co-operative. “About Green Net Cooperative.” Accessed July 18, 2014. 
<http://www.greennet.or.th/about/greennet>. 
Gurian-Sherman, D. Failure to Yield: Evaluating the Performance of Genetically 
Engineered Crops. Cambridge: Unions of Concerned Scientists, 2009, quoted 
in Giménez and Shattuck (2011), 119. 
Guthman, Julie. “Regulating Meaning, Appropriating Nature: The Codification of 
California Organic Agriculture.” Antipode 30, no. 2 (1998): 135–154. 
              . “Raising Organic: An Agro-Ecological Assessment of Grower Practices in 
California” (2000): 257–266. 
Hall, Derek. “Land Grabs, Land Control, and Southeast Asian Crop Booms.” 
Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 4 (October 2011): 837–857. 
Hall, Derek, Philip Hirsch, and Tania Murray Li. Powers of Exclusion: Land 
Dilemmas in Southeast Asia. Singapore: NUS Press, 2011. 
Hall, Stuart. “The Problem of Ideology-Marxism without Guarantees.” Journal of 
Communication Inquiry 10, no. 2 (1986). 
Harvey, David. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
              . A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Herren, H.R et al. UNEP Green Economy Report: Agriculture. Geneva, 2001. 
Hewison, Kevin. Power and Politics in Thailand: Essays in Political Economy. 
Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1989. 
386 
 
               . "Localism in Thailand: A Study of Globalisation and Its Discontents." A 
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University 
of Warwick, UK, Working Paper No. 39/99, September 1999. 
              . “Responding to Economic Crisis: Thailand’s Localism.” In Reforming 
Thai Politics, edited by Duncan McCargo. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2002. 
              . “A Book, the King and the 2006 Coup.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, 
no. 1 (2008). 
              . “Class, Inequality, and Politics.” In Bangkok May 2010: Perspectives on a 
Divided Thailand, edited by M. Montesano, 143–60. Singapore: ISEAS, 2012, 
quoted in Nishizaki (2014), 2. 
Hines, Colin. Localization: A Global Manifesto. London: Earthscan, 2000, quoted in 
Starr and Adams (2003), 22. 
Hinrichs, Clare C. “Embeddedness and Local Food Systems: Notes on Two Types of 
Direct Agricultural Market.” Journal of Rural Studies 16 (2000): 295–303. 
              . “The Practice and Politics of Food System Localization.” Journal of Rural 
Studies 19, no. 1 (January 2003): 33–45. 
Holt-Giménez, Eric, and Miguel A. Altieri. “Agroecology, Food Sovereignty and the 
New Green Revolution.” Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems 37, no. 1 
(September 04, 2013): 90–102. 
Holt Giménez, Eric, and Annie Shattuck. “Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food 
Movements: Rumblings of Reform or Tides of Transformation?” The Journal 
of Peasant Studies 38, no. 1 (January 2011): 109–44. 
Hongthong, Yupin. “The State Pushes to Solve Farmer Crisis: Open Smart Farmers 
School in 6 Provinces.” Bangkok Business Newspaper, August 11, 2013. (รัฐ
เดินหนา้แก"้วิกฤติชาวนา" เปิดโรงเรียนมืออาชีพ 6 จงัหวดั) 
Huguet, J. W., A. Chamratrithirong, and K. Richter. “Thailand Migration Profile.” In 
Thailand Migration Report 2011: Migration for Development in Thailand – 
Overview and Tools for Policymaker, edited by J. W. Huguet and A. 
Chamratrithirong. Bangkok: International Organization for Migration, 2012, 
quoted in Rigg Promphaking and Le Mare (2014), 190. 
Humphrey, John. “Policy Implications of Trends in Agribusiness Value Chains.” The 
European Journal of Development Research 18, no. 4 (2006): 574–575. 
Hutanuwat, Nanthiya. “A Strategy to Expand Organic Jasmine Rice Production. A 
Paper for the 5th National Academic Conference on Agricultural System 5: 
Alternative Energy and Food Security for Humanity, 2-4 July 2009, Ubol 
International Hotel, Ubolratchathani Province.” Ubolratchathani, 2009. 
<http://www.mcc.cmu.ac.th/Seminar/showseminar.asp?type_id=18>. 
387 
 
 (นนัทิยา หุตานุวตัร. "ยทุธศาสตร์การขยายการผลิตขา้วหอมมะลิอินทรีย.์" การประชุมวิชาการ ระบบเกษตรแห่งชาติ คร้ังท่ี 
5: พลงังานทดแทนและความมัน่คงทางอาหารเพ่ือมนุษยชาติ ระหวา่งวนัท่ี 2-4 กรกฏาคม 2552 ณ โรงแรมอุบลอินเตอร์
เนชัน่แนล อุบลราชธานี.) 
Hutanuwat, Nanthiya, and Narong Hutanuwat. Before a Community Rice Mill 
Business Can Be Established: A Case Study of Bakrua Farmer Group, 
Yasothon Province. Ubolratchathani: Local Development Institute (LDI), 2000. 
 (นนัทิยา หุตานุวตัร และ ณรงค ์หุตานุวตัร. กว่าจะเป็นธุรกิจโรงสีชุมชน กรณีศึกษากลุ่มเกษตรกรทาํนาบากเรือ จังหวัด
ยโสธร. อุบลราชธานี: สถาบนัชุมชนทอ้งถ่ินพฒันา, 2543.) 
Iewskul, Natwipa. “18 Years Track Records of GMOs: Threats to Thailand’s Food 
Sovereignty.” Green Peace Southeast Asia Website, April 02, 2013. 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/th/PageFiles/505377/18-year-of-gmo.pdf>. 
(ย้อนรอยจีเอ็มโอ 18 ปี: ภยัคกุคามอธิปไตยทางอาหารของประเทศ) 
Iewsriwong, Nithi. “Changing Thailand with the Rice Mortgage Scheme.” 
Mathichon Newspaper, November 05, 2012. 
<http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1352088566&grpid=03
&catid=03>. (เปล่ียนประเทศไทย ดว้ยการรับจาํนาํขา้ว) 
              . “Changing Thailand with the Rice Mortgage Scheme (one More Time).” 
Mathichon Newspaper, December 03, 2012. 
<http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1354506138&grpid=03
&catid=03>. (เปล่ียนประเทศไทย ดว้ยการรับจาํนาํขา้ว (อีกที)) 
iLaw website. “Third Attempt At Drafting Community Forest Law by the National 
Reform Assembly Is Still Not Relevant to Communities,” July 23, 2015. 
<http://www.ilaw.or.th/node/3728>. (ร่างกฎหมายป่าชุมชนยกท่ีสาม ในยคุสภาปฏิรูปแห่งชาติ ยงัคงไม่
ตอบโจทยชุ์มชน) 
Imai, Masami. “Mixing Family Business with Politics in Thailand.” Asian Economic 
Journal 20, no. 3 (September 2006): 241–256. 
International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD). Agriculture at a Crossroads. Global Report., 2009. 
<http://www.agassessment.org/index.cfm?page=iaastd reports&itemid=2713>. 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Rural Poverty Report 
2011. New Realities, New Challenges: New Opportunities for Tomorrow’s 
Generation. Rome, 2011. 
Isawilanont, Somporn. Thai Rice: Changes in Production and Distribution 
Structure. Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2010. 
 (สมพร อิศวิลานนท.์ ข้าวไทย: การเปล่ียนแปลงในโครงสร้างการผลิตและช่องทางการกระจาย. กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2553.) 
388 
 
Isawilanont, Somporn, Sanit Kao-ian and others. Dynamics of Thailand’s Rice 
Production Economy and The Future Outlook. Bangkok: Thailand Research 
Fund, 2009. 
 (สมพร อิศวิลานนท,์ ศานิต เกา้เอ้ียน และคณะ. รายงานวิจัยฉบับสมบูรณ์ ความเป็นพลวัตของเศรษฐกิจการผลิตของ
 ข้าวไทย และการมองไปข้างหน้า. กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2552.) 
Isawilanont, Somporn, and Prue Santithamrak. A Report on Global and Thai Rice 
Production and Trade Situation 2011 and Future Tendency (KNIT Agricultural 
Policy No. 2012-1). Bangkok: KNIT, 2011. 
 (สมพร อิศวิลานนท ์และ ปรุฬห์ สนัติธรรมรักษ.์ รายงานสถานการณ์การผลิตและการค้าข้าวของโลก และของไทย ปี 2554 
และแนวโน้ม. กรุงเทพฯ: สถาบนัคลงัสมองของชาติ, 2554.) 
Isra news. “Judiciary Declared the State Was Not Guilty for GM Papaya 
Contamination, Greenpeace Feared Monsanto Monopoly,” April 02, 2013. 
<http://isranews.org/??????????/?????-????????/item/20372-gdsdds.html>. (ตุลา
การแถลง ‘รัฐไม่ผิดคดีมะละกอจีเอม็โอ’ รอศาลตดัสิน กรีนพีซหวัน่มอนซานโตผ้กูขาด) 
              . "P-move reminds the government of the promises on land banks and the 
protection of CLTDs areas," February 23, 2013. <http://www.isranews.org/กระแส
ชุมชน/ข่าวการเมือง/item/19605-pmove220213.html>. (‘พีมูฟ’ทวงสญัญา รบ.ตั้ง ‘ธนาคารท่ีดิน”-เร่ง
ออกมติ ครม.คุม้ครองพ้ืนท่ีโฉนดชุมชน) 
              . “Against Section 190 Modification. NGOs against an Increase in the 
Power of the Executive - Elites, and a Reduction of Civil Society’s Spaces,” 
November 18, 2013. <http://www.isranews.org/isranews-news/item/25207-
fta_25207.html>. (คา้นแกม้าตรา 190 ‘เอน็จีโอ’ ช้ีมุ่งกระชบัอาํนาจฝ่ายบริหาร-ชนชั้นนาํ กาํจดัพ้ืนท่ีปชช.) 
              . “Macro View of Land in Thailand Reveals Inequality and Highly 
Concentrated Land: Wealth in Poor People’s Tears.”, July 14, 2014. 
<http://www.isranews.org/isranews-scoop/item/31125-0907571.html>. (เปิด
ภาพรวมท่ีดินไทย 'เหล่ือมลํ้า-กระจุกตวั' ความมัง่คัง่ในคราบนํ้ าตาคนจน) 
              . “Concerned That Giving Away 53,000 Rai Plan Will Fail, Prayong 
Doklamyai Suggests 35 CLTD Pilot Projects Instead.”, December 07, 2014. 
<http://www.isranews.org/isranews-news/item/34891-
thaireform0411257.html>. (แจกท่ีดิน 5.3 หม่ืนไร่ หวัน่เหลว ‘ประยงค ์ดอกลาํไย’ แนะจดัสรรโฉนดชุมชน 
35แห่งนาํร่อง) 
Issarapan, Dr. Pibul. “Farmers’ Risks from Using Agricultural Chemicals and 
Sudden Illness.” In An Academic Conference to Monitor Agricultural 
Chemicals 1, 16-17 June 2011, edited by National committee to plan for food 
security. Bangkok, 2011. 
 (น.พ.พิบูลอิสสระพนัธุ์ (รองผูอ้าํนวยการ สาํนกัโรคจากการประกอบอาชีพและส่ิงแวดลอ้ม กระทรวงสาธารณสุข). 
"สถานการณ์ความเส่ียงของเกษตรกรจากสารเคมีกาํจดัศตัรูพืชและการเจบ็ป่วยเฉียบพลนั." ใน การประชุมวิชาการเพ่ือการ
389 
 
เฝ้าระวงัสารเคมีทางการเกษตรคร้ังท่ี 1 วนัท่ี 16-17 มิ.ย. 2554 โรงแรมเซ็นจูร่ีพาร์ค กรุงเทพฯ โดย แผนงานสนบัสนุนความ
มัน่คงทางอาหาร แผนงานส่งเสริมการพฒันาระบบเพ่ือสุขภาวะของเกษตรกรและความเขม้แขง็ของชุมชนและสงัคม. 
กรุงเทพฯ, 2554.) 
Jamarik, Saneh. “Self-Sufficient Economy in the Globalisation Current.” In Safety 
and Stability through Self-Sufficiency Economy, edited by Pitaya Wongkul. 
Bangkok: Withithat Institute, 2008. 
 (เสน่ห์ จามริก. "เศรษฐกิจพอเพียงในกระแสโลกาภิวตัน์." ใน อุ่นใจในความมั่นคง ชูธงเศรษฐกิจพอเพียง. พิทยา ว่องกุง 
บรรณาธิการ. กรุงเทพฯ: มูลนิธิวิถีทรรศน์, 2551.) 
Jampaklai, Aree, Pattama Wapattanawong, Karnchana Tangcholtip, Carry Rickter, 
Nipat Ponpai, and Charita Prasithima. What Happens to Children When Parents 
Moved Away: CLAIM Project with the Support of UNICEF. Academic 
Document No. 411. Nakhon Pratom: Institute for Population and Social 
Research, Mahidol University, 2013. 
 (อารี จาํปากลาย, ปัทมา วา่พฒันวงศ,์ กาญจนา ตั้งชลทิพย,์ แคร่ี ริคเตอร์, นิพทัธ์ พน้ภยั, ชาริตา้ ประสิทธิหิมะ. ลูกๆเป็น
อย่างไร เม่ือพ่อแม่ย้ายถ่ิน. โครงการ CLAIM ภายใตก้ารสนบัสนุนจากองคก์ารยนิูเซฟ ประเทศไทย. นครปฐม: สถาบนัวิจยั
ประชากรและสงัคม มหาวิทยาลยัมหิดล, 2013.) 
Jantarawong, Sombat. Election Crisis. Bangkok: Kopfai, 1993, quoted in 
Laothamatat (2000), 26. 
 (สมบติั จนัทรวงศ.์ เลือกต้ังวิกฤต. กรุงเทพฯ: คบไฟ, 2536, อา้งใน Laothamatat (2000), 26.) 
Jaroenpanich, Sriracha, and et al. A Study of the Effects of the Paddy Pledging 
Scheme on Thai Farmers’ Quality of Life. Bangkok: Office of the Ombudsman 
Thailand, 2014. 
 (ศรีราชา เจริญพานิช (ผูต้รวจการแผน่ดิน) และคณะ. รายงานการศึกษาเร่ือง ผลกระทบของโครงการรับจาํนาํข้าวต่อ
คุณภาพชีวิตชาวนาไทย. กรุงเทพฯ: สาํนกังานผูต้รวจการแผน่ดิน, 2557.) 
Jeerapat, Wich. “Reflection on Thai Community Right Ideas.” Julniti Journal 3, no. 
38 (2010): 35–53. 
 (วิชช์ จีระแพทย.์ "มองยอ้นแนวคิดสิทธิชุมชนของไทย." จุลนิติ 3, no. 38 (2553): 35-53.) 
Jikkham, Patsara. “Rice Stockpile to Be Audited.” Bangkok Post Online, June 13, 
2014. 
Jitpleecheep, Pitsinee, and Piyachart Maikaew. “Delayed Scheme Payments Lead to 
Higher NPLs.” Bangkok Post, February 17, 2014. 
Jitsanguan, Thanwa. “Sustainable Agricultural Systems for Small-Scale Farmers in 
Thailand: Implications for the Environment, Paper at Kasetsart University, 
Bangkok, 12 January 2001,” quoted in Unger (2009), 143. 
390 
 
Johnson, Craig, and Timothy Forsyth. “In the Eyes of the State: Negotiating a 
‘Rights-Based Approach’ to Forest Conservation in Thailand.” World 
Development 30, no. 9 (September 2002): 1591–1605. 
Kaewthep, Kanoksak. “The Struggle of Thai Farmers 1989- 1999.” In The Path of 
Thai Farmers. Bangkok, 1999. 
 (กนกศกัด์ิ แกว้เทพ. เส้นทางชาวนาไทย. กรุงเทพฯ: มูลนิธิโกมลคีมทอง, 2542.) 
              . “Rakthammachart Rice Mill: Naso Community, Ampur Kudchum, 
Yasothon Province.” In Community Organised Welfare (2): Production 
Groups. Journal of Political Economy (for the Community) 18. Bangkok: 
Chulalongkorn University, 2001. 
 (_____. "โรงสีชมรมรักษธ์รรมชาติ ชุมชนนาโส่ อาํเภอกุดชุม จงัหวดัยโสธร." ใน สวัสดิการโดยภาคชุมชน (2) กลุ่ม
ผลิตภัณฑ์ วารสารเศรษฐศาสตร์การเมือง (เพ่ือชุมชน) 18. ณรงค ์เพช็รประเสริฐ บรรณาธิการ. กรุงเทพฯ: ม.จุฬาลงกรณ์, 
2544.) 
Kam Pakha. “Morality Leads Thailand towards Destruction.” Mathichon (weekly), 
January 2011. (คณุธรรมนําไทยให้ลม่จม) 
              . “‘Life Must Be Easy’ Is Just a Propaganda.” Mathichon Newspaper, 
September 18, 2014. 
<http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1411041439>. (คาํ ผกา: ชีวิต
ตอ้งง่าย เป็นโฆษณาชวนเช่ือ) 
Karnchuchat, Weerayuth. “Thai Retail Business: Two Cities Divide.” In The 
Struggles of Thai Capital 2: Politics, Culture and Survival, edited by Pasuk 
Phongpaichit, 217–279. Bangkok: Matichon, 2006. 
 (วีรยทุธ กาญจน์ชูฉตัร. "สองนคราคา้ปลีกไทย." ใน การต่อสู้ของทุนไทย 2 การเมือง วัฒนธรรม เพ่ือความอยู่รอด,  ผาสุก 
พงษไ์พจิตร บรรณาธิการ, 217–279. กรุงเทพฯ: มติชน, 2549.) 
Karriem, Abdurazack. “The Rise and Transformation of the Brazilian Landless 
Movement into a Counter-Hegemonic Political Actor: A Gramscian Analysis.” 
Geoforum 40, no. 3 (May 2009): 316–325. 
Kata, Prachathip. Civil Society and the Path of Self-Reliance: Lessons from the 
Organic Agriculture Network in Yasothon. Bangkok: Society and Health 
Institute, 2005. 
 (ประชาธิป กะทา. ประชาสังคม วิถีการพ่ึงตนเอง: บทเรียนเครือข่ายเกษตรอินทรีย์ยโสธร. กรุงเทพฯ: สาํนกัวิจยัสงัคมและ
สุขภาพ, 2548.) 
Kemp, Jeremy. Community and State in Modern Thailand (working Paper no.100), 
1988, quoted in Laothamatat (2000), 26. 
391 
 
Kerkvliet, Benedict. The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants 
Transformed National Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 
Keyes, Charles F. Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom as Modern Nation-State. Bangkok: 
Westview press, 1987. 
Khaosod newspaper (ข่าวสด). “Grassroot Voices Regarding the Rice Mortgage 
Scheme,” April 16, 2012. 
<http://www.khaosod.co.th/view_news.php?newsid=TURObFkyOHlOVEUyT
URRMU5RPT0=>. ("เสียงรากหญา้"ถึงจาํนาํขา้ว) 
Kirwan, James, and Damian Maye. “Food Security Framings within the UK and the 
Integration of Local Food Systems.” Journal of Rural Studies 29 (March 2012): 
91–100. 
Kittiarsa, P. “Becoming ‘red’: The New Brand of Thai Democracy with a Provincial 
Base.” Journal of the Siam Society 3 (2011): 226–230, quoted in Nishizaki 
(2014), 2. 
Klongyong community leaders. “A Summary of the Struggles of the Klongyong 
Community (a Document Prepared by the Locals for Visitors), Obtained 10 
October 2012.” (เอกสารสรุปความเป็นมาท่ีดินบา้นคลองโยง) 
Klonsky et al., K. Statistical Review of California’s Organic Agriculture 1995-1998. 
Davis: University of California, Agricultural Issues Center, 2001, quoted in 
Lyons et al. (2004), 124-125. 
Kom Chad Luek newspaper (คมชดัลกึ). "Mae-Aow villagers smile for the second 
CLTDs from the Prime Minister," March 18, 2011. < 
http://www.komchadluek.net/detail/20110318/91899/ชาวแมอ่าวยิม้รับโฉนดชมุชนใบทีส่อง
จากนายกรัฐมนตรี.html>. (ชาวแม่อาว "ยิม้" รับโฉนดชุมชนใบท่ีสองจากนายกรัฐมนตรี) 
Kongkaew, Ngao-sin. The Event Occured at Bantad Mountains. Bangkok: Bantad 
mountains land reform network and the Thai Health Organisation, 2011. 
 (เงาศิลป์ คงแกว้. เหตเุกิดท่ีเทือกเขาบรรทัด. กรุงเทพฯ: เครือข่ายปฏิรูปท่ีดินเทือกเขาบรรทดั และ สาํนกังานกองทุน
สนบัสนุนการสร้างเสริมสุขภาพ (สสส.), 2554.) 
Kraiyoorawong, Sayamon, et al. A Study of Land Conflicts in Thailand Phase 1. 
Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2005. 
 (ศยามล ไกยรูวงศ ์และคณะ. โครงการศึกษาและสาํรวจข้อพิพาทและความขัดแย้งปัญหาท่ีดินในประเทศไทย ระยะท่ี 1. 
กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2548.) 
              . Traditional Wisdom: Community and Nature’s Ways. Bangkok: Duan-tula 
printing, 2008. 
 (_____.ภูมิปัญญา วิถีชุมชน วิถีธรรมชาติ. กรุงเทพฯ: เดือนตุลา, 2551.) 
392 
 
Land Reform Network and Local Act. A Report on the Study “Land Management 
and Social Justice: A Case Study of the Land Reform Network”, Part of the 
Project to Encourage Social Justice, Chulalongkorn University Social Research 
Institute. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute, 2010. 
 (เครือข่ายปฏิรูปท่ีดินแห่งประเทศไทย (คปท.) กลุ่มปฏิบติังานทอ้งถ่ินไร้พรมแดน (Local Act.). รายงานการศึกษาวิจัยฉบับ
สมบูรณ์ "การจัดการท่ีดินกับความเป็นธรรมทางสังคม กรณีศึกษาเครือข่ายปฏิรูปท่ีดินแห่งประเทศไทย งานวิจัยภายใต้ชุด
โครงการพัฒนาความเป็นธรรมทางสังคมเพ่ือสังคมสุขภาวะ สถาบันวิจัยสังคม จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย. เอกสาร
ประกอบการนาํเสนอผลงานวิจยั 12 กรกฏาคม 2555 ณ ห้องประชุมสารนิเทศ หอประชุมจุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลยั. 
กรุงเทพฯ: สถาบนัวิจยัสงัคม จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลยั, 2555.) 
Land Reform Network. CLTDs - We Can: A Handbook. Bangkok: Land Reform 
Network, 2012. 
 (เครือข่ายปฏิรูปท่ีดินแห่งประเทศไทย (คปท.). โฉนดชุมชน เราทาํได้. กรุงเทพฯ: คปท., 2555.) 
Lang, Tim, and Colin Hines. The New Protectionism: Protecting the Future Against 
Free Trade. New York: New Press, 1993, quoted in Starr and Adams (2003), 
22. 
Laothamatat, Anek. Thai Democracy as a Tale of Two Cities: Paths to Reform 
Politics and Economy for Democracy. 5th ed. Bangkok: Wipasa, 2000. 
 (เอนก เหล่าธรรมทศัน์. สองนัคราประชาธิปไตย: แนวทางการปฏิรูปการเมือง เศรษฐกิจ เพ่ือประชาธิปไตย. พิมพค์ร้ังท่ี 4. 
กรุงเทพฯ: วิภาษา, 2543.) 
              . Changing Areas and Foundation: Building Local Administration and a 
Foundation for Democracy. Bangkok: Thammasat University, 2009, quoted in 
Nartsupha (2010), 175-176. 
 (_____.แปรถ่ิน เปล่ียนฐาน: สร้างการปกครองท้องถ่ินให้เป็นรากฐานของประชาธิปไตย. กรุงเทพฯ: สาํนกัพิมพ์
ธรรมศาสตร์, 2552, อา้งใน Nartsupha (2010), 175-176.) 
              . Progressive Locality: Political Theories to Build the Local as a 
Foundation for Democracy. Bangkok: Thai Health Organisation, 2009, quoted 
in Nartsupha (2010), 175-176. 
 (_____. อภิวัฒน์ท้องถ่ิน: สาํรวจทฤษฏีการเมืองเพ่ือสร้างท้องถ่ินให้เป็นรากฐานใหม่ของประชาธิปไตย. กรุงเทพฯ: สสส., 
2552, อา้งใน Nartsupha (2010), 175-176.) 
Lastarria-Cornhiel, S. “Impact of Privatization on Gender and Property Rights in 
Africa.” World Development 25, no. 8 (1997): 1317–1333. 
Lawrence, Geoffrey, and Philip McMichael. “The Question of Food Security.” 
International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 19, no. 2 (2012): 
135–142. 
393 
 
Le Mons Walker, Kathy. “From Covert to Overt: Everyday Peasant Politics in China 
and the Implications for Transnational Agrarian Movements.” In Transnational 
Agrarian Movements Confronting Globalization, 295–322. Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2008. 
Lerche, Jens. “The Agrarian Question in Neoliberal India: Agrarian Transition 
Bypassed?” Journal of Agrarian Change 13, no. 3 (July 16, 2013): 382–404. 
Lerche, Jens, Alpa Shah, and Barbara Harriss-White. “Introduction: Agrarian 
Questions and Left Politics in India.” Journal of Agrarian Change 13, no. 3 
(July 16, 2013): 337–350. 
Levi, Margaret, and April Linton. “Fair Trade: A Cup at a Time?” Politics & Society 
31, no. 3 (September 01, 2003): 407–432, quoted in Niles and Roff (2008), 6. 
Lienchamroon, Witoon. “Alternative Agriculture: A Path of Free, Independent 
Agriculture. A Document Summarising the Academic Content of the Third 
Congress of Alternative Agriculture (18-21 November 2004 at Kasetsart 
University).” In Reform the Agricultural Sector for Food Security: Analysis and 
Practical Policies, edited by Witoon Lienchamroon. Nonthaburi: BioThai, 
2011. 
 (วิฑูรย ์เล่ียนจาํรูญ. "เกษตรกรรมย ัง่ยนื: วิถีเกษตรกรมเพ่ือความเป็นไท." ใน ปฏิรูปเกษตรกรรมเพ่ือความมั่นคงทางอาหาร: 
บทวิเคราะห์ และปฏิบัติการทางนโยบาย.  วิฑูรย ์เล่ียนจาํรูญ บรรณาธิการ. นนทบุรี: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2554.) 
              . “Behind the Movement to Extend Agricultural Chemicals Registration.” In 
Reform the Agricultural Sector for Food Security: Analysis and Practical 
Policies. Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2011. 
 (_____. "เบือ้งหลงัการเคลื่อนไหวยืดระยะเวลาการขึน้ทะเบียนสารเคมีกําจดัศตัรูพืช." ใน ปฏิรูปเกษตรกรรมเพ่ือความ
มั่นคงทางอาหาร: บทวิเคราะห์ และปฏิบัติการทางนโยบาย.  วิฑูรย ์เล่ียนจาํรูญ บรรณาธิการ. นนทบุรี: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2554.) 
              . “Effects of Intellectual Property Rights on Biodiversity under the EU-
ASEAN FTA (written 2009 for the ASEAN Civil Society Conference, 2009, 
Phetchaburi, Thailand).” In Reform the Agricultural Sector for Food Security: 
Analysis and Practical Policies. Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2011. 
 (_____. "ผลกระทบของบททรัพย์สนิทางปัญญาด้านพืชและความหลากหลายทางชีวภาพ ภายใต้ข้อตกลงอีย-ู
อาเซียนเอฟทีเอ" ใน ปฏิรูปเกษตรกรรมเพ่ือความมั่นคงทางอาหาร: บทวิเคราะห์ และปฏิบัติการทางนโยบาย.  วิฑูรย ์เล่ียน
จาํรูญ บรรณาธิการ. นนทบุรี: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2554.) 
              . “Fighting FTA: the Thai Experience.” In Reform the Agricultural Sector 
for Food Security: Analysis and Practical Policies. Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2011. 
 (_____. "Fighting FTA: ประสบการณ์จากประเทศไทย." ใน ปฏิรูปเกษตรกรรมเพ่ือความมั่นคงทางอาหาร: บท
วิเคราะห์ และปฏิบัติการทางนโยบาย.  วิฑูรย ์เล่ียนจาํรูญ บรรณาธิการ. นนทบุรี: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2554.) 
394 
 
              . “Lessons from the Struggle over Plant Genetics Protection under the 
WTO’s TRIPs (originally Published in 2002 as a TDRI Annual Conference 
Paper).” In Reform the Agricultural Sector for Food Security: Analysis and 
Practical Policies. Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2011. 
 (_____. "บทเรียนการต่อสู้ของเกษตรกรและภาคประชนชน กรณีการคุม้ครองพนัธุ์พืชในขอ้ตกลงทรัพยสิ์นทางปัญญาใน
องคก์ารคา้โลก." ใน ปฏิรูปเกษตรกรรมเพ่ือความมั่นคงทางอาหาร: บทวิเคราะห์ และปฏิบัติการทางนโยบาย.  วิฑูรย ์เล่ียน
จาํรูญ บรรณาธิการ. นนทบุรี: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2554.) 
              . “Suggestions to Avoid Food Crisis for Thailand.” In Reform the 
Agricultural Sector for Food Security: Analysis and Practical Policies. 
Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2011. 
 (_____. "ขอ้เสนอสาํหรับประเทศไทยเพ่ือให้พน้ภยัวิกฤติการณ์อาหาร." ใน ปฏิรูปเกษตรกรรมเพ่ือความมั่นคงทางอาหาร: 
บทวิเคราะห์ และปฏิบัติการทางนโยบาย.  วิฑูรย ์เล่ียนจาํรูญ บรรณาธิการ. นนทบุรี: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2554.) 
              . “The Role of Agri-Businesses and the Changes in Rural Thailand and Thai 
Society,” November 25, 2011. <http://www.biothai.net/node/10889>. (บทบาทของ
บรรษทัเกษตรและอาหาร กบัการเปล่ียนแปลงชนบทและสงัคมไทย) 
Lienchamroon, Witoon, and Suriyon Thankitchanukit. From the Green Revolution to 
Bio-Engineering. Lessons for the Future of Thai Agriculture. Nonthaburi: 
BioThai, 2008. 
 (วิฑูรย ์เล่ียนจาํรูญ และ สุริยนต ์ธญักิจจานุกิจ. จากปฏิวัติเขียวสู่พันธุวิศวกรรม บทเรียนสาํหรับอนาคตเกษตรกรรมไทย. 
นนทบุรี: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2551.) 
Lienchamroon, Witoon, and Supha Yaimuang. “Alternative Agriculture: From 
Individual Farmers to Social Movements.” In Reform the Agricultural Sector 
for Food Security: Analysis and Practical Policies, edited by Witoon 
Lienchamroon. Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2011. 
 (วิฑรูย์ เลี่ยนจํารูญ และ สภุา ใยเมือง. "เกษตรกรรมทางเลือก จากปัจเจกเกษตรกรสูข่บวนการทางสงัคม." ใน ปฏิรูป
เกษตรกรรมเพ่ือความมั่นคงทางอาหาร: บทวิเคราะห์ และปฏิบัติการทางนโยบาย.  วิฑูรย ์เล่ียนจาํรูญ บรรณาธิการ. 
นนทบุรี: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2554.) 
Limnirandkul, Bootsara, Cho-paka Muangsuk, Pratanthip Kramol, and Pruek 
Yipmantasiri. "Contract Farming and the Opportunity of Development of Small 
Scale Farmers." Paper for the Conference at Agricultural Science Faculty, 
Chiang Mai University, 22-23 September 2006. 
<http://www.mcc.cmu.ac.th/research/MCCannualSeminar2006/link/sa.html>. 
 (บุศรา ล้ิมนิรันดร์กุล,  ช่อผกา  ม่วงสุข,  ประทานทิพย ์กระมล, และพฤกษ ์ยบิมนัตะสิริ. "เกษตรพนัธะสญัญากบัโอกาส
ของเกษตรกรรายยอ่ย." ประชุมวิชาการ ศวพก. คณะเกษตรศาสตร์ ม.เชียงใหม่ วนัท่ี 22-23 ก.ย. 2549.) 
395 
 
Lockie, Stewart. “The Invisible Mouth: Mobilizing ‘the Consumer’ in Food 
Production-Consumption Networks.” Sociologia Ruralis 42, no. 4 (2002): 278–
294. 
Lockie, Stewart, and L. Collie. “‘Feed the Man Meat’: Gendered Food and Theories 
of Consumption.” In Restructuring Global and Regional Agricultures: 
Transformations in Australasian Agri-Food Economies and Spaces, edited by 
D. Burch, J. Cross, and G. Lawrence, 225–273. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 
1999, quoted in Goodman and DuPuis (2002), 15. 
Lockie, Stewart, Kristen Lyons, Geoffrey Lawrence, and Kerry Mummery. “Eating 
‘Green’: Motivations Behind Organic Food Consumption in Australia.” 
Sociologia Ruralis 42, no. 1 (2010): 23–40. 
Lorlohakarn, Suphachai. Organic Farming Business. Bangkok: National Innovation 
Agency and Asian Institute of Technology, 2007. 
 (ศุภชยั หล่อโลหการ. ธุรกิจเกษตรอินทรีย์. กรุงเทพฯ: สาํนกังานนวตักรรมแห่งชาติ กระทรวงวิทยาศาสตร์และเทคโนโลย ี
และ สถาบนัเทคโนโลยแีห่งเอเชีย, 2550.) 
Losirikul, Manus, and Prasit Karnchan. The Possibility of Hom Mali Rice Production 
in Organic Farming Systems as an Alternative Farming Career with Poverty 
Alleviation Potential for Lower-Northeastern Farmer : A Case of Surin 
Province. Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2006. 
 (มานสั ลอศิริกุล และ ประสิทธ์ิ กาญจนา. โครงการความเป็นไปได้ของการผลลิตข้าวหอมมะลิในระบบเกษตรอินทรีย์ท่ีจะ
เป็นอาชีพทางเลือกท่ีมีศักยภาพในการแก้ไขปัญหาความยกจนสาํหรับเกษตรกรภาคตะวันออกเฉียงเหนือตอนล่าง: 
กรณีศึกษาจังหวัดสุรินทร์. กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2549.) 
Lutman, P.J.W. “Gene Flow and Agriculture: Relevance for Transgenic Crops.” In 
British Crop Protection Council Symposium Proceedings 72, 43–64, 1999. 
Lynas, Mark. “Mark Lynas Plenary Speech for International Rice Congress 2014, 
Bangkok, Thailand.” October 31, 2014. 
<http://www.marklynas.org/2014/10/mark-lynas-plenary-speech-for-
international-rice-congress-2014-bangkok-thailand/>. 
Lyons, Kristen, David Burch, Geoffrey Lawrence, and Stewart Lockie. “Contrasting 
Paths of Corporate Greening in Antipodean Agriculture: Organics and Green 
Production.” In Agribusiness and Society. Corporate Responses to 
Environmentalism, Market Opportunities and Public Regulation, edited by 
Kees Jansen and Sietze Vellema. London: Zed books, 2004. 
Madeley, John. Hungry for Trade. How the Poor Pay for Free Trade. London: Zed 
Books, 2000. 
Malseed, Kevin. “Where There Is No Movement: Local Resistance and the Potential 
for Solidarity.” Journal of Agrarian Change 8, no. 2–3 (2008): 489–514. 
396 
 
Manager Newspaper (online) (หนงัสือพิมพ์ผู้จดัการ). “Food Crisis Increases Pressure on 
Landless Farmers. Watch out for CP’s Monopoly Control over 100,000 Million 
Baht Rice Seeds Market,” May 01, 2008. 
<http://www.manager.co.th/Daily/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9510000050851>. 
(วิกฤตอาหารซํ้าเติมชาวนาไร้ท่ีดินจบัตาซีพีผกูขาดพนัธุ์ขา้วแสนลา้น) 
              . “CP Took over Makro, Swallowed Thailand, Advancing on Asian 
Markets,” April 27, 2013. 
<http://www.manager.co.th/AstvWeekend/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=
9560000050426>. (ซีพีฮบุแม็คโคร กินรวบประเทศไทย รุกตลาดเอเชีย) 
              . “Rak Chiang Mai 51 Shows Support to ‘Plod’ - Threathens NGOs Causing 
Chaos at the Water Summit - Prepares to Mobilise Thousands to Resist,” May 
16, 2013. 
<http://www.manager.co.th/Local/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9560000058929>. 
(รักเชียงใหม่ 51 ยกขบวนให้กาํลงัใจ “ปลอด” ขู่เอน็จีโอห้ามป่วนประชุมนํ้าโลก-ไม่เช่ือระดมกาํลงันบัพนัตา้น) 
              . “Farmers Bittered from Discriminatory Payment as the Government Only 
Paid Their Supporters,” January 29, 2014. 
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9570000011000>
. (ชาวนาสุดชํ้าฝนตกไม่ทัว่ฟ้า แฉรัฐบาลเลือกจ่ายพวกตวัเอง) 
Manager Newspaper (weekly) (ผู้จดัการรายสปัดาห์). “CP Advances on Biodiesel Business, 
Contract Farming of Palm Oil in Indochina,” March 21, 2008. 
<http://www.manager.co.th/iBizchannel/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=951000003
4527>. (CP รุกธุรกิจไบโอดีเซลทาํคอนแทรกตฟ์าร์มม่ิงปลูกปาลม์ในอินโดจีน) 
              . “Foreign Force’s Land Grabs in 25 Provinces. Land Sold in Massive 
Volume by Farmers and Brokers,” September 17, 2009. 
http://www.manager.co.th/mgrWeekly/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=95200001084
24. (ต่างชาติฮุบ 25 จงัหวดั ชาวนา - โบรกเกอร์แห่ขายท่ี) 
Manarangsan, Sompop. “Contract Farming and Thailand’s Agricultural 
Development.” In Our Lands, Our Lives, edited by Buddhadeb Chaudhuri. 
Bangkok: ACFOD, 1992, quoted in Bello, Cunningham and Li (1998), 164. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory. Principles of Macroeconomics. 5th ed. Mason, OH: South-
Western Cengage Learning, 2009. 
Manning, Richard. “The Oil We Eat: Following The Food Chain Back to Iraq.” 
Harper’s Magazine, 2004, quoted in Weis (2010), 321. 
Manopimok, Suphajit, and et al. A Complete Report on the Research Project on the 
Possibility of Alternative Agriculture in Thailand: An Economics Analysis. 
Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2001. 
 (ศุภจิต มโนพิโมกษ ์และคณะ. รายงานวิจัยฉบับสมบูรณ์ โครงการวิจัยเร่ืองความเป็นไปได้ของเกษตรกรรมทางเลือกใน
ประเทศไทย: การวิเคราะห์ทางเศรษฐศาสตร์. กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2544.) 
397 
 
Margulis, Matias E., Nora McKeon, and Saturnino M. Borras “Land Grabbing and 
Global Governance: Critical Perspectives.” Globalizations 10, no. 1 (2013): 1–
23. 
Margulis, Matias E., and Tony Porter. “Governing the Global Land Grab: 
Multipolarity, Ideas, and Complexity in Transnational Governance.” Global 
Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour. Contesting Neo-Gramscian 
Perspectives 10, no. 1 (2013): 65–86. 
Marsden, T. K., and A. Arce. “Constructing Quality: Emerging Food Networks in 
the Rural Transition.” Environment and Planning 27, no. 8 (1995): 1261–1279. 
Matichon Newspaper (มติชน). “3 Sugar Plants Associations Believe in the Long 
Bright Future of Sugar Cane and Sugar Industries, Pushing the State to Support 
Ethanol,” September 25, 2009. 
<http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1253896039&catid=05>.  
(3 สมาคมโรงงานนํ้ าตาลเช่ืออนาคตอุตฯ ออ้ย - นํ้าตาล สดใสยาวจ้ีรัฐชดัเจนหนุนใชเ้อทานอล) 
              . “National Reform Committee Suggests Land Reform to Take Advantage 
of Food Crisis,” March 16, 2011. 
<http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1300277716&grpid=03
&catid=00>. (คปร.แนะปฏิรูปท่ีดินตกัตวงช่วงวิกฤตอาหารโลก) 
              . “Village Leader Tells of Capitalist Land Grabbing of Rice Fields,” April 
04, 2012. (ผญบ.กรุงเก่าแฉนายทุนตระเวนกวา้นซ้ือนา) 
              . “Prapart Pintoptaeng - Politics Lecturer from Chulalongkorn Was Arrested 
after Soldiers Cancelled the Walk for Land Reform Event,” November 09, 
2014. <http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1415522432>. (จบั"
ประภาส ป่ินตบแต่ง" อ.รัฐศาสตร์ จุฬาฯ หลงัทหารสัง่ยติุกิจกรรมเดินเทา้ปฏิรูปท่ีดิน) 
Matsumura, Masaki. “Coercive Conservation, Defensive Reaction, and the 
Commons Tragedy in Northeast Thailand.” Habitat International 18, no. 3 
(January 1994): 105–115. 
McCargo, Duncan. “Thailand’s Political Parties: Real, Authentic and Actual.” In 
Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, edited by Kevin 
Hewison, 114–131. London and New York: Routledge, 1997. 
              . Politics and the Press in Thailand: Media Machinations. London: 
Routledge, 2000, quoted in McCargo and Pathmanand (2005), 173. 
              . “Populism and Reformism in Contemporary Thailand.” South East Asia 
Research 9, no. 1 (2001): 89–107. 
McCargo, Duncan, and Ukrist Pathmanand. “The Thaksinization of Thailand.” 
Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) Press, 2005. 
398 
 
McCluney, Ross. “Renewable Energy Limits.” In The Final Energy Crisis, edited by 
Andrew McKillop and Sheila Newman, 153–75. London: Pluto Press, 2005, 
quoted in Weis (2010), 321. 
Mckeon, Nora. “The FAO, Civil Society and the Global Governance of Food and 
Agriculture.” In The United Nations and Civil Society: Legitimating Global 
Governance - Whose Voice?, 17–120. New York: Zed Books, 2009. 
              . “‘One Does Not Sell the Land Upon Which the People Walk’: Land 
Grabbing, Transnational Rural Social Movements, and Global Governance.” 
Globalizations 10, no. 1 (2013): 105–122. 
McMichael, Philip. “Incorporating Comparison Within a World-Historical 
Perspective.” American Sociological Review 55, no. 2 (1990): 285–297. 
              . “Peasant Prospects in the Neoliberal Age.” Development 11, no. 3 (2006): 
407–418. 
              . “Peasants Make Their Own History, But Not Just as They Please...” 
Journal of Agrarian Change 8, no. July (2008): 205–228. 
              . “A Food Regime Analysis of the ‘World Food Crisis.’” Agriculture and 
Human Values 26, no. 4 (July 31, 2009): 281–295. 
              . “Banking on Agriculture: A Review of the World Development Report 
2008.” Africa 9, no. 2 (2009): 235–246. 
              . “Food Sovereignty, Social Reproduction and the Agrarian Question.” In 
Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the 
Agrarian Question., edited by A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi and C. Kay. Oxon: 
Routledge, 2009. 
              . “The Land Grab and Corporate Food Regime Restructuring.” Journal of 
Peasant Studies 39, no. 3–4 (July 2012): 681–701. 
McMichael, Philip, and Frederick Buttel. “New Directions in the Political Economy 
of Agriculture.” Sociological Perspectives 33, no. 1 (1990): 89–109, quoted in 
Araghi (1995), 337. 
McNally, Mark. “Gramsci’s Internationalism, the National-Popular and the 
Alternative Globalisation Movement.” In Gramsci and Global Politics. 
Hegemony and Resistance, edited by Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel. 
Oxon: Routledge, 2009. 
Mekong Youth Alliance for Organic Agriculture and Agro-ecology. "Occupy Your 
Life Manifesto." Obtained at an academic forum on agro-ecology, farmer rights, 
food sovereignty and farmer movements, 12 November 2012, Chulalongkorn 
University, Bangkok. 
Miliband, Ralph. State in Capitalist Society. London: Quartet Books, 1969. 
399 
 
Milonakis, Dimitris. “Neoclassical Economics.” In The Elgar Companion to Marxist 
Economics, edited by Ben Fine, Alfredo Saad-Filho, and Marco Boffo, 246–
251. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012. 
Ministry of Public Health. A Survey on Food and Nutrition of Thailand,5th 
Assessment. Bangkok, 2003, quoted in Prachason (2009), 19-20. 
MOAC. “Ministry of Agriculture and Co-Operatives Tries to Stop Capitalists from 
Increasing Rent and Exploiting Farmers, Using Legal Means according to the 
Agricultural Land Rent Act,” April 21, 2008. 
<http://www.moac.go.th/ewt_news.php?nid=1911&filename=wimol>. (กระทรวง 
เกษตรฯ เล็งสัง่ฟันนายทุนเอาเปรียบชาวนาข้ึนค่าเช่าท่ีดิน ใชช่้องทางกฎหมายดาํเนินการเด็ดขาด ตามพ.ร.บ.การเช่าท่ีดิน
เพ่ือเกษตรกรรม) 
Moore, Jason W. “Transcending the Metabolic Rift: A Theory of Crises in the 
Capitalist World- Ecology.” Journal of Peasant Studies 28, no. 1 (2011): 1–46. 
Morton, Adam David. Unravelling Gramsci. London: Pluto Press, 2007. 
              . “Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony Neo-Gramscian 
Perspectives in International Political Economy.” In Rethinking Gramsci, edited 
by Marcus E. Green. 1st ed. Oxon: Routledge, 2011. 
Morvaridi, Behrooz. “Capitalist Philanthropy and Hegemonic Partnerships.” Third 
World Quarterly 33, no. 7 (August 2012): 1191–1210. 
Mutebi, Alex M. “Explaining the Failure of Thailand’s Anti-Corruption Regime.” 
Development and Change 39, no. 1 (January 2008): 147–171. 
Naew Na Newspaper (แนวหน้า). “Warn the State to Revise Measures for Rubber Prices. 
Three Strategies to Develop the Rubber Industry,” December 13, 2012. (เตือนรัฐ
ทบทวนแกร้าคายาง แนะวางยทุธศาสตร์3ระยะ พฒันา‘ยางพารา’ครบวงจร) 
Nakthim, Chonlakanda. The Roles of Leaders in Knowledge Management of the 
Farmers’ Organic Rice Farming: A Case Study of Natural Farming Group in 
Thamo Sub-District, Prasat District, Surin Provice. Thesis from the 
Department of Social Service, Thammasat University (Bangkok, 2008). 
 (ชลกานดาร์ นาคทิม. บทบาทของผู้นาํในการจัดการความรู้ของเกษตรกรทาํนาเกษตรอินทรีย์: กรณีศึกษา กลุ่มเกษตร
ธรรมชาติตาํบลทมอ อาํเภอปราสาท จังหวัดสุรินทร์. วิทยานิพนธ์หลกัสูตรพฒันาชุมชนมหาบณัฑิต คณะสงัคมสงเคราะห์
ศาสตร์ ม.ธรรมศาสตร์. กรุงเทพฯ, 2551.) 
Narkwibulwong, Weerachai. “37 Years of Land Reform and the Adaptation of 
Sufficiency Economy.” In 37 Years of the Agricultural Land Reform Office. 
Bangkok: ALRO, 2012. 
 (วีระชยั นาควิบูลยว์งศ.์ "37 ปี ของการปฏิรูปท่ีดินกบัการประยกุตใ์ชป้รัชญาเศรษฐกิจพอเพียง." ใน 37 ปีสาํนักงานปฏิรูป
ท่ีดินเพ่ือการเกษตรกรรม.กรุงเทพฯ: สปก., 2553.) 
400 
 
Narkwibulwong, Weerachai, Arpapan Pattanapan, and Arthita Pongprom. Efficient 
Usage of ALRO Land: A Case Study of Maximum of 10 Rai per Household 
Land Plot. Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2011. 
 (วีระชยั  นาควิบูลยว์งศ,์  อาภาพรรณ  พฒันพนัธุ์, และ อาทิตยา  พองพรหม. การใช้ ประโยชน์ในท่ีดินเพ่ือเกษตรกรรมใน
เขตปฏิรูปท่ีดินอย่างมีประสิทธิภาพ: ศึกษากรณีขนาดการถือครองท่ีดินไม่เกิน 10 ไร่ต่อครัวเรือน. กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2554.) 
Nartsupha, Chatthip. Modernisation and the “Community” School of Thought. 
Bangkok: Sangsan Publishing, 2010. 
 (ฉตัรทิพย ์นาถสุภา. การเป็นสมัยใหม่กับแนวคิดชุมชน. กรุงเทพฯ: สาํนกัพิมพส์ร้างสรรค,์ 2553.) 
Nartsupha, Chatthip, and Wanworn Ja-noo. “Editorial.” In Community Culture 
School of Thought in Thai Society, edited by Chatthip Nartsupha and Wanworn 
Ja-noo, 8–11. Bangkok: Sangsan Publishing, 2012. 
 (ฉตัรทิพย ์นาถสุภา และ วนัวร จะนู. "บทบรรณาธิการ." ใน แนวคิดวัฒนธรรมชุมชนในสังคมไทย. ฉตัรทิพย ์นาถสุภา 
และ วนัวร จะนู บรรณาธิการ, 8-11. กรุงเทพฯ: สาํนกัพิมพส์ร้างสรรค,์ 2555.) 
 National Committee to Develop Organic Agriculture. National Strategic Plan to 
Develop Organic Agriculture 1 2008-2011 and National Practical Plan to 
Develop Organic Agriculture 2008-2011. Bangkok: Sahamit Printing, 2008. 
 (คณะกรรมการพฒันาเกษตรอินทรียแ์ห่งชาติ. แผนยทุธศาสตร์การพัฒนาเกษตรอินทรีย์แห่งชาติฉบับท่ี 1 พ.ศ. 2551-2554 
และ แผนปฏิบัติการพัฒนาเกษตรอินทรีย์แห่งชาติ พ.ศ. 2551-2554. กรุงเทพฯ: สหมิตรพร้ินต้ิงแอนด์พบัลิสช่ิง, 2551.) 
              . National Strategic Plan to Develop Organic Agriculture 2 2013-2016 
(draft), received from Ms. Wibulwan Wannamolee, senior specialist in agri-
food standards, National Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and Food 
Standards Office, 31 January 2013. 
 (______. แผนยทุธศาสตร์การพัฒนาเกษตรอินทรีย์แห่งชาติฉบับท่ี 2 พ.ศ. 2556-2559 (ร่าง). ไดจ้ากคุณวิบูลวรรณ วรรณ
โมลี นกัวิชาการมาตรฐานชาํนาญการพิเศษ สาํนกัรับรองมาตรฐาน สรม. ในมกอช. วนัท่ี 31 ม.ค. 2556.) 
National committee to develop strategic plan to manage chemicals. National 
Strategic Plan to Manage Chemicals 4 (2012-2021). Nonthaburi: Integrated 
program for chemical safety, food and drug administration, Ministry of Public 
Health, 2011. 
 (คณะกรรมการแห่งชาติวา่ดว้ยการพฒันายทุธศาสตร์การจดัการสารเคมี. แผนยทุธศาสตร์การจัดการสารเคมีแห่งชาติ ฉบับ
ท่ี 4 2555-2564. นนทบุรี:ศูนยพ์ฒันานโยบายแห่งชาติดา้นสารเคมี สาํนกังานคณะกรรมการอาหารและยา กระทรวง
สาธารณสุข, 2554.) 
National Health Committee. Report of the Meeting 1/2008 on the Topic of Policies 
and Strategies to Reduce Negative Health Effects from Chemical Pesticides on 
14 January 2008. Bangkok, 2008, quoted in Prachason (2008), 40. 
401 
 
 (คณะกรรมการสุขภาพแห่งชาติ. รายงานผลการประชุมคณะกรรมการสุขภาพแห่งชาติคร้ังท่ี 1/2551 วาระพิจารณาเร่ืองการ
พัฒนานโยบายและยทุธศาสตร์เพ่ือลดผลกระทบด้านสุขภาพจากการใช้เสารเคมีปองกันกาํจัดศัตรูพืช. 14 มกราคม 2551, 
ใน Prachason (2008), 40.) 
National Reform Committee. How to Reform Thailand: A Proposal for Political 
Parties and Voters. Bangkok: National Reform Committee, 2011. 
 (สาํนกังานปฏิรูป. แนวทางการปฏิรูปประเทศไทย ข้อเสนอต่อพรรคการเมืองและผู้มีสิทธิเลือกต้ัง โดยคณะกรรมการการ
ปฏิรูป. กรุงเทพฯ: สาํนกังานปฏิรูป, 2554.) 
Nelson, M.H. “Analyzing Provincial Political Structures in Thailand: Phuak, Trakun, 
and Hua Khanaen, SEARC Working Paper Series, Hong Kong.” The Southeast 
Asia Research Centre (SEARC) of the City University of Hong Kong, 2005, 
quoted in Bjarnegård (2013), 145. 
Network of People’s Media of the North. “An Open Letter to Thai People Regarding 
Tesco-Lotus’ Encroachment on Free Speech Right,” April 20, 2008. 
<http://www.tja.or.th>. 
 (เครือข่ายส่ือภาคประชาชนภาคเหนือ. "จดหมายเปิดผนึกถึงประชาชนคนไทย กรณีเทสโก-้โลตสั คุกคามสิทธิเสรีภาพการ
ส่ือสาร," 20 เม.ย. 2551) 
Newell, Peter. “Trade and Biotechnology in Latin America: Democratization, 
Contestation and the Politics of Mobilization.” Journal of Agrarian Change 8, 
no. 2 and 3 (April and July, 2008): 345–376. 
Nicholls, Clara Ines, and Miguel A. Altieri. “Conventional Agricultural 
Development Models and the Persistence of the Pesticide Treadmill in Laitn 
America.” International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 
4, no. 2 (1997): 93–111. 
Niles, Daniel, and Robin Jane Roff. “Shifting Agrifood Systems: The Contemporary 
Geography of Food and Agriculture: an Introduction.” GeoJournal 73, no. 1 
(July 26, 2008): 1–10. 
Nishizaki, Yoshinori. “Peasants and the Redshirt Movement in Thailand: Some 
Dissenting Voices.” Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no. 1 (January 30, 2014): 1–
28. 
Nontaworakarn, Phuttina. “Summary of the Current Status of the Revised Dangerous 
Chemical Acts 2008.” In An Academic Conference to Monitor Agricultural 
Chemicals 1, 16-17 June 2011, edited by National Committee to Plan for Food 
Security. Bangkok, 2011. 
 (พทุธิณา นนัทะวรการ (นกัวิจยั มูลนิธินโยบายสุขภาวะ). "การประมวลสถานการณ์ทางนโยบายภายใตพ้.ร.บ.วตัถุอนัตราย 
ฉบบัปรับปรุง พ.ศ. 2551." ใน การประชุมวิชาการเพ่ือการเฝ้าระวงัสารเคมีทางการเกษตรคร้ังท่ี 1 วนัท่ี 16-17 มิ.ย. 2554 
โรงแรมเซ็นจูร่ีพาร์ค กรุงเทพฯ โดย แผนงานสนบัสนุนความมัน่คงทางอาหาร แผนงานส่งเสริมการพฒันาระบบเพ่ือสุข
ภาวะของเกษตรกรและความเขม้แขง็ของชุมชนและสงัคม. กรุงเทพฯ, 2554.) 
402 
 
Nostitz, N. Red vs. Yellow, Volume 2: Thailand’s Political Awakening. Bangkok: 
White Lotus, 2011. 
O’Brien, Kevin, and Lianjiang Li. Rightful Resistance in China. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, quoted in Borras and Edelman (2008), 187. 
O’Laughlin, Bridget. “Gender Justice, Land and the Agrarian Question in Southern 
Africa.” In Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural 
Transformation and the Agrarian Question, edited by A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi 
and Cristobal Kay. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
O’Laughlin, Bridget, Henry Bernstein, Ben Cousins, and Pauline E. Peters. 
“Introduction: Agrarian Change, Rural Poverty and Land Reform in South 
Africa since 1994.” Journal of Agrarian Change 13, no. 1 (January 12, 2013): 
1–15. 
Ockey, J. “Change and Continuity in the Thai Political Party System.” Asian Survey 
43, no. 4 (2003): 663–680. 
              . Making Democracy: Leadership, Class, Gender, and Political 
Participation in Thailand. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004. 
Office of Agricultural Economics (Thailand). Agricultural Economics Indicators 
2010. Bangkok: Office of Agricultural Economics, 2010. 
 (สาํนกังานเศรษฐกิจการเกษตร. ตัวชี้วัดเศรษฐกิจการเกษตรของประเทศไทย ปี 2553. กรุงเทพฯ: สศก., 2553.) 
              . Basic Information on the Agricultural Sector 2010. Bangkok: Office of 
Agricultural Economics, 2010. 
 (_____. ข้อมูลพืน้ฐานเศรษฐกิจการเกษตร ปี 2553. กรุงเทพฯ: สศก., 2553.) 
              . Basic Information on Agricultural Economics of Thailand 2012. Bangkok: 
Office of Agricultural Economics, 2012. 
 (_____. ข้อมูลพืน้ฐานเศรษฐกิจการเกษตร ปี 2555. กรุงเทพฯ: สศก., 2555.) 
Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning. “Situation on 
State of Environment,” 2006, 
<http://www.onep.go.th/soe_online/default2.asp?active_page_id=110>, 12 
November 2008, quoted in Prachason (2009), 37. 
Oopayokin, Pricha, and Suri Karnchanawong. Business/tradesmen and Thai 
Parliamentary System: A Study Funded by the Secretariat of the House of 
Representatives. Bangkok, 1999. 
 (ปรีชา อุปโยคิน และ สุรีย ์กาญจนวงศ.์ รายงานการวิจัย เร่ือง พ่อค้าและนักธุรกิจกับระบบรัฐสภาไทย. ดว้ยเงินสนบัสนุน
ของสาํนกังานเลขาธิการสภาผูแ้ทนราษฏร. กรุงเทพฯ, 2542.) 
403 
 
Paarlberg, R. Starved for Science: How Biotechnology Is Being Kept out of Africa. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008, quoted in Holt Gimenez and 
Shattuck (2011), 114. 
Pananont, Pawida, and Weerayuth Karnchuchat. “Thai Capital Expands Abroad.” In 
The Struggles of Thai Capital 1: Adaptation and Dynamics, edited by Pasuk 
Phongpaichit. Bangkok: Matichon, 2006. 
 (ภวิดา ปานะนนท ์และ วีระยทุธ กาญจน์ชูฉตัร. "ตบเทา้ทุนไทยไปนอก." ใน การต่อสู้ของทุนไทย 1 การปรับตัวและ
พลวัต. ผาสุก พงษไ์พจิตร บรรณาธิการ. กรุงเทพฯ: มติชน, 2549.) 
Panjab, Arreerat. “Notes from the Seminar on 8 July 2011, Thammasat University.” 
Journal of Sociology and Anthropology 30, no. 2 (2011). 
Pannarong, Sukhum, and Pimolna Boonyasena. A Study of Development Opportunity 
and Direction of Organic Crop Production System. Chiang Mai: Research and 
Development Center for Community Economy, Economics Department, Chiang 
Mai University and the National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT), 2009. 
 (สุขมุ พนัธุ์ณรงค ์และ พิมลพรรณ บุญยะเสนา. รายงานการวิจัยฉบับสมบูรณ์ การศึกษาแนวทางการพัฒนาระบบการผลิต
พืชผักอินทรีย์แบบครบวงจร. เชียงใหม:่ ศูนยวิ์จยัและพฒันาเศรษฐกิจชุมชน คณะเศรษฐศาสตร์ ม.เชียงใหม่ ดว้ย ทุนจาก 
สาํนกังานคณะกรรมการวิจยัแห่งชาติ National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT), 2552.) 
Panyakul, Vitoon, and Pattarawadee Poomsak. A Report on the Status of Research 
and Innovation Relating to Organic Agriculture in Thailand. Bangkok: 
National Innovation Agency, 2008. 
 (วิฑูรย ์ปัญญากุล และ ภทัราวดี ภูมิภกัด์ิ. สถานภาพการวิจัย-นวัตกรรมเกษตรอินทรีย์ในประเทศไทย. กรุงเทพฯ: 
สาํนกังานนวตักรรมแห่งชาติ, 2551.) 
Panyakul, Vitoon, and Jade-sanee Sukjirattikarn. Organic Market: Opportunities and 
Paths to World Organic Markets. Bangkok: Earth Net Foundation/Green Net 
Co-operative, 2003. 
 (วิฑูรย ์ปัญญากุล และ เจษณี สุขจิรัตติกาล. การตลาดเกษตรอินทรีย์ โอกาสและช่องทางสู่ตลาดเกษตรอินทรีย์โลก. 
กรุงเทพฯ: มูลนิธิสายใยแผน่ดิน/กรีนเนท, 2546.) 
Paoletti, M.G., and D. Pimentel. “Genetic Engineering in Agriculture and the 
Environment: Assessing Risks and Benefits.” BioScience 46 (1996): 665–671. 
Parliament’s Committee of Commerce. Report on the Study of Problems and Effects 
of Modern Trade. Bangkok, 2003. 
 (คณะกรรมาธิการการพาณิชย ์สภาผูแ้ทนราษฏร. รายงานผลการพิจารณาศึกษาปัญหาและผลกระทบจากธุรกิจการค้าปลีก. 
กรุงเทพฯ, 2546.) 
404 
 
Patel, Raj. Stuffed and Starved. Power and the Hidden Battle for the World Food 
System. London: Portobello Books, 2007, quoted in Lawrence and McMichael 
(2012), 135. 
Paterson, Bill. “Trasformismo at the World Trade Organization.” In Gramsci and 
Global Politics. Hegemony and Resistance, edited by Mark McNally and John 
Schwarzmantel. Oxon: Routledge, 2009. 
Pathmanand, Ukrist. “Globalisation and Democratic Development in Thailand: The 
New Path of the Military, Private Sector, and Civil Society.” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 23, no. 1 (2001). 
Patrawart, Juthatip. “Branding as the Marketing Strategy for Organic Products: A 
Case Study on Moral Rice.” Asian Journal of Food and Agro-Industry (2009): 
256–263. 
Pattanapanchai, Nattapong. Food - Life or Commodity? Marketable Culture under 
the Control of Corporations. Edited by Ubol Yoo-wah. Nonthaburi: SATHAI, 
2008. 
 (นาถพงศ ์พฒันพนัธ์ชยั. อาหาร ชีวิตหรือสินค้า? วัฒนธรรมท่ีถกูซื้อขายภายใต้การครอบงาํของบรรษัท. อุบล อยูห่วา้ 
บรรณาธิการ. นนทบุรี: SATHAI, 2551.) 
Pattanapanchai, Nattapong, and Arat Saeng-ubon. A Report on the Tap-Tai 
Community Way of Life, Surin. Surin: Alternative Agriculture Network, 2007, 
quoted in Prachason et al. (2012), 186. 
 (นาถพงศ ์และ อารัติ แสงอุบล. รายงานผลการศึกษา แสราะปึงเคนียแอง วิถีชุมชนทางเลือกทัพไทย สุรินทร์. สุรินทร์: 
เครือข่ายเกษตรกรรมทางเลือก, 2550, quoted in Prachason et al. (2012), 186.) 
Patzek, Tad W., and David Pimentel. “Thermodynamics of Energy Production from 
Biomass.” Critical Reviews in Plant Sciences 24, no. 5–6 (2006): 329–64. 
Pechpa, Nikhom, Montri Baothong, Adul Klonepan, and Prachak Boontos. A 
Complete Report of the Research Project on the Moral Rice Network. Bangkok: 
Thailand Research Fund, 2009. 
 (นิคม เพชรผา, มนตรี เบา้ทอง, อดุลย ์โคลนพนัธุ์ และ ประจกัษ ์บุญทศ. รายงานวิจัยฉบับสมบูรณ์ โครงการวิจัยเครือข่าย
คุณค่าข้าวคุณธรรม. กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2552.) 
Peluso, Nancy Lee, Suraya Afiff, and Noer Fauzi Rachman. “Claiming the Grounds 
for Reform: Agrarian and Environmental Movements in Indonesia.” Journal of 
Agrarian Change 8, no. 2–3 (2008): 377–407. 
              . Suraya Afiff, and Noer Fauzi Rachman. “Claiming the Grounds for 
Reform: Agrarian and Environmental Movements in Indonesia.” In 
Transnational Agrarian Movements Confronting Globalization, edited by 
Saturnino M. Borras, Marc Edelman, and Cristóbal Kay, 209–238. Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2008. 
405 
 
Peterman, A., J. Behrman, and A. R. Quisumbing. A Review of Empirical Evidence 
on Gender Differences in Non-Land Agricultural Inputs, Technology and 
Services in Developing Countries. International Food Policy Research Institute 
Discussion Paper 001003. Washington DC, 2010. 
Petras, James, and Henry Veltmeyer. Social Movements in Latin America: 
Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
Phetprasert, Narong. Rice Politics under State-Capital Monopoly. Journal of 
Political Economy (for the Community) 27. Bangkok: Edison Press, 2005. 
 (ณรงค ์เพช็รประเสริฐ. การเมืองเร่ืองข้าว: ภายใต้อาํนาจรัฐทุนผูกขาด วารสารเศรษฐศาสตร์การเมือง (เพ่ือชุมชน) 27. 
กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2548.) 
Phipatseritham, Krirkkiat. The Social, Economic and Political Change and the 
Concentration of Economic Power by Private Enterprise. Bangkok: Economics 
Department, Thammasat University, 1979. 
 (เกริกเกียรติ พิพฒัน์เสรีธรรม. การเปล่ียนแปลงทางสังคมเศรษฐกิจการเมืองกับการรวมอาํนาจทางเศรษฐกิจโดยเอกชนใน
ประเทศไทย. กรุงเทพฯ: คณะเศรษฐศาสตร์ ม.ธรรมศาสตร์., 2522.) 
Pholnoi, Arunee. Retail and Wholesale Trade’s Strategies. Bangkok: Pansan, 2003. 
 (อรุณี ผลนอ้ย. เล่ห์เหล่ียมค้าปลีก. กรุงเทพฯ: ปันสนั, 2546) 
Phongpaichit, Pasuk. “Developing Social Alternatives. Walking Backwards into a 
Khlong.” In Thailand beyond the Crisis, edited by Peter Warr. New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2005. 
              . “Thai Politics beyond the 2006 Coup,” Excerpt of Supha Sirimanond 
Memorial Lecture, 2007, published in Bangkok Post, 31 July 2007. 
Phongpaichit, Pasuk, and Chris Baker. Thailand: Economy and Politics. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995. 
              . “Power in Transition. Thailand in the 1990s.” In Political Change in 
Thailand, edited by Kevin Hewison. London, 1997, quoted in Buch-Hansen 
(2001), 144. 
              . Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand. Chiang Mai: Silkworms 
Books, 2004. 
              . “Thailand, Thaksin and The Temple of Doom.” Far Eastern Economic 
Review 171, no. July/August 6 (2008): 338. 
Phuaphongsakorn, Niphon, et al. The Retail Business in Thailand: Impact of the 
Large Scale Multinational Corporation Retailers. Bangkok: TDRI, 2002. 
406 
 
 (นิพนธ์ พวัพงศกร และคณะ. รายงานการวิจัยเร่ือง การค้าปลีกของไทย : ผลกระทบของการแข่งขันจากผู้ประกอบการค้า
ปลีกขนาดใหญ่จากต่างประเทศ. กรุงเทพฯ: TDRI, 2545.) 
Phurisamban, Rapijan. “Basic Information on the Market and Usage of 4 High- 
Priority Agricultural Chemicals in the Monitoring List.” In An Academic 
Conference to Monitor Agricultural Chemicals 1, 16-17 June 2011, edited by 
National Committee to Plan for Food Security. Bangkok, 2011. 
 (รพิจนัทร์ ภูริสมับรรณ. "ขอ้มูลพ้ืนฐานดา้นตลาดและการใชส้ารเคมีกาํจดัศตัรูพืชในบญัชีเฝ้าระวงั 4 ชนิด." ใน การประชุม
วิชาการเพ่ือการเฝ้าระวงัสารเคมีทางการเกษตรคร้ังท่ี 1 วนัท่ี 16-17 มิ.ย. 2554 โรงแรมเซ็นจูร่ีพาร์ค กรุงเทพฯ โดย แผนงาน
สนบัสนุนความมัน่คงทางอาหาร แผนงานส่งเสริมการพฒันาระบบเพ่ือสุขภาวะของเกษตรกรและความเขม้แขง็ของชุมชน
และสงัคม. กรุงเทพฯ, 2554.) 
Pimbert, Michel P., John Thompson, William T. Vorley, Tom Fox, and Cecilia 
Tacoli. “Global Restructuring, Agri-Food Systems and Livelihoods.” 
Agriculture no. 100 (2001). 
Pimentel, David, and Tad W. Patzek. “Ethanol Production Using Corn, Switchgrass, 
and Wood; Biodiesel Production Using Soybean and Sunflower.” Natural 
Resources Research 14, no. 1 (2005): 65–76, quoted in Weis (2010), 325. 
Pintoptang, Prapart, Supha Yaimuang, and Banchorn Kaewsong. The Possibility of 
Developing the Welfare System for the Poor and the Disadvantaged: The Case 
of Farmers. Bangkok: Political Economy Study Center, Economics Faculty, 
Chulalongkorn University, 2003. 
 (ประภาส ป่ินตบแต่ง, สุภา ใยเมือง และ บญัชร แกว้ส่อง. การพัฒนาระบบสวัสดิการสาํหรับคนจนและคนด้อยโอกาส: 
กลุ่มเกษตรกร. กรุงเทพฯ: ศูนยศึ์กษาเศรษฐศาสตร์การเมือง คณะเศรษฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลยั, 2546.) 
Plan for Resource Base 2007-2010 and Plan to Support Food Security 2010-2013. 
From Resource Base to Food Security: Restoration of Natural Resource Base 
and Biodiversity for Food Security in Community and Thai Society. Co-
operation between BioThai, SATHAI, Esan Man Yuen Center at 
Ubolratchathani province, and others, n.d. 
 (แผนงานฐานทรัพยากรอาหาร 2550-2553 และ แผนงานสนบัสนุนความมัน่คงทางอาหาร ผา่นการพฒันาตน้แบบระดบั
ชุมชน และการขบัเคล่ือนนโยบายระดบัชาติ 2553-56. จากฐานทรัพยากรสู่ความมั่นคงทางอาหาร การฟ้ืนฟูฐาน
ทรัพยากรธรรมชาติและความหลากหลายทางชีวภาพ เพ่ือความมั่นคงทางอาหารของชุมชนและสังคมไทย. เป็นความ
ร่วมมือระหว่าง มูลนิธิชีววิถี มูลนิธิเกษตรกรรมย ัง่ยนื ประเทศไทย ศูนยอี์สานมัน่ยนื คณะศิลปศาสตร์ ม.อุบลราชธานี และ
สถานบนัวิจยัภาษาและวฒันธรรมเอเชีย สถาบนัโภนาการ ม.มหิดล และ ภาควิชาพฤกษศาสตร์ คณะวิทย ์จุฬาลงกรณ์
มหาวิทยาลยั และ โครงการส่งเสริมบทบาทชุมชนอ่างพงังาน โครงการอนุรักษแ์ละฟ้ืนฟคูวามหลากหลายทางชีวภาพและ
วฒันธรรมอาหารทอ้งถ่ินคาบสมุทรสทิงพระ โดยการสนบัสนุน สสส.) 
Pollan, Michael. “Farmer in Chief.” The New York Times Magazine, 2008, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/magazine/12policy-t.html>, quoted in 
Weis (2010), 321. 
407 
 
Pongthong, Yupin. “Solving Farmers Crisis through Professional Schools in 6 
Provinces.” Bangkok Business Newspaper, August 11, 2013. 
 (ยพิุน พงษท์อง. "เดินหนา้แก"้วิกฤติชาวนา" เปิดโรงเรียนมืออาชีพ 6 จงัหวดั." กรุงเทพฯธุรกิจ, 11 สิงหาคม 2556.) 
Post Today Newspaper. “Foreign and Thai Capital’ Purchases of Foundations of 
Agriculture.” Post Today, February 20, 2010. (ทุนต่างชาติ-ทุนไทย’ ไล่ฮุบฐานรากเกษตรกรรม) 
              . “Farmers Complain to the Government about Exorbitant Land Rents,” 
October 03, 2011. 
              . “Draft of Thai-EU FTA: Thai Loses More than Gain,” December 10, 2012.   
(ร่างกรอบเจรจาคา้เสรีไทย-อียไูทยเสียเปรียบมากกวา่ได)้ 
              . “Expensive Lesson: From Paddy Pledging to Rubber Price Speculations,” 
July 19, 2012. (บทเรียนราคาแพง จากจาํนาํขา้วถึง'ป่ัน'ราคายาง) 
              . “Yanyong Reveals That Low Prices of Rubber Is due to Depressed 
Economic Conditions,” September 06, 2013.(ยรรยงเผยราคายางตกตํ่าเหตุศก.ชะลอ) 
              . “Farmers Complained That Late Payment Made Them Turn to Informal 
Loans,” January 08, 2014. (ชาวนาโอดไดเ้งินชา้ตอ้งหนัไปกูน้อกระบบ) 
              . “Taking Back 5 Million Rai of ALRO Land.” Post Today, September 29, 
2014. (ยดึคืนท่ีสปก.5ลา้นไร่) 
              . “Prayuth - Yingluck Attended CP Owner’s Daughter's Wedding.” Post 
Today, November 29, 2014. ("ประยทุธ์"-"ยิง่ลกัษณ์"ร่วมงานแต่งลูกเจา้สวัซีพี) 
Prachachat Turakij Newspaper (ประชาชาติธุรกิจ). “Wave of Land Grabs for Speculations 
and Agro-Fuels Inputs due to Low Interest Rates and Rising Agricultural 
Commodity Prices,” May 14, 2008. (พิษดอกเบ้ียตํ่า ราคาพืชเกษตรพุง่ คนแห่ช็อปท่ีดินเก็งกาํไร-ปลูก
พืชพลงังาน) 
              . “Top Rice Exporter, Asia Golden Rice, Received Right to Purchase 
Government’s Stock at Low Price -Medium/small Size Companies at a 
Disadvantaged,” January 13, 2011. (เอเชียโกลเดน้ทฯ์แชมป์ส่งออกขา้ว เจา้ใหญ่ไดสิ้ทธิซ้ือสต๊อกรัฐ
ตํ่า-ถล่มรายกลาง/เล็ก) 
              . “Speculations Causes Rubber Prices to Plummet and for Rubber Co-
Operatives All over the Country to Lose over 10,000s Million,” March 16, 
2011. <http://www.prachachat.net/news_detail.php?newsid=1300240804>. (เก็ง
กาํไรล่วงหนา้ทาํราคายางด่ิงเหว สหกรณ์สวนยางทัว่ปท.เจง๊หม่ืนลา้น) 
              . “Famous Business Families Stocking up Land All over Thailand, Jareon 
Riched with 6.3 Hundred Thousand Rai, Land Tax in Consideration,” June 18, 
2014. (เปิดตระกูลดงัตุนท่ีดินทัว่ไทย "เจริญ"อูฟู้่ 6.3แสนไร่ ระทึกคลงัชงเกบ็ภาษี) 
408 
 
              . “Landlords from 11 Political Parties Hold 35,000 Rai: Phua Thai, 
Democrat and Phumjaithai in the Lead.” Prachachat Turakiij (online), June 19, 
2014. <http://www.prachachat.net/news_detail.php?newsid=1403161533>. (เปิด
โพย"แลนดล์อร์ด"11พรรคนกัการเมือง กอดแน่นท่ีดิน3.5หม่ืนไร่เพ่ือไทย-ประชาธิปัตย-์ภูมิใจไทยนาํโด่ง) 
Prachason, Sajin. “A Draft Document for the Meeting ‘Agriculture and Food in Time 
of Crisis’, 22 July 2008.” In Progress Report to the National Health 
Commission on Developments of Proposals from the National Health Assembly 
2008, 2008. 
 (ศจินทร์ ประชาสนัต์ิ. "(ร่าง) เอกสารประกอบการประชุมเตรียมขอ้เสนอประเด็น “เกษตรและอาหารในยคุวิกฤต” 22 
กรกฎาคม 2551." ใน รายงานดาํเนินงานโครงการพฒันาขอ้เสนอสมชัชาสุขภาพแห่งชาติ 2551 ประเด็น “เกษตรและอาหาร
ในยคุวิกฤต” เสนอต่อสาํนกังานคณะกรรมการสุขภาพแห่งชาติ (สช.), ตุลาคม 2551.) 
              . Food Security in Thai Society: A Report Submitted to UNDP Thailand, 
January 2009. Bangkok, 2009. 
Prachason, Sajin, Thanaporn Srisuksai, Nattaporn Liemjaratkul, Pornchai 
Wachirachai, Narisra Saisanguensat, and Patcha Duang-klad. Market Options of 
Farmers: Structural Effects on Unfairness and Benefit Distribution. Bangkok: 
BioThai and the Social Research Foundation, Chulalongkorn University, 2012. 
 (ศรินทร์ ประชาสนัต์ิ, ธนะพร ศรีสุขใส, ณฏัฐาภรณ์ เลียมจรัสกุล, พรรัตน์ วชิราชยั,  นริศรา สายสงวนสตัย,์ ภทัชา ดว้ง
กลดั. รายงานวิจัยฉบับสมบูรณ์ ทางเลือกทางการตลาดของชาวนา: ผลกระทบเชิงโครงสร้างต่อความไม่เป็นธรรมและการ
กระจายผลประโยชน์. กรุงเทพฯ: มูลนิธิชีววิถีและ สถาบนัวิจยัสงัคม จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลยั, 2555.) 
Prachathai news. “Report from the Seminar ‘CLTD and Solutions to Land Conflicts 
in Thailand.’” Prachathai Online News, July 04, 2009. 
<http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2009/07/24960>. (นกัข่าวพลเมือง: รายงานสมัมนา 
“โฉนดชุมชนกบัการแกไ้ขปัญหาท่ีดินในสงัคมไทย”) 
              . "P-move asks Supreme court to stop the delay of the enforcement of the 
ruling on the palm oil land conflict in Suratthani, as the delay has led to 
violence," December 25, 2012. <http://prachatai.com/journal/2012/12/44383>. 
(‘พีมูฟ’ ร้อง ‘ศาลฎีกา’ เลิกทุเลาบงัคบัคดีท่ีดินสวนปาลม์สุราษฎร์ฯ ช้ีความล่าชา้เป็นเหตุความรุนแรง) 
              . “NESDB Warns the Government the Unconstitutional Risk of Not 
Listening to Public Opinions Regarding Thai-EU FTA,” January 16, 2013. 
<http://prachatai.com/journal/2013/01/44713>. (สภาท่ีปรึกษาฯ เตือนรัฐบาลเส่ียงผิด รธน. ไม่นาํ
ร่างเอฟทีเอไทย-อียฟัูงความเห็นก่อน) 
              . “Civil Society Disagrees with Changing of the Law to Aid Seed 
Companies,” March 01, 2013. 
<http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2013/03/45554>. (ภาคประชาสงัคมคา้นแกไ้ข พ.ร.บ.
พนัธุ์พืชเอ้ือประโยชน์บริษทัเมล็ดพนัธุ์) 
409 
 
              . “Ammar’s Speech ‘The Future of Thai Agriculture under Changing 
 Circumstances,’” August 29, 2013. (ปาฐกถา ‘อมัมาร’ อนาคตเกษตรกรรมไทยในสถานการณ์ท่ี
 เปล่ียนแปร) 
Prachatham news. “Piroj Polpechr Investigates the Accusations of ‘Kathin’, Egoistic 
Strategy of Thai NGOs and Lack of Unity,” February 20, 2013. A report on a 
seminar in Chiang Mai, 16-17 February 2012. 
<http://www.prachatham.com/detail.htm?code=n6_20022013_01>. (ไพโรจน์ พลเพชร 
สาํรวจเอน็จีโอไทยกบัขอ้หา ทาํงานแบบกฐิน-ถือมัน่-ไร้ยทุธศาสตร์ร่วม) 
Prasertkul, Seksan. Citizen Politics in Thai Democracy. Bangkok: Amarin, 2005, 
quoted in Nartsupha (2010), 175-176. 
 (เสกสรรค ์ประเสริฐกุล. การเมืองภาคประชาชนในระบบประชาธิปไตยไทย. กรุงเทพฯ: อมรินทร์, 2548, อา้งใน Nartsupha 
(2010), 175-176. ) 
Prasertsuk, Kitti. “From Political Reform and Economic Crisis to Coup D’etat in 
Thailand: The Twists and Turns of the Political Economy, 1997-2006.” Asian 
Survey 47, no. 6 (2007). 
Prayukvong, Wanna. “A Buddhist Economic Approach to the Development of 
Community Enterprises: A Case Study from Southern Thailand.” Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 29 (2005): 1171–1185. 
President of the Thai Rubber Association. “Rubber Market Situation in 2013,” 
December 2013. http://www.thainr.com/th/message_detail.php?MID=187. 
(สถานการณ์ยางพาราปี 2556 สาส์นจากนายกสมาคมยาง) 
Pritchard, Bill. “Trading into Hunger? Trading out of Hunger? International Food 
Trade and the Debate on Food Security.” In Food Systems Failure: The Global 
Food Crisis and the Future of Agriculture, edited by Christopher Rosin, Paul 
Stock, and Hugh Campbell. London: Earthscan, 2012. 
Puapongsakorn, Nipon. Study of the Supply Chain Management and Logistics of 
Agricultural Products. Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute, 
2009. 
              . “The Political Economy of Thai Rice Price and Export Policies in 2007–
2008.” In The Rice Crisis Markets, Policies and Food Security, edited by David 
Dawe. London-Washington DC: FAO and Earthscan, 2010. 
              . Thai Rice Strategy: Research and Development on Thai Rice and Looking 
Forward. Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2013. 
 (นิพนธ์ พวัพงศกร. รายงานฉบับสมบูรณ์โครงการยทุธศาสตร์ข้าวไทย การวิจัยพัฒนาข้าวไทยและการมองไปข้าวหน้า. 
กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2556.) 
410 
 
Puapongsakorn, Nipon, and Jittakorn Jarupong. Rent Seeking Activities and The 
Political Economy of the Paddy Pledging Market Intervention Measures. 
Bangkok: Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, 2010. 
 (นิพนธ์ พวัพงศกร และ จิตรกร จารุพงษ.์ โครงการศึกษามาตรการแทรกแซงตลาดข้าวเพ่ือป้องกันการทุจริต: การแสวงหา
ค่าตอบแทนส่วนเกิดและเศรษฐศาสตร์การเมืองของโครงการรับจาํนาํข้าวเปลือก.  กรุงเทพฯ: สาํนกังานคณะกรรมการ
ป้องกนัและปราบปราบทุจริตแห่งชาติ (ปปช.), 2553.) 
Puapongsakorn, Nipon, and Ammar Siamwalla. “Rural Villagers’ Economic Group: 
Success and Survival, 51.” In A Report for the Annual Seminar 1995 of 
Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), 9-10 December. Cholburi, 
1995. 
              . “Transform Thailand with the Paddy Pledging Scheme: Facts for Ajarn 
Nithi and the Public,” November 24, 2012. <http://tdri.or.th/tdri-
insight/responses-to-nidhi/>. (เปล่ียนประเทศไทยดว้ยการรับจาํนาํขา้ว: ขอ้เทจ็จริงสาํหรับ อ.นิธิ และ
ประชาชน โดย นิพนธ์ พวัพงศกรและอมัมาร สยามวาลา สถาบนัวิจยัเพ่ือการพฒันาประเทศไทย) 
Puechphol, Daoruang, and et al. A Complete Report of the Research Project to Study 
Traditional Rice Genetics to Expand Organic Rice Production in Baan Kudhin, 
Baan Kammad, Baan Nonyang in Tambol Kammad, Ampur Kudchum, 
Yasothon Province. Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2010. 
 (ดาวเรือง พืชผล และคณะ. รายงานฉบับสมบูรณ์ โครงการวิจัย การศึกษาพันธุกรรมข้าวพืน้บ้านเพ่ือการขยายผลผลิตข้าว
ในระบบเกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืนในพืน้ท่ีบ้านกุดหิน บ้านกาํแมด บ้านโนนยาง ตาํบลกาํแมด อาํเภอกุดชุม จังหวัดยโสธร. 
กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2553.) 
Puntasen, Apichai. “Applying Self-Sufficient Economy to Systematically Solve 
Poverty.” In Dhamma Economics: A Collection of Speeches of Distinguished 
Professors from the Economics Department, Thammasat University, 92-94. 
Bangkok: OpenBooks, 2010. 
 (อภิชยั พนัธเสน."การประยกุตเ์ศรษฐกิจพอเพียงเพ่ือแกปั้ญหาความยากจนอยา่งเป็นระบบ." ใน เศรษฐธรรม รวมบท
ปาฐกถากีรตยาจารย์แห่งเศรษฐศาสตร์ธรรมศาสตร์, 92-94. กรุงเทพฯ: OpenBooks, 2553.) 
Puntasen, Apichai, and Paradorn Preedasak. “Agriculture in Thailand at the Cross-
Road.” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 15, no. 1 (1998). 
Rakchat, Jirawat. “From Farming to Contract Eggs Chicken: The Growth of Agri-
Business.” In Thai Countryside: Medium Size Farmers and Landless 
Agricultural Labourers, edited by Jamari Chiengthong, Wattana Sukansiel, 
Jirawat Rakchat, Swang Meesang, and Priyawal Jaipinta, 247–296. Chiang Mai: 
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Social Science Faculty, University 
of Chiang Mai, 2011. 
 (จิรวฒัน์ รักชาติ. "จากเกษตรในไร่นาถึงไก่ไข่พนัธสญัญา: การเติบโตของระบบอุตสาหกรรมอาหารเกษตร." ใน ชนบท
ไทย: เกษตรกรระดับกลางและแรงงานไร้ท่ีดิน. จามะรี เชียงทอง และคณะ บรรณาธิการ. เชียงใหม่: ภาควิชาสงัคมวิทยา
และมานุษยวิทยา คณะสงัคมศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลยัเชียงใหม่, 2554.) 
411 
 
Rakyutitham, Achara. “Anan’s Dynamic: From Culture, Na-Moo to Complexity.” In 
“I Don’t Have the Answer”: 60 Years Professor Dr. Anan Ganjanapan and 20 
Years of Social Movement on Community Rights and Natural Resources 
Management. Chiang Mai: Sustainable Development Foundation, 2008. 
 (อจัฉรา รักยติุธรรม. ""พลวตั" อานนัท ์จาก "วฒันธรรม" "หนา้หมู่" สู่ "เชิงซอ้น"." ใน "ผมไม่มีคาํตอบ" 60 ปี ศ.ดร.
อานันท์ กาญจนพันธ์ุ กับ 20 ปี ขบวนการเคล่ือนไหวทางสังคมด้านสิทธิชุมชนและการจัดการทรัพยากรธรรมชาติ. อจัฉรา 
รักยติุธรรม บรรณาธิการ. กรุงเทพฯ: มูลนิธิเพ่ือการพฒันาท่ีย ัง่ยนื, 2551.) 
Rakyutitham, Achara, Tuanjai Tiwong, Jetsada Chotikitpiwaj, Pongthip Samranjit, 
Krisda Boonchai, and Suriyan Thongnooiad. Land and Freedom. Bangkok: 
Black Lead Publishing, 2005. 
 (อจัฉรา รักยติุธรรม, เตือนใจ ธิวอ่ง, เจษฏา โชติกิจภิวาทย,์ พงษทิ์พย ์สาํราญจิตต,์ กฤษฏา บุญชยั และ สุริยนัต ์ทองหนู
เอียด. ท่ีดินและเสรีภาพ. กรุงเทพฯ: Black Lead publishing, 2548.) 
Ratsongkwae, Muanfan. “CP Maize: Naan Case Study.” In CP and Thai Agriculture, 
edited by CorpWatch-Thailand and BioThai. Nonthaburi: BioThai, 2009. 
 (เหมือนฝัน รัตน์สองแคว. "ขา้วโพดซีพี: กรณีศึกษาจากน่าน." ซีพีกับเกษตรกรรมไทย. นนทบุรี: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2008.) 
Rattanawaraha, Chanuan. Organic Agriculture. Nonthaburi: Biotech center, 
Department of Agriculture, 2007. 
 (ชนวน รัตนวราหะ. เกษตรอินทรีย์. นนทบุรี: สาํนกัวิจยัพฒันาเทคโนโลยชีีวภาพ กรมวิชาการเกษตร, 2550.) 
Raynolds, Laura T. “Consumer/Producer Links in Fair Trade Coffee Networks.” 
Sociologia Ruralis 42, no. 4 (October 2002): 404–424. 
Razavi, Shahra. “Liberalisation and the Debates on Women’s Access to Land.” Third 
World Quarterly 28, no. 8 (December 2007): 1479–1500. 
Research Institute of Organic Agriculture (FiBL) and International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM). The World of Organic Agriculture. 
Statistics and Emerigng Trends 2014. Edited by Helga Willer and Lernoud 
Julia. Frick and Bonn: FiBL and IFOAM, 2014. 
Research unit on agri-businesses at Kasetsart University. Strategic Commodity: Rice. 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Natural Resource, Kasetsart 
University, 1997, quoted in Iswilaanont (2010), 83. 
 (หน่วยวิจยัธุรกิจเกษตร. สินค้ายทุธศาสตร์: กรณีของข้าว. ภาควิชาเศรษฐศาสตร์เกษตรและทรัพยากร 
มหาวิทยาลยัเกษตรศาสตร์, 2540, อา้งใน Iswilaanont (2010), 83.) 
Rigg, Jonathan. “Grass-Roots Development in Rural Thailand: A Lost Cause?” 
World Development 19, no. 2–3 (February 1991): 199–211. 
412 
 
Rigg, Jonathan, and Sakunee Nattapoolwat. “Embracing the Global in Thailand: 
Activism and Pragmatism in an Era of Deagrarianization.” World Development 
29, no. 6 (June 2001): 945–960. 
Rigg, Jonathan, Buapun Promphaking, and Ann Le Mare. “Personalizing the 
Middle-Income Trap: An Inter-Generational Migrant View from Rural 
Thailand.” World Development 59 (July 2014): 184–198. 
Ritzer, George. Sociological Theory. 5th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005, quoted 
in Shaw (2011), 100. 
Robbins, Paul. Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. Chicester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2012. 
Rodmua, Nattakarn. An Analysis of Costs and Process of Thai Rice Export. A 
Dissertation for a Master’s Degree in Economics, Thammasat University. 
Bangkok: Thammasat University, 2009. 
 (ณฐักานต ์รอดเม่ือ. การวิเคราะห์ต้นทุนและกระบวนการส่งออกข้าวไทย. งานวิจยัเฉพาะเร่ืองน้ีเป็นส่วนหน่ึงของการศึกษา
ตามหลกัสูตรเศรษฐศาสตร์มหาบณัฑิต (เศรษฐศาสตร์ธุรกิจ) คณะเศรษฐศาสตร์ ม.ธรรมศาสตร์ 2552.) 
Roff, Robin Jane. “Shopping for Change? Neoliberalizing Activism and the Limits 
to Eating Non-GMO.” Agriculture and Human Values 24, no. 4 (August 08, 
2007): 511–522. 
Roitner-Schobesberger, Birgit, Ika Darnhofer, Suthichai Somsook, and Christian R. 
Vogl. “Consumer Perceptions of Organic Foods in Bangkok, Thailand.” Food 
Policy 33 (2008): 112–121. 
Rojanaphraiwong, Sukran. A Mission in Self-Reliance: Report of the Study on Tap-
Tai Community Way of Life, Surin, by Natpong Pattanapanchai and Arat 
Saeng-Ubol. Nonthaburi: Alternative Agriculture Network, 2008. 
 (สุกรานต ์โรจนไพรวงศ.์ ปฏิบัติการพ่ึงตนเอง : เรียบเรียงใหม่จากรายงานการศึกษาเร่ือง "เสราะปึงเคนียแอง-วิถีชุมชน
ทางเลือกทัพไทย จังหวัดสุรินทร์" โดย นาถพงศ์ พัฒนพันธ์ชัย และ อารัติ แสงอุบล. นนทบุรี: เครือข่ายเกษตรกรรม
ทางเลือก, 2551.) 
Rojanapraiwong, Sukran, et al. Local Genes and Sustainable Agriculture: A 
Document for the Third Alternative Agriculture Assembly 18-21 November 
2004, Kasetsart University. Nonthaburi: Pim-dee Printing, 2004. 
 (สุกรานต ์โรจนไพรวงศ ์และ คณะ. พันธุกรรมท้องถ่ินกับเกษตรกรรมยั่งยืน เอกสารประกอบสมัชชาเกษตรกรรมทางเลือก
คร้ังท่ีสาม มหกรรมเกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืน 18-21 พ.ย. 2547 มหาวิทยาลัยเกษตรศาสตร์. นนทบุรี: บริษทัพิมพดี์, 2547.) 
Rosset, Peter M. Food Is Different. Why We Must Get the WTO out of Agriculture. 
London: Zed Books, 2006, quoted in McMichael (2009), "A Food Regime 
Analysis," 289. 
413 
 
              . “Food Sovereignty and the Contemporary Food Crisis.” Development 51, 
no. 4 (2008). 
Rosset, Peter M., and Miguel A. Altieri. “Agroecology Versus Input Substitution: A 
Fundamental Contradiction of Sustainable Agriculture.” Society and Natural 
Resources 10, no. 3 (1997): 283–95. 
Rupert, Mark. Ideologies of Globalization: Contending Visions of a New World 
Order. London: Routledge, 2000. 
Sage, Colin. “The Interconnected Challenges for Food Security from a Food 
Regimes Perspective: Energy, Climate and Malconsumption.” Journal of Rural 
Studies (2013): 71–80. 
Saito, K., H. Mekonnen, and D. Spurling. Raising the Productivity of Women 
Farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Discussion Paper 230. Washington DC, 1994. 
Salam, Md. Abdus, Toshikuni Noguchi, and Rachanee Pothitan. “Community Forest 
Management in Thailand: Current Situation and Dynamics in the Context of 
Sustainable Development.” New Forests 31, no. 2 (March 2006): 273–291. 
Samnuanyen, Kingkarn. Dynamics of Social Movement Tactics: The Case of the 
Land Rights Movement in Lumphun Province. An Unpublished Masters Thesis 
at the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn Univeristy. Bangkok, 2006. 
 (ก่ิงกาญจน์ สาํนวนเยน็. พลวัตของยทุธวิธีการต่อสู้ของขบวนการทางสังคม ศึกษากรณีขบวนการต่อสู้เพ่ือสิทธิในท่ีดิน จ.
ลาํพูน. วิทยานิพนธ์ปริญญาโท คณะรัฐศาสตร์ ม.จุฬาลงกรณ์. กรุงเทพฯ, 2549.) 
Samranjit, Pongthip. “A Summary of Research on Ground-up Land Reforms by 
Communitites,” July 22, 2011. <http://www.landreformthai.net>. 
Samranjit, Pongthip, et al.. A Documental Report on the Research on What Thailand 
Will Lose without Land Reform: Land Management and Social Justice - a Case 
Study of the Land Reform Network in Thailand. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn 
University Social Research Institute, 2012. 
 (พงษทิ์พย ์สาํราญจิตต ์และคณะ. รายงานการศึกษาวิจัยฉบับสมบูรณ์ "การจัดการท่ีดินกับความเป็นธรรมทางสังคม" 
กรณีศึกษาเครือข่ายปฏิรูปท่ีดินแห่งประเทศไทย. กรุงเทพ: สถาบนัวิจยัสงัคม จุฬาลงการณ์มหาวิทยาลยั, 2555.) 
San Saeng-arun magazine (สานแสงอรุณ). “From Way of Life and Cultural Roots to 
Machine-like Farmers: Problems and Solutions in the View of Witoon 
Lienchamroon.” San Saeng-Arun Magazine. Bangkok, 2012. (จากวิถีชีวิต รากวฒันธรรม 
เราเดินหนา้พฒันาจนเกษตรกรเป็นเสมือนเคร่ืองจกัร ปัญหาและทางออกในทศันะของวิฑูรย ์เล่ียนจาํรูญ) 
              . “In the Water There Are Fishes, in the Paddy Field There Is Rice: Farmer 
Livelihoods, Disintegration and Survival.” San Saeng-Arun Magazine. 
Bangkok, 2012. (ในนํ้ามีปลา ในนามีขา้ว วิถีเกษตรกรรมไทย การล่มสลาย และความอยูร่อด) 
414 
 
Sangthongkam et al. 70 years Jirathiwat: Central's competition and growth (70 ปี จิ
ราธิวฒัน์ Central ยิง่สู้ยิง่โต). Bangkok: Manager Classic, 2003), 126 quoted in 
Karnchuchat (2006), 238. 
Sapphaitoon, Athiwat. 6 Mega Retail Business Empire: Various Marketing 
Techniques for Modern Trade, Case Study and Lessons from Thailand. 
Bangkok: Phueng-ton, 2002. 
 (อธิวฒัน์ ทรัพยไ์พฑูรย.์ 6 อภิมหาอาณาจักรธุรกิจค้าปลีกค้าส่ง: สรรพกลยทุธ์การตลาดธุรกิจค้าปลีกค้าส่งยคุใหม่ 
 กรณีศึกษาและบทเรียนทางธุรกิจการค้าของไทย. กรุงเทพฯ: พ่ึงตน, 2545.) 
Schreinemachers, Pepijn, Iven Schad, Prasnee Tipraqsa, Pakakrong M. WIlliams, 
Andreas Neef, Suthathip Riwthong, Walaya Sangchan, and Christian 
Grovermann. “Can Public GAP Standards Reduce Agricultural Pesticide Use? 
The Case of Fruit and Vegetable Farming in Northern Thailand.” Agriculture 
and Human Values 29 (2012): 519–529. 
Scott, James. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990. 
Senakham, Tirawuth, and Vitoon Panyakul. “The State and Agri-Businesses: From 
‘See-Prasan’ to Agricultural Council.” In Analysis and Policy Suggestions to 
Develop Alternative Agriculture: A Book for the Assembly of Alternative 
Agriculture 10-15 November 1992, Thammasat University, 153–177. Bangkok: 
Alternative Agriculture Network, 1992. 
 (ฐิรวฒิุ เสนาคาํ และวิฑูรย ์ปัญญากุล. "รัฐและธุรกิจการเกษตรครบวงจร: จากส่ีประสานถึงสภาการเกษตรแห่งชาติ." ใน 
บทวิเคราะห์และข้อเสนอแนะทางนโยบายเพ่ือพัฒนาระบบเกษตรกรรมทางเลือก. หนงัสือประกอบงานสมชัชา
เกษตรกรรมทางเลือก เพ่ือสุขภาพและส่ิงแวดลอ้ม 10-15 พ.ย. 2535 ม.ธรรมศาสตร์. กรุงเทพฯ: เครือข่ายเกษตรกรรม
ทางเลือก, 2535.) 
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Co-operatives. Report on the investigation on 
contract farming of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Co-operatives. 
Bangkok: 2003, quoted in Delforge (2007), 5. 
Shattuck, Annie. “Will Sustainability Certifications Work? A Look at the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels.” In Agrofuels in the Americas, edited by 
R. Jonasse. Oakland: Food First Books, 2009, quoted in Holt Gimenez and 
Shattuck (2011), 122. 
Shaw, Candice. “Global Agro Food Systems : Gendered and Ethnic Inequalities in 
Mexico’ S Agricultural Industry” McGill Sociological Review 2, April (2011): 
92–109. 
Shiva, Vandana. The Violence of the Green Revolution. Third World Agriculture, 
Ecology and Politics. London: Zed books, 1991. 
              . “The Future of Food: Countering Globalisation and Recolonisation of 
Indian Agriculture.” Futures 36 (2004): 715–732. 
415 
 
Siamwalla, Ammar. Politics and Business Interests under the 1997 Constitution: A 
Complete Report for Prapokplao Foundation. Bangkok, 2003. 
 (ดร. อมัมาร สยามวาลา. รายงานฉบับสมบูรณ์ โครงการศึกษาวิจัย เร่ือง “การเมืองกับผลประโยชน์ทางธุรกิจภายใต้
รัฐธรรมนูญ พ.ศ. 2540” เสนอ สถาบนัพระปกเกลา้ โดย ฝ่ายเศรษฐกิจรายสาขา สถาบนัวิจยัเพ่ือการพฒันาประเทศไทย 
มกราคม 2546. ) 
Siamwalla, Ammar, and Somchai Jitsuchon. Tackling Poverty: Liberalism, Populism 
or Welfare State. A Paper Presented at the Annual Thailand Development 
Research Institute Academic Seminar, 10-11th November 2007. Cholburi, 
Thailand, 2007. 
 (อมัมาร สยามวาลา และ สมชยั จิตสุชน. "“แนวทางการแกปั้ญหาความยากจน: ประชานิยม เสรี นิยม หรือรัฐสวสัดิการ." 
งานสมัมนาวิชาการประจาํปี 2550 “จะแกปั้ญหาความยากจนกนัอยา่งไร: แข่งขนั แจกจ่าย หรือสวสัดิการ” จดัโดย มูลนิธิ
ชยัพฒันา สาํนกังานคณะกรรมการพฒันาการเศรษฐกิจและสงัคมแห่งชาติ และมูลนิธิสถาบนัวิจยัเพ่ือการพฒันาประเทศ
ไทย, 10-11 พ.ย. 2007, จงัหวดัชลบุรี.) 
Singsootham, Methee. Practical Action Research Report on Sustainable Land 
Reform and Management by the People. Nonthaburi: Land Reform Network 
and Local Act, 2010. 
 (เมธี สิงห์สู่ถ ํ้า. รายงานการวิจัยเชิงปฏิบัติการ เร่ือง กระบวนการปฏิรูปท่ีดินและจัดการท่ีดินอย่างยั่งยืนโดยประชาชน. 
นนทบุรี: เครือข่ายปฏิรูปท่ีดินแห่งประเทศไทย (คปท.) กลุ่มปฏิบติังานทอ้งถ่ินไร้พรมแดน (Local Act.), 2553.) 
Siripat, Decha. “Diversified Farms: Solutions for Farmers (first Published in 1987).” 
In The Path of Sustainable Agriculture. 2nd ed. Samut-Sakorn: BioThai, 2011. 
 (เดชา ศิริภทัร. "การเกษตรแบบผสมผสาน ทางออกของเกษตรกร(พิมพค์ร้ังแรก 2530)." ใน เส้นทางเกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืน. 
พิมพค์ร้ังท่ีสอง. สมุทรสาคร: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2554.) 
              . “Present and Future of Alternative Farmers in Thailand (first Published in 
1987).” In The Path of Sustainable Agriculture. 2nd ed. Samut-Sakorn: 
BioThai, 2011. 
 (_____. "ปัจจุบนัและอนาคตของระบบเกษตรกรรทางเลือกในประเทศไทย (พิมพค์ร้ังแรก 2530)." ใน เส้นทางเกษตรกรรม
ยัง่ยืน. พิมพค์ร้ังท่ีสอง. สมุทรสาคร: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2554.) 
              . “The Assembly of the Poor and Alternative Agriculture Policies (first 
Published in 1997).” In The Path of Sustainable Agriculture. 2nd ed. Samut-
Sakorn: BioThai, 2011. 
 (_____. "สมชัชาคนจนกบันโยบายเกษตรทางเลือก (พิมพค์ร้ังแรก 2540)." ใน เส้นทางเกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืน. พิมพค์ร้ังท่ีสอง. 
สมุทรสาคร: มูลนิธิชีววิถี, 2554.) 
Sittichai, Pattama, et al. A Complete Report on the Project to Compile and Analyse 
the Problems of Farmers and Sustainable Development. Bangkok: National 
Economics and Social Development Board (NESDB), 2002. 
416 
 
 (ปัฐมา สิทธิชยั และคณะ. โครงการสังเคราะห์สภาพปัญหาเกษตรกรกับการพัฒนาการเกษตรอย่างยัง่ยืน : รายงานฉบับ
สมบูรณ์. กรุงเทพฯ: สภาท่ีปรึกษาเศรษฐกิจและสงัคมแห่งชาติ, 2546.) 
Smith, L. C., U. Ramakrishan, A. Ndjaye, L. Haddad, and R. Martorell. The 
Importance of Women’s Status for Child Nutrition in Developing Countries. 
Research Report 131. Washington DC, 2002. 
Snow, A.A. and Moran, P. “Commercialization of Transgenic Plants: Potential 
Ecological Risks.” BioScience 47 (1997): 86–96. 
Songwe, V., and K. Deininger. “Foreign Investment in Agricultural Production: 
Opportunities and Challenges. Agriculture and Rural Development Notes, Issue 
45, World Bank,” 2009, quoted in De Schutter (2011), 271. 
Sopranzetti, C. “Burning Red Desires: Isan Migrants and the Politics of Desire in 
Contemporary Thailand.” South-East Asia Research 20, no. 3 (2012): 361–379, 
quoted in Nishizaki (2014), 2. 
Southern Alternative Farmer Group. “Manifesto of the Southern Alternative Farmer, 
6 June 2009.” Patlung, Thailand. 
 (ปฏิญญาชาวนาทางเลือกภาคใต ้ขอ้เสนอจากงานแลกเปล่ียนพนัธุกรรมขา้วพ้ืนบา้นของชาวนาทางเลือกภาคใตปี้ 2552 ณ 
ศูนยวิ์จยัขา้วพทัลุง อ.เมือง พทัลุง 6 มิ.ย. 2552.) 
Sriboonchitta, Songsak. Overview of Contract Farming in Thailand: Lessons 
Learned. ADBI Discussion Paper 112. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank, 2008. 
Srimanee, Yanee, and Jayant Kumar Routray. “The Fruit and Vegetable Marketing 
Chains in Thailand: Policy Impacts and Implications.” International Journal of 
Retail and Distribution Management 40, no. 9 (2012): 656–675. 
Srisaowalak, Ittipol, et al. A Study Project on the Law to Manage Local Areas. 
Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2001. 
 (อิทธิพล ศรีเสาวลกัษณ์ และคณะ. โครงการวิจัยกฏหมายเพ่ือการบริหารจัดการในท้องถ่ิน. กรุงเทพฯ: สกว. 2544.) 
              . A Project to Study Appropriate Land Rights for Communities. Bangkok: 
Thailand Research Fund, 2007. 
 (_____.โครงการศึกษาระบบสิทธิในท่ีดินของชุมชนท่ีเหมาะสม. กรุงเทพฯ: สกว. 2554.) 
Sroythong, Kookiet. “Pesticides Usage and the Spread of Brown Planthoppers 
among Rice Crops in the Central and Lower North Regions.” In An Academic 
Conference to Monitor Agricultural Chemicals 1, 16-17 June 2011, edited by 
National Committee to Plan for Food Security, 2011. 
 (กูเ้กียรติ สร้อยทอง. "สถานการณ์การใชส้ารเคมีกาํจดัแมลงและการระบาดของเพล้ียกระโดดสีนํ้าตาลในขา้วเขตภาคกลาง
และภาคเหนือตอนล่าง." ใน การประชุมวิชาการเพ่ือการเฝ้าระวงัสารเคมีทางการเกษตรคร้ังท่ี 1 วนัท่ี 16-17 มิ.ย. 2554 
417 
 
โรงแรมเซ็นจูร่ีพาร์ค กรุงเทพฯ โดย แผนงานสนบัสนุนความมัน่คงทางอาหาร แผนงานส่งเสริมการพฒันาระบบเพ่ือสุข
ภาวะของเกษตรกรและความเขม้แขง็ของชุมชนและสงัคม. กรุงเทพฯ, 2554.) 
Starr, Amory, and Jason Adams. “Anti-Globalization: The Global Fight for Local 
Autonomy.” New Political Science 25, no. 1 (March 2003): 19–42. 
Stilwell, Frank. “The Ideology of the Market: Neoclassical Economics.” In Political 
Economy: The Contest of Economic Ideas, 149–210. 3rd ed. Victoria: Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 
Suksut, Paranat, and Wanna Jarusomboon. “The Identity of Sustainable Agriculture: 
A Case Study of the Middle Class.” In Sustainable Agriculture: Cultural 
Identity, Agricultural Problems and the Identity of Thai Farmers, edited by 
Anusorn Unno, 195–236. Nonthaburi: Sustainable Agriculture Assembly 
Committee and Heinrich Bӧll Foundation, 2004. 
 (ปารณฐั สุขสุทธ์ิ และ วรรณา จารุสมบูรณ์. "อตัลกัษณ์เกษตรกรรมย ัง่ยนื: กรณีศึกษาชนชั้นกลาง."  ใน เกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืน: 
อัตลักษณ์ทางวัฒนธรรมกับปัญหาการเกษตรและอัตลักษณ์ชาวนาไทย, อนุสรณ์ อุณโณ บรรณาธิการ, 195-236. นนทบุรี: 
คณะกรรมการจดังานมหกรรมเกษตรกรรมย ัง่ยนื และ Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2547.) 
Sullivan, Paul, and Wilder Nicholson. “Is The Master Plan to Solve the 
Deforestation or Yet Another Strategy to Remove and Evict People?” 
December 12, 2014. <http://www.esaanlandreformnews.com/landwacth-
01/31/แผนแม่บทแกปั้ญหาการทาํลายป่าฯ-หรือจะเป็นยทุธการร้ือบา้น-ไล่คน-อีกคร้ัง!.htm>. 
Sustainable Agriculture Thailand (SATHAI). Interesting Knowledge about 
Commercial Garden Plants: Case Studies of Rubber and Palm Oil. Nonthaburi: 
SATHAI, 2009. 
 (มูลนิธิเกษตรกรรมย ัง่ยนื. ข้อควรรู้เก่ียวกับพืชสวนเศรษฐกิจ:กรณียางพาราและปาล์มนํา้มัน. นนทบุรี: SATHAI, 2552) 
Tarrow, S. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005, 32, quoted in Borras (2008), 97. 
Techa-artik, Sompan. Diversified Farms Save Lives and Dhamma: Self-Reliance and 
Growing Wealth in the Soil Sustainably. Bangkok: Research and Development 
Institute, Khon-Kaen University, 1995, quoted in Unno (2003), 186. 
 (สมพนัธ์ เตชะอธิก และคณะ. เกษตรผสมผสาน กู้ชีวิต กู้ธรรม พ่ึงตนเองและฝังทรัพย์ในดินอย่างยั่งยืน. กรุงเทพฯ: 
สถาบนัวิจยัและพฒันา ม.ขอนแก่น, 2538, อา้งใน Unno (2003), 186.) 
Tejapira, Kasian. “Post-Crisis Economic Impasse and Political Recovery in 
Thailand: The Resurgence of Economic Nationalism.” Critical Asian Studies 
34, no. 3 (2002): 323–356. 
              . “Toppling Thaksin.” New Left Review 39 (2006). 
418 
 
Terd-udomsap, Thammawit. The Political Economy of Thai FTAs, Research 
Document 8. Bangkok, 2008. 
 (ธรรมวิทย ์เทิดอุดมธรรม. เศรษฐศาสตร์การเมืองว่าด้วยนโยบายเขตการค้าเสรีของไทย เอกสารวิจัยหมายเลข 8. กรุงเทพฯ: 
โครงการจบักระแสองคก์ารการคา้โลก, 2551.) 
Teubal, Miguel. “Peasant Struggles for Land and Agrarian Reform in Latin 
America.” In Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural 
Transformation and the Agrarian Question, edited by A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi 
and Cristobal Kay. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Thabchumpon, Naruemon. “NGOs and Grassroots Participation in the Political 
Reform Process.” In Reforming Thai Politics, edited by Duncan McCargo. 
Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2002. 
Thadsanakulpan, Thodsapol. Farmers’ Deadly Noose: Problems and Farmer Rights 
under Contract Farming. Bangkok: Working Committee for the Fair Contract 
Farming Network, 2013. 
 (ทศพล ทรรศนกุลพนัธุ.์ บ่วงบาศพิฆาตเกษตรกร: สภาพปัญหาและการคุ้มครองสิทธิเกษตรกรในระบบเกษตรพันธะ
สัญญา. กรุงเทพฯ: คณะทาํงานเครือข่ายเพ่ือความเป็นธรรมของระบบเกษตรพนัธะสญัญา, 2556.) 
Thai Post Newspaper (ไทยโพสต)์. “Hand over to DSI to Deal with Corruption in Rice 
Mortgage Scheme. Threaten to Blacklist- Boonsong Organised the Team,” 
February 24, 2012. <http://www.thaipost.net/node/53054>. (ส่งดีเอสไอฟันทุจริตจาํนาํขา้ว
ฮ่ึมยดัแบล็กลิสต-์บุญทรงจดัทีมจบัโกง) 
              . “World Supply of Sugar Pulls down Prices of Sugar Cane. Thai Producers 
Ask the State for Help,” December 06, 2013. 
<http://www.thaipost.net/news/061213/83030>. (นํ้าตาลโลกด่ิงฉุดราคาออ้ยทรุด ชาวไร่วอนรัฐ
เร่งเพ่ิมเงินช่วยเหลือ) 
Thai Publica (online). “An Interview with Niphon Puapongsakorn, Academic Master 
on Rice, on Things He Did Not Want to See in Paddy Pledging Scheme and 
Fear of Politics Destroying the Thai Rice Market,” September 21, 2011. 
<http://thaipublica.org/2011/09/nipon-rice/>. (เปิดใจกูรูขา้ว “นิพนธ์ พวัพงศกร” ส่ิงท่ีไม่อยาก
เห็นในโครงการรับจาํนาํ หวัน่การเมืองทาํตลาดขา้วไทยล่มสลาย) 
              . “‘Phongthep Wiwattanadech’, Medical Doctor at Chiang Mai University 
Suggests ‘Contract Farming’ to Be the Cause of Haze Pollution in Northern 
Thailand . Revealed Statistics Suggesting Peaked Dangerous Chemicals - Lung 
Cancer.” Thai Publica (online), September 01, 2012. 
<http://thaipublica.org/2012/09/contract-farming-cause-burning/>. (“พงศเ์ทพ วิ
วรรธนะเดช”แพทยม์ช. ช้ี ‘คอนแทร็กฟาร์มมิง’ ตน้เหตุภาคเหนือเมืองในหมอก (ควนั) เปิดสถิติ พบสารพิษ-มะเร็งปอด พุง่
สูงสุด) 
419 
 
              . “Problems from the Collapse of Paddy Pledging Scheme,” June 28, 2013. 
<http://thaipublica.org/2013/06/nipon-rice-pledging-scheme/>. (ปัญหาจากการล่มสลาย
ของโครงการรับจาํนาํขา้ว) 
Thailand Industry News. “The Private Sector Pushes for the Birth of Retail Business 
Act, Concerns over Foreign Monopoly and Destruction of Traditional Thai 
Shops.” Thailand Industry News Online, June 16, 2008. (เอกชนจ้ีรัฐออก กม.คา้ปลีก หวัน่
ต่างชาติผกูขาดทาํโชวห่์วยไทยสูญพนัธุ)์ 
Thairath (ไทยรัฐ). “The Economics Team’s Editorial.” Thairath Newspaper, June 15, 
2009. 
              . “Rice Mills Slowly Sell Their Rice to Speculate on Prices While Exporters 
Ask the Government to Sell Its Rice Stock. Ministry of Commerce Also 
Threatens to Sell Its Own Brand of Rice,” December 14, 2009. (แฉ โรงสีชะลอขายขา้ว 
เพ่ือป่ันราคา หวงัเก็งกาํไร ดา้น ผูส่้งออก ออ้น มาร์ค โละสตอ๊กรัฐ ดา้น กระทรวงพาณิชย ์ขู่ ผลิตขา้วถุงขายเอง) 
Than Settakit Newspaper (ฐานเศรษฐกิจ). “Fat Rice Traders! 6,000/ton Profit Export to 
Malaysia,” June 12, 2008. (พอ่คา้ขา้วพุงปล้ิน! ฟันกาํไร 6พนั / ตนั ออร์เดอร์มาเลเซีย) 
              . “Close the Deal Carrefour and Big C, Strategic Take over,” November 22, 
2010. (ปิดดีลคาร์ฟร์ู บ๊ิกซี ฮุบทางยทุธศาสตร์) 
              . “Rubber Prices Adjust Upwards according to Speculations in Tokyo,” 
October 12, 2013. (ราคายางปรับสูงข้ึน ตามการเก็งกาํไรในตลาดโตเกียว) 
              . “Many Factors Cause Sugar Cane Prices to Drop,” January 05, 2014. (มีหลาย
ปัจจยัทาํราคาออ้ยร่วง!) 
Thanapornpan, Rangsan. Transient Characteristics of Thai Politics. Bangkok: 
Manager News Group, 1993. 
 (รังสรรค ์ธนะพรพนัธุ์. อนิจลักษณะของการเมืองไทย. กรุงเทพฯ: ผูจ้ดัการ, 2536, อา้งใน Laothamatat (2000), 26.) 
              . The Political Economy of the 1997 Constitution (volume 1 and 2). 
Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2003. 
 (รังสรรค ์ธนะพรพนัธุ์. เศรษฐศาสตร์รัฐธรรมนูญ: บทวิเคราะห์รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย พ.ศ. 2540 (เล่ม 1 และ 
2). กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2546.) 
Thaotawil, Natedao. “‘Barely Sufficient’: A Question Regarding Self-Reliance of 
Organic Farmers in the Age of Globalisation and Development.” Journal of 
Sociology and Anthropology 30, no. 2 (2011): 81–109. 
 (เนตรดาว เถาถวิล. ""เฮ็ดอยู ่แต่บ่พอกิน": คาํถามวา่ดว้ยการพ่ึงตนเองของชาวนาเกษตรอินทรียใ์นยคุโลกาภิวตัน์และการ
พฒันา." วารสารสังคมวิทยามานุษยวิทยา 30, no. 2 (ก.ค.-ธ.ค. 2554): 81–109.) 
420 
 
Thaotawil, Pruek. “Government Policies and Farmers’ Debts: The Failure of Small-
Scale Farmers’ Debt Moratorium.” In A Study of the Possibility of Developing a 
Welfare System for the Poor and Disadvantaged in Thailand. Bangkok: 
Chulalongkorn University, 2003. 
 (พฤกษ ์เถาถวิล. "นโยบายรัฐกบัการเป็นหน้ีสินของเกษตรกร: ความลม้เหลวของโครงการพกัหน้ีเกษตรกรรายยอ่ย." ใน 
ประภาส ป่ินตบแต่ง, สุภา ใยเมือง และ บญัชร แกว้ส่อง. การพัฒนาระบบสวัสดิการสาํหรับคนจนและคนด้อยโอกาส: กลุ่ม
เกษตรกร. กรุงเทพฯ: ศูนยศึ์กษาเศรษฐศาสตร์การเมือง คณะเศรษฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลยั, 2546.) 
              . “Self-Sufficiency Project at the Village Level: Elitist Control over the 
Rural Sector.” Fah-Diewkan Academic Magazine 6, no. 2 (2008): 70–86. 
 (_____. "ปฏิบติัการพอเพียง : การควบคุมชนบทของชนชั้นนาํ." ฟ้าเดียวกัน ปีท่ี 6, ฉ.2 (เมษายน-มิถุนายน 2551): 70-86.) 
The Nation (online). “Stress Drives Another Farmer to Suicide,” February 16, 2014. 
<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/webmobile/national/Stress-drives-another-
farmer-to-suicide-30226933.html.> 
The Pilot Project to Develop Sustainable Agriculture for Small-Scale Farmers. 
Lessons and Experiences of Sustainable Agricultural Development by Farmers 
and Community Organisations: The Case of the Pilot Project to Develop 
Sustainable Agriculture for Small-Scale Farmers. Nonthaburi: Sustainable 
Agriculture Foundation Thailand (SATHAI), 2004. 
 (โครงการนาํร่องเพ่ือพฒันาเกษตรกรรมย ัง่ยนืของเกษตรกรรายยอ่ย. บทเรียนและประสบการณ์การพัฒนาเกษตรกรรม
ยัง่ยืนโดยเกษตรกรและองค์กรชุมชน กรณีโครงการนาํร่องเพ่ือพัฒนาเกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืนของเกษตรกรรายย่อย. นนทบุรี: 
SATHAI, 2547.) 
Tomich, Dale. Slavery in the Circuit of Sugar: Martinique and the World Economy, 
1830-1848. Baltimore, M.D.: John Hopkins University Press, 1990. 
Trimakka, Triyada, and Ubol Yoo-wah. A Study on Alternative Markets in Thailand: 
Market Access of Small-Scale Farmers. Nonthaburi: SATHAI, 2008, quoted in 
Prachason et al. (2012), 185. 
 (ตรียดา ตรีมรรคา และ อุบล อยูห่วา้. รายงานการศึกษาสถานภาพและบทบาทตลาดทางเลือกในประเทศไทย: การเข้าถึง
ตลาดของเกษตรกรรายย่อย. นนทบุรี: SATHAI, 2551, อา้งใน Prachason et al. (2012), 185.) 
Turton, Andrew. Production, Power and Participation in Rural Thailand: 
Experiences of Poor Farmers’ Groups. Geneva, 1987. 
Udomrat, Suthep. “Self-Sufficiency Philosophy.” In Safety and Stability through 
Self-Sufficiency Economy, edited by Pitaya Wongkul. Bangkok: Withithat 
Institute, 2008. 
 (สุเทพ อุดมรัตน์. "ปรัชญาเศรษฐกิจพอเพียง." ใน อุ่นใจในความมั่นคง ชูธงเศรษฐกิจพอเพียง. พิทยา ว่องกุง บรรณาธิการ. 
กรุงเทพฯ: มูลนิธิวิถีทรรศน์, 2551.) 
421 
 
Unger, Danny. “Sufficiency Economy and the Bourgeois Virtues.” Asian Affairs: An 
American Review 36, no. 3 (2009): 139–156. 
Ungpakorn, Giles J. “Class Struggle between the Coloured T-Shirts in Thailand.” 
Journal of Asia Pacific Studies 1, no. 1 (2009): 76–100, quoted in Nishizaki 
(2014), 2. 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Thailand Human Development 
Report 2007: Sufficiency Economy and Human Development. Bangkok: UNDP, 
2007, quoted in Unger (2009), 143. 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food. “Access to Land and the 
Right to Food, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Olivier De Schutter, to the 65th Session of the General Assembly, UN Doc. 
A/65/281,” 2010, quoted in De Schutter (2011), 271 and McKeon (2013), 110. 
United Nations. Foreign Land Purchases for Agriculture: What Impact on 
Sustainable Development? Sustainable Development: Innovation Briefs, Issue 
8., 2010. 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Genetically Engineered Crops for 
Pest Management. Washington DC: USDA Economic Research Service, 1999. 
              . “Alternative Agriculture: Indigenous Knowledge Advances and Counter-
Attack.” In Knowledge and Politics of Natural Resources. Academic Series 
Number 43, edited by Darin Inmuan. Bangkok: Princess Maha Chakri 
Sirindhorn Anthropology centre, 2005. 
Unno, Anusorn. Farmer Rights in Thailand: Learning Process and Agricultural 
System Development. A Research under Thai Human Rights Project. Bangkok: 
Thailand Research Fund, 2002, quoted in Unno (2004), 280. 
 (อนุสรณ์ อุณโณ. สิทธิเกษตรกรในประเทศไทย: กระบวนการเรียนรู้กับการพัฒนาระบบเกษตรกรรม รายงานการวิจัย
โครงการวิจัยสิทธิมนุษยชนไทยในสถานการณ์สากล. กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2545, อา้งใน Unno (2004), 280.) 
              . Sustainable Agriculture Movement in Thailand and the Politics of 
Sustainable Agriculture Narratives. Nonthaburi: Sustainable Agriculture 
Foundation Thailand (SATHAI), 2003. 
 (_____.ขบวนการเกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืนในสังคมไทยและการเมืองของงานเขียนเกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืน. นนทบุรี: SATHAI, 2546.) 
              . Social Movements for Common Resource Rights in the Thai Society: 
Alternative Agriculture in the Context of Property Rights System. Nonthaburi: 
Alternative Agriculture Fair Committee, 2004. 
 (_____. ขบวนการสิทธิเหนือทรัพยากรส่วนรวมในสังคมไทย: เกษตรกรรมยัง่ยืนในบริบทระบบกรรมสิทธ์ิเหนือ
ทรัพยากร. นนทบุรี: คณะกรรมการจดังานมหกรรมเกษตรกรรมย ัง่ยนื, 2547.) 
422 
 
Vanloqueren, Gaetan, and Philippe V. Baret. “How Agricultural Research Systems 
Shape a Technological Regime That Develops Genetic Engineering but Locks 
Out Agroecological Innovations.” Research Policy 38 (2010): 971–83, quoted 
in Wield, Chataway, and Bolo (2010), 356. 
Walker, Andrew. “Environmental Issues in Thailand: A Rural Perspective.” In 
Thailand’s Economic Recovery: Proceedings of the National Thai Studies 
Centre Annual Thailand Update 2004, edited by Cavan Hogue. Singapore: 
ISEAS, 2006. 
              . "Beyond the Rural Betrayal: Lessons from the Thaksin Era for the Mekong 
Region". Paper presented at the International Conference on Critical Transitions 
in the Mekong Region. Chiang Mai, Thailand, 29-31 January 2007, quoted in 
Hall, Hirsch, and Li (2011), 188. 
Warr, Peter. “The Economics of Enough: Thailand’s ‘Sufficiency Economy’ 
Debate.” International Conference on “Happiness and Public Policy”, 
Organized by PPDO, Prime Minister’s Office, UNESCAP, UNCC, Bangkok, 
18-19 July 2007 (2007): 1–14. 
Wasi, Prawase. Buddhist Agriculture and Peaceful Happiness for Thai Society. 
Bangkok: Mo-chaoban, 1987, quoted in Nartsupha (2010), 159.  
 (ประเวศ วะสี. พทุธเกษตรกรรมกับศานติสุขของสังคมไทย. กรุงเทพฯ: หมอชาวบา้น, 2530, อา้งใน Nartsupha (2010), 
159) 
              . Ideas and Strategies for Equality between State, Power and Society, and 
for Wisdom. Bangkok: Komolkeemthong, 1993, quoted in Nartsupha (2010), 
159. 
 (______.แนวคิดและยทุธศาสตร์สังคมสมานุภาพและวิชชา. กรุงเทพฯ: โกมลคีมทอง, 2536, อา้งใน Nartsupha (2010), 
159.) 
Weeks, John. The Irreconcilable Inconsistencies of Neoclassical Macroeconomics. 
New York: Routledge, 2012. 
Weis, Tony. “The Accelerating Biophysical Contradictions of Industrial Capitalist 
Agriculture.” Journal of Agrarian Change 10, no. 3 (2010): 315–341. 
White, Ben, Saturnino M. Borras, Ruth Hall, Ian Scoones, and Wendy Wolford. 
“The New Enclosures: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Land Deals.” Journal 
of Peasant Studies 39, no. 3–4 (July 2012): 619–647. 
Wiboonthanakul, Sittiphol. GMOs in the International Economic Governance. 
Bangkok: WTO Watch project, Economic Department, Thammasat University, 
2004. 
 (สิทธิพล วิบูลยธ์นากุล. GMOs ภายใต้ระเบียบเศรษฐกิจระหว่างประเทศ. กรุงเทพฯ: โครงการ WTO Watch 
คณะเศรษฐศาสตร์ ม.ธรรมศาสตร์, 2547.) 
423 
 
Wield, David, Joanna Chataway, and Maurice Bolo. “Issues in the Political 
Economy of Agricultural Biotechnology” 10, no. 3 (2010): 342–366. 
Williams, G.A. “Gramsci’s Concept of Egemonia.” Journal of the History of Ideas 
21, no. 4 (1960), quoted in Miliband (1969), 162. 
Winichakul, Thongchai. “Nationalism and the Radical Intelligentsia in Thailand.” 
Third World Quarterly 29, no. 3 (April 2008): 575–591. 
Wongharnchao, Warin, Land Institute Foundation and others. A Study of Ownership 
and Usage of Land, as Well as Economic and Legal Measures to Maximise 
Land Usage. Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund, 2001. 
 (วารินทร์ วงศห์าญเชาว ์มูลนิธิสถาบนัท่ีดิน และ คณะ. โครงการการศึกษาการถือครองและใช้ประโยชน์ท่ีดินและมาตรการ
ทางเศรษฐศาสตร์และกฎหมายเพ่ือให้การใช้ประโยชน์ท่ีดินเกิดประโยชน์สูงสุด. กรุงเทพฯ: สกว., 2544.) 
World Bank, The. World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development. 
Washington DC: The World Bank, 2007. 
World Bank, UNCTAD, FAO, IFAD. Principles of Responsible Agricultural 
Investments. Washington DC: World Bank, 2010, quoted in White el al. (2012), 
636. 
Worth, Owen. “Beyond World Order and Transnational Classes. The (re)application 
of Gramsci in Global Politics.” In Gramsci and Global Politics. Hegemony and 
Resistance, edited by Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel. Oxon: 
Routledge, 2009. 
              . “Reclaiming Critical IPE from the ‘British’ School.” In Critical 
International Political Economy Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, edited by 
Stuart Shields, Ian Bruff, and Huw Macartney, 117–131. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011. 
Yaimuang, Supha, et al. Alternative Markets: Partnership for a New Society. Edited 
by Walaipon Oddoam panich and Supha Yaimuang. Bangkok: Pim-dee 
Printing, 1996, and also quoted in Unno (2003), 147. 
 (สุภา ใยเมือง, พรรณี โทวกุลพาณิชย ์และ คณะ. ตลาดทางเลือก: หุ้นส่วนเพ่ือสังคมใหม่. วลยัพร อดออมพาณิช และ สุภา 
ใยเมือง บรรณาธิการ. กรุงเทพฯ: พิมพดี์, 2539, และอา้งใน Unno (2003), 147.) 
Zurcher, Sacha. “Public Participation in Community Forest Policy in Thailand: The 
Influence of Academics as Brokers.” Geografisk Tidsskrift-Danish Journal of 
Geography 105, no. 1 (January 2005): 77–88. 
424 
 
A List of Interviews 
1. Aarat Sang-ubol, CAE, 19 December 2012, Surin. 
2. Adisorn Puangchompoo, 1 rai-100,000 baht project, 13 January 2013, 
 Nonthaburi. 
3. Amporn Suyakomol, contract farmer at Baan Romphothong, 31 October 2012, 
 Chiang Mai. 
4. Anan Ganjanapan, Sociology and Anthropology, Chiang Mai university,  
 29 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
5. Arpaporn Krueng-ngern, Tambol Mae-ta, 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
6. Arunsak Ocharos, farmer leader from Sri-saket, 6 April 2012, Bangkok. 
7. Bood-dee Piengprom, Ta-toom Natural Farmer, 22 December 2012,  Surin. 
8. Boonlue Jaroenmee, Klongyong Co-operative, 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom. 
9. Boonsong Martkhao, Kammad Sustainable Agriculture group, 25 December     
       2012, Yasothon. 
10. Boonyuen Arj-arsa, Nam-oom Sustainable Agriculture Social Enterprise,  
 23 December 2012, Yasothon. 
11. Chanuan Rattanawaraha, Agricultural Advisor Office, Department of 
 Agriculture, 17 January 2013, Nonthaburi. 
12. Chomchuan Boonrahong, lecturer at Mae-Jo University, 3 November 2012, 
 Chiang Mai. 
13. Chuleerat Jaroenpon, Faculty of Social Innovation, Rangsit University,  
 4 October 2012, Pathum Thani. 
425 
 
14. Chutima, Muangman, Naso producer rice mill, 25 December 2012, Yasothon. 
15. Decha Siripat Khao Kwan Foundation, 14 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
16. Direk Kong-Ngern, Baan Pong, 30 September 2012 and 31 October 2012, 
 Nonthaburi and Chiang Mai. 
17. Jai Kiti, Baan Raidong/Mae-Aow, 30 October 2012, Lamphun.  
18. Janda Inpan, Baan Tanon Organic Herb and Vegetable Processing Group,  
 20 December 2012, Surin. 
19. Jirapan Meesap, Thamma-ruamjai network, 23 December 2012, Yasothon. 
20. Kamnueng Maneebool, Nam-oom Sustainable Agriculture Social Enterprise,  
 23 December 2012, Yasothon. 
21. Kampol Kongsathan, contract farmer at Baan Romphothong, 31 October 2012, 
 Chiang Mai. 
22. Kankamkla Pilanoi, Thamma-ruamjai Moral Rice Network, 23 December 2012, 
 Yasothon. 
23. Kanoksak Duangkaewruen, Subdistrict Administrative Organisation, Tambol 
 Mae-ta, 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
24. Kanya Onsri, Taptai community, Tambol Tamor, 22 December 2012, Surin. 
25. Kasemsak Sanpoch, former Surin Governor, 21 December 2012, Surin. 
26. Kiatsak Chatdee, ISAC, 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
27. Kittithanet Rangkaworaset, 1 rai-100,000 baht project, 13 January 2013, 
 Nonthaburi. 
28. Long Pechsood, Bantad Mountain group (Trang), 1 October 2012, Bangkok. 
29. Lun Saneh-ha, Naso organic farmer, 25 December 2012, Yasothon. 
426 
 
30. Man Samsri, Naso Rice Farmer, 25 December 2012, Yasothon. 
31. Manas Jittanadilokkul, Multiple Paths of Sustainable Community Project in the 
 North, 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
32. Mitr Boontawee, Tamor Natural Farmer, 20 December 2012, Surin. 
33. Montri Bualoi, Baan Pong, 31 October 2012, Chiang Mai. 
34. Nanta Haitook, Baan Tanon Organic Herb and Vegetable Processing Group,  
 20 December 2012, Surin. 
35. Nerm Nooboon,  Baan Saikling/Tachang group, Patlung, 1 October 2012, 
 Bangkok. 
36. Nichai Taipanich, Agricultural Advisor Office, Department of Agriculture,  
 17 January 2013, Nonthaburi. 
37. Nikhom Pechpa, Thamma-ruamjai Moral Rice Network, 23 December 2013, 
 Yasothon. 
38. Nop Mangkornmai, Baan Raidong, 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
39. Oonjai Akaruan, Baan Raidong, 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
40. Pachoen Choosang, Bantad mountain group (Trang), 1 October 2012, Bangkok. 
41. Paisit Panichkul, law lecturer at Chiang Mai University, 7 November 2012, 
 Chiang Mai. 
42. Pakphum Inpan, Tamor Natural Farmer, 20 December 2012, Surin. 
43. Pat Apaimool, Tambol Mae-ta, 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
44. Pattarawan Jansiri, Kamkhuenkaew hospital, 24 December 2012, Yasothon. 
45. Pimlada Pheekaew, contract farmer at Baan Romphothong, 31 October 2012, 
 Chiang Mai. 
427 
 
46. Pitak Saengsin, BAAC Chiang Mai branch, 2 November 2012  Chiang Mai. 
47. Pornpilai Lertwicha, researcher on Thai rural communities, skype interview 17 
 October 2012. 
48. Praderm Damrong-jaroen, former Farmer Network Party, phone interview on 17 
 October 2012. 
49. Prapart Pintoptang, Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, 16 October 
 2012, Nonthaburi. 
50. Prapat Panyachatrak, National Farmer Council, 29 January 2013, Bangkok. 
51. Pratueng Narintarangkul Na Ayuthya, Farmers' Reconstruction and 
 Development Fund (Chiang Mai branch), 2 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
52. Prayong Doklamyai, Northern Peasants Federation, 30 September 2012, 
 Nonthaburi and 1 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
53. Promma Suphatto, a monk at Thamma-ruamjai forest temple, Ampur Pa-tiew, 
 Yasothon, 23 December 2012, Yasothon. 
54. Rachata Rangsiri, Tambol Mae-faeg, Chiang Mai, 1 October 2012, Bangkok. 
55. Rangsan Sansongkwae, Baan Raidong, 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
56. Rungroj Kajadroka, Tamor Natural Farmer, 20 December 2012, Surin. 
57. Samrach Thong-iam, Tamor Natural Farmer, 20 December 2012, Surin. 
58. Samrit Boonsuk, CAE,19 December 2012, Surin. 
59. Samrueng Roopsuay, farmer leader from Sri-saket, 6 April 2012, Bangkok. 
60. Sangwal Kantham, Ban Mae-Aow, 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
61. Sarawut Wongnikorn, Northern Peasants Federation, 30 October 2012,  
 Chiang Mai. 
 
428 
 
62. Sawitta Teeronwattanakul, Northern Peasants Federation, 29 October 2012, 
 Chiang Mai. 
63. Shoti Saiyuenyong, Klongyong Co-operative, 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom. 
64. Sittiporn Bangkaew, Director of the Office of Commercial Affairs in Surin,  
 21 December 2012, Surin. 
65. Som Sadomsuk, Tamor Natural Farmer, 20 December 2012, Surin. 
66. Somchai Wisartpong, Organic Agriculture and Development Group, Department 
 of Agricultural Extension, phone interview on 21 January 2013. 
67. Somkiat Jai-ngarm, Northern Peasants Federation, 30 October 2012,  
 Chiang Mai. 
68. Sompoi Jansang, Rice Fund Surin Organic Agriculture Co-operative Ltd.,  
 19 December 2012, Surin. 
69. Somwang Chomchuen, Bak-rua producer rice mill, 24 December 2012, 
 Yasothon. 
70. Suchit Nokham, Maeping Organic Limited Partnership Company,  
 2 November 2012, Chiang Mai. 
71. Sukaew Fungfoo, Baan Pae-tai, 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
72. Supha Yaimuang, SATHAI, 3 October 2012, Nonthaburi. 
73. Suwanna Langnamsank, Health Society Company Limited (Lemon farm 
 supermarket), 11 February 2013, Bangkok. 
74. Suwonasart Konbua, Green Net Co-operative officer, 24 December 2012, 
 Yasothon. 
429 
 
75. Thamma Sangkalee, Ta-toom Natural Farmer, 22 December 2012, Surin. 
76. Thanachote Jaikla, Vice Director of the Local Administration Office in Tambol 
 Tamor, Surin, 20 December 2012, Surin. 
77. Thaspong Tonklang, Director of the Local Administration Office in Tambol 
 Tamor, Surin, 20 December 2012. 
78. Ubol Yoowah, NGO activist, 22 December 2012, Yasothon. 
79. Uthai Juansang, Bak-rua organic farmer, 24 December 2012, Yasothon. 
80. Vitoon Panyakul, Green Net Co-operative, 23 January 2013, Bangkok. 
81. Wacharin Ouprajong, Baan Huafai, Chiang Mai, 30 September 2012,  
 Nonthaburi. 
82. Wantana Iamsuwan, Klongyong Co-operative, 10 October 2012, Nakhonpratom. 
83. Weerachai Nakwibulwong, ALRO, 14 February 2013, Bangkok. 
84. Wibulwan Wannamolee, Senior Officer at the Office of Agricultural Standards 
 and Accredition, 31 January 2013, Nonthaburi. 
85. Wichai (undisclosed surname), Tambol Aynalai, Naan, 1 October 2012, 
 Bangkok. 
86. Wilaiwan Konka, Baan Pae-tai, 30 October 2012, Lamphun. 
87. Witoon Lienchamroon, BioThai Foundation, 5 April 2012, Nonthaburi. 
 
 
 
 
430 
 
Email correspondents 
1. Akinee Jiwattanapaiboon, Xondur Thai Organic Food, 21 February 2013. 
2. Archinya Ourapeepattanapong, Chiangmai Organic and Spa, 16 January 2013. 
3. Kriengsak Suwantharadol, Syngenta (Thailand), 14 March 2013. 
4. Paladisai Jinapak, All Be One Thailand, 18 January 2013. 
5. Pisit Werawaitaya, Earth Born Company, 8 January 2013. 
6. Piyanat Na-Nakhon, Southeast Asia Organic Company, 16 January 2013. 
7. Songpun Kuldilokrat, Managing Director of Arysta LifeScience, 21 January 2013. 
